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Chapter I: Introduction 
In October, 2008, thirteen universities announced the launch of HathiTrust, described at 
the time as a shared digital repository consisting of over two million volumes. 1   In the 
intervening eight years, HathiTrust has become much more than a safe, secure place to store 
digital materials.  HathiTrust is a now a partnership of more than one hundred academic and 
research institutions united around the goal of contributing to the common good by collecting, 
organizing, preserving, communicating, and sharing the record of human knowledge.2  It is a 
digital library with a fully indexed and searchable catalog; members of the general public can 
read and download public domain works for HathiTrust’s website, hathitrust.org, and persons 
with certified print disabilities can get full access to HathiTrust’s entire corpus; HathiTrust is “by, 
of, and for libraries and librarians.”3  HathiTrust is a research center offering computational 
access for text mining and other forms of non-consumptive research by nonprofit and 
educational researchers.  HathiTrust is an organization with an executive director, committees 
and advisory boards, employees, bylaws, and a membership with voting rights.  Notwithstanding 
he collective nature of the organization, HathiTrust is part of a single institution, offered as a 
service of the University of Michigan.  In addition, HathiTrust (along with several of its member 
institutions and their representatives) was a defendant in a major copyright infringement lawsuit.  
As of January, 2016, HathiTrust contained nearly fourteen million volumes, six hundred twenty-
two terabytes of information, thirty-nine percent of which is known to be in the public domain, 
which leaves the remaining sixty-one percent subject to copyright.4  But the way HathiTrust
                                                 
1 HathiTrust Press Release, October 13, 2008, “Launch of HathiTrust – October 13, 2008,” available at 
http://www.hathitrust.org/press_10-13-2008.  HathiTrust was launched jointly by the twelve-university consortium 
known as the Committee on Institutional Cooperation (“CIC”) and the eleven university libraries of the University 
of California system (the UC’s ten research university libraries plus the system-wide California Digital Library 
(“CDL”).  The CIC institutions circa 2008 included:  University of Illinois at Chicago; University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign; Indiana University; University of Iowa; University of Michigan; Michigan State University; 
University of Minnesota; Northwestern University; Ohio State University; Pennsylvania State University; Purdue 
University; University of Wisconsin-Madison.   
2 HathiTrust, “Mission and Goals,” available at https://www.hathitrust.org/mission_goals  
3 Interview with an architect of HathiTrust. 
4 See HathiTrust Digital Library Statistics and Visualizations at http://www.hathitrust.org/statistics_visualizations  
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looks now does not reveal all that much about how or why it turned out that way.  This research 
will describe and explain how and why HathiTrust came to be, and came to become this 
HathiTrust.   
This research will trace the emergence and evolution of HathiTrust as part of a larger and 
more complex story about processes of sociotechnical transformation.  Scholars have long-
recognized the entangled and mutually constitutive relationships among technology and social 
practice. 5   Transformation in this context is characteristically dynamic, non-linear, multi-
directional, and guided by careful deliberation and planning as well as luck and accident. 6  
Technologies open new spaces for social practice and engagement and, through processes of 
invention, use, modification, and regulation are also themselves socially constructed.7  The story 
of HathiTrust teaches important lessons about the intersections of technology and social practice, 
particularly as it relates to organizational and institutional behavior. 
This work aims to contribute to understandings of sociotechnical transformation by 
adding an additional important layer of inquiry, namely how emerging technologies, social 
practices, and law and policy interact and co-evolve.  Transformation is a concept of growing 
concern in the world of copyright.  Indeed, over the last twenty years, transformation has become 
so central to fair use determinations that one would be hard-pressed to find a fair use discussion 
that didn’t address, at length, questions around transformation.  Transformation in the copyright 
context is related to the broader notions of sociotechnical transformation mentioned above, but it 
is also distinct from those concepts.  In copyright law, transformation is made quantifiable 
through the application of elements, factors, comparisons, analogies and tests.  Part of this 
research, therefore, will be to explore and import transformation in the copyright context into 
these broader conceptions of sociotechnical transformation. 
                                                 
5 See e.g. Kling, R. (Ed.). (1996). Computerization and controversy: value conflicts and social choices. Morgan 
Kaufmann; Kling, R. (1991). Computerization and social transformations. Science, Technology & Human Values, 
16(3), 342-367; Bijker, W. E., Hughes, T. P., Pinch, T., & Douglas, D. G. (2012). The social construction of 
technological systems: New directions in the sociology and history of technology. MIT press;  
6 See e.g. Jackson, S. J., Gillespie, T., & Payette, S. (2014, February). The policy knot: Re-integrating policy, 
practice and design in Cscw studies of social computing. In Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer 
supported cooperative work & social computing (pp. 588-602). ACM. 
7 See e.g. Ackerman, M. S. (2000). The intellectual challenge of CSCW: the gap between social requirements and 
technical feasibility. Human-computer interaction, 15(2), 179-203. 
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Ways of Understanding Sociotechnical Transformation 
Developments in information technology are fundamentally altering the essential 
mechanisms by which information and knowledge are created, organized, shared, and disputed.  
The advent of the Internet, the creation of technical protocols and standards, and improvements 
in digitization combine to enable content to be moved rapidly, at relatively low cost, and without 
significant degradation.  Today, anyone with an Internet connection can gain tremendous access 
to the world’s shared cultural record, a feat unfathomable twenty years ago.  And regardless of 
the forms in which these works are fixed, whether they are literary, audio(-visual), or pictorial, 
graphical, or sculptural,8 opportunities to participate in, interact with, modify, build upon, and 
transform the works abound.       
This is not to suggest, however, that advances in information and communication 
technologies have proceeded lock-step with positive sociotechnical transformations.  While the 
retrospective conversion of twenty million analog works was unquestionably impressive as a 
technical matter, and as a feat of engineering throughput, the HathiTrust story (and related 
Google Books story which is discussed in part in this work) demonstrates that sociotechnical 
transformation involves much more than stewarding content from one format or technical 
environment to another.  The technological aspects of digitization are perhaps the simplest, least 
controversial evidence of transformation in the context of mass digitization.  Mass digitization 
spurred other complex, complicated, and often murkier transitions and reconfigurations with 
respect to the existing copyright regime and the traditions and practices of knowledge and 
memory institutions (universities and libraries).  Changes in information and communication 
technologies have significantly expanded the range of means available for engaging with cultural 
and intellectual works, however legal and social institutions have tended to lag behind in terms 
of legitimating many of those means.  This tension, and its relationships to sociotechnical 
transformation, is the chief concern of this thesis. 
The analytic approach adopted in this research takes as its jumping off point the 
observation that a central and recurring theme in research on sociotechnical transformation is the 
notion that technological change puts existing institutions — legal, political, and/or social — 
under significant strain.  The strain can be characterized in a number of ways but a fair 
generalization might be to say that technological change often disrupts or disturbs the relative 
                                                 
8 17 U.S.C. §102(a) 
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equilibria between innovation and control.  For example, new technologies are often 
characterized as dynamic, disruptive, and/or destructive forces in comparison to the relatively 
conservative, slow-moving, self-preserving forms adopted by many institutions.              
This theme appears in a number of works notable for their explorations of sociotechnical 
transformation.  Elizabeth Eisenstein’s work on the emergence and effects of the printing press 
highlighted the social, political, religious, and legal tensions raised by the transition from 
manuscript culture to print culture.9  Joanne Yates explored how changes in information and 
communication technologies shape and are shaped by organizational and managerial contexts in 
the first part of the twentieth century, leading to a rise in the mechanization of work processes.10  
Richard John offered a detailed historical account of the complex ebbs and flows — particularly 
among innovation, federal policymaking, and social response and adoption — of 
telecommunications technology development in the United States.11   Thomas Park Hughes’ 
research on the development of electrical systems couples historical observations with new 
frameworks and analytic tools for describing and explaining what he calls the “social 
construction” of technology.12  A common thread linking these relatively disparate moments in 
the history of technology is the centrality of disequilibrium and strain in processes of 
sociotechnical transformation.  
A number of theories and analytic approaches have developed for explaining, describing, 
and understanding the meanings of disequilibrium and strain in processes of sociotechnical 
transformation. For example, the so-called Chicago School of sociologists recognized nearly a 
century ago that rapid and significant changes in technology can lead to social disorganization as 
they undermine the web of normative controls (expectations, rules, laws, etc.) that typically 
govern our choices and interactions.13  In other words, significant changes in technology alter the 
possibility space of our activities and alter the context of decision-making.   
In addition, in his structural strain theory, sociologist Robert K. Merton argued that a 
mismatch or imbalance in society between culturally accepted goals and the availability of 
                                                 
9 Eisenstein, E. L. (2005). The printing revolution in early modern Europe: Cambridge University Press. 
10 Yates (1993) Control Through Communication: The Rise of System in American Management. 
11 Richard John, Network Nation 
12 Hughes, T. P. (1993). Networks of power: electrification in Western society, 1880-1930: JHU Press. Hughes, T. P. 
(1987). The evolution of large technological systems. The social construction of technological systems: New 
directions in the sociology and history of technology, 51-82. 
13 Thomas, W. I., & Znaniecki, F. (1918). The Polish peasant in Europe and America: Monograph of an immigrant 
group (Vol. 2). University of Chicago Press. 
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legitimate means to accomplish those goals can push people (and communities) toward deviance, 
i.e. rules, norms, laws no longer serve as effective restraints on behavior because of the strain 
caused by this disequilibrium.  Merton’s research was not particularly concerned with the role of 
technological change or intellectual property laws14 but, when considered in conjunction with the 
previously discussed work and approaches, it seems plausible that technological change has 
implications for both the ways societies generate and internalize broad social or cultural goals 
and, perhaps more importantly, for the means society creates and/or legitimates for 
accomplishing those goals.   
For purposes of clarity, we can break Merton’s theory into two parts.  The first part we 
can call the “end” which describes the generation and acceptance of broad social goals.  Applied 
to the topic of this thesis, we can readily identify a widely accepted goal as being the promotion 
of the progress of society through the creation, communication, and use of intellectual and 
cultural works.  In the United States, this goal is uncontroversial and clearly articulated in the 
U.S. Constitution which gives Congress the power to “promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts ….”15  The second part of Merton’s framework deals with the “means” which are the 
ways (paths, tools, opportunities, etc.) society makes available and/or deems legitimate for 
accomplishing a given end.  The Constitution gives clues here as well, saying that we can 
accomplish the goal “by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries ….”  Those means are, of course, further articulated 
in the Copyright Act (and the Patent Act, although that is beyond the scope of this thesis).  Taken 
in combination, a hypothesis begins to emerge suggesting that interactions between existing legal 
frameworks, emerging technologies, and social practices around the creation, dissemination, and 
use of cultural works results in a disequilibrium or imbalance between the goals of copyright and 
the availability of legitimate means for accomplishing those goals. 
This hypothesis seems to be somewhat borne out in the existing debates amongst 
rightsholders, content and media industries, educational institutions, and a variety of advocacy 
groups concerning networked digital technologies and mass digitization.  The following brief 
                                                 
14 A chief focus of Merton’s work was on the often socio-political structured inequalities within society.  His 
perspective was informed by, and perhaps can be understood as a response to, trends of urbanization, immigration, 
industrialization, and increased mechanization of aspects of human activity and interaction (such as work) of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  While technological change played a role in this, it was not a primary 
focus of Merton’s work.  In addition, as far as I can tell, his work did not reference intellectual property law at all. 
15 U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.   
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discussion highlights four contrasting perspectives on the relationship between existing laws and 
emerging technology and provides a back-of-the-napkin sketch of the disequilibrium in the 
copyright world.  The following discussion illustrates how different, sometimes oppositional, 
approaches can simultaneously resonate with the facts surrounding the mass digitization of 
libraries’ in-copyright collections. 
The Copyright Disequilibrium  
Discourse around copyright law and technological change is rich, diverse, and nuanced.  
It also tends to be fairly strident16 and characterized by rhetorical excess.17 I will therefore not 
attempt to summarize or distill the full extent of copyright debates around emerging technologies 
here.  Rather, I will provide a simplified snapshot of the basic perspective of some of the key 
stakeholders in the mass digitization context. 
The first perspective, held by some rightsholders, is that existing copyright laws are 
under-restrictive with respect to technological change.  In the context of mass digitization, the 
Authors Guild and some proprietary publishers have been proponents of this viewpoint.18  In 
addition, some individual authors have been outspoken about their desire to see copyright laws 
strengthened as a way of protecting and preserving their intellectual property and incentivizing 
their continued productivity.  Margaret Atwood, for example, a prolific and highly esteemed 
Canadian author, has expressed public skepticism and criticism about digitization.  Her position 
is neatly captured in a diptych (Fig.1) created by Atwood and presented at a 2011 conference.19  
In addition to publicly presenting this (and other) illustrations, Atwood emailed the drawing to 
the chief librarian of a major academic research library pursuant to some private discussions 
regarding her concerns about the library’s digitization practices and policies. 
 
                                                 
16 Samuelson, P. (2010). Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform, The. 25 Berkeley Tech. LJ 1175. 
17 Patry, W. (2009). Moral panics and the copyright wars: Oxford University Press. 
18 See e.g. The Authors Guild (2015). “The Authors Guild’s Top Legislative Priorities – 2015,” available at 
https://www.authorsguild.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/2015-AG-Top-Legislative-Priorities.3.23.15.pdf  
19 O’Reilly Media, Tools of Change for Publishing, Feb. 14-16, 2011.  New York, NY.  Information regarding 
Atwood’s presentation, The Publishing Pie: An Author’s View, is available at 
http://www.toccon.com/toc2011/public/schedule/detail/17569, last visited 6/24/15.   
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Figure 1.  Margaret Atwood drawing 
 
In this diptych, Atwood compares the ecological interconnectedness of the natural world 
with that of the literary world.  Like the moose (another Canadian national treasure), authors are 
a “primary source” of life-sustaining energy for numerous others including educational 
institutions (colleges, universities, and other schools), libraries and librarians, and various others 
integrated in publication and distribution chains.   In Atwood’s view, “Everything else in the 
world o’publishing [sic] depends on them.”20  In both images, the primary source is depicted as 
dead although, in her presentation, Atwood is quick to recognize that unlike the moose, authors 
need not perish in order to sustain others on the food chain although, she notes, many dead 
authors been “very lucrative,” generating lots of money for lots of people.21  Under this view, 
which some authors share, digitization (and electronic distribution more generally) jeopardizes 
authors’ abilities to fully control the exploitation of their creative works, thus potentially 
undermining their livelihoods and, by extension, the livelihoods of others within the literary 
ecosystem. 
A second, contrasting perspective held by others including authors22, technologists23, and 
public interest advocates24 is that existing copyright laws may be over-restrictive with respect to 
                                                 
20 Atwood, M. (2011). The Publishing Pie: An Author’s View, presentation at O’Reilly Media Tools of Change for 
Publishing conference, Fed. 15, 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-6iMBf6Ddjk at minute 9:25-9:35. 
21 Atwood, M. (2011). The Publishing Pie: An Author’s View, presentation at O’Reilly Media Tools of Change for 
Publishing conference, Fed. 15, 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-6iMBf6Ddjk at minute 9:35 – 9:42. 
22 See, e.g. PLOS (Public Library of Science), a nonprofit organization of scientists committed to making the 
world’s scientific and medical literature freely accessible to scientists and to the public, 
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emerging technologies.  Proponents of this view tend to object to a maximalist or rightsholder-
centered perspective of the law, focusing instead on the broader public policy-based goals of 
copyright.  For example, those who advocate this perspective may be quick to point out the fact 
that readers are notably absent from Atwood’s illustration even though readers, and the public 
more generally, are a core to copyright law.  This view encourages courts and lawmakers to 
exercise caution in allowing rightsholders to invoke copyright laws as mechanism for preserving 
their dying business models particularly given the combinatorial and participatory nature of 
innovation and creativity across intellectual and cultural domains.  The incumbent beneficiaries 
of an ailing regime, such as the traditional proprietary publishing industry, ought not to be able to 
rely on a hidebound regime that stifles rather than promotes technological innovation, creativity, 
and generativity.  As technologist and open access advocate Brewster Kahle said: “Copyright 
laws are intended to promote the progress of science and useful arts for the good of society as a 
whole — let’s let technology help us do that!”25 
A third viewpoint might be generalized as a law and economics perspective.  This 
viewpoint is less concerned with possible normative consequences of copyright law’s means-end 
imbalance than the prior two viewpoints.  Under this perspective, intellectual property laws are 
essentially trade regulations and therefore the sorts of harm generated by copyright disequilibria 
are characterized in terms of a copyright system that is inefficient, rife with uncertainty, and is 
prone to slack.26  The law and economics perspective originated in the work of Ronald Coase and 
Gary Becker, and has been adopted by several distinguished jurists including Seventh Circuit 
judges Frank Easterbrook and Richard Posner and noteworthy intellectual property law scholars 
                                                                                                                                                             
https://www.plos.org/about/plos/core-principles/ .  See also the Authors Alliance, “promoting the public good by 
supporting authors who write to be read,” at http://www.authorsalliance.org/  
23 See, e.g. Brewster Kahle and the Internet Archive, focused on “providing Universal Access to All Knowledge,” at 
https://archive.org/about/bios.php;  See, e.g. Richard Stallman, originator of the “copyleft” concept and founder of 
the Free Software Foundation and GNU Project, works to “encourage free software to spread, replacing proprietary 
software that forbids cooperation, and thus make our society better,” Copyright and Community speech delivered at 
Wikimania conference, Aug. 4-8, 2005, Frankfurt, Germany.  
24 See, e.g. Creative Commons, a nonprofit organization that provides free legal tools for enabling the “sharing and 
use of creativity and knowledge,” http://creativecommons.org/about.  
25 Interview with Brewster Kahle of the Internet Archive. 
26 Coase, R. H. (1937). The nature of the firm. economica, 4(16), 386-405; 
Coase, R. H. (2012). The firm, the market, and the law. University of Chicago press; Becker, G. S. (2009). Human 
capital: A theoretical and empirical analysis, with special reference to education. University of Chicago Press. 
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including William Landes 27  and Wendy Gordon 28 .  Gordon’s work in particular may be 
illustrative in the context of this research.  She explores the potential of developing what she 
calls an “ideal” model of copyright law, one that balances rightsholders’ incentives and interests 
in controlling and exploiting their works with justified personal liberties of free speech and fair 
use and the concept of “harm”.29   Fair use determinations, Gordon argued, should include 
consideration of whether or not a market failure has occurred; when a particular desired use is 
not available for purchase on the market, and the use would serve the public interest while not 
substantially impairing the rightsholder’s incentives, the use should be permitted as a fair use.30   
The final viewpoint I will mention is shared by those whose chief concern is the rule of 
law.  On the surface, this perspective does not privilege either rightsholders or users; it avoids 
much of the rhetoric characteristic of the first two viewpoints discussed.  In addition, while it 
shares the law and economics concern with the efficiency of the copyright system, values 
including credibility, legitimacy, relevance, and functionality share equal footing under the rule 
of law perspective.  Perhaps not surprisingly, the current Register of Copyrights, Maria Pallante, 
tends to advocate for this perspective.  In an article entitled “The Next Great Copyright Act,” 
Pallante observed that significant changes in technology have raised fundamental questions 
around the continuing functionality, credibility, and relevance of the existing regime.31  She 
observed that “the copyright world which once had predictable, even pristine demarcations, has 
morphed dramatically” 32  as a result of recent disruptive developments in information and 
communication technologies, and on that basis she and others have advocated for comprehensive 
copyright reforms to protect rightsholders, industries, the public and, perhaps most importantly, 
the rule of law itself. 
                                                 
27 See, e.g. Landes, W. M., & Posner, R. A. (1989). An economic analysis of copyright law. The Journal of Legal 
Studies, 325-363.  See, e.g. Landes, W. M., Posner, R. A., & Landes, W. M. (2009). The economic structure of 
intellectual property law: Harvard University Press. 
28 See, e.g. Gordon, W. J. (1982). Fair use as market failure: a structural and economic analysis of the" Betamax" 
case and its predecessors. Columbia Law Review, 1600-1657.  See, e.g. Gordon, W. J. (1991). Asymmetric Market 
Failure and Prisoner's Dilemma in Intellectual Property. U. Dayton L. Rev., 17, 853.  See, e.g. Gordon, W. J. (1997). 
Intellectual property as price discrimination: Implications for contract. Chi.-Kent L. Rev., 73, 1367. 
29 See, e.g. Gordon, W. J. (2008). Harmless Use: Gleaning from Fields of Copyrighted Works. Fordham L. Rev., 77, 
2411.  See, e.g. Gordon, W. J. (2002). Excuse and justification in the law of fair use: transaction costs have always 
been part of the story. J. Copyright Soc'y USA, 50, 149. 
30 Gordon, W. J. (1982). Fair use as market failure: a structural and economic analysis of the" Betamax" case and its 
predecessors. Columbia Law Review, 1600-1657.   
31 Pallante, M. A. (2012). Next Great Copyright Act, The. Colum. JL & Arts, 36, 315. 
32 Pallante, M. A. (2012). Next Great Copyright Act, The. Colum. JL & Arts, 36, at 339. 
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The four perspectives just discussed resonate, to varying degrees, with the stakeholders in 
the mass digitization project.  The perspectives also highlight tensions in discourse around 
copyright and technological change, highlighting aspects of disequilibrium or mismatch between 
copyright’s goals, its means, and emerging social practices.  A common thematic thread 
connecting these otherwise oppositional perspectives is what some have called “a growing sense 
of disarray and disjuncture”33 among existing legal regimes and institutions, social practices and 
norms, and the new and exciting, but often largely unproven, potentials of emerging 
technologies.    
Innovative Deviance 
Circling back to Merton’s structural strain theory of deviance, the copyright 
disequilibrium can be understood within Merton’s framework as evidence of a mismatch or 
imbalance between a culturally accepted goal (in this case the overriding goals of copyright law) 
and the availability of legitimate means to accomplish the goal (which are perceived differently 
by different stakeholders but nevertheless reflect a general consensus that copyright laws need 
reformation).  Under Merton’s framework, the consequence of this imbalance is a social strain or 
tension among copyright law and emerging technologies that effectively pushes people toward 
deviance — behavior that is illegitimate, unorthodox, and/or infringing.  Indeed, much of the 
discourse around copyright and technological change devolves fairly quickly into discussions of 
enforcement, the idea being that if we only have better tools for deterring and punishing 
unauthorized uses of copyrighted works, that would solve most of the problem.  As we continue 
with Merton’s theory, we can see that the emphasis on enforcement provides an illusory remedy.  
Merton contends that illegitimate, unorthodox, and/or infringing behavior is the natural 
outflow the structural strain caused by a means-end imbalance in society and this “deviance” will 
follow one of four possible paths: innovation, ritualism, retreatism, and rebellion (see Fig. 2). 
    
                                                 
33 Edwards, P. N., Jackson, S. J., Chalmers, M. K., Bowker, G. C., Borgman, C. L., Ribes, D., ... & Calvert, S. 
(2013). Knowledge infrastructures: Intellectual frameworks and research challenges. 
p. 19. 
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Figure 2.  Robert K. Merton’s Typology of Deviance 
 
While Merton’s typology will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter III, I take this 
opportunity to highlight one of the four paths, innovative deviance, as the path of primary 
interest in this research.  Innovative deviance can be understood as the “creative use of 
illegitimate means to obtain valued legitimate ends” and “the rejection of institutional practices 
but the retention of cultural goals.”34 In addition, Merton describes innovative deviance as “a 
normal outgrowth of having accepted cultural goals without having been provided with the 
opportunity to legitimately achieve those goals.”35   
Note that of the four possible paths of deviance, innovative deviance is the only one that 
promotes or sustains the culturally accepted goal; the other three paths reject it.  This is 
significant because, if we accept the premise that technological change produces social strains 
that lead inexorably to increased levels of deviance (or social disorganization), then rather than 
devoting our efforts to enhanced enforcement (through deterrence or punishment of the 
deviance), we might want to step back and distinguish between good deviance — i.e. 
infringement that is utilitarian, socially productive, and/or promotes the overriding goals of 
                                                 
34 Merton, R. K. (1938). Social structure and anomie. American sociological review, 3(5), 672-682; Merton, R. K. 
(1968). Social theory and social structure. Simon and Schuster. 
35 Merton, R. K. (1938). Social structure and anomie. American sociological review, 3(5), 672-682; Merton, R. K. 
(1968). Social theory and social structure. Simon and Schuster. 
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copyright with relatively little harm to rightsholders — from bad deviance — i.e. infringement or 
other behaviors that do not promote the overriding goals of copyright.  
Merton’s structural strain theory, and his concept of innovative deviance in particular, 
provides the basic scaffolding of the analytic framework for this thesis.  However, Merton’s 
theory does not, on its own, enable us to fully describe or explain the complex processes of 
sociotechnical transformation embodied in exemplars like the HathiTrust case.  Additional 
theories and approaches will be pulled in to help flesh out and extend Merton’s contribution. 
Continuing with the top-down approach of Merton’s structural strain theory, this thesis 
will explore meaningful synergies with the work of other theorists.  For example, Thomas Parke 
Hughes’ concept of a “reverse salient” introduces the observation that processes of 
sociotechnical transformation may be slowed down or impeded by sticking points. 36  While 
Hughes’ research was primarily concerned with technological reverse salients, the concept might 
be applied more broadly to include things like laws, policies, and organizational or institutional 
traditions that seem to counteract forward progression.  This perspective adds an additional, 
potentially useful point of analytic departure to Merton’s focus on a means-end disequilibrium. 
In addition, while Merton’s theory offers clues about the sources of strain and deviance, it 
does not offer much guidance on how strain might be alleviated and balance restored in the 
system.  Joseph Schumpeter’s theory of creative destruction,37 Albert Hirschman’s exit, voice, 
and loyalty framework, Manuel Castell’s work on informationalism and the networked society,38 
and Clay Christensen’s work on disruptive innovation39 could provide some important clues and 
perspectives on this question.   
Perhaps the biggest short-coming of Merton’s theory with respect to understanding the 
processes of sociotechnical transformation is that, in emphasizing the structural aspects of the 
problem, it does not give adequate attention or consideration to the dispersed, modest, more 
granular and nuanced aspects of the problem that percolate from the bottom up.  For example, 
                                                 
36 Hughes, T. P. (1993). Networks of power: electrification in Western society, 1880-1930. JHU Press; Bijker, W. E., 
Hughes, T. P., Pinch, T., & Douglas, D. G. (2012). The social construction of technological systems: New directions 
in the sociology and history of technology. MIT press. 
37 Schumpeter, J. (1942). Creative destruction. Capitalism, socialism and democracy, 82-5. 
38 Castells, M. (2011). The rise of the network society: The information age: Economy, society, and culture (Vol. 1): 
John Wiley & Sons; Castells, M. (2011). The power of identity: The information age: Economy, society, and culture 
(Vol. 2): John Wiley & Sons. Castells, M. (2010). End of Millennium: The Information Age: Economy, Society, and 
Culture (Vol. 3): John Wiley & Sons. 
39 Christenson, C. (1997). The innovator’s dilemma. Harvard Business School Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
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Merton’s theory does not offer much guidance in terms of helping us understand, describe, and 
explain how and why a particular form of innovative deviance was selected over others 
(assuming there are multiple, albeit potentially infringing, ways one might promote the culturally 
accepted goal).  It does not provide clues about why some people, organization, and institutions 
may choose innovative deviance over conformity.  In other words, it does not offer many clues 
about how technological change affects transformation on individual or organizational levels: 
“People who study how technology affects organizational transformation 
increasingly recognize its dual, paradoxical nature.  It is both engine and barrier 
for change; both customizable and rigid; both inside and outside organizational 
practices.  It is product and process.”40  
 
Understanding these aspects of sociotechnical transformation requires a more granular 
analytic approach.  To explore these questions, this research will draw upon sociologists 
Reckless’ work on inner and outer containment factors and Hirschi’s discussion of the 
importance of social bonds.41  In addition, economist Albert Hirschman’s exit, voice, and loyalty 
framework provides some useful clues about how perceptions about whether a problem is an 
economic one or a political one can influence behavioral outcomes.42  These questions are also 
particularly informed by the work of organizational theorist Karl Weick’s research on 
sensemaking, which offers important clues about the relationship between individuals’ and 
organizations’ meaning construction and decision-making processes.43    
Methodology   
This thesis explores sociotechnical transformation through the complicated, often messy, 
co-evolution of copyright law and policy, technological change, and emerging social practices.  
This research focuses on a particular case, the emergence and evolution of HathiTrust.  
The methods used in this thesis combine traditional legal research and analysis with a 
qualitative case study approach. 
                                                 
40 Star, S. L., & Ruhleder, K. (1996). Steps toward an ecology of infrastructure: Design and access for large 
information spaces. Information systems research, 7(1), 111-134. 
41 Reckless, W. C. (1961). New Theory of Deliquency and Crime, A. Fed. Probation, 25, 42; Hirschi, T. (2002). 
Causes of delinquency. Transaction publishers. 
42 Hirschman, A. O. (1970). Exit, voice, and loyalty: Responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states (Vol. 
25). Harvard university press. 
43 Weick, K. E. (1995). Sensemaking in organizations (Vol. 3). Sage; Weick, K. E., Sutcliffe, K. M., & Obstfeld, D. 
(2005). Organizing and the process of sensemaking. Organization science, 16(4), 409-421. 
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This study seeks to answer the following three research questions:  
 RQ1:  How and why did the University of Michigan engage in mass digitization of 
in-copyright works and how was its sensemaking and decision-making reflected in 
intra-organizational practices, processes, mechanisms, policies, and tensions? 
 RQ2: How and why did these (conceptions, decisions, practices, processes, 
mechanisms, policies, and tensions) prompt the genesis of HathiTrust and how have 
they continued to evolve over time and in response to internal and external factors? 
 RQ3:  How might HathiTrust’s emergence and evolution deepen understandings of 
processes of sociotechnical transformation and inform copyright policy debates 
around technological change?  
Outline of the Dissertation 
Processes of sociotechnical transformation are a source of growing interest amongst 
researchers.  This thesis explores this topic by tracing the emergence and evolution of 
HathiTrust.  Chapters II and III consist of a review of relevant literatures, focusing first on the 
copyright implications of mass digitization in effect when the mass digitization project was 
initially embarked upon in late 2004 before moving on to a review of relevant social science 
perspectives.  Chapter IV discusses the research design and methods used in the empirical study.  
Chapter V begins the story of HathiTrust by exploring its pre-history in the partnership between 
the University of Michigan and Google around the mass digitization of Michigan’s print 
collection.  Chapter VI describes and explains how that partnership led, in part, to the genesis of 
HathiTrust.  In Chapter VII, I discuss the evolution of HathiTrust from its initial inception as a 
shared digital repository to a semi-sovereign collectively governed organization.  In each of 
those chapters, the innovative deviance framework is used to highlight particularly salient 
features of the emergence and evolution of HathiTrust.  Chapter VIII focuses on the Authors 
Guild v. HathiTrust litigation and innovative deviance is drawn upon as a referent for the 
complex judicial interpretations and analyses of the mass digitization project.  In the final 
chapter, Chapter IX, attention turns toward implications for the future, for HathiTrust and for 
society as a whole.  The story of HathiTrust can facilitate deeper understanding of how 
institutions and organizations shape and are shaped by the interactions among copyright, 
technological change, and emerging social practices.  In addition, the analytic framework which 
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expands and extends innovative deviance in combination with sensemaking approaches can 
provide meaningful insights into the complex, often murky, processes of sociotechnical 
transformation. 
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Chapter II: Related Legal Literature 
This thesis explores processes of sociotechnical transformation through the story of 
HathiTrust.  HathiTrust emerged, in large part, out of the mass digitization project entered into by 
Google and a number of research institutions, most notably the University of Michigan.  That 
project had (and continues to have) enormous copyright implications.  Therefore this chapter, the 
first of two literature review chapters, focuses on the copyright aspects of technological change 
and emerging social practices, paying particular attention to the legal posture of mass 
digitization.  The chapter that follows, Chapter III, focuses on related social science literatures 
referenced in the Introduction. 
The review of legal literature is organized into three main sections.  The first section 
explores copyright and technological change, offering a perspective grounded in the history and 
sensitive to the themes and patterns that have emerged over time and reappear in the current 
discourse and debates.  This section concludes with a brief discussion of large-scale digitization 
efforts — the precursors of the mass digitization project. 
The second section of this chapter offers an in-depth doctrinal analysis of mass 
digitization.  This work is intended to chart the legal landscape, with both its known features and 
its uncertainties, as it existed at the time the mass digitization project was in contemplation, late 
2002-2004. Getting a firm understanding of the copyright implications of mass digitization 
provides important analytic scaffolding for the empirical work that follows.  In order to 
recognize the features and function of innovative deviance and understand the sensemaking and 
decision-making processes of those involved, we need a window into copyright law and policy.  
That said, the doctrinal analysis that follows demonstrates that the law as it existed at the time 
did not actually provide much guidance on large-scale digitization of in-copyright works.  For 
purposes of copyright law, the legitimacy of such a project was uncertain (as is often the case 
when technological change enables new forms of creation, interaction, and participation with 
cultural and intellectual works).  Therefore, in addition to highlighting relevant copyright
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doctrine and policy, this chapter sets up the social science perspectives and empirical work that 
follows, particularly with respect to innovative deviance and sensemaking under uncertainty. 
The final section of this chapter provides a connective bridge to the social science 
literature that follows in Chapter III and suggests that, instead of viewing copyright law as most 
significantly a matter of property, we might instead consider it as fundamentally a matter of 
social relationships.  Literature related to participatory culture and economic pragmatist 
perspectives of innovation provide insights into the “copyright and social relationship” 
perspective and offer a counterbalance to the doctrinal analysis that precedes it. 
Copyright and Technological Change 
Copyright law is often referred to in legal scholarship as being “a creature of statute,” a 
system of rules, statutes, and social control algorithms designed to incentivize and optimize 
cultural and intellectual production.  It is also part of a broader and more complex sociotechnical 
system that co-evolves, readjusts, and transforms with the technologies, behaviors, organizations, 
and institutions it is designed to mediate.  Using an historical perspective, this section draws out 
some key themes or patterns that resonate in more recent controversies around copyright and 
technological change, particularly with respect to the precursors of the mass digitization project, 
to illustrate how copyright law shapes and is shaped by technology and social practice. 
Copyright law and technological change have always had a closely linked and fairly 
tumultuous relationship, typically with copyright seemingly struggling to keep pace with the 
relatively more rapid changes in information and communication technologies.  The first 
copyright-light privileges, royal printing licenses, arose in the fifteenth century in Venice, Italy, 
after the introduction of the printing press.  These privileges were typically limited in duration 
(e.g. a monopoly set at five years) and in scope (e.g. limited to the printed reproduction of a 
single work or works).44   It was not until 1491 that the Venetian Senate granted an author 
monopoly rights over printing and selling his own work. 45   Fifty years later, in 1545, the 
Venetian decree of the Council of Ten (which by this time had adopted a more general series of 
                                                 
44 Patry, W. F. (2000). Copyright Law and Practice.  The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., available at http://digital-
law-online.info/patry/patry1.html, at pg. 4. 
45 Peter of Ravenna was granted exclusive rights in his work The Phoenix.  (Patry, 2000:4) 
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regulations governing printing and distribution) passed a prohibition on publishing an author’s 
work without proof of the author’s permission.46 
Germany also had some early forays into copyright-like protections, including a grant to 
the widow of Albrecht Dürer of exclusive rights to publish the late artist’s works.  In 1511, Dürer 
himself crafted a copyright notice that ranks with the most aggressive of all time, declaring: 
“Hold! You crafty ones, strangers to work, and pilferers of other men’s brains. 
Think not rashly to lay your thievish hands upon my works. Beware! Know you 
not that I have a grant from the most glorious Emperor Maximillian, that not one 
throughout the imperial dominion shall be allowed to print or sell fictitious 
imitations of these engravings? Listen! And bear in mind that if you do so, 
through spite or through covetousness, not only will your goods be confiscated, 
but your bodies also placed in mortal danger.” 
 
With respect to the development of copyright law in the U.S., the most relevant 
jurisprudential ancestor is England, the source of our common law tradition and the movable 
type printing press.  The invention of the moveable type printing press in England in 1476 was a 
watershed moment triggering not only England’s first copyright-like privileges, but also the 
tremendous social, political, and religious reconfigurations that followed. 47   “The ability of 
printers, via movable type, to produce large numbers of copies relatively quickly and 
inexpensively led to two important related developments: (1) a potentially large, new market of 
readers, and (2) the need to protect authors and publishers/booksellers from pirates bent on 
stealing that new market.”48 
The first copyright-like privileges in England arose in response to a particular 
technological development: the invention of the printing press.  Motivated by concerns around 
preserving the authorial and attributional integrity of King Henry VII’s statements, 
proclamations, and statutes (and, later, Henry VIII’s), in 1504 King Henry VII appointed William 
Facques as the first royal printer, giving him an exclusive right to print official documents.  In 
1518, a printing privilege was issued to Richard Pynson, the second royal printer, in the form of 
a two-year prohibition against others reprinting a sermon of particular significance.49  Pynson 
was regarded as, technically and typographically, the best English printer of his generation.   
Compared to his peers he was also prolific, publishing hundreds of books over the course of his 
                                                 
46 Patry, 2000:4. 
47 William Caxton established his movable type printing press at Westminster in 1476.  (Patry, 2000:5-6) 
48 Patry, 2000:6. 
49 The sermon was the Latin sermon of the dean of St. Paul’s Cathedral.  (Patry, 2000: 6) 
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lifetime.   As a consequence of his prolificacy, Pynson was hugely influential in terms of the 
standardization of the English language and the English society more generally.     
Pynson can serve as a useful figurehead or unwitting representative of a set of more 
generalized observations about the sociotechnical reconfigurations brought on by the invention 
of the printing press.  In addition to issues and concerns around the negative potentials of the 
emerging technology (i.e. the reproduction and disseminations of errors and misrepresentation), 
recognition grew around the printing press’ potential to both stimulate diversity and demand 
conformity within society.  This was patently true in the sense that printing, publishing, and the 
concomitant increases in literacy facilitated the expression of new ideas, beliefs, and values and 
enabled the censorship and restraint of expressions.  It was also latently true in the sense that 
printing, and standardized type more specifically, had an almost subliminal influence on diversity 
and conformity.  Eisenstein argues that this technical standardization, somewhat surprisingly, 
gave rise to an emerging sense of individualism that had not existing in English society prior to 
the introduction of the press: “The more standardized the type, indeed, the more compelling the 
sense of an idiosyncratic personal self.”50      
In this way, the first copyright-like privileges can be understood as having developed in 
response and relation to this range of social potentials embedded in printing and publication 
technologies.  As Pynson’s influence spread, so did copyright-like privileges.  By 1533, the first 
accusations of piracy surfaced and “an act was passed that ingeniously worked to the benefit of 
both English printers and the Crown by banning the importation of foreign books, and thereby 
ideas, such as those of Martin Luther.” 51   By 1538, Henry VIII instigated a form of 
prepublication censorship, decreeing that all new books needed preapproval by the Privy Council 
before they could be published.  In an effort to stem the flow of seditious, heretical, and/or 
disruptive texts, the Licensing Act, a sweeping system of pre-publication censorship, was passed 
into law by the British Parliament in 1557.  This Act gave the Stationer’s Company a perpetual 
monopoly over all printing and publication in England; Catholicism was a primary target of 
suppression. 52   But as diversity and conformity are interdependent features of society, the 
Licensing Act prompted its own sociotechnical reconfigurations.  In particular, the Act seemed to 
                                                 
50 Eisenstein, E. L. (2005). The printing revolution in early modern Europe. Cambridge University Press, at 
 p.56. 
51 Patry, 2000:6. 
52 Patry, 2000:7. 
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cultivate a growing sense of discontent regarding the use of copyright-like laws to restrain the 
creation and communication of cultural and intellectual works via emerging technologies.   
One of the earliest and most famous instances of pushback against the Licensing Act was 
proffered by John Milton in his Aeropagitica: A speech of Mr. John Milton for the liberty of 
unlicensed printing to the Parliament of England (1644).53  In this speech, Milton offered an 
impassioned criticism of the licensing requirements and censorship practices of the Stationer’s 
Company, arguing: “Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to 
conscience, above all liberties.”54  The progress of society could be measured, in Milton’s view, 
by the freedoms of its citizenry to create, disseminate, and use cultural and intellectual works.  
As vessels of free expression and therefore vital to the welfare of society, books, Milton argued, 
were “the precious lifeblood of a master spirit embalmed and treasured up on purpose to a life 
beyond life.”55   
Not only do books serve an important cultural or aesthetic function, as mirrors of nature 
and human society, Milton recognized that they also serve as potentially important sites of 
contestation whereby social values, beliefs, and norms can be promoted, traded, modified, and/or 
destroyed:   
“Though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play on the earth, so Truth be 
in the field, we do injuriously, by licensing and prohibiting, to misdoubt her 
strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in 
a free and open encounter?”56   
 
Laws, in Milton’s view, should not restrict the progress of society by censoring and 
restraining the creation and communication of multiple and varied viewpoints and expression.  
On this basis, he opposed the Licensing Act.      
The flipside of Milton’s critique was advanced a few years later by Thomas Hobbes.  
Hobbes did not share Milton’s optimism about the unfettered flow of information and social 
progress that would inevitably result from a deregulated printing and publishing industry.  
                                                 
53Milton, J. (1976). 1644.“. Areopagitica: A Speech of Mr. John Milton for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing, to the 
Parliament of England. 
54 Milton, J. (1976). 1644.“. Areopagitica: A Speech of Mr. John Milton for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing, to the 
Parliament of England. 
55 Milton, J. (1976). 1644.“. Areopagitica: A Speech of Mr. John Milton for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing, to the 
Parliament of England. 
56 Milton, J. (1976). 1644.“. Areopagitica: A Speech of Mr. John Milton for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing, to the 
Parliament of England. 
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Instead, Hobbes offered a compelling rationale for supporting copyright-like laws (and other 
legal protections).  
In Leviathan (1651), Hobbes famously argued that individuals’ mutual consent to abide 
by laws, rules, and other restraints is necessary “to prevent the certain collapse of humanity into 
an ongoing war between people with conflicting self-interests.”57  With respect to cultural and 
intellectual works in particular, Hobbes arguments would suggest that, absent copyright-like 
laws, “there is no place for industry because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no 
Culture of the Earth; … no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society.”58  It follows to 
reasons that Hobbes might have viewed intellectual property laws as a necessary precondition of 
cultural and intellectual production.   
When the Stationer’s Company’s monopoly over printing ultimately lapsed in 1694, the 
copyright regime that grew to replace it encapsulated elements of both Milton’s Aeropagitica 
(adopting the goal of learning and social progress) and Hobbes’ Leviathan (adopting the means 
of legal incentives to stimulate and protect the creation of cultural and intellectual works).  The 
balance between the two perspectives was codified in the Statute of Anne, the first copyright act, 
and continues to resonate today in the basic means-end formulation of the copyright system. 59    
The Statute of Anne, enacted in 1710, was a “watershed event in Anglo-American 
copyright history.”60 Construed in terms of the sociotechnical reconfigurations it signaled, the 
Statute of Anne diverged from the previous Licensing Act in four key ways.  First, it vested 
rights in the author of new works, rather than publishers, thereby shifting focus from 
dissemination of existing works to the creation of new works.  Second, while the Licensing Act 
authorized perpetual privileges, the Statute of Anne limited the term of protection to fourteen 
years, with the possibility of one fourteen-year renewal term.  Third, as a precondition of 
receiving copyright rights, works had to be registered and deposited in an official repository.  
The combined effect of the limited term and depository requirement was the creation of a public 
domain consisting of works that either had not met the formalities requirements or whose 
                                                 
57 Hobbes, T. (1969). Leviathan, 1651. Scolar Press. 
58 Hobbes, T. (1969). Leviathan, 1651. Scolar Press. 
59 The full official title of the Act is “An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed 
Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein mentioned.”  8 Anne, c. 19 (1710). 
“The Statute of Anne,” April 10, 1710.  Available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/anne_1710.asp  
60 Joyce, C., & Patterson, L. (2003). Copyright in 1791: An essay concerning the founders' view of the copyright 
power granted to Congress in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the US Constitution. Emory Law Journal, 52(909), 
 At p.916. 
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copyright had lapsed.  Finally, the Statute of Anne abandoned the practice of pre-publication 
censorship that Milton had objected to and which had been central to the Stationer’s Company’s 
licensing regime. 
In addition, and more generally, the Statute of Anne established the basic means-end 
formulation (largely derived from the just-discussed concepts articulated by Milton and Hobbes) 
which continues to operate, over three hundred years later, as the essential structure copyright 
law in England and other common law jurisdictions, including the United States.  The 
formulation, plainly evident from its official title — An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 
by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the 
Times therein mentioned — describes copyright law as “not an inevitable, divine, or natural right 
that confers on authors the absolute ownership of their creations” but rather as a system designed 
to “stimulate activity and progress in the arts for the intellectual enrichment of the public” by 
granting authors a limited monopoly over their original creations.61   
The historical and philosophical foundations of the current system of copyright law 
reveal a few key observations.  First, copyright is, and always has been, intricately tied to 
technological change.   Second, copyright law’s means-end formulation, which continues to 
serve as the essential structural foundation of the current common law copyright regime, has 
deep historical and philosophical roots that can be traced back to Milton’s theories on freedom of 
expression and Hobbes’ theories about the important of property laws. In addition, its goal — 
achieving social progress through enrichment of the cultural and intellectual record — operates 
in tension with its means — state-sanctioned monopoly rights in the exploitation of the fruits of 
one’s creative and intellectual talents and labors.  Third, the intersection between copyright, 
technology, and social institutions are interdependent, dynamic, and function as locales of 
contention and reconfiguration in sociotechnical systems. 
During the colonial period, U.S. copyright law mirrored English law in several key 
respects: copyright was recognized as common law, the grant of exclusive rights to authors as an 
incentive to create was the accepted justification and, due to considerations of practical 
application, it was agree that the law must be federal.  By the time the U.S. Constitution (1776) 
and the Copyright Act (1790) were drafted, however, the perspective on copyright had changed 
in a few important ways.  For example, in England, copyright protection emerged out of a 
                                                 
61 Leval, P. N. (1990). Toward a fair use standard. Harvard Law Review, 103(5), 1105-1136, p. 1107. 
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Lockean natural law approach; authors are entitled to state protection of the fruits of their labors 
as a matter of moral right.  By contrast, property rights in the U.S., including copyright rights, 
are a creature of statute; authors are not morally entitled to reap the benefits of their ingenuity 
and labor but rather benefit only to the extent the state deems appropriate and enforces.  In 
addition, unlike England, which empowered government officials to adjust down exorbitant 
pricing, copyright scholar William Patry notes that the U.S. Copyright Act relied solely on the 
marketplace to determine fair prices.62   
The Copyright Act underwent two major revisions, first in 1909 and then second in 1976.  
The revisions were spurred, in large part, by sociotechnical changes.  New technologies for 
creating (or fixing), reproducing, and distributing cultural and intellectual works prompted 
specific revisions to the Act.  In addition, the industrialization of the means of production created 
powerful lobbies which persuaded Congress to enact favorable reforms such as copyright term 
extensions, changes in formalities requirements, dissolutions in the distinctions between personal 
and public uses, and industry-specific protections including provisions targeting broadcast and 
cable networks, and libraries and archives.  In the next subsection, relevant legal principles and 
doctrines will be discussed, but before moving on I will spend a moment tracing some of the key 
transformations in technical and social aspects of reproduction and distribution of copyrighted 
works, drawing attention to some of the key moments between the invention of the movable type 
printing press and library digitization at scale. 
Notwithstanding the advent of the printing press, the vast majority of reproductions 
continued to be accomplished on a small, as-needed, scale.  Copyists, scribes, and scriveners 
were employed to copy works, in part or in their entirely, by hand.  Early reproduction 
technologies continued to be oriented around handwritten rather than typed works.  For example, 
in the early nineteenth century, polygraph machines enabled instantaneous duplication of a 
handwritten document by attaching a second pen to the primary one held by the writer (Fig. 3).  
By the end of the century, Edison’s pen enabled non-contemporaneous duplication of 
handwritten documents through what was essentially a stencil-creating pen (Fig. 4).  The Robot 
Pen or Autopen, created in the 1930s, recorded handwriting, such as a signature, on a storage 
device for later reproduction (Fig. 5).  Although these handwriting reproduction devices have 
largely been usurped by other reproduction technologies, autopens continue to be used, albeit 
                                                 
62 Patry, 2000: 30. 
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somewhat controversially, by government officials for state business; in 2005, the U.S. Justice 
Department issued an advisory opinion upholding the right of the President to sign bills by 
autopen63  and, in 2011, President Obama used an autopen to sign legislation extending the 
Patriot Act64 (fig. 6). 
   
                 
 
Clockwise from top left: Figure 3. Polygraph Machine; Figure 4. Edison’s Electric Pen;  
Figure 5. Autopen; Figure 6. President Obama signs bill into law using Autopen 
 
A distinct set of issues of arguably of greater relevance to the topic of this thesis are 
raised by duplication technologies designed to copy not unique, one-of-a-kind signatures and 
seals, but widely published materials such as books, pamphlets, and articles.  The earliest 
copiers, called letter copying presses, where invented in the late eighteenth and underwent 
refinements through the late nineteenth century and essentially consisted of a moistened tissue 
paper being inserted between an existing printed pages and a new page that, when pressed, 
would transfer or imprint the text to the new sheet (Fig. 7).  Other technologies such as carbon 
paper (Fig. 8), mimeographs (Fig. 9), and ditto machines (Fig. 10) proliferated during the 
twentieth century.  Through the work of companies such as Xerox and others, photocopiers grew 
                                                 
63 Nielson, Howard C., Jr., (2005). “Whether The President May Sign a Bill by Directing That His Signature Be 
Affixed To It,” Report of the United States Department of Justice, available at 
http://search.justice.gov/search?query=whether+the+president+may+sign+a+bill+directing&op=Search&affiliate=ju
stice . 
64 Shear, Michael D., (2011). “Making Legislative History, With Nod from Obama and Stroke of an Autopen,” The 
New York Times, May 28, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/28/us/politics/28sign.html?_r=0  
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to dominate much of the twentieth century and continue to be a staple in most offices, 
notwithstanding the rise in digital document creation, scanning, and delivery (Fig. 11).     
 
         
 
                
 
Clockwise from top left: Figure 7. Letter Copying Press;  
Figure 8. Carbon Paper; Figure 9. Mimeograph; Figure 10. Ditto Machine 
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Figure 11. Xerox Machine 
 
The first commercially available scanner, marketed in 1978, was initially embraced by 
the business and government sectors and, in particular, organizations that were paper-laden and 
had fairly predictable workflows. 65   Many of these early efforts, particularly those in the 
governmental sector, were primarily driven by a desire to simplify and streamline print 
distribution channels.  For example, in one of the earliest large-scale digitization efforts, the 
Library of Congress (“LOC”) began scanning Newsweek, Time, and other periodicals onto 14-
inch optical platters.  The scans were used to generate additional print copies that were then 
distributed to congressional staffers for research and information purposes.  Digitization was not 
much more than an intermediary step in the process of improved print distribution.     
It was not long before early digitizers began contemplating other uses of converted 
materials.  For example, in the early 1980s the National Library of Medicine (“NLM”), which 
had been digitizing medical journals and journal articles in an effort to streamline distribution, 
began envisioning the potential of digitization to enable digital document delivery.  Removing 
the step of printing the digital scan would certainly seem to remove friction in the interlibrary 
loan process but, at this early stage, digitization was still very much conceptualized and 
understood in analog terms, as a more convenient, efficient, perhaps less expensive version of 
print material.    
                                                 
65 Digital Pioneers interview with Paul Conway, dated May 25th, 2010.  Available at 
http://digitalpioneers.library.du.edu/paulConway/transcript.html.   
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A few years later, around 1985, the National Archives provided $2 million in funding for 
the Optical Digital Imaging Storage System (“ODISS”) project.  This was one of the first 
concerted forays into exploring technical standards for digitization, suggesting that perspectives 
had begun to shift from seeing digitization as a transitional step in an essentially analog process 
to an end point with independent value.  ODISS was evidence that digitization could offer a new, 
viable way to storage and archive content.  Using equipment that was state of the art at the time 
— Honeywell scanners capable of producing a 200 dpi bi-tonal image — ODISS was 
characterized as by one of the pioneers of digitization as “an experiment to see how bad digital 
images could be and still be acceptable to users.”66 
By the late 1980s, interest in the potential of digitization to improve access and facilitate 
preservation of print collections was widespread among national and academic libraries and 
archives.  These early efforts were characteristically project-specific, goal-oriented, and 
relatively short-lived.  Digitization was incredibly costly, both in terms of human resources and 
technological resources.  Compounding things further, digitization projects seemed to be waging 
a constant (often losing) war against obsolescence.  The rate of progress and development in 
digital technologies fast outpaced the human processes of acquiring funding resources, curating, 
collecting and transporting the content to be digitized, scanning and turning pages, and so forth.  
Unfortunately, many of these early digitization efforts failed to reach their goals and, even worse, 
many of the artefacts from their early efforts were disposed of, leaving few physical traces and 
diminishing intangible traces in the recollections of participants. 67 
For example, toward the end of the ODISS project, 14-inch optical platters were no 
longer standard.  The technology had shifted to CD-ROMs and CD-writable disks.  One of the 
central figures in the ODISS project reflected: 
“We no longer had equipment to make use of the large optical scans but then I 
figured out that the Bush Presidential library in Texas had a bridging technology 
that we could use to get the images off of our disks using their system.  I figured 
out a way to do that and the whole thing was going to cost about $125,000 more, 
but in the end, what do you have but a bunch of 200 dpi scanned images?  The 
conclusion was that it wasn’t worth it and so all of the scans and indexing from 
that $2 million project were thrown away.”68 
                                                 
66 Interview with Peter Hirtle, dated September 30, 2014.  Transcript on file with author. 
67 Interview with Peter Hirtle, dated September 30, 2014.  Transcript on file with author. 
68 Interview with Peter Hirtle, dated September 30, 2014.  Transcript on file with author. 
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Another failed project was the scan-to-print-to-microfilm project (Paul Conway).  Those 
scans eventually became worthless due to technical incompatibilities that developed.69  Early 
digitization efforts were prone to fail and, unfortunately for researchers studying digitization, 
much of the historical record of these early forays disappeared, was thrown away, or became 
unreachable as the technology obsolesced.  As one of my participants remarked, “I’ve been 
involved with more failed digitization projects than probably anyone in history,” which is why it 
is even more important to build a tangible record of this history that, otherwise, lives in the 
recollections of early digitization pioneers. 
One of the ways organizations and institutions worked to combat or stem the seemingly 
inevitable slip into obsolescence was through the formation of partnerships.  Cooperative action 
was a way to both spread out the immense expense of digitization and also generate greater 
accountability for projects’ maintenance and success.  In 1987, for example, the National 
Agriculture Library held a conference on the applications of optical scanning in libraries and 
participants there discussed a joint project between Syracuse and the Kellogg School to digitize 
continuing education materials for adults. 
Most of the early pioneers in retrospective digitization point to the Making of America 
project, begun in 1995, as one of the first significant and successful collaborative large scale 
digitization efforts.  Funded originally by the Mellon Foundation, Making of America was a joint 
effort of Cornell University and the University of Michigan and sought to fulfil three basic goals.  
First, the project sought to preserve and make accessible through digital technology a significant 
body of primary sources related to the development of the United States’ infrastructure, focusing 
on documenting American social history from the antebellum period through reconstruction.  At 
Cornell University, 109 monographs (267 volumes) and 22 journals (955 volumes) were 
digitized.70  The University of Michigan digitized approximately 1,600 books and 10 journals.71  
By 2007, the year the website was last updated, the collection totalled approximately 10,000 
books and 50,000 journal articles. 
In addition to making content digitally available, Making of America was founded upon a 
preservation goal.  Many of the scanned materials were brittle and thus digitizing this content 
                                                 
69 Interview with Peter Hirtle, dated September 30, 2014.  Transcript on file with author. 
70 Cornell University Library, Making of America, website available at 
http://digital.library.cornell.edu/m/moa/about.html  
71 University of Michigan Library, Making of America, website available at  
http://quod.lib.umich.edu/m/moagrp/about.html 
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enabled libraries to print them onto acid-free paper, bind them, and put them on the shelf for 
patrons to use.   
The third goal of the Making of America project was to obtain and engage the broader 
research and national institutional community to “develop common protocols and consensus for 
the selection, conversion, storage, retrieval, and use of digitized materials on a large distributed 
scale.”72  There was a tension in these early projects between manufacturers of the technical 
devices and the user community, which consisted primary of government and academic libraries 
and archives.  The technological developers were motivated to develop newer and better 
technological innovations and did not necessarily see a rationale for providing continued 
technical support or interoperability with previous digitization technologies.  The institutions, on 
the other hand, seemed to be throwing money away on digitization projects that would invariably 
grow obsolete and often become wholly inaccessible on a very quick timeline.  The ODISS 
project, discussed below, provides one such example. 
Some of the pioneers involved in these early projects viewed the establishment of norms, 
technical standards and protocols, and techniques around digitization as a much-needed source of 
stability in the rapidly changing digital environment.  Cornell University, in particular, was one 
of the early leaders on this, benefitting from the experience and expertise of individuals that had 
worked on the ODISS project.  Through its numerous early digitization efforts and experiments, 
Cornell University became a leader in developing standards that were subsequently incorporated 
into the federal digitization guidelines standards for preservation set forth by the National 
Archives and Records Administration (“NARA”) which, in turn, became the basis for the federal 
digitization guideline standards. 73   But, the tension between diversity and standardization 
continued to play out, despite NARA’s ratification.   
By the turn of the millennium, momentum was building around large-scale digitization.  
In addition to the Making of America project, Raj Reddy and colleagues at Carnegie Mellon 
University embarked on the “Universal Library Project,” a project aimed at creating a free-to-
read, searchable collection of one million books, primarily in the English language, available to 
                                                 
72 Cornell University Library, Making of America, “About the Project,” website available at 
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/m/moa/about.html.  
73  Interview with Peter Hirtle, dated September 30, 2014.  Transcript on file with author. 
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everyone in the world over the Internet.74  Brewster Kahle, founder of the Internet Archive, was 
also immensely influential as an early leader in digital archives and universal access efforts, 
followed a few years later by an active and expansive digitization program, with scanning 
centers and Internet Archive “nodes” dispersed across geographies and supported through 
diverse institutional partnerships. 
When Google embarked on its digitization project, what would ultimately come to be 
recognized as the world’s first mass digitization project, it added several layers of influence (or 
disruption) into the digitization universe.  For example, it chose not to follow the preservation 
standards, because doing so would have required more time and more storage capacity and 
would have ultimately slowed the project down.  As one of my participants who had been active 
in the standards setting process described: “The Google Books project comes along and says 
‘We’re going to ignore all of this.’  That’s fine.  It would have been nicer if they had done 
everything to our preservation standards but something is better than nothing, isn’t it?”   
Google’s decision to make satisficing scans may have been motivated by efficiency and 
expediency, but it also has a number of second- and third-order effects.  Standards can emerge 
through a deliberative process, as illustrated by Cornell University’s work with NARA, but they 
can also emerge as a by-product of design choices made by first-movers who gain rapid 
dominance over a new market, industry, or technology.  One of my study participants analogized 
this process to the impact of a dominating feature of the natural environment: “In Seattle, people 
say that Mount Rainier makes its own weather and I think the same can be said of Google’s mass 
digitization project; it changes the existing knowledge environment and enables new standards to 
emerge.” 
In addition, the Google project raised significant copyright concerns in comparison to its 
predecessors (which primarily dealt in public domain materials).  As one noteworthy copyright 
scholar noted at the time, Google’s mass digitization project … 
“… strikes at the very heart of the copyright system and reveals that we tend to 
rely on the rickety structure of fair use to support too many essential public 
values.  Google’s Library Project threatens to unravel everything that is good and 
stable about the copyright system.  It injects more uncertainty and panic into a 
system that is already in disequilibrium.”75  
                                                 
74 Reddy, R. and StClair, G. (2001). “The Million Book Digital Library Project,” Dec. 1, 2001, available at 
http://www.rr.cs.cmu.edu/mbdl.htm  
75 Vaidhyanathan, S. (2006). Googlization of Everything and the Future of Copyright, The. UC DAViS l. reV., 40, 
1207. 
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While the potential copyright implications in existence contemporaneously with the start 
of Google’s mass digitization project will be discussed in the next subsection, it is worth 
signalling the non-obvious, but potentially significant, linkages between those early decisions 
about scan quality standards and available legal rationale for the digitization.  For example, if 
Google intended to defend its actions based upon an archival preservation argument, its decision 
to scan at a quality level significantly lower than NARA’s standards could have had a bearing on 
the success of its defense.  Decisions about technical standards have potentially important 
ramifications for what the intended uses of the scans might be and, as a copyright matter, what 
potential legal rationale might be successfully advanced for doing the copying in the first place.  
Doctrinal Analysis of Mass Digitization 
This section walks through the various elements of copyright law implicated by the mass 
digitization of in-copyright works to illustrate both the legal complexity and the potential for 
confusion surrounding the practice.  The focus is on the law as it existed at the time the 
University of Michigan and Google entered into an agreement to digitize UM Library’s print 
collection in the fall of 2004.76  The reasons for adopting this bright-line are twofold.  First, 
because this research is interested in sensemaking and decision-making in the lead up to, and at 
the outset of, the mass digitization project, the contemporaneous legal context is crucial to 
understanding.  Second, because this research is also interested in how sensemaking and 
decision-making evolved over time, as part of a larger and more complex process of 
sociotechnical transformation sparked, in part, by the mass digitization project, it is helpful to 
have an established starting point from which we can begin to trace and disentangle the 
copyright, technology, and social practice “strands.”  Pausing the doctrinal analysis in 2004 
allows the findings relating to sensemaking, decision-making, and processes of transformation 
around mass digitization and HathiTrust to emerge through the empirical study.  In addition, 
because retrospective and historical accounts may be prone to normalization and other forms of 
hindsight bias, the following detailed accounting of copyright law as it existed in 2004 also 
                                                                                                                                                             
  
76 Serious discussions for the project began earlier, in late 2002.  But as the discussion demonstrates, there were no 
key relevant copyright decisions during the contemplation period (late 2002 – late 2004) and therefore this section 
uses late 2004 as the critical date for purposes of determining the copyright law as it existed when the project was 
embarked upon. 
 32 
provides a way to anchor participants’ recollections about the risk and uncertainty of the 
undertaking against a relatively more objective measure.   
The following review begins with a brief discussion of the goals of copyright, the 
“exclusive rights” in §106, and remedies for infringement including damages and profits in §504 
and state sovereign immunity in §511.  The focus then shifts to potentially relevant limitations on 
the exclusive rights including: fair use in §107; library and archives exemptions in §108; 
computer programs exemption in §117; exemption for blind and disabled persons in §121; and 
relevant provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, §§1201-1205.  Because the statute 
provides a snapshot of the law rather than a living, breathing interpretation of it, case law (up 
through 2004) will also be cited, particularly with respect to fair and/or transformative uses and 
the sovereign immunity of universities. 
Goals and Purposes of Copyright Law 
While the previous subsection explored some of the historical and philosophical 
foundations of copyright law, particularly with respect to technological change, this section 
focuses more narrowly on its representations in positive law.  Article I, Section 8, clause 8 of the 
U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power “To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”77  This section also provides the basic means-end formula 
Congress ought to abide by when crafting the Copyright Act, aiming to should strike a balance 
between the Miltonesque desire for broad social benefit (through free expression and the ready 
exchange of cultural and intellectual works) and the Hobbesian desire for private benefit (in the 
form of personal monopolies and enforceable property rights in the fruits of one’s labor).  The 
result is a regime that, at its essence, uses state-created property rights simultaneously as an 
economic trade regulation and as a fount of cultural and intellectual activity for the benefit of 
society as a whole.   
                                                 
77 The framers of the Constitution used the term “science” to refer to knowledge and learning, and used the term 
“useful Arts” to refer to industry.  Although it may be somewhat peculiar to our present-day lay usage of the terms, 
copyright law (which we typically associate with creative expression) is intended promote the progress of science 
while patent law (which we typically associate with technological innovation) is intended to promote the progress of 
the useful arts.  See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 242-243 (U.S. 2003) (Breyer, J. dissenting) (citing  
Walterscheid, E. C. (2002). The nature of the intellectual property clause: A study in historical perspective. William 
S. Hein & Co., Inc.. 
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While this means-end formulation may seem inherently fraught given the strident debates 
and never-ending battles between rightsholders and public interest advocates, scholar William 
Patry explains that, when this clause was written into the Constitution, no such tension existed: 
“[T]he public interest fully coincides with the interest of authors having exclusive 
rights in their works. The source of this harmony between public and private 
interests is not difficult to discern once we strip away our present-day, consumer-
oriented perspective: in place of government control, the Founding Fathers 
believed private property, including intellectual property, was the best way to 
ensure the triumph of democracy over the tyranny of the aristocracy. As former 
Register of Copyrights Abraham Kaminstein observed: 
The basic purpose of copyright is the public interest, to make sure that the 
wellsprings of creation do not dry up through lack of incentive, and to provide an 
alternative to the evils of an authorship dependent upon private or public 
patronage. As the founders of this country were wise enough to see, the most 
important elements of any civilization include its independent creators – its 
authors, composers and artists – who create as a matter of personal initiative and 
spontaneous expression rather than as a result of patronage or subsidy. A strong, 
practical copyright is the only assurance we have that this creative activity will 
continue.”78 
 
By giving creators (referred to collectively as “authors” in copyright parlance) a limited 
monopoly over their creations (referred to as “works”), copyright permits them to exercise their 
creativity independent of governmental control or systems of patronage, and control and receive 
compensation for many aspects of the communication and use of their works.  As the Supreme 
Court explained:  
“The economic philosophy behind the clause … is the conviction that 
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance the 
public welfare through the talents of authors ….”   
 
Therefore, the goal or purpose of copyright is a fundamentally public one as it seeks to 
promote the progress of society through knowledge and learning, and the means set out to 
accomplish this goal are property rights-based — copyright incentivizes the creation and 
                                                 
78 Patry, 2000: 24, citing the testimony of Register of Copyrights Abraham Kaminstein, Copyright Law Revision: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 1006, 
89th Cong., 1st Sess.65 (1965). See also Register Kaminstein’s further remarks in Copyright Law Revision Part 6: 
Supplementary Report on the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law: 1965 
Revision Bill, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.xiv-xv (House Comm. Print 1965). 
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communication of the fruits of authors’ creative and intellectual labor by establishing a 
marketable right to the use of one’s own expression.79   
“The copyright law celebrates the profit motive, recognizing that the incentive to 
profit from exploitation of copyrights will redound to the public benefit by 
resulting in the proliferation of knowledge.”80 
 
Despite the founders’ beliefs that the “public good fully coincides … with the claims of 
individuals,”81 as the previous section described, tensions have emerged as to whether or not 
(and the extent to which) copyright laws fairly balance the public’s interest and rightsholder 
interests.  This has become particularly true as revisions to the Act have repeatedly expanded the 
scope of the exclusive rights and extended the duration of copyright protection (which now 
stands as seventy years beyond the life of the author for published works and ninety-five years 
from publication for works-made-for-hire).  Furthermore, broadening the protections for authors 
comes at a time when significant changes in information and communication technologies have 
fundamentally altered the ways in which works can be created, preserved, disseminated, used, 
modified, remixed, and so forth.  So while the copyright regime seems increasingly focused on 
the expansion and enforcement of rightsholder protections, technologies continue to emerge that 
enable new forms of participation with protected works in furtherance of copyright’s essential 
goals.  
With the purpose of copyright laid out, we can now turn to relevant sections of the 
Copyright Act. 
Exclusive Rights - 17 U.S.C. §106 
If intellectual property laws add the “fuel of interest to the fire of genius,”82 as Abraham 
Lincoln declared before the Springfield Library Association in 1860, the exclusive rights may be 
the primary source of combustion.  Copyright protection in the U.S. subsists in original works of 
authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression from which they can be perceived, 
                                                 
79 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. National Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). 
80 American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc. 882 F. Supp. 1, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) , aff’d,  60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 
1994). 
81 Madison, J. (1788). THE FEDERALIST NO. 43. 
82 Lincoln, A., & Miller, M. M. (1908). The wisdom of Abraham Lincoln. New York: A. Wessels company. “Lecture 
before the Springfield, IL. Library Association: Discoveries, Inventions and Improvements,” (Feb. 22, 1860), at pg. 
104.  Lincoln’s statement was made in reference to the Patent Law system but is also applicable to the Copyright 
Law system. 
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reproduced, or otherwise communicated.83  These works can be literary, musical (compositions 
and sound recordings), dramatic, choreographic, pictorial, graphic or sculptural, audiovisual, or 
architectural.  In §102(b), ideas, procedures, processes, and systems, methods of operation, 
concepts, principles, and discoveries are expressly excluded from Copyright protection.84   
Authors of copyrighted works are entitled to certain “exclusive rights” specified in the 
Act.  The relevant rights for purposes of this research include the right to do and authorize any of 
the following: 
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies; 
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
(3) to distribute copies of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of 
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; 
(4) to perform the copyrighted literary work publicly; and 
(5) to display the copyrighted literary work publicly.85 
Copyright rights vest automatically the moment a work is created, regardless of whether 
or not it is made public.  Formalities such as affixing a “©” to the work, registering the work 
with the Copyright Office, and depositing copies of the work with the Library of Congress are 
not a prerequisite to protection, although these measures may afford rightsholders additional 
benefits or remedies, such as statutory damages, in some cases.  The lack of a comprehensive 
recording process makes tracking ownership rights a challenge, if not an outright impossibility.  
In addition, as property lawyers and scholars are keen to point out, property rights really consist 
of a “bundle of rights” meaning that each of the enumerated rights may be subdivided and 
partitioned indefinitely, and each piece of the exclusive right may be owned and enforced 
                                                 
83  17 USC §102(a). 
84 17 USC §102(b). 
85 Right to distribution, performance, and display are conditioned on “public” communication.  In §101, the Act tells 
us “publicly” means a display or performance that is “at a place open to the public or at any place where a 
substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of family and its social acquaintances is gathered” or that is 
transmitted or otherwise communicated to such a place or “to the public, by means of any device or process, whether 
the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate 
places and at the same time or at different times.”  The accompanying House Report further explains that “one of the 
principle purposes of the definition was to make clear that performances (and/or displays) in semipublic places such 
as … schools are public performances (and/or displays) subject to copyright control” and that the transmission 
guidelines are “broad enough to include all conceivable forms and combinations of wired or wireless 
communications media” and apply with equal force to co-located and geographically dispersed transmissions as well 
as transmissions that are received contemporaneously and/or at staggered times. House Report no. 94-1476 (1990, 
1995, 1999, 2002). 
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separately.86  The result is that, over the life of a copyright, the bundle of rights may become 
dispersed and difficult to trace making permission-seeking for uses implicating the exclusive 
rights untenable. 
Compounding these concerns further is the fact that copyright infringement is a strict 
liability tort, meaning that the subjective intent of the actor is irrelevant to the question of 
culpability.87  There is no such thing as “innocent,” “excusable,” or “justifiable” infringement.  If 
a person interferes with any of the rightsholder’s exclusive rights, and their activity is not subject 
to one of the enumerated limitations or exceptions discussed below, they may be found liable for 
copyright infringement and subject to the penalties outlined in Chapter V of the Act.     
Statutory Remedies & Questions of Liability 
This section discusses remedies for infringement and potential relevant limitations on 
liability including §504 — Damages and Profits, and §511 — State Sovereign Immunity. 
DAMAGES AND PROFITS - §504 
Remedies for copyright infringement can include monetary damages, 88  temporary or 
permanent injunction, 89  impounding and destruction of infringing copies, 90  and costs and 
attorney’s fees.91  Instead of recouping actual damages and profits, prevailing plaintiffs who 
timely registered their work may elect statutory damages that range from $750 - $30,000 per 
instance of infringement, and up to $150,000 per instance of willful infringement.92  Willful 
infringement is not defined by the Act, but courts have typically treated the willfulness 
determination as consisting of two prongs: 1) the defendant engaged in the (infringing) acts, and 
2) the defendant knew or should have known that the acts were infringing.93  The burden is on 
the plaintiff to prove willfulness by a preponderance of the evidence.  In addition, although they 
                                                 
86 House Report no. 94-1476 (1990, 1995, 1999, 2002). 
87 But see Goold, P. R. (2015). Fair Use: Why Copyright Infringement Is Not a Strict Liability Tort. Berkeley 
Technology Law Journal, arguing that the fair use defense suggests that culpability for copyright infringement 
actually based on a negligence standard. 
88 17 USC §504. 
89 17 USC §502.  
90 17 USC §503. 
91  17 USC §505.  A prevailing plaintiff may only recover costs and fees if the copyrighted work was timely 
registered. 
92 17 USC §504.  Statutory damages range from $750 - $30,000 per infringement.  Damages for “willful” 
infringements can run up to $150,000 per infringement.  (17 USC §504(c)). 
93 Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc., 769 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014), at 1381-1382. 
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are rarely imposed, criminal penalties including imprisonment may be ordered in some cases of 
copyright infringement.94  
Plugging these potential remedies into the mass digitization context we can speculate that 
the “worst case scenario” in terms of possible copyright infringement liability is extreme.  
Assume, for example, that the University of Michigan’s library contains five million in-copyright 
works and the digitization project meets the threshold for willfulness, the potential liability for 
making a single copy is seven hundred and fifty billion dollars.  Of course, Google would need 
its own copy (double that figure) and Michigan would need at least one back-up copy (double 
that figure again).  And then if Michigan or Google wanted to actually do anything with the 
copies, that might trigger additional instances of infringement.  This is all to say that, in terms of 
the worst case scenario, the risks were extreme.   
 That said, however, §504(c) of the Act includes a potentially significant added source of 
protection for libraries and archives that may be relevant to the mass digitization project: 
“The court shall remit statutory damages in any case where an infringer believed 
and had reasonable grounds for believing that his or her use of the copyrighted 
work was a fair use under section 107, if the infringer was an employee or agent 
of a nonprofit educational institution, library, or archive acting within the scope 
of his or her employment who, or such institution, library, or archives itself, 
which infringed by reproducing the work in copies ….” 95 
 
Thus, if the infringing activity was undertaken by a nonprofit educational institution, 
library, or archive under the belief — subjectively and reasonably under an objective standard — 
that the infringing activity qualified as a fair use, it would be insulated from an award of 
statutory damages.  It is worth noting that a belief that its activities were non-infringing under 
other exemptions (such as §108, §117, and §121 discussed infra) would not be sufficient to 
trigger §504(c)’s protections.  Furthermore, libraries associated with for-profit institutions or 
universities would not be eligible to avail themselves of this added protection. 
STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY - §511 
Another potential limit on public institutions’ liability for copyright infringement is the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity.  Most scholars agree that the doctrine stems from the U.S. 
Constitution although there appears to be some disagreement about its specific source within that 
                                                 
94  17 USC §506. 
95 17 USC §504 (c)(2)(i). 
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document.  The dominant understanding is that state sovereign immunity derives from the 
Eleventh Amendment which provides, in pertinent part: 
“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any 
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States 
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” 
 
The express text of the amendment does not mention suits brought against a state by its 
own citizens.  However, over time, the principle has evolved beyond a strict textual reading to 
encompass suits filed by citizens of the defendant state.96 
Although state sovereign immunity has been interpreted fairly broadly in recent years, the 
principle is still undergoing active exploration and thus is not well-settled.  As one scholar notes, 
“the Eleventh Amendment has emerged from relative obscurity to become a major focus of 
constitutional controversy.” 97   While it was relatively ignored through the first half of the 
twentieth century, court opinions have mentioned it liberally in recent years.98  In the last two 
decades the Supreme Court has made several important Eleventh Amendment rulings that reflect 
a deeply divided court.  Majority opinions, as will be discussed momentarily, are frequently 
coupled with vehement dissents.  Many of the decisions are 5-4 splits and the differences of 
opinion between the majority and dissent often revolve around crucial and foundational aspects 
of Eleventh Amendment interpretation. 
Before distilling some of key aspects of sovereign immunity in the context of public 
universities’ potential liability for copyright infringement, I will take a moment to offer a general 
observation on the highly contentious and unsettled nature of state sovereign immunity 
jurisprudence drawing upon the Supreme Court’s 1999 decision in Alden v. Maine. 
In Alden v. Maine, the majority held that Congress may not use its Article I powers to 
abrogate state sovereign immunity to subject unconsenting states to suit in state court, writing:   
“We have … sometimes referred to the States’ immunity from suit as ‘Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.’  The phrase is convenient shorthand but something of a 
misnomer, for the sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is 
limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment.  Rather, as the Constitution’s 
structure, its history, and the authoritative interpretations of this Court make clear, 
the States’ immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which 
                                                 
96 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S. Ct. 504, 33 L. Ed. 842 (1890). 
97 Meltzer, D. J. (1996). The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity. The Supreme Court Review, 1996, 1-
65:1. 
98 Meltzer, (1996:): “The Amendment was cited in only ten Warren Court decisions (over sixteen terms) [1953-
1969], but has been mentioned in 125 decisions in the twenty-seven Terms since.”  
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the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they 
retain today (either literally or by virtue of their admission into the Union upon an 
equal footing with the other States) except as altered by … certain constitutional 
Amendments.” 
 
Note that under the majority’s perspective, States’ immunity from suit is so essential to 
the fundamental structure of the United States that the principle not only predates the 
Constitution but it does not even require express articulation and ratification in that crucial 
founding document; it is just that obvious. 
Writing for the dissent, Justice Souter argued that the Eleventh Amendment and the 
principle of state sovereign immunity should be interpreted narrowly to limit only the diversity 
jurisdiction of the federal courts.  In Souter’s view (which is joined by three other Justices), even 
if States had broad sovereign immunity at some point they necessarily surrendered it when they 
ratified the Constitution.99 
One might reasonably wonder whether the majority and the dissent could be any farther 
apart in terms of their respective constructions of the role of the Eleventh Amendment and 
interpretations of the doctrine of state sovereign immunity.  Alden v. Maine demonstrates that 
questions of state sovereign immunity are extremely contentious and open to debate.  Keeping in 
mind the stark difference of opinion and interpretation regarding the doctrine of state sovereign 
immunity, consider the following discussion. 
At its essence, the doctrine of state sovereign immunity precludes unconsenting states 
from being sued for monetary damages or equitable relief in federal100 and state101 courts.  As 
immunity turns on questions of consent, states can waive their sovereign immunity, in whole or 
in part, 102  either expressly or constructively through the operation of certain rules of civil 
procedure.103  In addition, based on still evolving case law, it appears that the protections of state 
sovereign immunity extend to some arms of the state including libraries, archives, and 
universities run by states or their instrumentalities.104  Sovereign immunity does not, however, 
                                                 
99 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 144 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1999). 
100 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 134 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1996). 
101 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 144 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1999). 
102 Most states, for example, have waived sovereign immunity for liability based negligence in tort actions but few, 
if any, have waived immunity for liability from intentional wrongs. 
103 Lapides v. Board of Regents of Univ. System of Ga. 535 U.S. 613 (2002). 
104 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, (1996);  
Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 40 
apply to state municipalities and counties105  although, as a practical matter, if municipal or 
county officials are sued in federal court in their official capacity and any relief granted would 
have a significant effect on the state treasury, courts will consider it a “suit against the state” and 
sovereign immunity would kick in.106   
Aside from states waiving the protection, another important potential limitation derives 
from Congressional abrogation of states’ immunity.  The seminal decision was the Supreme 
Court’s 1996 ruling in Seminole Tribe v. Florida.  Prior to Seminole, state universities and 
libraries were understood to be subject to damages for copyright infringement.107  In this case, 
however, the Court held that Congress cannot use its Article I powers to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity to subject unconsenting states to suit in federal court.  A year later, however, the Court 
ruled in City of Boerne v. Flores that Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant 
to its powers under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provided that it gives (1) an express 
statement of intent and (2) the abrogation is a constitutionally valid exercise of power.”108  These 
two decisions may have important implications on questions of the potential liability of 
universities for copyright infringement stemming from mass digitization.  
First, with respect to the first factor cited in City of Boerne, it is uncontroverted that 
Congress has attempted to abrogate state sovereign immunity in the copyright context.  In §511 
of the Copyright Act, Congress provided an express statement of intent to make states and their 
instrumentalities liable for copyright infringement: 
“Any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State 
or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity, shall not be 
immune, under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States 
or under any other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in federal court … 
for a violation of any of the exclusive rights of a copyright owner provided by 
sections 106 through 122 … or for any other violation under this title.” 
 
This section further provides that states and their instrumentalities may be subject to any 
of the standard remedies for infringement including impounding and disposition of infringing 
copies, actual damages and profits, statutory damages, and costs and fees (§511(2)).  
                                                 
105 Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890); Ford Motor Co., v. Dept. of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945); 
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 
106 Pennhurst State School  & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). 
107 Section 108 Study Group Report (2008). An Independent Report sponsored by The United States Copyright 
Office and the National Digital Information Infrastructure and Preservation Program of the Library of Congress, 
March 2008.  Available at http://www.section108.gov/docs/Sec108StudyGroupReport.pdf.   
108 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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Under a plain reading of the statute, §511 satisfies the first prong of the Boerne test 
because it offers an express statement of intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity with respect 
to copyright suits. Therefore the inquiry shifts to the second prong: whether or not §511 reflects a 
constitutionality valid exercise of Congress’ power.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, this question turns 
out to be far more contentious.   
As previously discussed, Congressional authority to pass copyright laws stems from the 
powers granted it under Article I of the Constitution.  Under this clause, Congress may pass laws: 
“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries.”109   
 
 While Congress clearly has constitutional authority to pass laws granting rights under 
Article I, City of Boerne tells us the key inquiry with respect to sovereign immunity turns on 
whether or not Article I gives Congress the power to enforce rights, particularly with respect to 
states, as it attempts with to §511 of Act. 
In Seminole, the Court seems to answer this question with a resounding “no.”  In that 
decision, the majority plainly states that Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity 
under its Article I powers.  Seminole would therefore suggest that, despite its express intent, §511 
of the Copyright Act does not actually abrogate states’ immunity from copyright suits absent 
some other valid source of constitutional authority. 
 In City of Boerne, the majority held that Congress may use its enforcement powers under 
§5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to limit state sovereign immunity provided that certain 
conditions are satisfied.  The relevant provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment provide in 
pertinent part: 
 “Section 1.  … No State shall … deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law …. 
 
 Section 5.  The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article.” 
 
 Applying the Fourteenth Amendment to the copyright context, we must ask whether or 
not copyright infringement by states or their instrumentalities could reasonably constitute the 
deprivation of property without due process of law.  Copyright rights are unquestionably a form 
                                                 
109 U.S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 8. 
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of (albeit intangible) property, however not all deprivations are legally cognizable.  Section 1 
tells us that only deprivations that occur “without due process of law” trigger Congress’s 
enforcement powers against the states.  In other words, states’ sovereign immunity from liability 
for copyright infringement could only be abrogated if state courts are unwilling or unable to 
adequately remedy the harm. 
A nearly identical question was brought before the Court in Florida Prepaid 
Postsecondary Educational Expense Board v. College Savings Bank in the patent law context.110 
(The Patent Act contains a provision, “PRCA,” that is functionally identical to §511 of the 
Copyright Act.)  The majority in Florida Prepaid stated the applicable rule for purposes of the 
Fourteenth Amendment as follows: 
“[O]nly where the State provides no remedy, or only inadequate remedies, to 
injured patent owners for its infringement of their patents could a deprivation of 
property without due process result.”111  
 
 Given that both patent and copyright law falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
federal courts, and state courts are therefore powerless to rule on patent and copyright 
infringement actions, a reasonable inference might be that state courts would be unable to 
provide adequate remedies in infringement suits.  This was the view held by Justice Stevens in 
his dissenting opinion (joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) in Florida Prepaid. On 
the due process question, Justice Stevens explains: 
“Given the absence of effective state remedies for patent infringement by States 
and the statutory pre-emption of such state remedies, the [PRCA] was an 
appropriate exercise of Congress’ power under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to prevent state deprivations of property without due process of law.” 
 
The majority did not align with this conclusion because, in its view, Congress “barely 
considered the availability of state remedies for patent infringement” based on laws properly 
within the jurisdiction of state courts such as contract law, tort law, and so forth.  In other words, 
the legislative record did not present persuasive evidence suggesting that Congress adequately 
considered the possibility of re-tooling patent and copyright infringement cases based on state 
                                                 
110 Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 144 L. 
Ed. 2d 575 (1999). 
111 Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 144 L. 
Ed. 2d 575 (1999) at 643; citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 539-541 (1981); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 
532-533 (1984); id., at 539 (O’connor, J. concurring) (“[i]n challenging a property deprivation, the claimant must 
either avail himself of the remedies guaranteed by state law or prove that the available remedies are inadequate …. 
When adequate remedies are provided and followed, no … deprivation of property without due process can result”).  
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law principles. While lack of support in the legislative record is not determinative, in this 
instance the Court concludes the record was insufficient to warrant abrogating state sovereign 
immunity:  
Congress must “identify conduct transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
substantive provisions, and must tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or 
preventing such conduct” and “[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality 
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that 
end.” 112 
 
In addition, the majority did not find in the legislative record substantial evidence that 
Congress passed the PCRA in response to “a history of ‘widespread and persisting deprivation of 
constitutional rights’ of the sort Congress has faced in enacting proper prophylactic §5 
legislation.”113  While the record contained testimony suggesting a fear that infringement of 
patents and copyrights by states might be on the rise, there was little evidence in the record to 
demonstrate that these fears were substantiated.  In the majority’s view, “the record at best offers 
scant support for Congress’ conclusion that States were depriving patent owners of property 
without due process of law by pleading sovereign immunity in federal-court patent actions.”114 
Therefore, it concluded that the provision was neither congruent nor proportional in “in light of 
the evil presented” and thus was not a constitutionally valid exercise of Congress’s §5 powers. 
The dissent countered by arguing: 
“It is true that, when considering the [provision], Congress did not review the 
remedies available in each State for patent infringements and surmise what kind 
of recovery a plaintiff might obtain in a tort suit in all 50 jurisdictions.  But, it is 
particularly ironic that the Court should view this fact as support for its holding.  
Given that Congress had long ago pre-empted state jurisdiction over patent 
infringement cases, it was surely reasonable for Congress to assume that such 
remedies simply did not exist.”   
 
Moreover, the dissent argues that the Court’s holding is unsupported by City of Boerne 
and actually conflicts with the Courts reasoning in that case:  
“[T]his Court has never mandated that Congress must find ‘widespread and 
persisting deprivation of constitutional rights’ in order to employ its §5 authority.  
It is not surprising, therefore, that congress did not compile an extensive 
legislative record analyzing the due process (or lack thereof) that each State might 
afford for a patent infringement suit retooled as an action in tort.  In 1992, 
                                                 
112 Florida Prepaid at 639. 
113 Florida Prepaid at 645; quoting City of Boerne at 526. 
114 Florida Prepaid at 646. 
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Congress had no reason to believe it needed to do such a thing; indeed, it should 
not have to do so today.” 
 
The central difference between the majority and dissent in this case might boil down to a 
difference of opinion around the how Congress’s Article I authority under the Copyright Clause 
to pass laws granting rights intersects with its power to pass laws enforcing rights against the 
states.   The majority concluded that Article I, in granting Congress the power to pass copyright 
laws, did not also give Congress jurisdiction over a State that does not consent to be sued for 
violating those rights.  While the contested provision ensured uniformity of the patent system 
and closed a potential loophole in the uniform federal scheme, which are valid Article I purposes, 
the provision did not satisfy the purposes of the Due Process clause as required by constitutional 
law. 
In contrast, the dissent viewed the Article I powers as necessarily encompassing both the 
power to pass copyright laws and the power to ensure their enforcement:   
“Article I … calculus is directly relevant to this case because it establishes the 
constitutionality of the congressional decision to vest exclusive jurisdiction over 
… infringement cases in the federal courts.  That basic decision was 
unquestionably appropriate.  It was equally appropriate for Congress to abrogate 
state sovereign immunity in … infringement cases in order to close a potential 
loophole in the uniform federal scheme, which, in undermined, would necessarily 
decrease the efficacy of the process afforded to [rights] holders.”   
 
In addition, Justice Stevens argued that the PRCA, the legislation that expressed 
Congress’s intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity in patent infringement cases, did not alter 
any substantive rule of state law but “merely effectuates settled federal policy to confine patent 
infringement litigation to federal judges.”115  Recognizing the inherent injustice of sovereign 
immunity in this context, the United States waived its immunity from patent infringement suits 
via a 1910 Act of Congress.116  And, in the 1973 Goldstein v. California case, the Supreme Court 
said: “When Congress grants an exclusive right or monopoly, its effects are pervasive; no citizen 
or State may escape its reach.” (emphasis added)  The dissent therefore remains sharply critical 
of the majority’s rationale.  After all, why then should states receive an added cloak of protection 
against liability? 
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While the Supreme Court has not ruled precisely on the validity of §511, it is reasonable 
to assume the holding in Florida Prepaid would transfer to the copyright context.  Indeed, lower 
courts in the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have applied 
Florida Prepaid to the copyright context, concluding that, notwithstanding the express intent of 
§511 to make states and their instrumentalities amenable to suit in copyright cases, the principle 
of state sovereign immunity applies.117  To date, no court has enforced §511 against a state.  
Therefore, at the time the mass digitization project was in contemplation, it would appear that 
state sovereign immunity might provide a significant layer of protection for public universities 
against liability for copyright infringement (although universities could still be enjoined from 
using the scans, an outcome that would render the digitized copies effectively useless). 
Statutory Limits on Exclusive Rights - 17 U.S.C. §§107-122 
Aside from the potential complete bar to liability offered by the state sovereign immunity 
doctrine, copyright holders’ rights are limited in several important ways. 118   Rightsholders 
cannot, for example, interfere with subsequent distribution of copies of their work after the initial 
sale.119  Libraries are permitted to make preservation copies under certain conditions specified in 
the Act.120  Owners of computer programs are permitted to make a backup copy and/or a copy 
made as an incidental and necessary step in using the program (i.e. a RAM copy).121 
This section describes four of the primary potential limitations on authors’ exclusive 
rights that may be applicable to the mass digitization context: fair use (§107), library and archive 
exception (§108), the “dark archive” exception for computer software (§117), and the exception 
for uses made in the provision of services to blind and disabled persons (§121). 
FAIR USE - §107 
For purposes of this research, the most significant potential limitation on copyright 
holders’ exclusive rights is the fair use limitation codified in §107 of the Act.122  The doctrine of 
fair use limits an author’s exclusive rights by allowing “the public to draw upon copyrighted 
                                                 
117 Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601 (5th Circuit, 2000) (Under Seminole  and City of Boerne §511 is an 
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materials without the permission of the copyright holder in certain circumstances.”123 As the 
Supreme Court notes, fair use is essential to fulfilling the Act’s overriding goal:   
“From the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of 
copyrighted materials has been thought necessary to fulfill copyright’s very 
purpose, ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts …’”124  
 
Fair use is an “equitable rule of reason” that asks courts to undertake a sensitive 
balancing of interests, taking into account relevant facts, legal precedent, and equitable 
considerations to determine whether or not a secondary use of a protected work is infringing or 
non-infringing.  The precise meaning of fair use has always been someone difficult to pin down 
in practice.  Legislative and administrative guidance has motioned, at various times, toward 
clarifying the doctrine.  For example, in contemplation of its inclusion in the Copyright Act 
(prior to the last major revision to the Act in 1976), the Register of Copyrights produced a report 
that provided a non-exhaustive list of core fair use examples:125 
 Quotation of excerpts in a review or criticism for purposes of illustration or comment; 
 Quotation of short passages in a scholarly or technical work, for illustration or 
clarification of the author’s observations; 
 Use in a parody of some of the content of the work parodied; 
 Summary of an address or article, with brief quotations, in a news report; 
 Reproduction by a library of a portion of their works to replace part of a damaged copy; 
 Reproduction by a teacher or student of a small part of works to illustrate a lesson; 
 Reproduction of a work in legislative or judicial proceedings or reports; 
 Incidental and fortuitous reproduction, in a newsreel or broadcast, where the work is 
located in the scene of an event be reported. 
What the Register’s list communicates (perhaps implicitly) is that fair use is a 
fundamentally fact-based, case-by-case, determination.  This gives courts a tremendous amount 
of discretion in terms of the doctrine’s application, but also infuses the copyright system with a 
tremendous amount of ambiguity and uncertainty. 
Fair use was given an express statutory recognition for the first time in §107 of the 1976 
Act.  The specific fair use language adopted in the Act is the result of a process of accretion 
                                                 
123  Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d at 95 (2nd Cir. 2014). 
124 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. at 574 (1994). 
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resulting from repeated collisions in the courts between rightsholders and the defendants 
asserting their practices were in support of the overriding public policy goals of copyright.  The 
Act requires courts to weigh together four nonexclusive factors in assessing whether a particular 
use is fair: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial 
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work, including whether it is primarily creative or 
instructive (which copyright tends to value and seek to foster) or primarily factual (in 
which the law of fair use recognizes a greater need to disseminate); 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work 
as a whole, including whether the secondary use employed no more than was necessary 
to effectuate any valid purpose under the first factor; and  
(4) the effect of the use upon the market for or value of the copyrighted work. 126   
Notwithstanding this guidance provided by Act and substantial case law, fair use still 
retains a seemingly unshakeable reputation for being a murky, ill-defined concept: 
“Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use doctrine over 
and over again, no real definition of the concept has ever emerged.  Indeed, since 
the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is 
possible, and each case raising the question must be decided on its own facts.”127   
 
Examples of fair use arising from pre-2004 litigation include: 
 Book reviewers and biographers quoting from an original work in order to 
illustrate a point and substantiate criticism;128  
 Rap artists using copyrighted music in a commercial parody of the original;129  
 Internet search engines displaying low-resolution thumbnails of copyrighted 
images in order to direct users to the website hosting the original;130  
 Viewers recording a television broadcast for later viewing;131  
                                                 
126  17 U.S.C. §107. 
127 House Report no. 94-1476. 
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 Competitors copying protected software for purposes of reverse engineering;132  
The perceived lack of a unifying theory has prompted lengthy discussions and debates 
amongst scholars, judges, policymakers, and commentators on what the doctrine means and how 
it should be interpreted and applied, particularly with respect to new technologies and the 
emerging social practices they enable. 
In his seminal work on the subject, Leon Seltzer, an expert on the intersections of 
copyright law and scholarly publishing in the years leading up to and immediately following the 
1976 Act, argued that fair uses are those that are “productive.”  He argued that the emphasis on 
productivity could assist courts in characterizing the essence of the fair use trade-off: “reasonable 
portions of the work of a prior author” may be used to create a new work which, in turn, “adds to 
the fount of public knowledge.”133 
Seltzer’s viewpoint was adopted by the Ninth Circuit in its seminal Sony v. Universal 
decision.  Sony asked the Court to consider whether or not the manufacturer of the Betamax 
should be found contributorily liable for the infringing uses of its consumers when the home 
video tape recorder was capable of substantial non-infringing uses.  The Ninth Circuit 
determined that, as a matter of law, use of a home video tape recorder was not a fair use because 
it was not a “productive use.”134  On appeal, however, the Supreme Court declined to ascribe to a 
rule requiring fair uses to be productive ones.  Still, it is fair to say that productivity played an 
important, although not determinative, role in the Court’s decision. 
One of the central (ultimately determined to be non-infringing) uses the Court focused on 
in Sony was time-shifting — recording a television broadcast off the air for later viewing.  Time-
shifting, the court noted, “enlarges the television viewing audience” for rightsholders’ content 
which they broadcast for free for at-home viewing. Although time-shifting involves users making 
verbatim copies of entire copyrighted works, and no associated new expressive or creative 
secondary work is produced, the Court implied that the copying may nevertheless be 
                                                 
132 Sony Comp. Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 599-601 (2000). 
133 Seltzer, L. E. "Exemptions and Fair Use in Copyright: The Exclusive Rights Tensions in the New Copyright Act." 
Bull. Copyright Soc'y USA 24 (1976): 215, discussed by Patry, W. (2005). “Productive Use, Transformative Use, 
Complementary Use: Who’s Right?,” The Patry Copyright Blog, Oct. 28, 2005, available at 
http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2005/10/productive-use-transformative-use.html  
134 "Without a `productive use,' i. e. when copyrighted material is reproduced for its intrinsic use, the mass copying 
of the sort involved in this case precludes an application of fair use." Sony, 659 F. 2d, at 971-972. 
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“productive” because it “expands public access to freely broadcast television programs” and, in 
so doing, “yields societal benefits.”135   
This reasoning drew upon an earlier case that cited “First Amendment policy of providing 
the fullest possible access to information through the public airwaves;”136 applying that rationale 
to time-shifting, the Court noted that:  
“… access is not just a matter of convenience ….  Access has been limited not 
simply by inconvenience but by the basic need to work.  Access to the better 
program has also been limited by the competitive practice of 
counterprogramming.”137  
 
Thus, while the Supreme Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit that “productive use” 
was an absolute rule, it nevertheless referenced the link between fair use and productive use as 
“helpful in calibrating the balance” of interests on review, and for constructing meanings around 
issues of access. 
Perhaps more important to the Court’s fair use analysis, however, were its concerns 
around the potential economic harms (or lack thereof) stemming from the Betamax.  While the 
advent of the Betamax may “require some adjustments in marketing strategy” for rightsholders, 
the Court concluded that the practice of time-shifting did not impair the commercial value of the 
broadcast content nor create any likelihood of future economic harm.138  Potentially foreclosing 
the manufacture and sale of an article of commerce useful for numerous non-infringing uses 
because of some potential speculative future harm to certain copyright holders’ interests would 
result in a miscarriage of justice.  In cases involving emerging technological innovations that 
have the potential to majorly alter the market for copyrighted materials, courts should be 
“circumspect in construing the scope of rights created by a legislative enactment which never 
contemplated such a calculus of interests.”139  Quoting from Justice Stewart’s 1975 opinion: 
“The limited scope of the copyright holder’s statutory monopoly, like the limited 
copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing 
claims upon the public interest.  Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, 
but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public 
availability of literature, music, and the other arts.  The immediate effect of our 
copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor.  But the 
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ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general 
public good.  ‘The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in 
conferring the monopoly,’ this Court has said, ‘lie in the general benefits derived 
by the public from the labors of authors.’ When technological change has 
rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be construed in light 
of this basic purpose.”140 
 
Justice Blackmun, writing for the dissent, disputed the Court’s interpretation and 
application of fair use doctrine, writing:   
“It may be tempting as, in my view, the Court today is tempted, to stretch the 
doctrine of fair use so as to permit unfettered use of this new technology in order 
to increase access ….  But such an extension risks eroding the very basis of 
copyright law, by depriving authors of control over their works and consequently 
of their incentive to create.”   
 
Of particular concern to Blackmun were potential market harms caused by “unproductive 
‘ordinary’ uses” like (in his view) time-shifting that, though appearing harmless when viewed in 
isolation could become “a major inroad on copyright that must be prevented” when taken in the 
aggregate.141   
Following on the heels of Sony, the Supreme Court made another major fair use ruling in 
the Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises case.142 The subject matter of that case involved a 
memoir written by former President Gerald Ford and, in particular, portions that described his 
decision to pardon Richard Nixon.  Ford had licensed his publications rights in the memoir to 
Harper & Row.  Prior to its official publication, however, The Nation magazine “scooped” its 
competitors by publishing portions of the memoir without permission.  The content published by 
The Nation consisted of direct quotes comprising approximately 300-400 words of the 
approximately 500-page memoir.   
Harper & Row sued The Nation for copyright infringement.  In its defense, The Nation 
asserted that Ford was a public figure, his reasons for pardoning Nixon were a matter of public 
concern, and therefore its appropriation should qualify as a fair use.  Noting that the right of first 
publication is a particularly strong right, the Supreme Court held that there was no ‘public figure’ 
exception to copyright.  In applying the four fair use factors, the Court ruled in favor of Harper & 
Row, finding: (1) that The Nation’s use (“scooping” a competitor) was not a good faith use of the 
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fair use principle, (2) that the nature of the copyrighted work was informative, (3) that, although 
the amount copied was small in relation to the whole, it comprised the “heart of the work,” and 
(4) there was actual harm to the market for the original (Time magazine cancelled a contract with 
Harper & Row on the basis of The Nation’s publication).  Beyond the specific facts of the case, 
this decision is often referenced for the principle that “the single most important element of fair 
use” is the fourth fair use factor: the effect of the use on the potential market.143   
Driven by a concern that fair use cases were too often “adjudicated upon ad hoc 
perceptions of justice without a permanent framework,” Judge Pierre Leval modified the concept 
of productive use and proposed “transformation” as a cogent governing principle for fair use 
determinations in his seminal article, Toward a Fair Use Standard.144  In describing this new 
approach, Leval argued that the secondary use must be productive, i.e. not merely repackage or 
republish the original.145  In determining whether a use is productive, the concern is whether the 
secondary use: 
 “… adds value to the original – the quoted matter is used as raw material, 
transformed in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and 
understandings – this is the very type of activity that the fair use doctrine intends 
to protect for the enrichment of society.”146  
 
In the landmark case, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,147 the Supreme Court revisited 
fair use and applied, for the first time, a transformation analysis to a fair use determination.  
Since that decision, courts have increasingly focused on whether the purpose and character of a 
secondary use is transformative: 
“A use is transformative if it does something more than repackage or republish the 
original copyrighted work.  The inquiry is whether the work ‘adds something new, 
with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new 
expression, meaning, or message …’”148  
 
Despite the inclusion of the transformation analysis, subsequent fair use cases illustrate 
the doctrine’s persistent lack of clarity and signal a potentially important disconnect between the 
core transformative use cases (that deal with creative or expressive uses that “add, modify, or 
                                                 
143 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. National Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). 
144 Leval, P. N. (1990). Toward a fair use standard. Harvard Law Review, 103(5), 1105-1136. 
145Leval, P. N. (1990). Toward a fair use standard. Harvard Law Review, 103(5), 1105-1136. 
146 Leval, P. N. (1990). Toward a fair use standard. Harvard Law Review, 103(5), 1105-1136. 
147 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. at 574 (1994). 
148 Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust (2014), p. 96, quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 1994, p. 579, citing Leval, 1990, 
p. 1111.   
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alter” the original with new expression) and an emerging sub-set of transformative use cases 
(that deal with the technical manipulation of existing works, not to create new/derivative 
expressive works but rather to enable the subsequent discoverability of new facts and 
information about the originals).149   
Yet another interpretation of fair use was offered by Judge Posner in a case before the 
Seventh Circuit.  Drawing upon economic theory to inform legal theory, Posner did not dismiss 
outright the transformative use language adopted by the Supreme Court (of course, bound by 
precedent, he could not) but rather conceptualized fair uses as those that are “complementary” to 
the original as opposed to “substitutional.”150 Thus, Posner regarded fair uses as those that make 
reference to a pre-existing work as a way to ground the new, complementary one, adding to the 
market value of the original rather than reducing it by offering a substantially similar 
substitution.   
The focus on market harm as the central factor of fair use is consistent with Harper & 
Row, but, somewhat paradoxically, Posner’s approach would shift the transformation analysis 
from the first factor (purpose and character of the use) to the fourth factor.  These tensions 
between the first and fourth fair use factors raise a unique and complicated tension.  As already 
described, the first factor focuses on the questions of transformation and, almost by definition, 
courts are reluctant to find market harms following from such uses.  Transformative uses by their 
very nature do not devalue the market for the original because they are transformative.  By 
contrast, where a use is not likely to be found to be transformative, the fourth factor rises to 
dominate the court’s analysis and the existence of the secondary work can, in and of itself, be 
suggestive of a potential market harm to the original (e.g. through lost licensing opportunities, 
for example).  Therefore, the relationship between market harms and transformative becomes 
even more significant in fair use analyses.      
 On the heels of the Campbell decision, the Second Circuit applied the Court’s 
transformative use analysis in American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, a case involving a pattern 
and practice of photocopying scientific journals in association with research-related activities.  
Specifically, the record showed that Texaco subscribed to numerous scientific journals for the 
                                                 
149 This issue is discussed in greater depth in  
Centivany, A. (2015). Innovative Deviance: A Theoretical Framework Emerging at the Intersection of Copyright 
Law and Technological Change, pg. 6. 
150 Ty, Inc. v. Publications Int’l Ltd., 292 F. 3d 512, 2002. 
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use of its research scientists, that the scientists could place their names on a list to ensure that 
particular journals would be routed to their office or lab, that the scientists would make 
photocopies of entire articles of interest and/or relevance to their research, and, the copying was 
done, in part, in avoidance of paying for additional subscriptions or license fees.  Texaco, which 
at the time of the litigation employed 400-500 research scientists, stipulated that it presumed all 
or most of its scientists photocopied scientific journal articles in support of their research.   
Several key facts distinguish the Texaco case from the mass digitization project at issue in 
this research.  There were technological differences: photocopying as opposed to digital 
scanning.  The status of the parties differed: Texaco is a private for-profit company whereas at 
least some of the universities and institutions involved in the mass digitization project were 
nonprofit state instrumentalities, and all except Google enjoyed the special/privileged status of 
“library.”151  The organizational arrangement facilitating or “doing” the copying differed: Texaco 
supported and/or encouraged the selective photocopying of its researchers whereas, in the mass 
digitization context, the institutions themselves were active participants in the mass digitization 
project.  The intent or purpose of the copying, and its outcomes and effect, may have differed in 
significant ways although, at this stage, I will focus only on Texaco’s activity and reserve 
discussion of the intents, purposes, and outcomes of the mass digitization for subsequent 
chapters of this work.   
Notwithstanding all of these potentially important factual differences, however, Texaco 
likely provides the most direct precedential analog to the sort of systematic, institutional, 
verbatim copying of print materials at issue in this thesis.  In particular, the case provides 
guidance on how a court might apply fair use doctrine to the systematic, institutional, mechanical 
reproduction of scholarly works for research purposes.  In addition, the majority viewed as 
significant the fact that there was a temporal and causal disconnect between the copying and the 
purported research uses.  The copying done by Texaco’s scientists was found not to be 
spontaneous reproduction, prompted by a specific, active, contemporaneous research purpose, 
but was rather pre-emptive or “archival” — the scientists made the copies and filed them away 
                                                 
151 For purposes of this research, the special status of libraries is most acutely made manifest in section 108 of the 
Copyright Act, discussed supra, however, given that fair use is an “equitable rule of reason,” it is reasonable to 
assume that libraries privileged position in society might afford them additional protections under fair use as well, 
although this is likely to be a door that swings both ways:  libraries may be given broader latitude but are held to a 
higher ethical/legal standard because of their special status. 
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for possible future reference and use.  Indeed, the court estimated that the majority of copies 
made were filed away and never used at all.152   
At the outset of its analysis, the court draws attention to the copyright risks associated 
with innovations in mechanical reproducing technologies.  It notes, “the invention and 
widespread availability of photocopying technology threatens to disrupt the delicate balances 
established by the Copyright Act.”  Quoting Blackmun’s dissent in Sony, the Court recognizes 
that ‘the advent of inexpensive and readily available copying machines … has changed the 
dimensions’ of the legal issues concerning the practice of making personal copies of copyrighted 
materials.”153  While the focus here was on individual behaviors (personal copying) rather than 
organizational behaviors per se, the concern for striking the “appropriate balance between 
authors’ interest in preserving the integrity of copyright, and the public’s right to enjoy the 
benefits that photocopying technology offers” may be extended, arguably with more strength, to 
systematic institutional copying. 
In one of its strongest statements, the Court casts doubt upon the very applicability of fair 
use to mechanical verbatim reproduction: 
“Indeed, if the issue were open, we would seriously question whether the fair use 
analysis that has developed with respect to works of authorship alleged to use 
portions of copyrighted material is precisely applicable to copies produced by 
mechanical means.  The traditional fair use analysis … developed in an effort to 
adjust the competing interests of authors – the author of the original copyrighted 
work and the author of the secondary work that ‘copies’ a portion of the original 
work in the course of producing what is claimed to be a new work.  Mechanical 
‘copying’ of an entire document, made readily feasible and economical by the 
advent of xerography is obviously an activity entirely different from creating a 
work of authorship. Whatever social utility copying of this sort achieves, it is not 
concerned with creative authorship.”154  
 
The Court then, reluctantly, acknowledges that it is bound, under Sony, to apply a fair use 
analysis to the photocopying practices of Texaco’s scientists. 
                                                 
152 American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 915-916.  It is worth noting that neither he parties nor the Court 
attempted to discover the photocopying practices of all 400-500 of Texaco’s scientists.  Instead, “in order to spare 
the enormous expense of exploring the photocopying practices of each of them” the parties stipulated that “one 
scientist would be chosen at random as the representative of the entire group.”  This scientist, Dr. Donald H. 
Chickering II, was discovered to have copied eight articles from the scientific journal Catalysis, three of which he 
ended up using in his research while the remaining five copies were not used.   
153 American Geophysical Union v. Texaco at 917 quoting Sony at 801-802. 
154 American Geophysical Union v. Texaco at 917 (internal citations omitted) 
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Given its relevance to this thesis, I will now briefly address the Court’s analysis with 
respect to each of the four fair use factors in turn.  With respect to the first factor — the purpose 
and character of the use — the court is concerned with whether or not the copying was 
transformational or purely substitutive.  It noted that Dr. Chickering’s primary purpose was 
substitutional.  He made the photocopies,  
“at least initially, for the same basic purpose that one would normally seek to 
obtain the original – to have it available on his shelf for ready reference if and 
when he needed to look at it …. Making copies enabled all researchers … to have 
the article readily available in their own offices.  In Chickering’s own words, the 
copies of the articles were made for ‘my personal convenience,’ since it is ‘far 
more convenient to have access in my office to a photocopy of an article than to 
have to go to the library each time I wanted to refer to it.”  
 
Furthermore, the court characterized this photocopying practice as primarily “archival,” a 
term it used to describe copying done for the primary purpose of providing numerous scientists 
access to each article without having to purchase additional copies of the original journal.155   
The Court does, however recognize that the photocopies served other, potentially 
transformative, purposes as well.  It postulates, for example, that, by disembodying a single 
article from a larger bound journal volume, the photocopying might facilitate lab research that 
would otherwise be hampered by excessive or bulky papers.  Photocopying might also enable 
Texaco to preserve the original journals against the risks of deterioration or damage posed by 
chemicals used in the lab and ensure the originals remain free from markings and other 
marginalia made by scientists.   
While the Court recognized that conversion of articles through mechanical reproduction 
technologies might enable transformative uses in some cases, in this case Texaco’s photocopying 
“merely transformed the material object embodying the intangible article that is the copyrighted 
original work.”156  While the copies were made as part of the scientists’ research process, the 
Court stresses that fair use is primarily concerned with “the work of authorship alleged to be a 
fair use, not to the activity in which the alleged infringed is engaged.”  Whatever added value 
might derive from converting an original copy into a more useable format, the Court’s holding 
seems to suggest that transformative fair use requires a more concrete and express generativity, 
typically manifesting in a secondary work of authorship.   
                                                 
155 American Geophysical Union v. Texaco at 919-920. 
156 American Geophysical Union v. Texaco at 923. 
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The Court determined that the dominant purpose of making the copies was to simply 
multiply copies without having to pay for additional subscriptions.  While the link between 
Texaco’s commercial gain and its copying was admittedly somewhat attenuated, the Court 
nevertheless noted that the copying did not seem to occur “in good faith to benefit the public,” or 
to “produce a value that benefits the broader public interest” 157  the sort of broad policy 
considerations motivating fair use. Making copies as an end-run around purchasing additional 
journal subscriptions “merely supersede[s] the objects’ of the original creation” and tilts the first 
fair use factor against Texaco.    
The second and third fair use factors — nature of the copyrighted work and amount and 
substantiality of portion used, respectively — were relatively less important to the Court’s 
analysis than either the first or fourth factors.  The Court concluded that the scientific journal 
articles were primarily informative, a finding that weighed in Texaco’s favor, while the fact that 
articles were copied in their entirely weighed against Texaco.  Interestingly, the court notes the 
circularity or reinforcing aspects of the first and third factors noting that the amount and 
substantiality used (third factor) is assessed in light of whether it was reasonable in relation to the 
purpose of the copying (first factor).  Furthermore, the Court notes that the extent of the copying 
can “provide insight into the primary purpose of copying,” in this case concluding that copying 
articles in their entirety weakens Texaco’s assertion that the overriding purpose and character of 
the use was to enable the immediate use of the articles in the lab and conversely strengthens the 
Court’s view that the “predominant purpose and character of the use was to establish a personal 
library of pertinent articles” for its individual scientists.158         
The fourth fair use factor requires the Court to consider the effect of the use upon the 
potential market or value of the copyrighted work.  As previously discussed, in Harper & Row, 
the Supreme Court had characterized this factor as the “single most important element of fair 
use.”159  In the Campbell case that followed, however, that language is conspicuously absent.  
Subsequent courts have interpreted this omission as the Court signaling its apparent abandoning 
of the notion that the fourth factor enjoys primacy in fair use determinations: “Campbell instructs 
                                                 
157 American Geophysical Union v. Texaco at 922. 
158 American Geophysical Union v. Texaco at 925-926. 
159 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566. 
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that ‘[a]ll [four factors] are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the 
purposes of copyright.”160   
Under this factor, Courts are only interested in “traditional, reasonable, or likely to be 
developed markets.”161  Transformative uses, by their very nature, do not supplant any part of the 
normal market for a copyrighted work.  Criticisms and parodies, for example, fill a market niche 
that copyright holders simply have no interest in occupying and/or have no power to take 
advantage of.162  Thus, there is a negative reciprocity between the first and fourth factors; if a 
court finds a use transformative, that sharply undercuts the possibly of the fourth factors 
weighing in the rightsholders’ favor.  As previously noted, the Court concluded that the dominant 
purpose of the photocopying was archival and non-transformative and thus, the Court was tasked 
with evaluating the potential effect photocopying had on the market for or value of the original 
scientific articles. 
After noting that the marketing pattern for scientific articles consists of their inclusion in 
composite journals sold through subscription or as back issues, and there was not an existing 
market for single stand-alone articles, the Court acknowledged that this complicates the 
application of the fourth fair use factor.  In particular, the Court says:  
“Quite significantly … in the unique world of academic and scientific articles, the 
effect on the marketability of the composite work in which individual articles 
appear is not obviously related to the effect on the market for or value of the 
individual articles.” 
 
That said, however, the court noted that Texaco’s use would suggest a potential market 
for licensing revenues derived from individual articles.  Through the establishment of the 
Copyright Clearance Center (“CCC”), publishers have “created … a workable market for 
institutional users to obtain licenses for the right to produce their own copies of individual 
articles via photocopying.”163  It is therefore proper, in the Court’s view, to consider the existence 
of a ready market means for paying for the uses. 
In addition, the Court tells us that “Congress has impliedly suggested that the law should 
recognize licensing fees for photocopying as part of the “potential market for or value of” journal 
                                                 
160 American Geophysical Union v. Texaco at 926. 
161 American Geophysical Union v. Texaco at 930 citing Campbell 114 S.Ct. at 1178. 
162 American Geophysical Union v. Texaco at 930, citing Harper & Row at 568, Twin Peaks, 996 F.2d at 1377, 
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articles in two ways.  The first justification can be derived from the library and archive 
exceptions in §108 (discussed supra) which “narrowly circumscribes the conditions under which 
libraries are permitted to make copies of copyrighted works” and “implicitly suggests that 
Congress views journal publishers as possessing the right to restrict photocopying, or at least 
demand a licensing royalty” from entities that are not eligible for §108 protections.164  The 
second justification offered by the Court is that Congress itself “prompted the development of 
CCC by suggesting that an efficient mechanism be established to license photocopying” and thus 
it would be illogical to conclude that Congress “did not believe that fees for photocopying should 
be legally recognized as part of the potential market for journal articles.”165  Due to the potential 
market for licensing copies of the article, paired with the existence of a reasonable payment 
mechanism (the CCC) the Court concluded that the fourth factor weighed against a finding of 
fair use. 
Weighed together, the Court concludes that “the institutional, systematic, archival 
multiplication of copies” was not a fair use.  In particular, because the court did not find the 
copying to be transformative, and a licensing regime existed whereby publishers could extract 
payments for copies of disembodied single articles, the fourth factor played a major role in its 
determination.  These conclusions, however, raised a sharp dissent that will now be briefly 
discussed. 
First, the dissent found the copying to be “integral to transformative and productive ends 
of scientific research.”166  The key distinction between the majority and the dissent turns on their 
differing understandings of what constitutes “research.”  The majority adopted a more narrow 
approach to research: 
“Though Texaco claims that its copying is for “research” as that term is used in 
the preamble of section 107, this characterization might somewhat overstate the 
matter.  Chickering has not used portions of articles from Catalysis in his own 
published piece of research, nor has he had to duplicate some portion of 
copyrighted material directly in the course of conducting an experiment or 
investigation.  Rather, entire articles were copied as an intermediate step that 
might abet Chickering’s research.” 
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Citing sociological and anthropological research on how research practices unfold in 
scientific labs, the dissent notes the fundamental role scientific journals play in disseminating 
and communicating information and the long-standing traditions of note-taking, i.e. interacting 
with, emphasizing, and copying portions of protected expression.  Under the Williams & Wilkins 
case, a decision affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court: 
“It is almost unanimously accepted that a scholar can make a handwritten copy of 
an entire copyrighted article for his own use, and in the era before 
photoduplication it was not uncommon (and not seriously questioned) that he 
could have his secretary make a typed copy for his personal use and files.  These 
customary facts of copyright-life are among our givens.”167  
 
In the dissent’s view, the copying at issue in Texaco was part of this note-taking process, 
rather than, as the majority concluded, archival multiplication of copies to avoid paying for 
additional subscriptions or license fees.  Photocopying is a “technologically assisted form of 
note-taking” in line with these long-standing customs and practices among researchers. 168  
Photocopying saves researchers “the toil and time of recording notes on index cards or in 
notebooks, and improves the accuracy and range of the data, charts, and formulas he can extract 
from the passing stream of information.”169  The photocopying of journal articles, and the use of 
them, “is customary and integral to the creative process of science.”170    
Under Harper & Row, “the fair use doctrine is predicated on the author’s implied consent 
to ‘reasonable and customary’ use”171 and, under Williams & Wilkins, the dissent argues that a 
reasonable and customary use does not become unfair when the copyright holder develops a way 
to exact an additional price for the same product. 172   Since copying was a reasonable and 
customary part of research practices, particularly the note-taking practice, the dissent argues that 
the first fair use factor should weigh in Texaco’s favor.   
Going even further, the dissent argues that the photocopying of entire articles for note-
taking purposes is transformative.  It is not probative, as the majority contended, to consider 
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whether or not the material object embodying the copyrighted work is physically transformed by 
the secondary use:   
“Good notes, being as precise and copious as time allows, do not aspire to 
transform the original text, but are useful in research only to the extent that they 
faithfully record the original.  Such notes, however, are important raw material in 
the synthesis of new ideas.”   
 
Thus, under the dissent’s view, the photocopying of entire articles was transformative as 
means of note-taking integral to the creative research process.173  
Second, the dissent found the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of 
the work to be illusory:174   
“There is a circularity to the problem: the market will not crystallize unless courts 
reject the fair use argument that Texaco presents; but, under the statutory test, we 
cannot declare a use to be an infringement unless (assuming other factors also 
weigh in favor of the secondary user) there is a market to be harmed.”         
 
The dissent further adds that only a small proportion of publishers have sought to exact 
these fees, through CCC or using some other mechanism, which implies that “there is no normal 
market in photocopy licenses, and no real consensus among publishers that there ought to be 
one.”  And, even if extracting such fees should become “administratively tolerable” this fact 
alone should not determine whether or not photocopying articles is unfair in the first place.175   
Emphasizing that fair use is an “equitable rule of reason” the dissent questions how the 
interests of the authors of photocopied journal articles would be promoted by a ruling against 
Texaco: 
“The single fact that evidences the fair use expectation of the people whose 
creativity Congress seeks to stimulate, is that they give away their copyright in 
order to promote their work, their ideas and their reputations. … The authors of 
scientific articles publish in order to gain distinction, appointment, resources, 
tenure.  But they seek and derive absolutely no direct cash benefit from 
publication.  It seems to me that this fact is of great importance: it means that, so 
long as the copyright system assures sufficient revenue to print and distribute 
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scientific journals, the level of copyright revenue is not among the incentives that 
drive authors to the creative acts that copyright laws are intended to foster.” 176 
 
While the CCC’s licensing fees would benefit the copyright holders, the link between that 
marketing strategy and the sort of creative activity copyright law was designed to foster is 
tenuous at best.  As the dissent argues, courts should consider the incentives for authors “chiefly 
from the perspective of the authors and scientists … [and] [f]rom their point of view … what is 
truly important is the wide dissemination of their works to their colleagues” through the 
cooperative practice of scholarly communication.177  For those reasons, the dissent finds that the 
fourth factor should also weigh in Texaco’s favor. 
Aside from the cases already discussed, one additional fair use case decision is worth 
bringing in.  Kelly v. Arriba Soft178 was a Ninth Circuit decision from 2003 and dealt with a very 
different sort of activity than what was at issue in Texaco but is arguably still potentially relevant 
to sensemaking and decision-making around the mass digitization project. 
The central issue before the Court in Kelly was whether or not it was fair use for an 
Internet search engine to make copies of protected images and display “thumbnails” of the 
images as part of its search functionality.  Kelly was a professional photographer who posted 
some of his protected works on his website and other licensed websites.  Arriba Soft was an 
Internet search engine that developed software to crawl the web, copying full-sized copies of 
images from other websites that were then converted into lower resolution thumbnail images, 
indexed, and used to generate image-based search results to users.  The Ninth Circuit concluded 
that Arriba Soft’s creation, use, and display of “thumbnails” of Kelly’s works in the search 
engine was a fair use.  
In reaching its conclusion, the Court found Arriba’s use of Kelly’s images for its 
thumbnails was transformative.179  Importantly, although exact replications of Kelly’s images 
were made:  
“the thumbnails were much smaller, lower-resolution images that served an 
entirely different function than Kelly’s original images.  Kelly’s images are 
artistic works intended to inform and to engage the viewer in an aesthetic manner.  
Arriba’s use of Kelly’s images in the thumbnails is unrelated to any aesthetic 
purposes.  Arriba’s search engine functions as a tool to help index and improve 
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access to images on the internet and their related web sites.  In fact, users are 
unlikely to enlarge the thumbnails and use them for artistic purposes because the 
thumbnails are of much lower-resolution than the originals; an enlargement 
results in a significant loss of clarity of the image, making them inappropriate as 
display material.”180 
 
Acknowledging that courts “have been reluctant to find fair use when an original work is 
merely retransmitted in a different medium,” the court found those cases inapposite because the 
secondary uses were the same as the original uses. 181  In this case, the Court observes, Arriba’s 
use of the images was for improving access to information on the Internet rather than Kelly’s use 
— artistic expression.  Furthermore, because the images are low-resolution, the court concluded 
it was unlikely that users of the search engine would find the thumbnails substitutional with 
respect to the originals.  Therefore, the Court concluded, Arriba’s use was transformative because 
it does not supersede Kelly’s use but rather creates a different purpose for the images. 
The Court based its decision, in part, on its earlier decision in Worldwide Church of God 
v. Philadelphia Church of God.  That case involved the copying of an entire book to create 
additional copies for distribution to a different audience.  The court concluded that the copying in 
that case was not transformative because the secondary use was for the same intrinsic purpose as 
the original – to serve religious practice and education.182  Quoting from Justice Story in the 
landmark 1841 fair use case, Folsom v. Marsh: 
“There must be real, substantial condensation of the materials, and intellectual 
labor and judgment bestowed thereon; and not merely the facile use of the 
scissors; or extracts of the essential parts, constituting the chief value of the 
original work.”183 
 
Verbatim copying of an entire book to facilitate its reading and study by a new audience 
was not transformative because the dominant uses of both communities were the same.  Such 
was not the case in Kelly where the thumbnails were a tool for discovering and accessing 
information rather than observing the aesthetic value that might only be readily available in a 
higher-resolution version. 
Taken together, the statutory construction of fair use and its interpretation by courts 
suggests that, while the exception is unquestionably crucial to the overall health and function of 
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the copyright regime, it remains a relatively murky predictive tool, particularly where new 
activities emerging from technological innovations may be concerned.  While the purpose and 
character of the use, including whether or not it is transformative, is central to the fair use 
inquiry, these questions are subject to complicated and diverging interpretations and opinions.  
Even concepts like “research” can be prone to disagreement and debates can ensue about what 
uses may “dominate” or take “primacy” over others. 
Several fair uses cases involved questions of verbatim copying of entire print works, and 
in each instance the use was not deemed to be transformative or fair.  But in each of those 
instances, the copies were made and distributed in print form, not electronic form.  While simple 
conversion of an original work to a new medium does not, in and of itself, result in 
transformation for purposes of copyright law, new, potentially transformative affordances may be 
possible by virtue of (or may be embedded in) the digital format.  In addition, Kelly suggests that 
improving access to information may qualify as a transformative use so long as steps are taken to 
guard against the copy superseding the original, i.e. through restrictions on quality or other 
metrics.  
A more implicit thread running through fair use jurisprudence with respect to 
technological change is the notion that fair use functions as a sort of pressure valve within the 
system of copyright law.  By permitting certain reasonable exercises of discretion, guided by 
equitable considerations, and in light of changes in technology and social practice, fair use 
enables otherwise ridged legal doctrine and procedures to accommodate the emerging and 
evolving contours of the “copyright world.” In practice, this has led some scholars to opine that 
“judges do not apply the four-factor fair use test to discover the outcome of the case but rather 
decide upon an outcome and use the factors to reason backward toward an explanatory 
rationale” 184  but, as subsequent sections of this work describe, this may be a somewhat 
inescapable feature of all sensemaking, whether in a legal context or other setting.   
The accuracy or common sense appeal of this understanding of fair use jurisprudence 
does not, however, assuage concerns around the predicative value (or lack thereof) of fair use 
jurisprudence.  No matter how thorough or deep one’s understanding is of fair use, the process of 
identifying and evaluating the risks and opportunities associated with a new and innovative 
                                                 
184 Interview with legal scholar, transcript on file with author. (AP) 
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course of action will always be rife with uncertainty.  As the sociologist and economic Thorstein 
Veblen noted:  
“It is not easy in any given case – indeed it is at times impossible until the courts 
have spoken – to say whether it is an instance of praiseworthy salesmanship or 
penitentiary offense.’”185 
 
Notice, in the above quote, Veblen uses the catch-all “it” to describe some non-specific 
category of emerging behavior.  Even more challenging, however, are emerging behaviors that 
we cannot anticipate, understand, or even recognize until they have already occurred.  The 
meaning and significance of digitizing an entire print collection of a major research library is 
likely to yield some the obvious outcomes — we don’t have to go to the library to read this book 
— as well as emerging, unpredictable, possibly still utterly unfathomable outcomes.  While fair 
use doctrine provides clues and breadcrumbs, how and whether it will accommodate and respond 
to changes on this scale — sociotechnical transformations — remains an open and important 
question.  
LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES EXEMPTIONS, §108 
Libraries and archives have enjoyed special privileges under copyright law since 1935, 
when the National Association of Book Publishers and the Joint Committee on Materials for 
Research of the American Council of Learned Societies entered into a voluntary gentleman’s 
agreement that set out the standard for acceptable reproduction practices undertaken by libraries 
and archives.186  The agreement permitted libraries, archives, or similarly situated institutions to 
make a single photographic reproduction of a copyrighted work for a scholar provided that the 
scholar represented in writing that he or she would use it for research purposes.187  Additional 
restrictions included the prohibition on copying for profit, the requirement that the scholar-
recipient was given notice that the use of the reproduction could result in copyright infringement, 
and precluded substitutional copies (i.e. copies that would substitute for the purchase of a book 
because of the extensiveness of copying or were deemed unfair “for any other reason.”)188 
The gentleman’s agreement and its progeny governed library and archive practices 
around reproduction and distribution of copyrighted works until the 1976 Copyright Act was 
                                                 
185 Merton (1957:195). 
186 Section 108 Study Group Report (2008: fn 39). 
187 Section 108 Study Group Report (2008). 
188 Section 108 Study Group Report (2008). 
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passed and included a codified and fairly complex series of targeted provisions pertaining to 
libraries and archives, in section 108.  Prior to embarking on a description of §108 and its 
potential implications for library mass digitization, it is important to note that fair use and the 
library and archives exemptions operate in concert with each other; neither should be read to 
limit or proscribe the other.  In addition, under §108(f), the Act makes explicit the fact that the 
library and archives exemptions discussed below would not pre-empt or trump contrary 
contractual obligations189 and thus the role of contracts and licensing in the mass digitization 
project and, more generally, in the publishing environment, require continued attention even 
where one might find §108 protections.  Finally, with respect to questions of liability (discussed 
in greater detail in the remedies section of this chapter) absent a determination to the contrary in 
an applicable administrative rulemaking proceeding, libraries and archives are not permitted to 
circumvent technological protection measures that effectively control access to a work for the 
purposes of exercising the section 108 exceptions.190  The intent of the drafters of §108 was that 
the section should be revisited every five years in order to remain current and responsive to 
changing technologies and practices.  Despite a study group report drafted in 2008, it appears 
that no modifications have been made to this provision. 
General Library Exceptions and Requirements for Eligibility: 
§108 provides libraries and archives with two general categories of exception: (1) 
copying and distribution for library purposes such as replacement and preservation, and (2) 
copying and distribution at the request of patrons for private study, scholarship, and research.  
These two broad categories will be discussed in greater detail shortly, but at the outset, it is 
important to keep in mind that §108’s exceptions, and all of the various and often confusing 
subsections, must ultimately relate to one or both of these two broad categories of use.       
Keeping that caveat in mind, §108(a) lays out the general library and archives exception.  
In particular, the first part of this section reads in pertinent part:  
“it is not an infringement of copyright for a library or archives … to reproduce no 
more than one copy … of a work, except as provided in subsections (b) and (c), or 
to distribute such copy …, under the conditions specified by this section….” 
                                                 
189 The section 108 study group reviewed section 108(f) and agreed that the terms of any negotiated, enforceable 
contract should continue to apply notwithstanding the section 108 exceptions however the group disagreed as to 
whether or not section 108, especially the preservation and replacement exceptions, should preempt contrary terms 
in nonnegotiable agreements.  To date, no action has been taken to revise section 108(f). 
190 Section 108 Study Group Report (2008). 
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This section has generated some confusion right out of the gate.  Based on a simple reading of 
the text, §108(a) would seem to suggest that eligible libraries and archives enjoy a stand-alone 
exception permitting them to make and distribute a single copy of any work, for any purpose, 
irrespective of the subsequent sections.  Under this interpretation, §108(a) provides a minimum 
allowance that may be expanded by subsequent subsections such as (b) and (c). This 
interpretation, however, is not controlling.  The Copyright Office drafted a comprehensive report 
indicating that the legislative history of the 1976 Act makes clear that, instead of providing a 
minimum stand-alone exception, “108(a) instead serves as a chapeau for the specific exceptions 
set forth in the subsequent provisions.”191  As evidence, this report notes that, after laying out the 
requirements of eligibility under §108, the House Report accompanying the section then states 
that “the rights of reproduction and distribution under section 108 apply in the following 
circumstances:” and goes on to discuss the remainder of section 108’s subsections.192  §108(a) is 
therefore more accurately understood as enabling the more-specific library and archives-related 
uses described in the subsequent subsections. 
The primary function of §108(a) would therefore seem to be that it states the three basic 
conditions for eligibility.  As the Copyright Act does not provide a definition of “library” or 
“archives,” §108(a) provides a series of threshold requirements for determining which libraries 
and archives, and which of their activities, are eligible for the 108 exemptions.  To qualify under 
§108, the library or archive must be: 
 Open to the public, or at least to researchers in a specialized field; 
 The reproduction and distribution activities may not be for direct or indirect commercial 
advantage; and 
 The library and/or archives must include a copyright notice on all copies provided or, if 
no notice appears on the original copy, it must provide a legend indicating that the work 
may be protected by copyright. 
                                                 
191 Section 108 Study Group, “Overview of the Libraries and Archives Exception in the Copyright Act: Background, 
History, and Meaning,” April 14, 2005. Available at 
http://www.section108.gov/docs/108BACKGROUNDPAPER%28final%29.pdf  
192 Section 108 Study Group, “Overview of the Libraries and Archives Exception in the Copyright Act: Background, 
History, and Meaning,” April 14, 2005. Available at 
http://www.section108.gov/docs/108BACKGROUNDPAPER%28final%29.pdf  
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While the eligibility requirements may appear relatively straightforward, like most 
sections of the Copyright Act, they too have generated some discussion and debate.  In particular, 
as the technological terrain continues to morph conceptions of what constitutes libraries and 
archives, tensions have emerged surrounding questions of whether and/or how §108 eligibility 
can or should extend to evolving forms of knowledge and memory institutions such as, for 
example, the Internet Archive.  Relatedly, an active debate has been circulating around whether 
or not a virtual-only library or archive can or should be eligible for the protections of §108.  
There is a compelling argument that subsequent subsections of §108 implicitly require a brick-
and-mortar establishment; for example, in §108(b)(2) libraries and archives are restricted from 
distributing digital copies “outside the premises of the library or archives” and this sort of 
language is inherently difficult to square with a virtual-only context.   
Furthermore, in passing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (discussed in subsequent 
sections), Congress indicated that it did not intend to broaden the scope of §108 eligibility to 
include purely virtual institutions: 
“[J]ust as when section 108 of the Copyright Act was first enacted, the term 
“libraries” and “archives” as used and described in this provision still refer to 
such institutions only in the conventional sense of entities that are established as, 
and conduct their operations through, physical premises in which collections of 
information may be used by researchers and other members of the public.  
Although online interactive digital networks have since given birth to online 
digital “libraries” and “archives” that exist only in the virtual (rather than 
physical) sense on websites, bulletin boards and homepages across the Internet, it 
is not intended that section 108 as revised apply to such collections of 
information.”193 
 
While the changing technological environment and evolving conceptions around the role, 
function, and “appearance” of libraries and archives leaves some open questions, for the time 
being it appears that eligibility under §108 is limited to a more traditional and conventional 
image of libraries and archives.194 
If §108(a) does not, in and of itself, permit library and archives reproduction and 
distribution of copyrighted works but rather provides the eligibility requirements, one might 
                                                 
193 S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 62 (1998). 
194 The 2008 §108 Study Group Committee contemplated this question and ultimately concluded that it would not 
issue a recommendation that virtual-only libraries and archives should not be eligible for §108 protections. 
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reasonably wonder why it bothers including the confusing language regarding “making one 
copy.”  A compelling explanation may be gleaned from another subsection: §108(g).  
Prohibition against Related, Concerted, and Systematic Copying - §108(g): 
Under §108(g), libraries’ and archives’ rights under 108 only extend to “isolated and 
unrelated reproduction and distribution of a single copy … of the same material on separate 
occasions.”  In addition, in §108(g)(1) “related or concerted” copying and/or distribution of 
“multiple copies of the same material, whether made on one occasion or over a period of time, 
and whether intended for aggregate use … or for separate use” is expressly prohibited.  
Furthermore, in §108(g)(2) “systematic reproduction or distribution” of copies made at the 
request of patrons for private study, scholarship, or research is expressly prohibited.   
Tying the prohibitions against related, concerted, and systematic copying back to §108(a) 
gives new insight into why Congress included the “make one copy” language where it did not 
intend to grant any stand-alone rights for libraries and archives.  The language contained in 
§108(a) may be tied to concerns around libraries and archives using the exception to avoid 
paying for additional copies, the assumption being that there is less risk of financial harm to 
copyright owners where only a single copy is presumed. 
The link between general library and archive copying and distribution, and potential 
financial harms to copyright owners, is made more explicit when read in conjunction with the 
accompanying House Report:  
“There is a direct interrelationship between the ‘indirect commercial advantage’ 
requirement and the prohibitions against ‘multiple’ and ‘systematic’ photocopying 
in section 108(g)(1) and (2).  Under section 108, a library and profit-making 
organization would not be authorized to: (a) use a single subscription or copy to 
supply its employees with multiple copies of material relevant to their work; or 
(b) use a single subscription or copy to supply its employees, on request, with 
single copies of material relevant to their work, where the arrangement is 
‘systematic’ in the sense of deliberately substituting photocopying for 
subscription or purchase; or (c) use ‘interlibrary loan’ arrangements for obtaining 
photocopies in such aggregate quantities to substitute for subscriptions or 
purchase of material needed by employees and their work. 
 
Isolated, spontaneous making of single photocopies by a library and a for-
profit organization, without any systematic effort to substitute photocopying for 
subscription or purchase, would be covered by section 108, even though copies 
are furnished to the employees of the organization for use in their work.  
Similarly, for-profit libraries could participate in interlibrary arrangements for 
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exchange of photocopies, as long as the reproduction or distribution was not 
systematic.  These activities by themselves would not ordinarily be considered for 
direct or indirect commercial advantage since the advantage referred to in this 
clause must attach to the ultimate profit-making motivation behind the 
reproduction or distribution itself, rather than to the ultimate profit-making 
motivation behind the enterprise in which the library is located.  On the other 
hand, section 108 would not excuse reproduction or distribution if there was a 
commercial motive behind the actual making or distributing of the copies, if 
multiple copies were made or distributed, or if the photocopying activities were 
systematic in the sense that their aim was to substitute for subscriptions or 
purchases.”  
 
§108(g)’s prohibitions against related, concerted, and systematic copying raise potentially 
serious implications for library mass digitization.  As subsequent sections of this work describe, 
the mass digitization project that enabled and/or prompted the emergence of HathiTrust was, at 
its core, about the related, concerted, and systematic copying of protected works.  In addition, it 
was formed around a partnership between a for-profit organization (Google) and libraries (for-
profit and nonprofit).  A central point of contention with respect to 108(g) as discussed in the 
House Report relates to the “direct or indirect commercial advantage” prong — whether or not 
the intent of Google and the libraries in engaging in the mass digitization project was to avoid 
paying subscription and purchase costs associated with obtaining copies.  The House Report’s 
language seems to point toward the subjective intent of the library or archive doing the copying. 
This does not seem to be an interpretation shared by the Copyright Office.  According to 
the Copyright Office’s 1983 report, cited by its draft 2005 report, “whether or not reproduction is 
‘systematic’ is an objective test; if the reproduction is done via a common plan, regular 
interaction, organized or established procedure, then it is infringing.”195  The 1975 Senate Report 
issued in advance of the 1976 Copyright Act revisions noted that, while a definition of 
“systematic copying” is impossible, a few clear-cut examples might include: 
(1) A library with a collection of journals in biology informs other libraries with 
similar collections that it will maintain and build its own collection and will 
make copies of articles from these journals available to them and their patrons 
on request.  Accordingly, the other libraries discontinue or refrain from 
purchasing subscriptions to these journals and fulfill their patrons’ requests for 
articles by obtaining photocopies from the source library. 
                                                 
195 The Register of Copyrights, LIBRARY REPRODUCTION OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS (17 U.S.C. 108) 14 (1983), at 
139; Section 108 Study Group (2005), “Overview of the Libraries and Archives Exception in the Copyright Act: 
Background, History, and Meaning,” April 14, 2005. Available at 
http://www.section108.gov/docs/108BACKGROUNDPAPER%28final%29.pdf at 29. 
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(2) A research center employing a number of scientists and technicians subscribes 
to one or two copies of needed periodicals.  By reproducing photocopies of 
articles the center is able to make the material in these periodicals available to 
its staff in the same manner which otherwise would have required multiple 
subscriptions. 
(3) Several branches of a library system agree that one branch will subscribe to 
particular journals in lieu of each branch purchasing its own subscriptions, and 
the one subscribing branch will reproduce copies of articles from the 
publication for users of the other branches.196 
 
A proviso to the “systematic copying” clause clarifies that it is not intended to prevent 
interlibrary loan activities so long as their purpose or effect is not to provide a receiving library 
with such aggregate quantities of material so as to substitute for purchase.  The House intended 
understandings of this provision to be clarified by the Commission on New Technological Uses 
of Copyrighted Works (“CONTU”)197 and guidelines were published in the Conference Report 
for the 1976 Act, which although not binding with the force of law, was agreed to be a 
“reasonable interpretation of the proviso of section 108(g)(2) in the most common situations to 
which they apply.”198  Admittedly, the mass digitization project central to this thesis inhabits a 
vastly different technological world than when CONTU issued its “reasonable interpretation” of 
systematic copying nearly 30 years prior.  The thorny issue of systematic library copying is 
highlighted here, and will be returned to in the empirical sections of this thesis.  
Finally, as mentioned at the outset of the discussion of §108, libraries would not only 
need to overcome the concerns of §108(g) to qualify for the protections of §108, but their 
copying and distribution must also fall under one of the two broad categories of use: copying for 
library purposes such as preservation and replacement, or copying and distribution initiated by 
library patrons.199  Doctrine relating to each category will be addressed in turn. 
                                                 
196 S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 70.  In addition, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has analyzed the 
meaning of “systematic” copying in the context of actions by a library in a for-profit corporation.  This analysis, 
however, was within the fair use context (discussed infra), and did not directly address 108(g).  See American 
Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 916, 919-20, 924-25 (2d Cir. 1994). 
197 See H.R.Rep. No. 94-1476, at 78. 
198 Conf. Rep. No. 94-1733, at 71-74 (1976). 
199 With respect to terminology in the Act, although §108 applies to both libraries and archives, in an effort to reduce 
excess verbiage I will only use the term “library” instead of “library and archives” in the discussion of §108 
following this note. 
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Copying for Library Purposes — §108(b) and (c): 
Protections afforded to copying and distribution for library purposes differ depending on 
whether or not the copyrighted work was published or unpublished.   
Copying and Distribution of Unpublished Works 
Under §108(b), a library may make and distribute up to three copies of an unpublished 
work for preservation or security purposes, or for deposit for research use in another eligible 
library, if the copy is currently in the first library’s collection.  In addition, if the preservation or 
security copy of the unpublished work is in a digital format, the copy may not be distributed 
digitally outside the premises of the library.  “Premises” is generally understood to mean the 
physical buildings in which the library or archives is housed, not the wider campus or 
community in which those buildings are situated.200 
A potentially important aspect of this subsection is the fact that the copies may only be 
made for preservation or security purposes and thus may not be lent or shared with patrons.  
Since the works under this provision are unpublished, a draft report of the Copyright Office in 
2005 noted that such lending would “infringe the copyright owner’s right of first publication.”201  
As previously discussed, however, case law suggests that fair use might provide some coverage 
where the unpublished works pertain to public figures and/or matters of public concern.  
When §108(b) was initially passed, the exemption did not extend to reproductions in 
“machine-readable language for storage in an information system.”202  There may have been 
some implicit assumption that such copies could not satisfy the preservation and security 
requirements of the subsection.  Given the advances in digital technologies and the rapid rise of 
electronic publications and subscriptions, this limitation was lifted in 1998 when the DMCA 
                                                 
200 Section 108 Study Group Report (2008). An Independent Report sponsored by The United States Copyright 
Office and the National Digital Information Infrastructure and Preservation Program of the Library of Congress, 
March 2008.   
201 The Register of Copyrights, LIBRARY REPRODUCTION OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS (17 U.S.C. 108) 14 (1983), pg. 
105-106. 
202 Section 108 Study Group Report (2008). An Independent Report sponsored by The United States Copyright 
Office and the National Digital Information Infrastructure and Preservation Program of the Library of Congress, 
March 2008.   
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broadened §108(b) to include the making and distributing of digital reproductions for 
preservation purposes.203        
Copying of Published Works 
Under §108(c), a library may make up to three copies of a published work for 
replacement purposes if the copy is damaged, deteriorating, lost, stolen, or if the existing format 
in which the work is stored has become obsolete204 if the library has, through reasonable effort, 
determined that an unused replacement cannot be obtained at a fair price and, if it is a digital 
copy, the copy is not distributed digitally outside the premises of the library. 
Worth noting, this subsection only refers to making copies for replacement, not 
distributing the copies.  This is somewhat of a peculiarity since, presumably if a library or 
archive were making a replacement copy of a work in its collection, it would presumably intend 
to put the replacement copy into circulation.  The Copyright Office report (2005) notes this 
peculiarity: “this provision … was designed to make sure that items in the library collections are 
preserved in usable form despite factors — like time, change, and technology — beyond the 
library’s control.”205  That report goes on to say that despite the subsection omitting language 
related to distribution, “it is nevertheless implied that the library will retain the same rights of 
distribution to the copy as it did to the original version of the work (under the first sale doctrine), 
since the purpose of the provision is to permit continued access to the work.”206  In addition, 
given that the rights under this subsection only kick in when a work is already damaged, 
deteriorating, lost, stolen, or in an obsolete format, it is also implied that interlibrary 
arrangements for replacement copying and distribution are permitted.207   
The language referencing the risks associated with obsolescence was added in 1998 via 
the DMCA and notes: “a format shall be considered obsolete if the machine or device necessary 
                                                 
203 Section 108 Study Group Report (2008). An Independent Report sponsored by The United States Copyright 
Office and the National Digital Information Infrastructure and Preservation Program of the Library of Congress, 
March 2008.   
204 The Act notes: “a format shall be considered obsolete if the machine or device necessary to render perceptible a 
work stored in that format is no longer manufactured or is no longer reasonably available in the commercial 
marketplace.” 
205 Section 108 Study Group (2005), “Overview of the Libraries and Archives Exception in the Copyright Act: 
Background, History, and Meaning,” April 14, 2005, pg. 27.  See S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 62 (1998). 
206 Section 108 Study Group (2005), “Overview of the Libraries and Archives Exception in the Copyright Act: 
Background, History, and Meaning,” April 14, 2005, pg. 27.  See S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 62 (1998). 
207 Section 108 Study Group (2005), “Overview of the Libraries and Archives Exception in the Copyright Act: 
Background, History, and Meaning,” April 14, 2005. pg. 27.   The Register of Copyrights, LIBRARY REPRODUCTION 
OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS (17 U.S.C. 108) 14 (1983), pg. 114. 
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to render perceptible a work stored in that format is no longer manufactured or is no longer 
reasonably available in the commercial marketplace.” 
Copying and Distribution at Patrons’ Requests — §§108(d) and (e): 
In addition to certain types of copying and distribution for library purposes, the Act also 
permits libraries to make and distribute copies for the private study, scholarship, and research of 
patrons under certain circumstances.     
Copying and Distributing a Single Article or Part of a Larger Work 
Pursuant to §108(d), libraries may make one copy of a single article contained within a 
larger collection, or a small part of a larger work, at the request of a patron or other library under 
the following four conditions: 
(1) The work must be in the collection of the library where the patron makes the request, 
or from that of another library (§108(d)); 
(2) The copy must become the property of the requesting patron, and cannot be added to 
the library’s collections (§108(d)(1)); 
(3) The library must have no notice that the copy will be used for anything other than 
private study, scholarship, or research (§108(d)(1)); and 
(4) The library must display a copyright warning where copy orders are made and attach 
the same warning to copy order forms (§108(d)(2)). 
Copying and Distributing an Entire or Substantial Part of a Work 
Pursuant to §108(e), libraries may make one copy of an entire work or substantial parts 
thereof, at the request of a patron under the following five conditions: 
(1) The library must first consult the copyright holder or customary trade sources to 
determine that a used or unused copy is not available on the market at a fair price 
(§108(e)); 
(2) The work must be in the collection of the library where the patron makes their 
request, or of another library (§108(e)); 
(3) The copy must become the property of the requesting patron, and cannot be added to 
the library’s collections (§108(e)(1)); 
(4) The library must have no notice that the copy will be used for anything other than 
private study, scholarship, or research purposes (§108(e)(1)); 
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(5) The library must both display a copyright warning where copy orders are made, and 
attach the same warning to copy order forms (§108(e)(2)). 
It is worth noting that, because of subsection (1) above, this provision is intended to 
apply to out-of-print works.  In addition, although the express text of this subsection only 
accounts for patron requests, not requests made by other libraries, the accompanying House 
Report notes that libraries may invoke this right through interlibrary loan arrangements.208  
Other General Exemptions — §108(f), (h), and (i): 
The Act contains a number of other general exemptions, the relevant portions of which 
are noted below: 
 Vicarious Liability:  Under §108(f)(1), libraries are exempted from liability for 
contributory or vicarious infringement stemming from the unsupervised use of 
reproducing equipment located on its premises so long as it provides notice to the 
person(s) using the equipment that they may be engaging in infringing activity.   
 Effect of Contrary Contracts:  Under §108(f)(4), if there is an express contractual 
prohibition against library reproduction and distribution for any purposes, §108 
shall not be construed as justifying a violation of the contract.  However, fair use 
may still apply. 
 Orphan Works:  Reflecting the Copyright Term Extension Act (“CTEA”) 
instituted in 1998 which extended the duration of copyright by an additional 
twenty years, §108(h) was added to permit libraries to copy and distribute 
published orphan works for preservation, scholarship, or research purposes in the 
last twenty years of its copyright term.209  Orphan work status may be inferred 
where the library has determined after reasonable investigation that: 
o The work is not currently subject to normal commercial exploitation 
(§108(h)(2)(A)); 
o A new or used copy of a work in not available at a reasonable price 
(§108(h)(2)(B)); or 
                                                 
208 Section 108 Study Group Report (2008). An Independent Report sponsored by The United States Copyright 
Office and the National Digital Information Infrastructure and Preservation Program of the Library of Congress, 
March 2008.   
209 Note that the exception only applies to libraries and archives, not to their patrons or downstream uses of the 
work. 
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o The rightsholder has not notified the Copyright Office that the work is 
either subject to normal commercial exploitation or is available at a 
reasonable price.210   
DARK ARCHIVE EXEMPTION FOR COMPUTER PROGRAM, §117 
Pursuant to §117 of the Act, owners of copies of computer programs are entitled to make 
a single additional copy provided that the new copy is created as an essential step in the 
utilization of the computer program and it is used in conjunction with the computer or machine 
(i.e. a RAM copy), or that the copy is created for archival purposes only.  A further requirement 
is that the archival copy must be destroyed if and when ownership of the original copy ceases 
being lawful.  In addition, copies made in accordance with this section may be leased, sold, or 
otherwise transferred only as part of the lease, sale, or transfer of the original copy.   
While this section may not pertain in any obvious way to mass digitization, particularly 
when compared to fair use or the library and archives provisions, there has been some suggestion 
that this provision may provide libraries with some additional protections with respect to digital 
content.  This topic will be addressed more fully in the empirical sections of this thesis. 
EXEMPTION FOR THE PROVISION OF COPIES TO PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, §121 
Pursuant to §121 of the Act, some reproductions and distributions of published works to 
persons with disabilities may be exempt from copyright infringement if certain conditions are 
met. The relevant conditions include:   
 The work is a nondramatic literary work that is neither a standardized, secure, or 
norm-referenced test or testing material, nor a computer program (except for the 
portions that are in conventional human language and displayed to users in the 
ordinary course of using the computer programs) (§121(a) and (b)(2)); 
 The work is reproduced and distributed in specialized formats (i.e. braille, audio, 
or digital text) exclusively for use by blind or other persons with disabilities 
(§121(a) and (b)(1)(A)); 
 The copy bears notice that further reproduction and distribution in non-specialized 
formats constitutes infringement (§121(b)(1)(B)); 
                                                 
210 According to Section 108 Study Group (2005), “Overview of the Libraries and Archives Exception in the 
Copyright Act: Background, History, and Meaning,” April 14, 2005, no rightsholder has ever filed a notice under 
this provision. Pg. 31. 
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 The copy bears notice identifying the copyright holder and the date of original 
publication (§121(b)(1)(C)); 
 The copying and distribution is done by an “authorized entity” meaning a 
nonprofit organization or a governmental agency that has a primary mission to 
provide specialized services relating to education, adaptive reading, or 
information access needs of blind or disabled persons under 17 U.S.C. 135a 
(1931) (“An Act to provide books for the adult blind”) (§121(d)). 
Copyright as Social Relationship 
Since its earliest beginnings, copyright laws and law-like privileges have been deeply 
entangled with technological innovation and social practices.  With the Statute of Anne, in 
England in the early eighteenth century, copyright law’s basic means-end formulation, 
attempting to strike a balance between public and private benefit, was established.  This basic 
formulation continues today.  Significant changes in information and communication 
technologies and reforms of the legal mechanisms (such as scope and duration of protection) 
although technological changes have enhanced tensions between the public policy underpinning 
copyright and the legal mechanisms for achieving the law’s goals.   
Mass digitization highlights the tensions and uncertainties at the intersection of copyright 
law, technological change, and emerging social practice.  This chapter provides an in-depth 
account of copyright doctrine as it existed when the mass digitization project was being 
contemplated and demonstrates that, from a copyright law perspective, the potential legality or 
potential illegality of the project was uncertain.  Copyright law (and law in general) mediates our 
decisions about opportunities and risks when we consider whether or not to engage in a 
particular course of action, such as the digitization of books.  That said, copyright law is 
inherently retrospective; particularly when new and innovative uses are at issue, it is often 
difficult to predict in advance how a court might interpret the use for purposes of copyright law 
and fair use.  While copyright considerations played a role in sensemaking and decision-making 
around the mass digitization project, it is both limiting and misleading to view emerging social 
practices involving cultural and intellectual works as an algorithmic or mechanized response to 
(often ambiguous) existing copyright law and doctrine.   
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While it is true that copyright law favors rules, elements, factor tests, precedent, and other 
sorts of formulas for human behavior, some would argue that copyright at its essence is less 
about property than it is about social relationships. Under this view, copyright is not a “thing” 
that is created, traded, and protected, but rather copyright is about the creation of value through 
social collaboration and interaction. 211   This perspective prioritizes the social aspects of 
copyright in a couple of key ways.   
First, in terms of the production, this perspective recognizes that cultural and intellectual 
works are not created de novo, out of whole cloth, but rather emerge as a result of active 
collaboration between members of society.212  One of the most notable proponents of this view is 
Henry Jenkins, founder of participatory culture theory, who famously analogized the creation of 
cultural works to the philosophical ponderings of the Skin Horse in The Velveteen Rabbit: 
“The value of a new toy lies not in its material qualities (not ‘having things that 
buzz inside you and a stick-out- handle’), the Skin Horse explains, but rather in 
how the toy is used, how it is integrated into the child’s imaginative experience: 
‘Real isn’t how you are made.  It’s a thing that happens to you.’213 …The Rabbit 
is fearful of this process, recognizing that consumer goods do not become ‘real’ 
without being actively reworked: ‘Does it hurt?...Does it happen all at once, like 
being wound up or bit by bit?’214  Reassuring him, the Skin Horse emphasizes not 
the deterioration of the original but rather the new meanings that get attached to it 
and the relationship into which it is inserted: ‘It doesn’t happen all at once.  You 
become.  It takes a long time.’ 215 
 
Similarly, the value of copyrighted works lies not so much in its making as in the process 
by which the works become real, a process that is essentially and fundamentally social, 
collaborative, and participatory.   
Support for this perspective can also be found in research on collective action, or user-
focused, models of innovation.  In contrast to the ‘private investment’ model of innovation, 
which assumes that returns to the innovator result from private goods and efficient regimes of 
intellectual property protection, this literature recognizes a growing phenomenon of user 
innovation characterized by users innovating to solve their own as well as shared problems, and 
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then freely revealing their innovations to others, thereby transforming the would-be proprietary 
innovation into a public good.216   
Beyond the tendency of users to freely reveal their innovations, researchers have 
observed that user innovation is distinct from traditional sources and practices of innovation in a 
number of key respects.  For example, in many industries users are in a better position than 
manufacturers to innovate.217  Eric von Hippel developed a theory of “lead users” to explain this 
phenomenon.  Lead users “are users whose present strong needs will become general in a 
marketplace months or years in the future.”218  These are users who are so linked in to an existing 
product or service that they are able to anticipate, imagine, and develop improvements, 
enhancements, and modifications of those products and services and therefore “can serve as a 
need-forecasting laboratory for marketing research … (and) … can provide new product concept 
and design data as well.”219  Furthermore, because sticky information — information which is 
costly to acquire, transfer, and use in a new location — can be difficult to come by through 
traditional models of innovation but is readily developed by users, von Hippel suggests that 
organizations should find it in their own self-interest to support, and possibly harness, the 
creative and intellectual potential of users by offering toolkits and other customizable options for 
their products and services.  When viewed in this light, the problem of copyright and 
technological change is not a problem of unauthorized uses but rather a problem of industries 
being slow to learn “to exploit the value of lead user innovations for commercial advantage.”220  
Granting users a wide berth to innovate on existing products and services may be 
economically pragmatic for the reasons articulated by von Hippel and others, but structural 
elements of the existing intellectual property regime tend, in practice, to lead rightsholders away 
from that approach.  While some scholars contend that intellectual property laws’ impacts on 
innovation depend entirely on “the ease with which innovators can enter into agreements for 
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rearranging and exercising those rights,”221 von Hippel notes that “it is becoming increasingly 
clear that … rearranging and exercising intellectual property rights is often difficult rather than 
easy.”222  Furthermore, it has been fairly widely observed that rightsholders strategically deploy 
their rights to “achieve private advantage at the expense of general innovative progress.”223   This 
lends support to the contention that policymakers and theorists are simply out of touch with the 
ways in which characteristics of intellectual property regimes are actually experienced by 
innovators and creators and prompted some researchers to conclude “that intellectual property 
rights are bad for innovation (and competition) in many cases.”224    
Researchers studying sociotechnical systems from a variety of disciplinary perspectives 
have observed the tendency of industries, particularly those characterized by a single corporate 
monopoly, to routinize innovation and ultimately shift toward technological conservatism as a 
technique of self-preservation.225  This has led some scholars to caution about the “tragedy of the 
anticommons”226 which is said to occur when a resource, such as innovation-related information, 
is underused because “multiple owners each have a right to exclude others and no one has an 
effective privilege of use.”227  The result in both cases is that the system of intellectual property 
law, the purpose of which is to stimulate artistic and intellectual creativity, can have the opposite 
effect, stifling innovation, particularly with respect to its non-traditional sources. 
It is worth noting that the research just discussed deals with innovation in general and 
thus captures behaviors that might implicate patent law as well as copyright.  Moreover, while 
scholars conducting research in this area acknowledge that owners of large collections of 
copyrighted works in the movie, publishing, and software fields can employ strategies that 
concentrate information production and retard innovation more generally, 228 there is a tendency 
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amongst scholars to focus their efforts primarily on technological innovation and the invention of 
useful articles (the purview of patent) rather than primarily expressive creative works (the 
purview of copyright).  This may be due to a perception that restrictions on innovation are less 
problematic in the copyright context because expressive innovators have more access to 
alternatives, both in terms of the expressive possibility space and legal alternatives such as 
creative commons licensing.229   
Economic pragmatists put a lot of credence into the potential of alternative licensing 
regimes, such as creative commons, to temper the property-focused maximalist tendencies which 
currently dominate copyright discourse.  Von Hippel posits: “If the commons then grows to 
contain reasonable substitutes for much of the proprietary intellectual property relevant to the 
field, the relative advantage accruing to large holders of this information will diminish and 
perhaps even disappear.”230  This perspective fails to recognize, however, that the nature of 
copyrighted works, being primarily oriented around original creative and intellectual expression, 
may make them ill-suited to a pure market substitution analysis.  For example, format-shifting 
aside, what might a reasonable substitute be for the contents of a major academic research 
library? 
Viewing copyright as a social relationship recognizes that the meaning and the value of 
cultural works emerges from a dynamic and evolving relationship between authors, objects, and 
their audience.  Furthermore, the fact that boundary lines between each of these categories is 
blurred, not well-delineated, and not static raises implicit concerns about the propriety of legal 
structures that, by their very design, draw sharp distinctions between authors, users, and so forth 
and are triggered to an instant in time (when a work is “fixed”) and a particular agent (the 
“author”). 
The perspective of copyright as a social relationship may seem somewhat far-fetched in 
light of the dominant discourse and debates in copyright, but it is clearly visible in copyright’s 
overriding goal.  The purpose of copyright is not to promote the interests of authors but rather to 
promote the progress of science for the whole of society.  As one legal scholar commented: 
“[W]e have focused so hard on the idea that copyright is an incentive for authors 
and publishers that it is almost as if we thought that we could achieve the 
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“Progress of Science” just by filling up some stockroom somewhere with lots of 
works of authorship.”231  
 
The fundamental reason we have copyright laws is because we care about learning which, 
as any educator or student will tell you, is fundamentally a process of social collaboration.  The 
increasing tendency of copyright law and surrounding discourse to conflate copyright’s means 
(which focus on authors, rightsholders, and property) with copyright’s end (societal progress) 
suggests a troubling shift away from seeing copyright as being by, of, and for society and, 
instead, being by, of, and for rightsholders.  
Finally, the view of copyright as social relations rejects the construction that copyright 
law, technological change, and emerging social practices are oppositional.  They may develop in 
tension with each other, and may problematize norms, expectations, and traditional ways of 
doing things, but these three strands are mutually constitutive and, in tangled combination, are 
crucial to societies’ success in accomplishing the goal of copyright.   
In Confronting the Challenges of Participatory Culture: Media Education for the 21st 
Century, Jenkins and his co-authors described a participatory culture as one with: (1) relatively 
low barriers to artistic expression and civic engagement; (2) strong support for creating and 
sharing one’s creations with others; (3) some type of informal mentorship whereby what is 
known by the most experienced is passed along to novices; (4) members who believe that their 
contributions matter; and (5) members who feel some degree of social connection with one 
another (at the least they care what other people think about what they have created).232  Jenkins’ 
approach recognizes that copyright is one part of a larger sociotechnical system and our concerns 
should focus, more broadly, on accomplishing the larger objectives of society.  Thus, while 
interaction with cultural works is an important part of the social-relational aspects of copyright, 
interacting through cultural works as part of the functional, dynamic, and complex interplay 
between law, emerging technology, and institutions/organizations should be a primary focus. 
This chapter discussed the primary goals and purposes underpinning copyright law.  
While copyright-like protections may have arisen as a reaction to the invention of the movable 
type printing press, taken more broadly, the law emerged as a way of negotiating the 
intersections of technological change and social practices with respect to information and 
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communication.  From its early beginnings, we see that copyright law is, at its core, driven by 
Enlightenment principles around freedom of thought and expression and the communication of 
ideas and expression as a core value.  In addition, this chapter described relevant legal doctrine 
as it existed in 2004 enabling us to recognize the uncertainty and ambiguity of copyright law 
with respect to the mass digitization of in-copyright works.   This could lead us to speculate that 
a narrow, “conformist,” view of the law might lead decision-makers to adopt a “wait and see” 
approach.  Similarly, a risk-averse organization or institution might refrain from digitizing in-
copyright works because of the potential copyright risks.  On the other hand, one might argue 
that leadership is about taking risks, and the big risk here was the open question of whether the 
mass digitization of in-copyright works, and their subsequent uses, would be deemed to be 
within the law after the fact.  The law is inherently limited when it comes to preparing us for the 
future.  The next chapter shifts away from a legal analysis to a discussion of relevant social 
science literature, and considers non-legal theories and approaches to sensemaking and decision-
making under conditions of uncertainty, ambiguity, and disequilibrium. 
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Chapter III: Related Social Science Literature 
In this chapter I review social science perspectives on the intersections among law, 
technological change, and processes of social transformation.  As the last chapter described, the 
tensions between copyright law’s overriding public policy of promoting the progress of society 
through the creation and dissemination of cultural and intellectual works operates in tension with 
the existing mechanisms for effectuating that policy (namely copyright doctrine).  In the context 
of mass digitization, the tension is further complicated by doctrinal uncertainty: in 2004, when 
the mass digitization project was embarked upon, it was not clear whether a court would view 
the activity as a legitimate exercise of fair use (or some other exception or limitation) or whether 
it would generate a cognizable claim of mass copyright infringement. 
How do individuals, organizations, and institutions make sense of this uncertainty?  How 
do they identify and evaluate the potential promise and peril of an activity like mass digitization?  
How do we as a society, through our judicial system or otherwise, make sense of and make 
decisions regarding about emerging activities at the fulcrum of the public-private intersection of 
copyright?  How do we navigate the intersections of copyright, technological change, and 
emerging social practice? 
This chapter explores perspectives on these questions through relevant social science literature.  
The chapter is organized around two main sections.  The first section discusses relevant 
literatures that adopt what might be called a “top down” theoretical approach.  These are 
perspectives that focus on behavior as a natural outflow of systemic, institutional, structural 
social arrangements.  The centerpiece of this section is Robert K. Merton’s structural strain 
theory, but it also discusses social disorganization theory, relevant work of economists including 
Hirschman and Schumpeter, and Hughes’ concept of reverse salient.  This literature suggests that 
some of the answers to the above questions, and some of the insights into processes of 
transformation, are likely tied to structural and institutional aspects of sociotechnical systems. 
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But transformation of the sort exemplified by the mass digitization project is not purely a 
matter of systemic, structural, or institutional arrangements.  Transformation is also shaped by 
more dispersed, distributed, relatively more modest instances of human agency that coalesce and 
percolate up to generate change.  Therefore while the first section of this chapter provides a top-
down orientation, the second part provides a bottom-up approach to the processes of 
sociotechnical transformation.  The centerpiece of this section is Karl Weick’s research on 
sensemaking and decision-making but it also brings in relevant organization science theories 
about change and learning.  This section highlights how, in addition to being impacted by 
structural and institutional forces, processes of transformation are also activated through 
instances of human agency, interaction, and cooperation.  
The goal of this chapter is to lay out and begin weaving together these different but 
related social science perspectives, synthesizing an analytic framework that contributes to the 
study and understanding of the interplay among copyright law, emerging technologies, and 
processes of social transformation.  A framework that blends social science and law-based 
approaches can best take into account fairly complex copyright-related concerns while remaining 
attuned and responsive to other (non-legal) social, organizational, institutional, and structural 
pieces of the HathiTrust story. 
Structural aspects of transformation: A top-down approach 
This section begins with the work of social disorganization theorists.  The social 
disorganization perspective provides a long chain of analytical thinking about the relationships 
among change and social practices beginning with the work of the Chicago School of 
sociologists in the 1920s and continuing through recent times.   
At the heart of social disorganization theory is the belief that rapid change — particularly 
in the areas of technology, institutions, and demography — damages society’s web of normative 
controls and causes social disorganization.  The theory emerged in the period after World War I 
when the United States’ economy, modes of industrial and agricultural production, and 
communications infrastructures were undergoing fundamental changes.  One of the responses to 
the intense growth and innovation stimulated by the war was that social institutions, 
organizations, and interactions were becoming increasingly mechanized.  Social disorganization 
theorists adopted an approach characterized by professional detachment and technical efficiency, 
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viewing human relationships and functioning as a complex system that could be tweaked and 
enhanced (later explored most pointedly through the work of cybernetics theorists) much as post-
War business organizations became increasingly mechanized, algorithmic, and structured.233  To 
the extent that technological change generated normative dissension and produced social 
deviance, these ill-effects were technically correctable by tweaking and modifying the social 
systems of interaction.234  
The near-term effect of significant technological change is that it creates a sort of 
normative disequilibrium that results in increases in deviance.  Over the longer-term, however, 
social disorganization theorists suggest that the social disequilibrium is a form of normative 
competition.  In other words, deviance is a marker or evidence of the process of sociotechnical 
transformation whereby a society disrupted will, eventually, move toward reorganization around 
a new series of norms, expectations, and shared practices.   
An example of this process was explored by Thomas and Znaniecki in The Polish 
Peasant in Europe and America, one of the earliest social disorganization studies (1919).  This 
study highlighted the problems endemic to immigrants who are unable to successfully transplant 
the “ways of the old world to the new world” and who also have “tremendous difficulty 
assimilating the norms and standards of their new social environments.” 235   Social 
disorganization, the authors note, is the “process by which the authority and influence of an 
earlier culture and system of social control is undermined and eventually destroyed.”  Significant 
change epitomized, in this case, by their relocation to the United States, unmoors shared social 
norms amongst Polish immigrants and facilitates their drift into deviance.     
In terms of methodological approaches, the hallmark model for studying social 
disorganization was developed by Park and Burgess in their work Human Communities.236 Park 
and Burgess viewed the normative order of a well-organized society as existing in a state of 
symbiosis amongst its members.  Using the metaphor of invasion, Park and Burgess developed 
an ecological model of social disorganization whereby: 1) change introduces an 
invasive/competing species into a community; 2) there is conflict/competition for dominance 
between species; 3) the weaker species accommodate the demonstrably dominant one(s); and, 4) 
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all members of the community assimilate a new order of symbiosis based upon the 
accommodative outcomes of the previous three stages.  Under this ecological model of social 
disorganization, deviance remains widespread until society becomes symbiotically reorganized 
around a new dominant form of normative order through the processes of accommodation and 
assimilation.237  Although the ecological model may be somewhat unnecessary limiting in a 
modern context, it echoes the sorts of mutual readjustment and social reconfigurations that STS 
scholars recognize as fundamental to processes of sociotechnical transformation.  
Social disorganization theories were subsequently adopted and modified by social control 
theorists who applied a social-psychological perspective to the concerns originally articulated by 
the Chicago School.  Control theorists agreed that normative disequilibrium results in disrupted 
socialization but were primarily interested in how this disruption was internalized.  In other 
words, recognizing that social disorganization is a causative factor in, rather than a determinant 
of, deviance, control theorists focused on identifying factors which might be helpful in 
differentiating which individuals or groups might be more or less likely to engage in deviant 
behavior.  As one scholar notes, control theorists are particularly interested in making explicit 
something most disorganization theorists leave implicit: the link between social disequilibrium 
and the likelihood of acting outside norms, or what came to be called deviance.238  
For example, Reckless, one of Park’s students, generated a model to help explain why, 
when faced with acute social disorganization, some individuals and communities hold steadfastly 
to traditional norms while others fall into forms of deviance.  A central feature of Reckless’s 
model is the notion that social-structural factors impacting socialization, what he calls “outer 
containment factors,” are mediated by social-psychological factors, what he called “inner 
containment factors.” During periods of high social disorganization, when normative constraints 
deteriorate due to rapid change, outer containment factors, conceptualized as structural buffers in 
a person’s immediate social world, would fail to adequately protect the person from slipping into 
deviance unless there is high strength of inner containment.239 (Fig. 12)  
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Figure 12. Reckless’ containment factors impacting socialization 
 
Similarly, in Causes of Delinquency, Hirschi focused on the role of social bonds in 
influencing the likelihood of deviance or conformity in the face of normative disequilibrium.240    
In Hirschi’s view, social disorganization primes deviant behavior but whether or not a particular 
individual or community engages in deviant behavior ultimately depends on the condition of 
their bond to society.  If the social bonds are weak or broken, deviant behavior is likely.  Social 
bonding, in Hirschi’s view, has inner and outer dimensions. (Fig. 13)  Significant technological 
changes may result in deviance by disrupting the social bonding process through weakening or 
suspending the power of internalized beliefs (norms) and/or external attachments, commitments, 
and involvements.241  
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Figure 13. Hirschi’s dimensions of social bonds impacting socialization 
 
We can take a number of useful lessons from social disorganization and social control 
theory.  The first may be the recognition that as significant innovations and changes in 
technology permeate society, enabling new forms of social practice and participation and 
disrupting old ones, the result may be a disruption or questioning of previously shared norms and 
expectations within a given organization or institutional context, or within society more broadly.  
Technological change can result in social disequilibrium where normative consensus is replaced 
by normative dissension.  Social disorganization theorists suggest that, while this normative 
dissension may be characterized as deviance within its immediate context, over the longer term 
this behavior tends to reflect normative competition or what cyberneticists might call a process 
of homeostasis.  Significant, rapid change is a trigger for mutual readjustment of laws, 
technologies, and social practices and, in combination, the system is transformed through 
dynamic evolutions between balance and disequilibria.        
In addition, drawing from the social control literature, we can begin to distinguish and 
refine the relationship between change and deviance.  Rather than assuming the relationship is 
linear and determinative, control theorists suggest that change primes rather that directs 
deviance.  Also important are the social-psychological factors which recognize the important role 
of human agency in determining outcomes.  For example, social structures such as the degree of 
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institutional support for internalized norms, goals, and expectations, how committed, attached, 
and involved a person or organization might be in the broader social context, the availability and 
effectiveness of safety valves for engaging in innovative and unorthodox behavior without 
penalty, and the opportunity to accomplish important personal and social goals through 
conforming behavioral channels can play key roles in terms of how disorganization and 
disequilibrium is responded to.  Also important are what Reckless calls the “inner containment” 
factors which is roughly analogous to what Hirschi called the “inner dimensions of social bonds” 
which can include considerations such as toleration for frustration, sense of responsibility, goal 
orientation, the ability to find substitute behaviors, and so forth.  In the context of the mass 
digitization project, these may provide touchstones by which we can begin to distinguish and 
understand the various organizational and institutional responses to the risks and opportunities of 
the project.  
While social disorganization and control theories provide some potentially useful ways of 
approaching and analyzing the mass digitization project — in digitizing millions of books, the 
project rapidly and fundamentally altered the ecology of traditional academic research libraries 
— these theories suffer from a number of potential weaknesses or limitations.  For example, 
critics of these approaches contend that the theories fail to fully operationalize the concept of 
disorganization and control.  Perhaps what might be characterized as disorganization could more 
accurately be seen as differential organization.  In addition, these approaches have faced 
criticism for neglecting socially productive forms of deviance, such as innovation.  Finally, social 
disorganization theorists’ perspective that deviance results from one’s spatial location in the 
natural ecology of a rapidly changing society fails to account for the causative potential of 
structured differences in social power and social class, so-called structural inequalities.  These 
critiques are answered, in part, by bringing in additional theoretical perspectives discussed below 
beginning with Robert K. Merton’s structural strain theory of deviance. 
Focusing also on the generation, function, and effects of social instability, Robert K. 
Merton posited in his 1938 book, Social Structure and Anomie, that anomie did not derive from 
normlessness (as Émile Durkheim had argued) but was rather a consequence of structural 
inequalities in society.  In particular, Merton was concerned with structural inequalities that 
reflected a mismatch between cultural goals and socially available, i.e. legitimate, means to 
achieve such goals.  Deviance, in Merton’s view, is the normal product of an unequal society.  
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The imbalance or disequilibrium between socially accepted goals and the availability of 
legitimate institutionalized means to accomplish the goals produces a strain that pushes people 
toward deviance.  
Merton further argues that the deviance will follow one of four possible paths. (See Fig. 2 
reproduced below as Fig. 14)  
 
 
 
Figure 14.  Robert K. Merton’s Typology of Deviance 
 
 
Under this typology Merton distinguished between behavior on the basis of whether or 
not it: 1) accepts or rejects a given cultural goal, and 2) accepts or rejects institutionalized means 
for accomplishing the cultural goal (although he acknowledges that, in some cases, 
institutionalized means may not exist).  Working counter-clockwise from Conformity in Figure 
14, Ritualism is behavior that is deviant because it “follows the rules” but is not motivated by the 
culturally accepted goal.  An example of ritualistic deviance might be a person who attends 
college because they feel like “it’s what people do” rather than because they want to develop 
knowledge, be successful, have more employment opportunities, and so forth.  Retreatism is 
behavior that is deviant because it rejects both the culturally accepted goal and the 
institutionalized means of accomplishing the goal.  An example of retreatist deviance might be 
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the iconic loner or hermit who shuns the basic mainstays of life, preferring instead to live off the 
grid, separate from the rest of society.   
Rebellion describes deviant behavior that does not fit neatly within Merton’s 2x2 
typology.  Rebellious deviance is behavior that not only rejects both the culturally accepted goal 
and the institutionalized means to accomplish it, but seeks to replace either or both with a new 
order.  The residents of Copenhagen’s Christiania (also called “Freetown Christiania”) may be an 
example of rebellious deviance as they took over a mostly abandoned military base in the city to 
create a purportedly autonomous new society with its own goals, rules, and forms of governance.    
Finally, innovation describes behavior that is deviant because, while it accepts the 
culturally accepted goal, it rejects the institutionalized means for accomplishing the goal or such 
means are unavailable.  Merton’s classic example of innovative deviance is Al Capone, a person 
who whole-heartedly accepted the success goal but rejected the legitimate (i.e. legal) means of 
accomplishing success.  It is worth noting that, of the four paths of deviance Merton identifies, 
innovative deviance is the only path which promotes the culturally accepted goal.  In this work, I 
will focus on this path of deviance and, in subsequent sections, will argue that participation in the 
mass digitization of in-copyright works was an example of innovative deviance not because the 
participants rejected the institutionalized means of accomplishing the digitization but because 
legitimate means to do so were unavailable for reasons I will later describe.   
Merton defines innovative deviance as the “creative use of illegitimate means to obtain 
valued legitimate ends” and “the rejection of institutional practices but the retention of cultural 
goals.”242  “Innovative deviance is a normal outgrowth of having accepted cultural goals without 
having been provided with the opportunity to legitimately achieve those goals.”243  
In his later works, Merton focuses on innovative deviance as tool in economic or business 
dealings.  Explaining the cause of deviant innovation, Merton writes:   
“Great cultural emphasis upon the success-goal invites this mode of adaptation 
through the use of institutionally proscribed but often effective means of attaining 
at least the simulacrum of success – wealth and power.  Innovative deviance 
occurs when the individual has assimilated the cultural emphasis upon the goal 
without equally internalizing the institutional norms governing the way and means 
for its attainment.” 244 
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Furthermore, Merton suggests that we tend to look upon upper class, or white-collar, 
innovative deviance with a degree of tactic approval.  At the top economic levels, he observes:  
“[T]he pressure toward innovation not infrequently erases the distinction between 
the business-like strivings this side of the mores and sharp practices beyond the 
mores.  As Veblen observed: ‘It is not easy in any given case – indeed it is at 
times impossible until the courts have spoken – to say whether it is an instance of 
praiseworthy salesmanship or penitentiary offense.’”245 
 
The focus on white-collar crime and organized crime reflects one possible version of 
innovative deviance, namely behaviors that reject institutionalized means for accomplishing 
cultural goals.  But innovative deviance can also result from circumstances where legitimate 
institutionalized means for the accomplishing a goal simply do not exist.  This is often the case, 
according to Merton and many others, due to structured inequalities in society based on race, 
gender, class, wealth, and so forth.  For those in society’s lower strata, where the pressure toward 
deviance is greatest and, not coincidentally, deviance generates the strongest social control 
response innovative deviance have very little to do with a rejection of institutionalized means.246   
In the context of mass digitization, the structured inequalities are based on an imbalance 
between the public’s interest and the private interests of rightsholders, an imbalance exacerbated 
by significant changes in information and communication technologies and recent compounding 
reforms to copyright law which favor rightsholders at the expenses of the public.  The relevant 
mismatch or imbalance is between the culturally accepted goal — promoting the progress of 
society through the creation, dissemination, and use of cultural and intellectual works — and the 
institutionalized means of accomplishing the goal — the Copyright Act and associated case law.  
The transition from an analog world to a digital one through the mass digitization of libraries’ 
entire print collection would advance the goals of copyright, yet there were no clearly legitimate 
means for accomplishing the goal based on copyright law as it existed at the time.  Given the 
uncertainty and ambiguity in the law, mass digitization could be interpreted as a form of socially 
productive potential infringement.  As the empirical sections of this work will describe, 
participants and observers held different opinions on the potential legality (or illegality) of the 
mass digitization project.   
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Furthermore, to the extent that different libraries and institutions responded differently to 
the mass digitization project, some taking on roles as willing partners, some limiting 
participation to public-domain works, others refusing to participate, suggests that internalized 
norms discussed earlier and mentioned again by Merton also played a key role in the outcome.     
Merton also acknowledges the pragmatic advantages to researching innovative deviance 
as compared to the other paths of deviance he identified.  In particular, because “the law provides 
formal criteria of this form of deviance, it is relatively visible and readily becomes a focus for 
study.”  In contrast, “other forms of behavior which are sociologically though not legally 
departures from accepted norms … are less visible and receive little attention.”247  That said, the 
research attention Merton cites is in the domain of criminal deviance such as theft, violent 
crimes, and so forth, rather than intellectual property infringement.  Extending Merton’s theories 
to the IP context could provide some useful insights not already addressed by research in this 
area. 
Several sociologists have carried forward Merton’s theories on anomie and the paths of 
deviance.  Richard Cloward, for example, contributed to Merton’s theory by arguing that 
structured inequalities in society may actually block access to both legitimate and illegitimate 
means of goal attainment.  Cloward calls this “double failure” stating: “If illegitimate means are 
unavailable, if efforts at innovation fail, then retreatist adaptations may be the consequence, and 
the ‘escape’ mechanism chosen by the defeated individual may perhaps be all the more deviant 
because of his ‘double failure.’”248   
In addition, in work with Ohlin, Cloward observed that social adjustments to the strain of 
blocked opportunity can be collective, calling these collectives “subcultures,”249 and moreover, 
by adopting elements of Edward Sutherland’s learning perspective of deviance, concluded that 
deviance must be, at least partially, learned in interaction with others.  This notion, which has 
come to be called the cultural transmission theory, focuses on the relational dynamics by which 
one form of adjustment to frustration is selected instead of others.  Subsequent research on 
cultural transmission suggests that it is a communicative process dependent on innovation in the 
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creation of new, problem-solving responses to changes in the environment and the ability to 
communicate this behavior and/or imitate the behaviors of others.250   
Structural strain theories have received their fair share of criticism.  For example, Albert 
Cohen argued that Merton’s theory was too atomistic in the sense that it places undue emphasis 
on the individual and the discontinuity of the deviant act.  Cohen argues, instead, that the way a 
person experiences frustration and selects a particular mode of deviant adaptation is highly 
dependent upon his or her interpersonal associations with his or her social reference group.  
This criticism is well-founded and, to some extent, was resolved by Cloward and Ohlin’s 
cultural transmission theory and their studies of collective deviance.  In addition, Merton 
himself also ultimately incorporated Cohen’s concerns as his own.     
Cohen also took issue with Merton’s focus on utilitarian deviance.  Cohen acknowledges 
that, while Merton’s theory of deviant adaptation is a “sociologically sophisticated and highly 
plausible … explanation” of utilitarian, or instrumentally-oriented, forms of deviance, it failed 
to account for non-utilitarian or expressive forms of deviance.”251  Subsequent researchers have 
picked upon on the distinction between utilitarian and non-utilitarian forms of deviance. For 
example, Gould (1987) contrasts deviant innovation with deviant aggression.  Citing Merton’s 
theories, Gould states that deviant innovation “implies a rational, utilitarian innovation to obtain 
the facilities necessary to achieve a desired goal.  The innovation will be termed deviant when 
and if it results in acts that violate the institutionalized normative order….”252  By contrast, 
deviant aggression, according to Gould, is non-utilitarian deviance.  Ultimately, for Gould, the 
distinction comes down to the subjective intent of the deviant actor.  Providing the example of a 
person who breaks the windshield of a car, Gould reasons that the individual would be 
characterized as a deviant innovator if they were a “glazier who does so for profit” — because 
they would be paid to repair the damage – versus a deviant aggressor who broke the windshield 
as nothing more than an act of vandalism.253  
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It is worth noting that Gould does not appear to be applying the philosophical doctrine of 
utilitarianism stemming from the work of Jeremy Bentham and others which defines utilitarian 
as “the greatest good for the greatest number,” since it would be impossible to know whether the 
glazier’s profit was a greater good than the loss of property to the car owner.  Rather, it appears 
that Gould is employing a definition that more closely aligns utilitarian with utility – the 
glazier’s breaking of the windshield is utilitarian because it is “of or relating to utility” or, 
drawing upon Cohen’s work, is “instrumentally-oriented” because it motivated by an economic 
self-interest rather than (merely) expressive aggression.   
Furthermore, Gould’s critique may fail to fully incorporate the goal orientation of 
Merton’s concept of innovative deviance.  While it is true that innovative deviance does contain 
some inherent reference to utilitarianism via its premise that the behavior in question be 
motivated by the pursuit of a culturally accepted goal, it is worth noting that none of the other 
paths of deviance articulated by Merton include such a condition.  Therefore, it may be that non-
utilitarian or expressive forms of deviance may be captured by ritualist, retreatist, and rebellious 
forms of deviance. 
Until this point, I have focused on sociological theories which have framed processes of 
change and transformation in terms of interactions between systemic, structural, and institutional 
forces and shared norms and practices.  I would like to break away from these normative 
frameworks to introduce two additional perspectives.  The first perspective is that of the 
economist Albert Hirschman.  The second is the perspective of the historian of technology 
Thomas Parke Hughes. 
Hirschman’s approach to change and transformation is oriented around notions of 
rationality, efficiency, and participation through political and economic action rather deviance 
and conformity.  Furthermore, while the previously discussed theories used change — 
particularly significant, rapid technological change — as a jumping off point, Hirschman uses 
change — particularly decline and deterioration in goods and services — as his jumping off 
point.  Notwithstanding this fairly significant difference, I believe Hirschman’s approach offers a 
complementary perspective to those discussed earlier and offers potentially important insights 
into processes of sociotechnical transformation in the context of mass digitization context. 
In Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States 
(1970), Hirschman begins with the premise that “lapses from efficient, rational, law-abiding, 
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virtuous, or otherwise functional behavior always happen, no matter how well a society’s basic 
institutions are devised.”254  Moreover, “society learns to live with a certain amount of such 
dysfunctional or mis-behavior” because, in his view, this sort of deterioration is: 
 “… the inevitable counterpart of man’s increasing productivity and control over 
his environment.  Occasional decline as well as prolonged mediocrity – in relation 
to achievable performance levels – must be counted among the many penalties of 
progress.”255   
 
Societal deterioration, thus, goes hand-in-hand with economic surplus and technological 
progress and any “homeostatic controls” with which societies are equipped to correct the 
elements of decline are “bound to be rough.”256  This basic framework seems to align with the 
previously discussed perspectives on sociotechnical reconfiguration in responses to technological 
change.   
While the search for social arrangements that wholly eliminate deviance or deterioration 
may be futile, Hirschman notes that society nevertheless continues to:  
“… marshal from within itself forces which make as many of the faltering actors 
as possible revert to the behavior required for its proper functioning … lest the 
misbehavior feed on itself and lead to general decay.”257   
 
In fact, Hirschman argues that the progress of society is almost inversely correlated to the 
severity of sanctions it seeks to impose on deviance.  Recognition of the unpleasant truth that 
some level of deviance is unavoidable “has been impeded by a recurring utopian dream: that 
economic progress, while increasing the surplus above subsistence, will also bring with it 
disciplines and sanctions of such severity as to rule out any backsliding that may be due, for 
example, to faulty political processes.”258  Explaining further: 
“The common assumption of these constructs is simply stated: while technical 
progress increases society’s surplus above subsistence it also introduces a 
mechanism of the utmost complexity and delicacy, so that certain types of social 
misbehavior which previously had unfortunate but tolerable consequences would 
now be so clearly disastrous that they will be more securely barred than before.  
As a result, society is, and then again it is not, in a surplus situation: it is 
producing a surplus, but is not at liberty not to produce it or to produce less of it 
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than is possible; in effect, social behavior is as simply and as rigidly prescribed 
and constrained as it is in a no-surplus, bare subsistence situation.”259 
 
Within this context, where progress, deterioration, and deviance co-exist and are to a 
large extent interdependent, Hirschman contends that organizational behavior reflects a 
characteristic he describes as “slack.”  Organizational behavior is primarily about satisficing, he 
argues, rather than obtaining the highest possible profits. 260   Therefore, organizational 
development may more appropriately be understood “not so much (as) finding optimal 
combinations of resources and factors of production as on calling forth and enlisting for 
development purposes resources and abilities that are hidden, scattered, or badly utilized.”261 
How are an organization’s members to respond when the organization seems 
“permanently and randomly subject to decline and decay” or, stated somewhat differently, “to a 
gradual loss of rationality, efficiency, and surplus-producing energy, no matter how well the 
institutional framework within which they function is designed”? 262   Hirschman’s theory 
suggests two possible alternative answers.  First, members can “exit” by making use of market 
competition to withdraw from the relationship and possibly select an alternative.   Second, they 
can “voice” their complaints and hope that, through communication of the grievance, they can 
prompt the organization to repair the perceived lapse or defect.  Exit and voice thus represent a 
convergence of economic and political action.   
Hirschman argues that economists bias exit over voice because it is neat, impersonal, 
indirect, and most importantly efficient.  However, exit can only signal an organization’s possible 
decline and does not, as compared to voice, communicate much information about the reasons 
for the decline.  Therefore, Hirschman argues that organizations should prefer voice over exit.  
Furthermore, one way in which organizations can sway members’ cost-benefit analysis regarding 
whether to choose exit or voice is to foster loyalty.   
Loyalty is therefore the lynchpin in Hirschman’s analytic framework.  Fostering member 
loyalty carries with it its own challenges because those members who care most about the 
organization “and therefore are those who would be the most active, reliable, and creative agents 
of voice are for that very reason also those who are apparently likely to exit first in the case of 
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deterioration.”263  When the organization creates mechanisms through which members can make 
their voice heard and effectuate reform, members’ loyalty grows as does their devotion to the 
organization’s success.  
Hirschman’s exit, voice, and loyalty framework is relevant to inquiries into processes of 
sociotechnical transformation and mass digitization because it can provide useful clues about the 
relationship between social structures, such as economic and political institutions, whose effects 
filter down through society, and more individual or dispersed forms of engagement and 
participation, such as exit, voice, and loyalty, that percolate and coalesce to generate 
transformations from the bottom-up.  His framework, which is oriented around concepts of 
rationality/irrationality, efficiency/inefficiency, exit/voice, and so forth, offers a nice analytic 
counterpoint to sociological theories that are primarily focused on norms, conformity, and 
deviance.  Decisions involving the mass digitization of in-copyright works may be partly 
motivated by norms and shared expectations, but they may also be motivated by economic and 
political concerns.       
Another non-normative concept that is potentially relevant to the topic of sociotechnical 
transformation at the intersection of copyright law, technological change, and emerging social 
practices is Thomas Parke Hughes’ work on the social construction of technology and, in 
particular, his concept of reverse salient.264  Again, this research is a bit of a departure from the 
sources previously discussed.  Hughes was primarily interested in historical and sociological 
aspects of technological and infrastructural development.  I draw upon it here because mass 
digitization may be fairly characterized in terms of a transition between analog and digital 
information environments.  Indeed, the development of HathiTrust is, in many ways, an example 
of knowledge infrastructure development that draws upon and interoperates with centuries-old 
knowledge infrastructures while simultaneously carving out a new, different path that takes 
advantage of networked communication technologies, data mining and data analytics, distributed 
computer-supported collaborative work, and other emerging forms of knowledge technology and 
practices.   
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Hughes argued that the development of infrastructure is not as a grand scheme 
conceptualized from the outset.  Instead, he stressed the local and entrepreneurial construction of 
systems that, over time, and were assembled into larger systems, networks, and Internetworks.  
We can apply these observations more generally to processes of sociotechnical transformation 
that shapes and is shaped by dynamic, entangled interactions of law, technological change, and 
emerging social practice.   
Of particular note is Hughes’ introduction of the concept of the “reverse salient.”  
Borrowing from military terminology, a reserve salient is a part of a system that underperforms 
the rest and therefore prevents the system from achieving its full potential.  A reverse salient can 
be technological, such as a capacitor in an electrical system, or social, such as founder’s myopia 
that biases organizations against innovation.  In this research, I would extend the concept to also 
include existing legal mechanisms and doctrines in copyright law that unnecessarily hamper the 
progress of society’s useful arts and science.  As a practical matter, reverse salients become focal 
points in processes of sociotechnical transformation.  An obvious sticking point highlighted by a 
backward protrusion against forward momentum, reverse salients function as a convenient locale 
for orienting debates and reforms.  Thus, in the context of mass digitization (and previous 
controversies involving technological change) debates around how and why copyright law must 
be reformed given the new technical realities can be understood as an effort to alleviate the 
copyright’s effect as a reverse salient.         
Distributed sources of transformation: A bottom-up approach  
In seeking to describe, explain, and understand how individuals and organizations 
navigate the intersections of copyright law, technological change, and emerging social practice 
and influence processes of transformation, organizational science theory provides useful insights 
particularly with respect to sensemaking and decision-making.  This section focuses primarily on 
the work of Karl Weick and colleagues before touching briefly on organization change literature.   
As a preliminary matter, organizational science literature does not provide a specific, 
concrete, concise definition of “sensemaking.”  Somewhat like the sensemaking process itself, 
sensemaking theories seems to ask researchers to take on the role of bricoleur, 265  building 
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interpretations and meanings over time through an iterative process of redrafting and synthesis 
subject to potentially endless revision.  Preeminent sensemaking scholar Karl Weick analogizes 
sensemaking to cartography.  Maps reflect where the cartographer looked, how they looked, what 
they wanted to represent, and their tools of representation; the same can be said of sensemaking.  
Moreover, as with sensemaking, there is no one best map of a particular terrain because, for any 
terrain, there will be an indefinite number of useful maps.   
As a researcher engaged in my own sensemaking about the sensemaking of an 
organization, the irony of this endeavor does not escape me.  Like the participants in my study, I 
too will cobble together a retrospective story that invariably privileges certain features and 
aspects of the story and leaves others hidden.  But, as one of my committee members wisely 
counseled, in communicating research, the story is not going to come from it, it is going to come 
from me looking at it and saying here is what I see.  In sensemaking, the “terrain keeps changing 
and the task is to carve out some momentary stability in this continuous flow.”266  With that said, 
I will attempt to sketch some of the features of sensemaking and decision-making literature that I 
have found most prominent, relevant, and useful in my research on sociotechnical transformation 
and, more specifically, to a case study of mass digitization and the emergence and evolution of 
HathiTrust.  
Sensemaking is not a normative process about Truth and getting it right. Instead, it is 
“about continued redrafting of an emerging story so that it becomes more comprehensive, 
incorporates more of the observed data, it is more resilient in the face of criticism.” 267 
Sensemaking generates understanding that is “provisional, plausible, subject to revision, swift, 
directed toward continuation of interrupted activity, ready to hand, tentative, infused with 
ignorance, and sufficient for current purposes.”  Sensemaking starts out as “a momentary, 
expedient understanding.  But the sense thus created often lingers and gets stored as if it were the 
product of a far more deliberate, intentional analysis.”268  Sensemaking by an organization is an 
instance of the organization giving order to flux:  
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“sensemaking does not begin de novo, but like all organizing occurs amidst a 
stream of potential antecedents and consequences. … All of these activities 
furnish a raw flow of activity from which he may or may not extract certain cues 
for closer attention.”269   
 
Weick thus identifies sensemaking as the primary site where “meanings materialize that 
inform and constrain identity and action.”270  
 The relationship between sensemaking and decision-making is complex and 
interdependent.  Both are processes with no clear starting or ending point and each feeds into the 
other, creating swirling currents of meaning within a larger temporal stream.  As a practical 
matter, this can lead to difficulties in terms of knowing where to jump in to an analysis or 
discussion.  For purposes of this literature review and its subsequent application to the empirical 
study on mass digitization and the emergence and evolution of HathiTrust, I organize 
sensemaking and decision-making theories around three phases: 1) pre-decision processes 
involving choosing among alternatives; 2) the choice or act captured by a behavioral 
commitment, and 3) the post-decision process of sensemaking.  
Phase One: Choosing Between Alternatives  
Preceding a decision, or an “event of behavioral commitment,” would-be decision-
makers operate in a state of ambiguity or uncertainty.  Jones and Gerard observe that this 
uncertainty is a motivating force in the decision-making process.  In comparison to other 
disciplines (such as law) that tend to privilege rationality as a central tenet of good decisions, 
organizational science researchers tend to problematize the deliberation process by, for example, 
emphasizing tradeoffs between rationality and expediency in organizational decision-making.   
An approach to decision-making that prioritizes rationality and a careful assessment of 
alternatives might result in the discovery of a better alternative.  Reducing uncertainty and 
ambiguity enables organizations to register fine grain details of the environment and choose an 
action that is sensitive to potentially important aspects of that complicated environment.  One 
potential downside to this approach is that dedicating significant resources to assessing 
alternatives might dissipate some of the energy that could be used to help implement that chosen 
action.  Thus, in working to discover the best alternative, “people (lose) some of the 
commitments that they needed to put it into action.”  However, Weick notes that by more fully 
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understanding a problem, decision-makers are able to craft responses that consist of small 
actions, executed with relatively little commitment (and thus requiring less implementing 
energy), to produce big results.271  
On the other hand, an organization might resolve ambiguity not through decision 
rationality but through vigorous action.  By just jumping in rather than carefully assessing 
alternatives, organizations necessarily simplify the environment so that “relatively crude analyses 
are sufficient to keep track of the main things that are happening.”272  This approach favors 
expediency and simplicity over rationality.  While it enables decision-makers to proceed with 
alacrity, the tradeoff of this approach is that it precludes decision-makers from “any chance of 
learning more about the situation as it originally existed.”  This potential drawback is mitigated 
by the fact that, in the view of sensemaking theorists, meaning and significance are largely 
socially constructed through retrospective processes and therefore getting a firm, detailed picture 
of the decision-making environment may be somewhat illusory.   
How do organizations navigate these tradeoffs?  How do organizations decide whether to 
engage in decision rationality or just jump out into the unknown?  As a practical matter, 
researchers note organizations rarely (if ever) employ formal rationality in decision-making, 
beginning by perceiving a problem, defining the problem carefully, generating possible courses 
of action solely because they might solve the identified problem, and selecting an action solely 
because it ought to be the best way to solve the problem.273  One explanation offered for this is 
that organizations simply lack the bandwidth to deliberate in this way.  The problem of decision-
making amongst alternatives is a problem of requisite variety because “no sensing device can 
control input that is more complicated than the sensing device.”274   
The implications of requisite variety suggest that a choice amongst alternatives will 
ultimately come down to the control of salience, deciding whether deliberation or action is more 
important, and deciding which factors or aspects of the environment should emphasized or 
foregrounded.  The effects of this decision on how to approach decision-making are often 
irreversible.  “If you choose in favor of accurate sensing, you reduce your capability to take 
strong action.”  Carried to the extreme, looking before one leaps may result in not seeing 
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anything, and therefore may result in inaction.  However, if a problem is construed such that only 
a relatively small corrective action is required, then then detail and accuracy are crucial.”275 On 
the other hand, if a problem is construed on a grand scale, as many social movement-oriented 
problems are, then an action-oriented approach may be better suited.  By jumping in and 
choosing a course of action before gathering and assessing all the alternatives, action is 
guaranteed to generate outcomes that ultimately provide the raw material for seeing something 
and generating momentum. 276   Through the mechanism of salience, organizational science 
theorists shift the problem of decision-making from one of uncertainty in the environment — a 
framework that would indicate that increased quantities of information may provide the source of 
a solution — to confusion in the environment — where the problem is really a criticality 
resulting from multiple meanings:  
“[W]hen a decision means many different conflicting things, the problem is one of 
too many meanings, not too few, and the problem shifts from one of uncertainty to 
one of criticality.”277   
 
Understanding how an organization navigates the tradeoffs between careful deliberation 
and vigorous action is therefore tied to the question of how an organization controls salience 
regarding the problem.     
Rationality is not abandoned by the organization that chooses efficient action over 
decision rationality, it simply gets shifted to a subsequent phase of the process.  Organizational 
science researchers adopt multiple views of rationality based on its various functions.  
Rationality can include: 1) a set of prescriptions that change as the issue changes; 2) a façade 
created to attract resources and legitimacy; and/or 3) a post-action process used retrospectively to 
invent reasons for the action.”278  When an organization adopts a decision-making approach that 
privileges vigorous action over careful deliberation, rationality shifts from an evaluative function 
to a form of rationalization, a process of retrospective justification whereby decision-makers 
seek to resolve multiple, conflicting definitions of what their decision means.   
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Before moving on to the retrospective justification phase, we must discuss the 
intermediate phase between choosing amongst alternatives and sensemaking.  This is the phase 
where the actual act of decision-making happens, what Weick calls the “behavioral commitment” 
or the event which triggers the sensemaking process.     
Phase Two:  Behavioral Commitment 
In sensemaking theory, a behavioral commitment is the trigger moment which unleashes 
the forces that destroy the plausibility of alternatives and remove their ability to inhibit action.  
As Weick notes, although rationality may play an initial role in our decision-making process, 
what drives, energizes, and justifies our choice is “the nonrational basis of our motivational 
commitment to them.”279   Thus, after the committed action has been chosen, there is little 
advantage to reflecting on the advantages of the rejected alternative or disadvantages of the 
chosen alternative.  “Once a decision is made, action is more effective when probabilistic 
information is treated as if it were deterministic and beliefs that are only relatively true are 
treated as if they were absolutely true.”280  Behavioral commitment is therefore the stimulus 
around which people and organizations build coherent worldviews through the process of 
sensemaking.   
The binding strength of any action depends on three conditions: 1) choice, 2) 
irrevocability, and 3) visibility.  When a behavior involves a high degree of choice, is undeniable, 
and is irreversible, it stimulates a retrospective process of justification “in which behavior is 
rationalized by referring to features of the environment which support it.”281  Sensemaking is 
thus a matter of articulating a rationale, or providing a justification, for a binding behavioral 
commitment.   
Phase Three: Sensemaking — Retrospect and Social Justification  
The importance of retrospect to the sensemaking process cannot be understated.  
Justification and rationalization are fundamentally post-hoc devices. 282   “Societal ideologies 
insist that actions ought to be responses – actions taken unreflexively without specific reasons 
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are irrational and irrationality is bad.” 283  Therefore, organizations point to information in their 
environment, such as problems, threats, success or opportunities, to justify their action.   
Post-hoc rationalizations tend to underestimate the vast amount of uncertainty present 
during the early stages of acting, because people overestimate the predictability of past events 
once they know how they turned out. 284   This is essentially the issue of hindsight bias.285  
Organizational science researchers argue that hindsight bias most often implicates assumptions 
about reality (that what appears to happen did happen), intention (that what happened was 
intended to happen), and necessity (that what happened had to happen).286  As discussed in the 
following chapter on Methods, hindsight bias may have some implications for how research into 
organizational sensemaking is conducted, but poses relatively fewer problems for constructivist 
research that triangulates, corroborates, and anchors the accounts of participants. 
In addition to being an essentially retrospective process, sensemaking is also 
fundamentally social.  This is true in a number of ways.  First, retrospective justification is often 
done for external consumption, to attract resources and legitimacy, for example.  The strength of 
the behavioral commitment to trigger subsequent justification depends in large part on the 
publicness of the act.  When an action is irrevocable, public, and volitional, there is more at stake 
for the actor; the role of justification is intensified by the social context in which it occurs.  The 
actor seeks socially acceptable justifications for the lapsed action. Shared norms and 
expectations affect the rationalizations developed for behavior as a process of legitimation.  
“People develop acceptable justifications for their behavior as a way of making such behavior 
meaningful and explainable.” 287  As a consequence, explanations that are developed 
retrospectively to justify committed actions are often stronger, more tenacious, and more likely 
to produce selective attention and confident action. 
The second way in which retrospective justifications are social is that they serve 
important needs internal to the organization for understanding and predicting future events.288  
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Tenacious justifications tend to prefigure subsequent perception and action, which means they 
often become self-confirming, verging on self-fulfilling prophecies.289   
The third way in which sensemaking is essentially social is that behavioral commitments 
are often justified by explanations that reify social structure.  In particular, Weick identifies five 
ways in sensemaking tends to link micro-behavioral commitments to macro social consequences:  
1) they begin as commitments to social relationships rather than commitments to individual 
behaviors, 2) the social relationships often generate their own conditions of commitment, 3) 
since social relationships rather than behaviors are what people become bound to, justifications 
tend to invoke social entities rather than individual reasons, 4) reifications that justify social 
commitment tend to set up expectations that operate like self-fulfilling prophecies, and 5) efforts 
to validate the social justifications tend to spread them to other actors.290  
Put in more explicit terms, sensemaking is a process through which collectivity may be 
generated.  This occurs when behavioral commitments, typically double interacts, are justified 
through shared committed interpretations.  Commitment occurs as a result of what Weick calls a 
double interact represented as A1B1A2.  The double interact is also the smallest unit building 
block of collective structures which Weick argues form when “self-sufficiency proves 
problematic.”291   Thus, collective structures are built initially around interdependent means:  
“Neither A nor B has direct control over their outcomes, and they must entice someone else to 
contribute a means activity to get their own desired outcomes.”292   Furthermore, “people commit 
to and coordinate instrumental acts (means) before they worry about shared goals.”293  “But 
shared goals do emerge as people search for reasons that justify the earlier interdependent means 
to which they have become bound.”294     
Thus, agreements to agree introduce stability into an equivocal flow of events by means 
of justifications that increase social order and collectivity: 
“When people act on behalf of these committed interpretations and their reified 
contents, their actions become more orderly, more predictable, more organized.  
As a result of this tightening, their actions have more impact on others and are 
more likely to be imitated.  Thus, both the form and substance of organization 
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become more distinct and the world momentarily becomes slightly less chaotic.  
And all because some action first stuck out as more public, more irrevocable, and 
more attached to a set of actors than were other actions.”295 
 
Reification of a collectivity thus becomes a mechanism for justifying commitment.  
“Having become bound to interdependent action, a person might invoke macro sources of micro-
constraints as in, for example, “that’s the way we do things in this culture.”296   
The relationship between action, sensemaking, and reality are interdependent, circular, 
and often murky.  Organizational science literature on sensemaking and decision-making seems 
to support the contention that “we need only in cold blood act as if the thing in question were 
real, and keep acting as if it were real, and it will infallibly and by growing and such a 
connection with our life but it will become real.”297   And, “if men define situations as real, they 
are real in their consequences.”298  When considering sensemaking around mass digitization and 
the subsequent emergence and evolution of HathiTrust, it makes sense to bear in mind how 
retrospective justification and reification might operate in combination with structural and social-
psychological factors to configure sociotechnical transformation. 
Moreover, while the process of sensemaking involves retrospective, socially attuned 
justification, “that action initially explained by reification soon generates the reality that replaces 
the reification with substance.”299  Once a justification begins to form, “it exerts an effect on 
subsequent action”300 and can ultimately turn into preferences that “control subsequent attention 
and action.”301  Thus, sensemaking processes can form tighter entanglements among aspects of 
copyright, technological change, and social practice effecting behavioral commitments and 
salience around future related issues.  In that way, while past action and sensemaking are not 
necessarily predictive, they more forge new “go to” pathways which can have a tendency to 
channel behavior.  Whether one calls it a self-fulfilling prophecy, drawing upon the work of  
Weick and colleagues, or gives it a different name, identifying and investigating the relationship 
between innovation and a persistent, almost gravitational pull toward tradition, is a vital area of 
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exploration in the story of HathiTrust and the context of sociotechnical transformation more 
broadly.     
Possibly related to this, organizational science scholars identify a number of factors that 
can interrupt or otherwise create difficulties for sensemaking.  One such factor is technological 
change, particularly where emerging technologies disrupt normal expectations “and hence, the 
efficacy of established patterns of meaning and associated behavior.”302  Weick notes that as 
newer information technologies become more stochastic, continuous, and abstract, more of their 
operation has become a problem for sensemaking with respect to how a technology works and its 
organizational impacts.303  When faced with technological change that disrupts organizational 
order or increases flux within the organization, individuals will draw creatively on their memory 
— especially their personal experience — in composing a story that begins to make sense of 
what is happening.  The transition of research libraries from a purely analog world, grounded in 
centuries-old practice and traditions, to a hybrid analog-digital one raises complex questions and 
challenges for how institutional memory intersects with technological change in the context of 
sensemaking and decision-making around things like mass digitization.  
When technological change produces ambiguities in the environment and its “products 
are value laden, … commitment to goals and procedures, whatever they are, may be sufficient 
for proper adjustment to the environment.  At the extreme, a school of thought may be created as 
in university life where successful organizational leaders are those who can convince others that 
their own commitments are the standard to be achieved.”304  This might suggest that a return to 
the foundational goals or missions of libraries and universities (or perhaps the institution of 
copyright law also) as the motivation for behavioral commitments and decisions may take 
primacy over past practices, processes, mechanisms, and means for carrying out those objectives 
which, in light of technological change, no longer hold the same relevance.   
Technological change enables the introduction and development of new knowledge 
ecologies and alters the context in which existing institutional structures and patterns of practices 
operate.  Sometimes, the changes reveal tremendous promise with respect to the development 
and introduction of new, adaptive, continuous methods for creating, debating, and spreading 
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knowledge.  But knowledge infrastructure development, and efforts to transition the analog 
world to an uncertain digital one, faces numerous challenges.  The history of large-scale 
digitization offers relevant touchstones for exploring, understanding, and problematizing 
sensemaking around the mass digitization project. 
Researchers note that one common source of failure or obsolescence is the failure to 
account for the non-technical aspects of infrastructure development.  When a significant 
technical change is introduced it can put a tremendous strain on existing institutions (e.g. 
copyright law, universities, and libraries) that may be prone to inertia.305  When new technologies 
fail to account for key features of the social environments in which they operate, an otherwise 
promising technology can end up having a disastrous and deleterious effect.306  As Erik van der 
Vleuten observed, “technical infrastructure elements are increasingly intertwined with non-
technical ones” such that they two systems can be self-reinforcing and similarly generate their 
own gravitational pull.  He explains: 
“In the establishment phase(s) technical designs are adapted and coupled to an 
actor playing field, organization structures, marketing strategies, legal 
frameworks, etc.; in the expansion phases such sociotechnical intertwinement is 
further strengthened to the degree that technical and non-technical elements 
interlock and make the whole thing difficult to change.”307   
 
While issues at the intersection of sensemaking, technological change, and STS have 
been explored by Weick, van der Vleuten, Edwards and others, a related body of literature on 
organizational change offers additional insights.  Organization change theory is concerned with 
how organizations construe, interpret, and respond to events that disrupt existing patterns and 
expectations.  One important, however obvious, difference between the two approaches is that 
organizational change focuses on the change process, rather than the sensemaking process.  
Literature on organizational change is concerned with the process by which uncertainty and 
conflict are accepted by the organization and transformed through confirmation so that novelty 
and innovation, eventually, becomes routinized. 308  This research therefore has potential bearing, 
in particular, on HathiTrust’s evolution from an emerging upstart to a more seasoned and 
entrenched organization. 
                                                 
305 Edwards, P. N., Jackson, S. J., Chalmers, M. K., Bowker, G. C., Borgman, C. L., Ribes, D., ... & Calvert, S. 
(2013). Knowledge infrastructures: Intellectual frameworks and research challenges, pg. 5. 
306 E.g. Rob Kling, Computerization and Controversy: Value conflicts and social choices 
307 Vleuten, E. V. D. (2006).  Patterns and principles in infrastructure development.  Position paper, September 2006.   
308 Kimberly, J. R., & Quinn, R. E. (1984). Managing organizational transitions. McGraw-Hill/Irwin, pg.303. 
 110 
Lynn Isabella's research draws upon previous research on the role of cognition and 
interpretation in organizational change and proposes a model for the change process. 309   She 
posits that the sensemaking process turns into organizational change in four key stages.  The first 
stage is anticipation — when an organization's key members “assemble an interpretive portrait 
based on speculation and anticipation” by piecing together ill-fitting information into a “coherent 
and cogent frame of reference.”310  The second stage is confirmation — where the interpretation 
of the event is standardized: “Interpretations at this stage provide no new or creative insights and 
primarily reflect understandings that worked or are believed to have worked in the past – 
presumptions about what will be, based upon what has been.”311  The third stage is culmination 
— when an organization amends its view of an event:  
“Interpretations no longer represent standard or presumed use but reconstructed 
use, frames of reference that are being amended at the event occurs to include 
new information or omit information no longer of value. … A real hands-on sense 
of experimentation and testing and learning by doing characterize collective 
interpretations at this stage. Since each event brings with it the need to create new 
norms and execute new behaviors, old views may not be effective.”312 
  
The final stage is the aftermath during which an event is evaluated.  As organizations 
“test and experiment with a construed reality that moves beyond the traditional boundaries of 
past sense making, there comes a growing, concrete realization of the permanent changes 
wrought and of the consequences those changes and the event itself have had for the organization 
and its members.”  In this stage, the organization evaluates its interpretation of the event in terms 
of its consequences and actively seeks out the strengths and weaknesses of changes brought on 
by the event in an attempt to (hopefully) rebuild certainty in the system.313  
Approaching organizational change and processes of transformation with these stages in 
mind may help researchers guard against a tendency to follow the “new, fast-moving, and 
dramatic parts of the current transition.”  Chasing the rabbit leaves the “complex processes of 
mutual adjustment by which older knowledge institutions adapt to emergent ones, and vice 
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versa” under-examined.314  In addition, it ignores the tensions that arise as boundaries between 
co-existing educational institutions (such as research universities) and memory institutions (such 
as libraries and archives) become increasingly blurred, reconfigured, and reconstituted during the 
process of transformation.315  This is particularly troubling when, as is frequently the case, “[t]he 
institutions in which most knowledge workers live and labor have not kept pace, or have done so 
piecemeal, without a long-term vision or a strategy.” 316   Educational institutions, libraries, 
publishers, intellectual property regimes, and political mechanisms have struggled to adapt to or 
accommodate the changing information environment.” 317   Programmatic efforts to improve 
knowledge infrastructures frequently prioritize “investments in technical systems over research 
on how to effect equally crucial cultural, social, and organizational transformations.”318 These 
observations suggest that particular gaps exist, and continue to grow, in our understandings of the 
sociotechnical aspects of transformation in the context of knowledge infrastructure development 
in which mass digitization and HathiTrust may play important roles. 
Research into processes of transformation in the context of knowledge and memory 
organizations and infrastructures must necessarily display a willingness to engage the complex, 
often messy intersections of law, technology, and social practice over time.  There are, therefore, 
inherent challenges in studying this phenomenon but the challenges are mitigated by the 
enormous potentials of generating a richer, deeper understanding of the processes of 
transformation as they unfold:  
“This is an exhilarating possibility.  Imagine what might have happened if 
scholars of the 15th and 16th centuries could have experimented directly with the 
sociotechnical reconfigurations that accompanied the advent of the printing press 
– as we can do today.”319 
 
Of course, we cannot turn back the clock and experiment directly with the transformative 
impact of the printing press, but we can open ourselves to the lessons that history might teach 
and use those lessons to generate new insights into things like mass digitization and the 
emergence and evolution of HathiTrust. 
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Chapter IV: Methods 
Qualitative Case Study Approach 
The primary goal of this research is to develop a richer understanding of processes of 
sociotechnical transformation arising from the intersections of copyright law, technological 
change, and emerging social practices.  As this is a rather broad field of inquiry, I have narrowed 
the analytic aperture to focus on a single case: the mass digitization project and subsequent 
emergence and evolution of HathiTrust.  Through the story of HathiTrust, this research hopes to 
contribute to understandings of transformation, delving into the ways copyright law, technology, 
and social practices co-evolve through dynamic, often murky, processes of entanglement, 
reconfiguration, and mutual-readjustment. 
The focus of this research is necessarily interdisciplinary.  As the previous chapters 
demonstrate, insights abound from multiple domains including law, history, sociology, 
economics, and organizational science (in addition to the countless other perspectives not 
discussed).  The analytic framework for this research is based upon the theory of innovative 
deviance expanded through sensemaking theory and traditional legal analysis.  Synthesizing 
approaches from various domains to describe and explain a complex case requires analytic 
flexibility and sensitivity to multiple, varied perspectives.  The most appropriate method for 
studying transformation in the context of mass digitization and HathiTrust is a qualitative case 
study approach informed by a constructivist paradigm as this facilitates the collection of 
information-rich data supporting thick description and the emergence of potentially deeper 
insights and understandings of a complex multidimensional phenomenon.320     
Qualitative interview studies enable researchers to develop detailed holistic descriptions, 
integrate multiple perspectives, learn how events are interpreted, describe process, and bridge
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inter-subjectivities.321  A qualitative approach is particularly useful when studying organizations 
and institutions as these units of analysis “lend themselves to multiple, conflicting 
interpretations, all of which are plausible.”322  As Weick describes, to reduce the criticality of 
information, researchers do not need larger quantities of information but rather richer qualitative 
information: 
“Information richness is defined as the ability of information to change 
understanding within a time interval.  Communication transactions that can 
overcome different frames of reference or clarify ambiguous decisions to change 
understanding in a timely manner are considered rich.  … In a sense, richness 
pertains to the learning capacity of a communication.”323   
 
In seeking to generate rich information, qualitative research privileges the perceptions of 
local actors ‘from the inside’ and the meanings they ascribe to their activities with the goal of 
“explicat[ing] the ways people in particular settings come to understand, account for, take action, 
and otherwise manage their day-to-day situations.”324  
Furthermore, a constructivist approach has been adopted by leading case study 
methodologists,325 researchers studying organizational sensemaking, and sociologists who have 
adopted social disorganization, social control, structural strain, and labelling approaches to the 
study of deviance. 326   Constructivism stresses the importance of the subjective creation of 
meaning, encouraging participants to describe their views of reality which, in turn, enables the 
research to better understand the participants’ conceptions and practices.327  As sensemaking 
theorists explain:   
“Individuals are not seen as living in, and acting out their lives in relation to a 
wider reality so much as creating and sustaining images of a wider reality, in part 
to rationalize what they’re doing.”328   
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Sensemaking literature further suggests three premises for constructivism: 1) the 
identification of any given action is subject to internal revision, 2) the anchor point for any given 
identification relies on a network of interdependent and continuously modifiable interpretations, 
and 3) any given action is subject to multiple identifications, the relative superiority of which is 
problematic.329  Constructivist research therefore is not motivated by a desire to discover Truth 
and facts but is rather motivated by Verstehen — a desire to understand social phenomena, 
namely the processes by which meanings are created and revised, in relation to internal and 
external events in a given context.   
Retrospect and the documentary method are essential aspects of the constructivist 
approach adopted in this study.  As sensemaking literature reminds us, “remembering and 
looking back are our primary source of meaning,”330 and thus retrospect and the documentary 
method are emphasized as the processes by which decisions are interpreted, justified, and 
understood: 
“We take seriously people’s accounts of how they accomplish interpretation, 
mindful however, that retrospective sensemaking involve bias reconstruction of 
antecedents since outcomes are known at the time reconstruction occurs.  This 
very bias in the strength of retrospect as a method of sensemaking since it edits 
out false starts and imposes a spurious order on an indeterminate past.  But the 
same editing requires that investigators observe sensemaking as it unfolds if they 
wish to contract this bias, which often means that ethnography and use of personal 
experience are crucial sources of data about interpretation.”331 
 
Even in the case of research on institutions — including legal institutions discussed 
primarily in Chapter VIII’s analysis of the copyright litigation involving HathiTrust and, more 
generally, academic institutions such as universities, libraries, and archives — retrospect and the 
documentary method offer approaches that are responsive to the scale, scope and rhythms of the 
changes being studied.332  A sensitivity to historical context and retrospect teaches that what 
might otherwise appear as necessary and obvious features of a social, technological, or legal 
system might in fact be “historical creations which could have followed other paths.”333  By 
organizing the scope of this study to include the approximately twelve years from the outset of 
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the mass digitization project to the present day, this research attempts to study the phenomenon 
of transformation through the lens of what Stewart Brand called “the long now.” 334  
Transformation and the development of things like HathiTrust take time to emerge, develop, 
evolve and, sometimes, obsolesce as do the meanings we generate about them.     
Studies of technological change similarly highlight the importance of the long now.  As 
Paul David’s work, and in particular his notion of the “productivity paradox,” describes, 
technological “advancements” may, at least initially, undermine productivity before enhancing it.  
For example, David observed that, after computers were introduced to the workplace, it took 
about twenty years of social, cultural, organizational, and institutional adjustments before they 
improved, rather than undermined, productivity.335  Similarly, since the advent of the Internet, we 
are “changing our knowledge generation and expression procedures root and branch.”336  Change 
does not happen overnight.  In the grand scheme of things, the ripple effects of mass digitization 
and HathiTrust are still fairly close to their epicenter.  Despite the emergence of new information 
and communication technologies and new organizational and infrastructural forms:   
“We remain bound to the book and article format and to the classic nineteenth-
century technology of files and folders.  It took well over 200 years for printed 
books to acquire the intellectual armature we now consider intuitive (such as the 
index, table of contents, bibliography, footnotes, and generally agreed rules on 
plagiarism).  Even page numbers were once an innovation.”337  
 
A case study approach offers distinct advantages in the context of constructivist research 
into complex, multi-faceted subjects because the approach emphasizes “contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context.” 338    In addition, by facilitating exploration of a 
phenomenon within its context using a variety of data sources, this approach “ensures that the 
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issue is not explored through one lens, but rather a variety of lenses which allows for multiple 
facets of the phenomenon to be revealed and understood.”339   
While not limited to qualitative data, case study methods generally include interviews, 
observations, and documentary analysis.  These multiple sources of evidence allow the 
researcher to triangulate data, thus corroborating phenomena.340  Case studies are particularly 
adept at enabling researchers to answer “how” and “why” questions when the behaviors or 
phenomena involved in the study are not amenable to researcher manipulation.  In addition, case 
studies allow researchers to delve into contextual conditions that may prove relevant to the 
phenomenon under study or, framed a slightly different way, enable researchers to study a 
phenomenon when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clear.341 
After noting the merits, benefits, and advantages of a constructivist case study approach, 
it is worth pausing to reflect on what this method is not.  Conclusions drawn from case studies 
are not intended to be generalizable to larger populations.  Instead, they aim for theoretic 
generalizability (Yin, 2009) and transferability.  Findings could, as a result, be applied to cases 
with similar characteristics along the theoretical lines examined and uncovered in the study.  In 
addition, the proposed study of HathiTrust’s mass digitization project could therefore provide 
useful touchstones for other digitization efforts, offer probative insights for the larger copyright 
policy debates around innovative deviance and technological change, and provide clues about 
processes of sociotechnical transformation.   
In addition, as already mentioned, this study is not motivated by a desire to find Truth, 
but rather to generate a rich description and some potential explanation for how and why 
HathiTrust and its progenitors navigated the legal, technological, and social aspects of mass 
digitizing in-copyright works.  The story which unfolds from the empirical work and is discussed 
in the following chapters aims for Verstehen.  I therefore refrain from interrogating or evaluating 
the veracity or legitimacy of the interpretations of interview participants.  That is not to say that I 
back away from or deemphasize conflicting or multiple perspectives.  I simply do not use 
differentiation as a springboard for generating broader normative claims.          
                                                 
339 Baxter, P., & Jack, S. (2008). Qualitative case study methodology: Study design and implementation for novice 
researchers. The qualitative report, 13(4), 544-559. 
340 Yin, R. K. (2009). Case study research: Design and methods, 4th. Thousand Oaks. 
341 Baxter & Jack (2008). 
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Case Selection Strategy 
Prior to embarking on this study, I had been interested in the relationship between 
innovation and deviance.  In particular, I was fascinated by how we make sense of and respond 
to behaviors that seem simultaneously socially productive or beneficial and potentially 
transgressive or infringing.  These early explorations led me to a theoretical framework for 
studying the phenomenon based, in large part, on Merton’s structural strain theory.  As a result of 
conversations regarding these early manifestations, culminating in the dissertation proposal 
defense, I heeded the advice of my committee to narrow the scope of my exploration into 
innovative deviance to a single case, fairly quickly settling on the mass digitization project and 
the subsequent emergence and evolution of HathiTrust. By binding the case in this way, I am 
able to research a complex phenomenon while maintaining a reasonable scope.      
Stake recommends that cases should be selected for their anticipated ability to help the 
researcher better understand the phenomenon in question (Stake, 2006).  He presents three main 
criteria for selecting cases: 1) the case should be relevant to the phenomena or thing studied; 2) 
the case should be representative of diversity across contexts; and 3) the case should provide 
opportunities to learn about complexity and contexts.  
Mass digitization and HathiTrust are important and timely examples of a particular set of 
controversies arising at the intersection of copyright, technological change, and emerging social 
practice.  This example provides a glimpse into processes of sociotechnical transformation and 
enables the synthesis and application of a new analytic approach combining innovative deviance 
and sensemaking theories.  The mass digitization project and HathiTrust have drawn the 
attention, ire, and/or admiration of members of academia, industry, the government, the judiciary, 
as well as diverse set of stakeholder advocacy groups.  Furthermore, because the mass 
digitization project involves numerous partners, and HathiTrust now consists of over 100 
partners, this case enables exploration of embedded diversity (within, between, and across 
partners) in the context of the Google project and HathiTrust as well as in comparison to other 
parallel and/or competing large-scale digitization projects (such as those spearheaded by the 
Internet Archive and Open Content Alliance).     
Research Questions 
This study seeks to answer the following three research questions:  
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 RQ1:  How and why did the University of Michigan engage in mass digitization of 
in-copyright works and how was its sensemaking and decision-making reflected in 
intra-organizational practices, processes, mechanisms, policies, and tensions? 
 RQ2: How and why did these (conceptions, decisions, practices, processes, 
mechanisms, policies, and tensions) prompt the genesis of HathiTrust and how have 
they continued to evolve over time and in response to internal and external factors? 
 RQ3:  How might HathiTrust’s emergence and evolution deepen understandings of 
processes of sociotechnical transformation and inform copyright policy debates 
around technological change?  
Data Sources and Analysis 
The primary data for the study were derived from semi-structured interviews and 
documents.  Participants were selected using purposeful sampling, supplemented by a snowball 
recruiting strategy, focusing on current and past employees and advisors of HathiTrust partner 
institutions, participants in competing and/or parallel digitization efforts, and critics of mass 
digitization and/or HathiTrust.  I made use of existing networks to identify and recruit key 
informants.  I also sought out marginal, retired, and possibly disaffected figures as well.  
Additional participants with special knowledge of the legal and policy implications of mass 
digitization were also recruited.   
Recruitment took place via in-person meetings as well as email solicitations.  Interviews 
were conducted in person, over the phone, and using Skype (voice only) at a time and length 
convenient to my participants.  The interviews typically lasted one hour and many participants 
were interviewed multiple times.  All interviews were recorded with the consent of participants 
on an HTC Inspire using the Smart Voice application or, if conducted via Skype, using Amolto 
Call Recorder software.  Interview recordings were transcribed by the researcher or Scribie, a 
transcription service provider.  A total of thirty-one individuals were interviewed, representing 
twelve different institutional/organizational affiliations. 
While the identities of many of the figures associated with HathiTrust and other large-
scale digitization efforts are a matter of public record, I have taken care to anonymize the 
responses of my participants to the greatest extent possible.  In particular, I have opted to 
associate quotes, statements, and perspectives with somewhat vague reference to the participant’s 
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role, such as, for example,  “lead architect,” “HathiTrust member,” “librarian,” “technologist,” 
and “legal commentator.”  In addition, I have made every attempt to make direct quotes non-
attributable and general statements a synthesis of multiple responses.  That said, readers may be 
familiar enough with HathiTrust and its members to surmise sources of content.  The informed 
consent document used for this study is attached as Appendix A.  The University of Michigan 
Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board reviewed this study and determined that it is 
exempt from IRB oversight.       
In addition to interviews, documents provided another key source of data for this study. 
Documents analyzed for this study included publicly available artifacts (HathiTrust’s website and 
web archive including press releases, statistics, and other items; court filings, orders, briefs, and 
opinions; agreements and contracts made available through freedom of information laws; 
articles, reports, and public statements contained in news articles and published presentations) 
and private intra-organizational communications (memos, emails, meeting notes) where provided 
by participants.   
Data analysis, including coding, began with the first data collected and ran throughout the 
project.  I extracted themes from my data by coding passages relevant to my research questions; 
the themes were then organized into categories.  Early analysis assisted me in refining and 
formulating subsequent interview questions and in testing the theory and narrative through a 
process of member checking as these elements emerged.  Interview transcriptions, notes, and 
documentary data were analyzed using an iterative, inductive, open coding process combined 
with qualitative memoing to identify important themes and concepts that emerge from the 
data.342  Coding and cross-coding of interview transcripts and other artifacts were done by hand.   
The story of HathiTrust called for data analysis of embedded units (distinguishing based 
upon institutions, participant roles, public vs. private status, academic vs. nonacademic and so 
forth) situated within the larger case.  The data was therefore analyzed within the subunits 
separately, between the subunits, and across all of the subunits to offer a richer and more fully 
illuminated description and explanation of the phenomenon in its organizational context.343  
Given the relevance of theme- and pattern-based elements as well as temporal elements 
in the study of knowledge infrastructure development, findings from the study have been 
                                                 
342 Miles & Huberman (1994). 
343 Baxter & Jack (2008); Yin (2003). 
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organized as a diachronic story tracing the development and evolution of HathiTrust from its pre-
origins in the mass digitization project through the present day, punctuated by synchronic 
flourishes tying the narrative back to themes and theoretical frameworks discussed in the 
literature review.  
Limitations 
A case study approach to research, and single-case studies in particular, are often 
criticized for their lack of causal generalizability to larger populations via repeatability or 
replicability.  However, where the purpose of the research is to describe the experience of an 
individual or organization, develop interpretations or explanations of that experience, or develop 
courses of action and to make decisions appropriate for this particular individual or organization, 
then the case study method is an extremely useful one.  Thus, while case studies do not offer 
statistical generalizability, when applied successfully they do enable analytic generalizability,344 
a rich understanding of the relevant contextual factors involved in the phenomenon of interest, 
and transferability.  As already discussed, relevant literature and research from related fields 
(STS, law, sociology, and organizational science) promote constructivist case studies as ideally 
suited to my focus of inquiry.  Findings from this study are not intended to provide replicable or 
predictive capacity but are rather intended to describe and explain, in a deeply contextual sense, 
the processes of sociotechnical transformation arising from the co-evolution of copyright laws, 
technologies, and emerging social practices shaping and shaped by mass digitization and the 
development of HathiTrust.  
Qualitative studies have also occasioned criticism for their perceived lack of rigor or 
trustworthiness.  Scholars have written extensively on both the challenges of qualitative research 
design and strategies for establishing credibility, transferability, dependability, confirmability, 
and trustworthiness.345  General guidelines for critically appraising qualitative research have also 
been published.346  This research employed design principles intended to diminish issues related 
                                                 
344 Yin (1994). 
345 Guba, E. G. (1981). Criteria for assessing the trustworthiness of naturalistic inquiries. ECTJ, 29(2), 75-91; 
Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1985). Naturalistic inquiry (Vol. 75). Sage; Lindlof, T. R., & Taylor, B. C. (2002). 
Asking, listening, and telling. Qualitative communication research methods, 170-208. 
346 Forchuk, C., & Roberts, J. (1993). How to critique qualitative research articles. Canadian Journal of Nursing 
Research, 25, 47-47; Mays, N., & Pope, C. (2000). Assessing quality in qualitative research. British medical journal, 
320(7226), 50. 
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to lack of rigor, credibility, or trustworthiness by including numerous and varied data sources 
which enabled me to triangulate between data sources, explore the phenomenon from multiple 
perspectives, and anchor findings.  In addition, I used principles of idea convergence, 
confirmation of findings, and a process of member checking to ensure that my data was of a high 
quality.   
Another potential limitation is one that is common to many empirical studies: missing 
data.  When working with historical and retrospective data, there is some inherent difficult in 
figuring out the extent to which artifacts and pieces of data are missing.  The problem of 
“unknown unknowns” is an unavoidable risk in every study.  The more troubling issue with 
respect to missing data, however, is the “known unknowns.”   
This study was conducted while the copyright infringement litigation involving 
HathiTrust was active.  As a result, I faced a challenge in that some of my potential participants 
were reluctant to be interviewed due to potential risks associated with the pending litigation.  
While reluctant and absentee participants formed the distinct minority, the possibility cannot be 
ignored that potentially important perspectives will be inadvertently left out of this analysis.  I 
attempted to ameliorate this issue, wherever possible, by triangulating existing participants’ 
accounts against publicly available documents to fill in those gaps. 
In addition, as a researcher with institutional ties to HathiTrust, and a professional and 
sometimes personal relationship with some of my research participants, I must acknowledge the 
risks associated with my own close proximity to the focus of my research.  As I have proceeded 
with this research, I have taken opportunities to pause and reflect on whether or not I might be 
unduly privileging a perspective or occluding a perspective, whether I am dispassionate and 
disinterested enough to represent the understandings of my participants without clouding them 
with my own biases, whether I am confident enough to tell the story I see emerging from the data 
without feeling constrained by my relationships with some of my participants (some of whom are 
also members of my dissertation committee).  I have attempted to mitigate these risks by seeking 
guidance and mentorship from seasoned researchers who are both familiar with my work and 
personality and also completely without any interest in HathiTrust or the University of Michigan.  
In addition, I have used strategies of member checking, idea convergence, and confirmation of 
findings to avoid biases and/or selective inattendance that might otherwise problematize the 
findings and conclusions of this research.   
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Conclusion 
In this chapter I detailed the features of qualitative case study research approaches 
conducted under a constructivist paradigm, explained my path to the HathiTrust case, and 
detailed sources of data, methods of analysis, and limits to this study.   I conducted a total of 42 
interviews with individuals associated with HathiTrust, parallel or competing digitization 
projects, critics and detractors, and individuals with special knowledge and expertise.  In 
addition, I also collected and analyzed numerous documents generated throughout HathiTrust’s 
pre-and-early history and well as contemporaneous artifacts.  These data are the primary inputs 
of the chapters to follow.   
Too little is known about the processes and mechanisms of sociotechnical transformation.  
A case study approach yields the best information for beginning to fill that gap and lay some of 
the groundwork for other forms of research (surveys, experiments, and so forth) to follow in the 
future.  HathiTrust provides a kind of “natural experiment” that allows me to study the 
phenomenon.  It is an “existence proof” of important aspects of this topic of sociotechnical 
transformation.   
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Chapter V: Pre-History of HathiTrust 
This study explores processes of transformation in sociotechnical systems by tracing the 
emergence and evolution of HathiTrust.  As previously discussed in Chapter II, large-scale 
digitization efforts had been ongoing since the late 1970s but faced significant technological, 
financial, and social challenges.  In fact, due to the limited scope of these earlier digitization 
efforts, copyright law never surfaced as a significant concern in most of these early endeavors.  
The Google Library Project represented a significant departure from earlier large scale 
digitization efforts.  
The story of HathiTrust begins not with its official launch in 2008, but with Google’s 
mass digitization project (“MDP”), discussions for which began as early as December, 2002.  As 
subsequent chapters will describe, HathiTrust emerged out of the Google MDP and particularly 
the partnership between Google and the University of Michigan.  This chapter first describes 
some of the principle contours of the Google Library Project and highlights some of the main 
tensions that arose among various stakeholders, particularly at the intersections among academic 
research libraries and information technology firms.  
Next, the chapter delves into sensemaking around the MDP, using public statements and 
contracts (where available) to make some general observations about the sensemaking of MDP 
partner institutions before focusing in greater depth on the sensemaking and decision-making 
around the University of Michigan-Google agreement.  Interview data is used to draw out the 
main justifications offered in support of Michigan’s behavioral commitment — its decision to 
partner with Google in the digitization of its entire print collection. These justifications include 
pragmatic, ideological, reputational, as well as copyright concerns and reflect the convergence of 
socio-structural forces and individual and organizational factors.  The innovative deviance 
framework is applied as a way of helping further describe and explain the University of 
Michigan’s sensemaking and decision making process with respect to the mass digitization of 
millions of copyright-protected works in its library collections.  In addition, special attention is 
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drawn to section 4.4.2 of the UM-Google agreement; this provision is significant not only 
because it enabled cross-institutional collaboration around the newly digitized corpus — making 
HathiTrust possible — but because it demonstrates the role of policy-making as a way of 
safeguarding space for future (potentially transformative) innovation and generativity.     
Google Library Project  
To contextualize the emergence of HathiTrust, it is necessary to step back and briefly 
discuss some important precursors, particularly the “Google Book Search Project,” the broad 
umbrella term encompassing the “Partner Program” and the “Google Library Project” and the 
mass digitization project.  Under the Partner Program, publishers who hold copyrights in a work 
could authorize Google to scan and index their books so that users’ search queries would produce 
information about the book such as bibliographic information, page number(s) containing the 
search term, and information about where to purchase the book from booksellers and/or from the 
publisher directly.  In addition, under this Program publishers who permitted Google to display 
ads on the pages of their books would also share in the contextual advertising revenue.  As the 
Partner Program is carried out pursuant to an agreement with rightsholders, it does not raise 
copyright issues with respect to potentially unauthorized and/or infringing activity.  The Partner 
Program began in 2005 and has been widely used ever since. 
Under the Library Project, Google scanned and indexed materials from partner libraries, 
made the full-text of public domain works available for browsing and/or reading, and made 
“snippets” (a few sentences of text around the search term) available for books subject to 
copyright protection.  As with the Partner Program, basic bibliographic information about the 
book as well as information regarding bookstores and libraries that sell or lend the book is 
provided to users of Google search.347  The Library Project involved the scanning of both public 
domain and in-copyright works and therefore the project raised concerns amongst various 
stakeholders regarding the legitimacy and legality of the scanning; the digitization has been the 
                                                 
347 Google (2016). “Google Books Library Project:  What does a Google Books Library Project book look like?” 
available at http://books.google.com/googlebooks/library/index.html  
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basis of a major copyright infringement lawsuit that, over a decade later, is still a potentially live 
controversy. 348             
The Google Library Project began in 2004 with the announcement of Google’s 
agreements with several major research libraries.  The so-called “Google 5” included Harvard 
University, Stanford University, Oxford University, the University of Michigan, and the New 
York Public Library.  The Library Project quickly grew to include a number of other libraries.  
Over time, additional partners have joined but exact numbers are difficult to pin down because 
many aspects of the project, including basic information identifying partners, have remained 
hidden from view.   
For example, Google’s own website indicates that it has over 40 partner libraries around 
the world but it does not provide an exhaustive list. 349   Further confounding a precise 
understanding of the project, Google entered into separate agreements with each of its partners.  
These agreements defined the parameters of the partnership including identifying what materials 
the library would permit Google to scan and what Google and the library might do, or be 
prohibited from doing, with the resulting digital copies.  All but a handful of the contracts remain 
sealed under confidentially agreements.  Except in the few instances where state freedom of 
information laws have been invoked to overcome the non-disclosure agreements between public 
institutions and Google, or where confidentially was breached, basic information about the 
project, such as what portions of the collection have been digitized, what the ownership or 
disposition of those digital copies might be, and what uses might be permitted, is spotty.  Thus 
there is a persistent and significant haze of uncertainty and ambiguity around the details of the 
Google Library Project.350   
Despite having access to significantly incomplete data on the project, there are a few 
basic facts we know.  For example, we know that Google pays all of the costs associated with the 
digitization, aside from the library personnel expenses associated with pulling and re-stacking 
books.  Counsel representing Google in its lawsuit with the Authors Guild testified before the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals that, as of December, 2014, Google had invested upwards of 
                                                 
348 The Authors Guild has filed a petition for Certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court.  Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, 
Inc, 804 F. 3d 202, Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit, October 16, 2015;  Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc. 954 F. Supp. 
2d 282, Dist. Court, SDNY, Nov. 14, 2013. 
349 http://books.google.com/googlebooks/library/partners.html  
350 The publicly available agreements include: University of Michigan’s agreement; University of California’s 
agreement; University of Wisconsin-Madison agreement; University of Texas-Austin agreement. 
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$120 million on the project. 351   Furthermore, we can glean some basic information from 
institutional press releases and other public statements commonly published when the 
partnership is announced.  The table below provides information identifying known partners, the 
date they joined the project, and some information about the (at least initial) scope of their 
participation.  (Table 1. Google Library Project) 
 
Table 1.  Google Library Project 
Name Joined Scope 
University of Michigan352 12/2004 PD & in-©; UM retains digital copy; UM can use copy internally and 
in offering cooperative web-based services (§4.4.2) 
Harvard University353 12/2004 PD only; Harvard retains digital copy 
New York Public 
Library354 
12/2004 PD only 
University of Oxford355 12/2004 PD only 
Stanford University356 12/2004 PD first (pre-1964) then in-© 
University of 
California357 
8/2006 PD works only; UC retains copy for internal use; distribution of text 
files to other libraries limited to 10% 
Complutense University 
of Madrid358 
9/2006 PD only; C.U.M. retains digital copy; cooperation possible 
                                                 
351 Authors Guild v. Google  Oral argument before the Second Circuit on December 3, 2014,  Synapsis available at 
robertjbernsteinblog, https://robertjbernsteinblog.wordpress.com/2014/12/06/authors-guild-v-google-oral-argument-
before-second-circuit-on-december-3-2014/  
352 University of Michigan Library – Google Digitization Project: A Brief Overview, Dec. 13, 2004, available at 
http://www.lib.umich.edu/michigan-digitization-project/michigan-digitization-project-complete-list-resources; U-M 
Library/Google Cooperative Agreement, available at ; U-M Library/Google Amended Agreement, May 2009, 
available at http://www.lib.umich.edu/michigan-digitization-project/michigan-digitization-project-complete-list-
resources ; Further Information on U-M Google Amended Agreement available at 
http://www.lib.umich.edu/michigan-digitization-project/michigan-digitization-project-complete-list-resources  
353 Harvard University Library, Harvard-Google Project, http://hul.harvard.edu/hgproject/index.html  
354 http://newsbreaks.infotoday.com/NewsBreaks/Google-and-Research-Libraries-Launch-Massive-Digitization-
Project-16307.asp  
355 University of Oxford Bodleian Libraries, Oxford Google Books Project, available at 
http://www.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/dbooks  
356 Stanford University Libraries, 2005 Statement of Support & Participation, available at 
http://lib.stanford.edu/google-books/statement-support-participation-2005  
357 http://www.cdlib.org/cdlinfo/2006/08/10/uc-libraries-partner-with-google-to-digitize-books/  Broken links to 
press release and additional information about the partnership.  But see University of California Digital Library, UC 
Libraries Mass Digitization Projects available at http://www.cdlib.org/services/collections/massdig/faq.html  
358 Jimenez, Ricardo Acebes, The partnership project between Complutense University of Madrid Library and 
Google Book Search, Fourth UNICA Scholarly Communication Seminar 2008, May 15-16, 2008, Charles 
University in Prague. 
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University of Wisconsin-
Madison & Wisconsin 
Historical Society359 
10/2006 PD works & university-owned works; links to Google360 
University of Virginia361 11/2006 PD & in-© 
University of Texas-
Austin362 
1/2007 PD & in-© 
Library of Catalonia363 Early 2007 PD only; links to Google 
Princeton University364 2/2007 PD only 
Bavarian State 
Library365 
3/2007 PD only 
Cantonal and University 
Library of Lausanne366 
5/2007 PD only 
Ghent University367 5/2007 PD only 
Committee on 
Institutional 
Cooperation (CIC)368 
6/2007 PD & in-©; links to Google 
Keio University369 7/2007 PD only 
Cornell University370  8/2007 PD & in-©; Cornell retains digital copy 
 
  
                                                 
359 University of Wisconsin-Madison Libraries, Overview of the Google Library Initiative, available at 
http://proxy.library.wisc.edu/digitization/faq.html#primary.   
360 UW/Google Agreement was amended in 2009 to permit sharing across libraries and linking with HathiTrust 
copies in addition to Google copies. See Press Release, UW-Madison Expands Agreement with Google, July 9, 
2009, available at http://proxy.library.wisc.edu/digitization/press.html   
361 University of Virginia, U.Va. Library Joins the Google Books Library Project, November 14, 2006, available at 
http://news.virginia.edu/content/uva-library-joins-google-books-library-project  
362 University of Texas at Austin, The University of Texas Libraries Partner with Google to Digitize Books, January 
19, 2007, available at http://www.lib.utexas.edu/about/news/google/  
363 Technologia, Google digitalize 35 mil libros de la Biblioteca de Catalunya libres de derechos de autor, available 
at http://www.lavanguardia.com/internet-y-tecnologia/noticias/20090727/53753696854/google-digitaliza-35-mil-
libros-de-la-biblioteca-de-catalunya-libres-de-derechos-de-autor.html  
364 Princeton University, Library Joins Google project to make books available online, February 5, 2007, available at 
http://www.princeton.edu/main/news/archive/S16/84/71S02/index.xml?section=topstories  
365 http://www.imageware.de/en/anwenderberichte/AWB-Loesungen/690-2/  
366 http://www.google.ca/googlebooks/library/partners.html  
367 http://www.google.ca/googlebooks/library/partners.html  
368 Committee on Institutional Cooperation, Google Book Search Project Introduction, available at 
http://www.cic.net/projects/library/book-search/introduction.  CIC-Google Agreement available at 
http://www.cic.net/projects/library/book-search/cic-google-agreement  
369 Keio University Library, Keio University’s collection digitized by Google Books Library Project, October, 2013.   
370 Cornell University Library, Google Books Search Library Project, available at 
https://www.library.cornell.edu/google-book-search-library-project  
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Columbia University371 12/2007 PD only; Columbia retains digital copy; links to Google 
Austrian National 
Library372 
? PD only; ANL retains digital copy 
Municipal Library of 
Lyon373 
7/2008? PD only?; library retains a digital copy 
 
Based on the information contained in public documents summarized in Table 1, we can 
see that the project appears to have been rolled out in two main periods — the initial launch 
period in the Fall of 2004, and then a second period during late 2006-2007 — and that the second 
roll-out was primarily comprised of non-U.S. partners.  Perhaps most importantly, we can 
observe that the project had acquired critical mass — a wealthy global benefactor in Google and 
lots of prestigious partner institutions — making it difficult to stop.   
In addition, it appears that the vast majority of partners limited the digitization to public 
domain works, presumably to avoid potential copyright liability.  The ownership interests in the 
digital copies varies from institution to institution with many institutions retaining copies that 
Google provide and others linking to or eschewing ownership.  We can speculate that the 
disposition of ownership of the copies may also be tied to copyright-related concerns, although it 
is likely that technological and/or infrastructural limitations also play a role.   
The Library Project has generated significant criticism from a variety of stakeholders on 
a number of fronts.  The most obvious criticism was raised by some authors, author-advocacy 
groups, and publishers claiming that the Project infringes copyright rights.  Shortly after the 
Library Project got underway, two major lawsuits were filed against Google.  On September 20, 
2005, the Authors Guild and several individual authors filed a class action lawsuit against 
Google for copyright infringement, requesting damages and injunctive relief.  On October 19, 
2005, five publishers (McGraw-Hill, Pearson, Penguin, Simon & Schuster, and John Wiley & 
Sons) sued Google for copyright infringement, requesting only injunctive relief.  (A subsequent 
lawsuit, filed by the Authors Guild against HathiTrust, makes similar arguments and will be 
                                                 
371 Columbia University Libraries, Columbia University Libraries Becomes Newest Partner in Google Books Search 
Library Project, December 13, 2007, available at 
http://library.columbia.edu/news/libraries/2007/20071213_google.html  
372 Austrian National Library, Austrian Books Online, available at 
http://www.onb.ac.at/ev/about/austrianbooksonline.htm  
373 ActuaLitte, Google partenaire numerique official de la biblioteque de Lyon, July 12, 2008, available at 
https://www.actualitte.com/bibliotheques/google-partenaire-numerique-officiel-de-la-bibliotheque-de-lyon-3396.htm  
 129 
discussed in subsequent chapters of this work.374)  In both cases, the plaintiffs based their claims 
on Google’s copying the entire text of copyrighted works for use in conjunction with its search 
database and providing snippets of text to users in response to user search queries.  Authors’ and 
publishers’ complaints generally revolve around issues of control and financial remuneration.  
The Library Project, and digitization more generally, is perceived as a threat to the established 
business models many authors and publishers have come to rely upon for their livelihoods.   
The criticisms of authors and publishers were rebutted on several grounds.  First, to the 
extent that copyright law is being used to bolster a declining method of conducting business, 
those arguments stand in clear opposition to provisions of the Copyright Act.375  Second, to the 
extent that copyright law functions as a trade regulation aimed at preventing market harms from 
befalling copyright owners, it is not clear that the Library Project is undermining the market in 
authors’ works.  If a work is in-copyright but out-of-print, as many of the digitized works are, the 
argument is particularly flimsy because readers have few meaningful alternative venues for 
accessing the work.  Relatedly, it is difficult to comprehend a rational basis whereby an author 
seeks to restrict users from accessing a digital copy of their work when the user has free access to 
a print version (albeit at a higher transaction cost).  Finally, there are issues related to “orphan 
works” — works that are likely in-copyright but the rightsholder’s identity is not reasonably 
ascertainable.  Restricting access to these works seems, by definition, to be a victimless 
infringement where all plaintiffs are hypothetical and no one would have standing to sue.376 
Authors and publishers are not the only groups who have been critical of the Library 
Project.  While many legal scholars have expressed support for the endeavor, others have 
expressed concern.  For example, shortly after the Google Library Project was announced, Siva 
Vaidhyanathan, a cultural historian and media scholar and professor of Media Studies and Law at 
the University of Virginia, raised a number of concerns including the privacy of patron records, 
                                                 
374 See also Centivany, A. (2015).  
375 17 U.S.C. §102(b) states “In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any 
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in 
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.” 
376 The orphan works problem will be discussed in greater depth in a future work that, borrowing from real property 
law, characterizes the orphan works problem as a problem of absentee landlords.  Real property law (i.e. law 
governing land rights and use) provides mechanisms whereby an individual may gain rightful access, and even 
ownership, of a parcel of land through adversarial use however no such provisions exist in the context of intellectual 
property.  In addition, while one of the claims in the Authors Guild’s suit against HathiTrust involved orphan works, 
the courts declined to adjudicate those claims for lack of ripeness (although I believe one could object on the basis 
of standing as well).   
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risks of privatization, and property concerns tied to the tremendous investment in proprietary 
formats.  Chief among his concerns, however, were the intellectual property issues raised by the 
project, namely that the project risks destabilizing a system already out of equilibrium.377  Under 
this view, while it is true that the Google Library Project raised significant substantive concerns 
around specific legal principles, the larger concern was its impact on the rule of law more 
generally.  The fact that the existing copyright regime is out of balance or miscalibrated with 
respect to technological change provides a justification against engaging in activities that are 
likely to exacerbate the disequilibrium.  This concern seems to recognize the sorts of concerns 
expressed by social disorganization and structural strain theories.  Instead of accepting that the 
disequilibrium is a trigger for normative competition or innovative deviance, however, 
Vaidhyanathan seems to argue that we should focus on bolstering and buttressing inner and outer 
containment factors — the individual and organizational buffers that maintain social order in the 
face of structural strain.    
Framed a slightly different way, Vaidhyanathan’s perspective may be indicative of a 
reluctance among legal scholars to break new legal ground in such a public and potentially high-
stakes manner until sufficient groundwork has been laid to enable a court to make a ruling 
favorable to their viewpoint.  Borrowing from a related history, many in the intellectual property 
and technology law community were still reeling from the Supreme Court’s ruling in Eldred v. 
Ashcroft.378  Eldred, lead petitioner in the case, was an Internet publisher who challenged the 
constitutionality of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998.  He was joined by a 
number of other publishers who relied upon the public domain for their work.379  The Sonny 
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act provided rightsholders an additional twenty years of 
copyright protection and applied both prospectively to new works and retrospectively to works 
already in existence.  Under the revision, the new copyright term amounted to the life of the 
author plus seventy years or, in the case of works-for-hire, anonymous, or pseudonymous works, 
ninety-five years from the date of first publication or one hundred and twenty years from the date 
of creation.  The petitioners argued that extending the term of copyright project was an 
unconstitutional divestment of the public’s interests in public domain works.     
                                                 
377 Vaidhyanathan, S. (2005). A Risky Gamble with Google. Chronicle of Higher Education, 52(15).  See also 
Vaidhyanathan, S. (2006). Googlization of Everything and the Future of Copyright, The. UC DAViS l. reV., 40, 1207. 
378 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003). 
379 Pub.L. 105-298.  Sections amended: 17 U.S.C. §§108, 203(a)(2), 301(c), 302, 303, 304(c)(2). 
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Passage of the Act was extensively lobbied for by members of the content industry.  The 
Walt Disney Company in particular was a staunch supporter of the Act as it sought to delay its 
copyright in Mickey Mouse from expiring.380  As its title suggests, Sonny Bono’s estate was also 
a key supporter.  Bono’s widow testified before Congress that “Sonny wanted the term of 
copyright protection to last forever” but, as that would violate the Constitution, she suggested 
Congress consider Jack Valenti’s proposal that copyright lasts “forever less one day.”381  The Act 
was also vehemently opposed by many law scholars, public interest advocacy groups, and 
technology firms.  Ultimately, the twenty-year extension was passed.   
Lawrence Lessig, a renowned intellectual property and technology law scholar and lead 
counsel for Eldred, expressed regret over his handling of the case.  In an article entitled “How I 
Lost the Big One,” Lessig explained how it was his own mistake and failure that lost this 
incredibly important case.  In his view, he had focused too heavily on logic and reasoning and 
too little on impassioned and persuasive rhetoric.382  As a result, countless works of authorship 
would remain under lock and key for another two decades and the public suffers.  Others 
criticized Lessig for having underestimated his opposition, being overly confident in the 
correctness of his interpretation of the law and his beliefs in what was “right,” and thus failing to 
lay sufficient groundwork for a successful argument.  It was reasonable for some legal scholars 
and commentators, fresh off the disappointment of Eldred v. Ashcroft, to be hesitant about the 
Google Library Project’s brazen willingness to tempt fate by opening a new portal for 
rightsholders to secure their own interests against “encroachment” of the public domain.       
LIBRARY PERSPECTIVES 
Within the library community, a number of issues and objections were raised about the 
Library Project including concerns around disintermediation, the social implications and 
community-borne resentment, and objections from competing digitization projects and the open 
access community.  Each will be briefly discussed in turn. 
Some librarians have expressed concerns that mass digitization may lead to 
disintermediation.  The idea is that patrons may increasingly turn to Internet-based resources and 
physical libraries may become underutilized and, as a result, their financial support may become 
                                                 
380 As a result the Act was nicknamed by some “The Mickey Mouse Protection Act.” 
381 Testimony of Mary Bono, “H9952” Congressional Record. Government Printing Office. October 7, 1998. 
382 Lessig, L. (2004). How I Lost the Big One. Legal Affairs. Retrieved January, 15, 2007. 
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increasingly difficult to justify.  Concerns around disintermediation have been particularly 
vociferous in the context of smaller municipal libraries and libraries in developing countries, but 
even within the ARL community fears of disintermediation as a result of large-scale digitization 
are being voiced.    
A librarian employed by possibly the nation’s largest and most prestigious university 
described the climate of library budgetary concerns as follows:   
“Now, we’re so driven by costs.  Everything needs to be transactionalized and so 
we’ve articulated the costs of every transaction in the library.  We’ve got the costs 
of what the space is, how your taxes are being used in libraries, how much money 
the university is spending, how much money it costs them to maintain what some 
people might see as mausoleums, big buildings in the middle of campus that 
would be a great place for a student center or classroom space.  So there is a 
constant threat to libraries.  This is made even clearer when you consider that 
academic libraries, in relation to other units on campus, often employ the greatest 
number of staff.  If a university is looking for permanent savings, where do look 
first?  They look to cut staff.  All libraries are under threat, some town libraries 
have unfortunately lost the battle, but even university and college libraries are 
under constant threat.” 
 
The concerns raised by this study participant were made even more palpable by the 
knowledge that the interview was taking place on their last day of work. Due to what they called 
a “slash and burn” restructuring at the library, this particular librarian decided to (or perhaps felt 
pressured to) resign and look for opportunities elsewhere, possibly in a different sector. 
The majority of librarians interviewed for this study were not as concerned about the 
potential of disintermediation, despite sharing a general concern around budgetary issues.  A 
more general perspective was that digitization had, in general, a positive impact on the role of 
libraries and librarians.  The availability of digital content tended to draw more attention to the 
collection, bring more people into the library, and actually bolster interest, support, and use of 
the brick-and-mortar library space. 
In addition to concerns around disintermediation, another criticism about the Google 
Library Project stemmed from resentment about being “passed over.”  Some members of the 
library community voiced discontent that Google had not approached or chosen their institution 
for partnership in this ground-breaking project.  As previously mentioned, a number of libraries 
had been actively engaged in digitization efforts.  Raj Reddy and colleagues at Carnegie Mellon 
University had been working on their Million Books Project, which sought to create a free-to-
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read, searchable collection of one million books available to everyone over the Internet. 383  
Cornell University had been a leader in digitization and, in particular, standard-setting efforts.  
The University of California system had established the California Digital Library, linking its 
users to digital information culled from its various campus libraries.  Many of these efforts were 
undertaken with the support of public and private (nonprofit and for-profit) funds.  The National 
Science Foundation, the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, Xerox, Microsoft, Yahoo!, and the Internet 
Archive invested resources, money, and expertise in many of these early collaborative 
digitization efforts. 
When murmurs of Google’s project began filtering through the library community, it 
prompted a mixed reaction.  For some, it generated anticipation and excitement.  It raised the 
hackles of others; there was a concern that Google would throw its weight around and quickly 
dominate the digitization playing field.  In addition, when the Google 5 were announced, some of 
the early innovators in large-scale digitization were disappointed or resentful that their institution 
had not been selected.   
A librarian at the University of California noted the tensions and responses within the 
library community when news of the Library Project began to come out: 
“Another perspective or window on those relationships was the facts surrounding 
the Google 5.  University of California is, of course, in Google’s backyard and we 
weren’t part of that project and I think that to some degree the formation of the 
Open Content Alliance was a response to the Google project.”384 
 
 The concerns and resentment were, in the case of the University of California, the 
Internet Archive, and other partners, channelled toward a competing digitization project, 
undertaken under the umbrella of the “Open Content Alliance.”  This endeavor will be discussed 
in subsequent sections. 
One can only speculate about Google’s sensemaking around the selection of its initial 
partners.  Based on the institutions that comprised the Google 5, Harvard University, Oxford 
University, Stanford University, University of Michigan, and the New York Public Library, some 
possible conclusions might be drawn.  For example, institutional reputation and prestige may 
have played a role.  Related to this, the collections housed by the various partners (their size, 
                                                 
383 Reddy, R. and StClair, G. (2001). “The Million Book Digital Library Project,” Dec. 1, 2001, available at 
http://www.rr.cs.cmu.edu/mbdl.htm 
384 Interview with digitization pioneer, transcript on file with author. 
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quality, strengths, special collections etc.) likely had an impact of Google’s selection.  
Geographical diversity may have played some role.  Institutional culture, particularly whether the 
institution was risk-averse or risk-taking, overly bureaucratic or willing to fast-track initiatives, 
and conservative or exceptionally innovative may have played a role.  Finally, it seems plausible 
that social relationships and the personalities of key participants probably played some role.  For 
example, Larry Page, the co-founder of Google, is an alum of the University of Michigan and 
had a personal role in developing the project at that site.    
To the extent that there was disappointment or resentment amongst members of the 
library community for being “left out” of the Google Library Project, those energies were fairly 
quickly channelled into support for alternative projects, perhaps most notably the Open Content 
Alliance.  The Open Content Alliance formed as a collaborative digitization effort, spearheaded 
by Brewster Kahle and the Internet Archive, united around making digital content openly 
accessible to everyone over the Internet.  Kahle described its origins, and its relationship to the 
Google project, as follows: 
“We started hearing secret murmurs of secret negotiations going on between 
Google and libraries, that there was going to be a digitization project.  I was 
receiving an award at a library conference, the Coalition for Networked 
Information, so I got to make a speech and I basically asked: ‘If we build it will 
you come?  If we make it so you can digitize a book for $0.10 per page will you 
support this?’  Carole Moore, the Librarian at the University of Toronto, said she 
wanted to work with the Internet Archive to digitize all of the library’s public 
domain works.  I cried for help because I suspected that, working with Google, 
libraries would go and make a closed system.  Sloan funded what became the start 
of the Open Content Alliance, and Yahoo! chipped in and eventually Microsoft 
decided to pay $0.10 per page to really get the digitization going.  Microsoft 
eventually put in ten million dollars through the $0.10 per page thing. And it 
turned out that Google and the libraries were making a closed system.  It would be 
accessible by some people, people in large research institutions, but not the 
public.”   
 
Despite his misgivings about the Google Library Project, Kahle does credit it with 
“getting people off their butts” and motivating a tremendous amount of activity around 
digitization.  
Carole Moore has since retired from the University of Toronto but she did participate in 
this study, as did a number of current U of T librarians and Internet Archive employees who still 
run the scanning center housed on the 7th floor of Robarts Library at the University of Toronto.  
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In conducting this study and, in particular, researching the technical aspects of the project and its 
workflows, the open vs. closed dichotomy becomes somewhat striking.  I had the opportunity to 
observe the Internet Archive’s scanning center at the University of Toronto, to observe and 
photograph the Scribe machines (scanners), to observe the scanning process, and to interview its 
employees. (Figure 15) 
 
Figure 15.  Employees scanning books at the Internet Archive’s scanning center, Robarts Library, University of Toronto. 
 
The scanning center on the seventh floor of Robarts Library has approximately two dozen 
scanning stations.  In recent years, the scope of the digitization at Toronto has been scaled way 
back.  Only a couple of the scanners are in use during a typical work day.  But during the 
digitization heyday at Toronto, all of the stations were filled by full-time employees working in 
multiple shifts.  The scanning center is located on a secure floor of the library which means that 
only certain library staff would have access to the facilities.  The restricted access is more likely 
a consequence of the other tenants of the space, namely library IT, rather than an indication of 
the Internet Archive’s wishes to around privacy and security.      
By contrast, Google’s scanning centers are secret, even from its institutional partners.  A 
University Librarian at one of Google’s partners recalled visiting a scanning center but the 
recollection was vague as he had only visited it once.  He also noted concern about his 
obligations under the university’s non-disclosure agreement and therefore exercised extreme 
caution in discussing his (admittedly foggy) recollections.  
Carole Moore, the former University Librarian at the University of Toronto, described her 
decision to partner with the Internet Archive and house a scanning center as follows: 
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“Many of the larger libraries were discussing and considering the Google 
contract, sort of talking to each other but sort of not talking to each other.  We at 
the University of Toronto were talking actively to the University of California at 
the time, which was very anti-Google because they wanted a much more open 
approach.  We were talking about how we would or could collaborate.  It was sort 
of open, but everybody was keeping their own counsel in terms of what they 
would do in their own institution.  But in Canada, all grants provided to public 
institutions are always under the condition that the digital content is open freely to 
everyone.  The public tradition of Canada, the public investment and the 
contractual requirement gave us this tradition that things would be open.  So the 
Google conditions did not sit well with us at all.  We started experimenting with 
Brewster, with out-of-copyright books, and we were learning along the way.  We 
went from one (scanner) machine that didn’t work all that well, to two, to ten.  At 
one point we had 26 machines and were doing two or three shifts per day.” 
 
The University of Toronto, as one of the Internet Archive’s main partners in the Open 
Content Alliance, moved forward with the digitization of public domain works, content to figure 
out the technical aspects project as they went.  The positive relationship between Carole Moore 
and Brewster Kahle played a significant role in the relatively smooth success of that partnership.  
But the Open Content Alliance faced some internal challenges with some of its other institutional 
partners. 
For example, some other members of the Open Content Alliance were troubled by the 
lack of organizational infrastructure to support the endeavor.  The California Digital Library, for 
example, had a relatively long history of digitization and was already well-integrated and 
embedded into a complex institutional arrangement as the digital library for the entire 12-campus 
University of California system.  Some OCA members from the CDL found the process of 
adapting to the looser, more emergent, organizational structure of the Open Content Alliance 
challenging: 
“The Open Content Alliance was defined as an alliance of organizations but it 
never really developed any organizational infrastructure.  I think that was 
somewhat frustrating to many of the libraries that were part of that initiative.  
Many of us really wanted to form some organizational infrastructure around the 
partnership and that was challenging with the Internet Archive because it’s a very 
different sort of organization.  It’s led by one brilliant individual and was not 
founded as a true collaborative organization.  Efforts to turn it into a more 
collaborative organization were not successful.  We discussed it but were never 
able to move it to an organization that had a coherent shared leadership and 
decision-making authority.  The Open Content Alliance didn’t really exist 
organizationally.  It was just a series of funded activities that were loosely 
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connected primarily by the funding source (Microsoft) and by the Internet 
Archive as a galvanizing force.”385     
 
It was apparent, at least to some members of the library community, that in addition to the 
technical challenges of large-scale digitization, social and organizational aspects also posed some 
potentially serious obstacles.  Despite shared core values of openness and shared goals of making 
the cultural record accessible in digital format online, forging effective collaborations and 
building momentum for collective action proved to be a significant stumbling block.   
In addition, securing continuous funding for digitization was a constant source of strain.  
While Microsoft and others had contributed significant funds to the Internet Archive’s efforts, 
they also put certain conditions on how those projects would develop including, for example, the 
selection of which materials could be scanned.  If there were specific collections a library wanted 
scanned, they often had to secure their own sources of funding through grants or other forms of 
support.   
By contrast, Google covered virtually all of the costs associated with scanning, and they 
scanned everything the library would permit.  Thus, while the University of California had a 
strong commitment to open-access and had been, at least by some accounts, resented having 
been left out of the initial roll-out of the Google Library Project, it did ultimately join the project 
in 2006.  The University of California continued, for a time, with the Open Content Alliance 
even after it partnered with Google but, at least for Kahle, UC’s move was somewhat of a hit to 
the open access cause.  Describing one of the key administrators at the University of California, 
Kahle said:  
“He was one of the most articulate and really thoughtful people in this whole area.  
He backed the Internet Archive and the Open Content Alliance and was really 
articulate as to why you’d want to do this.  He’s a really smart guy.  But then he 
went and backed Google and I think it was monetary.  I think it was just, they 
offered to pay for it.  It’s something the libraries have always wanted to do and 
they look at us (the Internet Archive) and say, ‘How are you going to get there 
from here?’  So I think it was ‘Take the money where you can.’ And also, he 
thought, and I think he was right, that someday these books will be freed up.  But 
it hasn’t happened.  They’re still sitting on the public domain.  It doesn’t make 
any sense.” 
 
Kahle’s view of the Google Library Project as being a fundamentally closed system 
benefitting the academic research community to the exclusion of the general public is disputed 
                                                 
385 Interview participants from the California Digital Library, transcript on file with author. 
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by others.  Many people argue, for example, that the public domain works are, in fact, free-to-
read online.  That said, however, Google’s agreements with its partners require those institutions 
to put technical protection measures in place to prevent bulk downloads of content.  In Kahle’s 
view, these provisions unnecessarily restrict the public domain which should be downloadable 
and minable as well as readable.   
In addition, the terms of Google’s agreements with partner institutions continues to 
exclude the Internet Archive from collaboration.  Kahle has asked Google Library Project 
partners for access to the public domain scans for inclusion in the Internet Archive’s database but 
those requests have been rejected.  Never one to take rejection lying down, Kahle and others 
have pushed back against Google’s restrictions.  Kahle recounted a particular example involving 
the late Internet entrepreneur, visionary, and open access hacktivist, Aaron Swartz: 
“Aaron Swartz, who by the way worked at the Internet Archive for a period of 
time, orchestrated a set of his friends to slowly download Google’s public domain 
scans and upload them to the Internet Archive.  800,000 of them were done this 
way.  The Internet Archive attributes the copies to Google and the libraries they 
came from originally, and we did our best to OCR them, but they are in the public 
domain so they are posted on the Internet Archive site.  Google, to its credit, did 
not assert copyright on these digitized materials.  We’ve gotten unsupportive 
comments from one of the Google libraries but very supportive comments from 
another for having these materials up on the Internet Archive.  I found it an 
interesting Rorschach test of the libraries and librarians.”   
 
Amongst the librarians I interviewed, this revelation about Swartz raised modest 
disappointment rather than outrage.  As one participant reflected: 
“It’s a tough one.  There are those people who say ‘These are public domain 
books and so they should be freely available to everyone else.’  But I’m saying 
that Google is making a huge capital investment that we can’t make ourselves for 
digitizing these books and I’m going to be respectful of that.   And so, I don’t 
really approve of what Swartz did.  I wish he had gone and digitized those 
800,000 books himself or convinced Google to change its practices.” 
 
This sentiment, while understandable, is not really practicable.  The technical, financial, 
and organizational challenges of large-scale digitization proves prohibitive for many established, 
well-endowed institutions, let alone a (albeit incredibly dedicated and talented) college student. 
To summarize, some of the key issues raised in contemplation of Google’s mass 
digitization project were: 1) copyright infringement, 2) harm to authors and publishers, 3) 
exacerbating copyright disequilibrium and anomie, 4) opening up vulnerabilities for further 
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encroachments on the public domain and fair use by rightsholders, 5) potential for 
disintermediation, 6) tremendous costs associated with digitization and the overall financial 
strain most libraries operate under, 7) organizational and institutional challenges of collaboration 
and collective action, and 8) ideological choices and tensions along the closed vs. open spectrum.  
This list reflects both socio-structural top-down factors and bottom-up social or relational 
concerns.  Whether and how the Library Project might ameliorate or exacerbate those issues was, 
at the early stage, anyone’s guess.  Stakeholders on all sides of the issue pressed forward into the 
unknown, bracing for whatever they might find (and create).  
Sensemaking and Decision-making around the Library Project 
As already noted, we have few hard facts about the Library Project because so much of it 
remains confidential.  In this section, using publically available data, I begin with some general 
observations about the sensemaking of Library Project partners.  While it is difficult to draw 
conclusions in a data vacuum, we can use the publicly available statements and press releases 
that so often accompany institutional participation to speculate about the sensemaking of many 
of the Project’s partners.  These public statements include basic information, such as the date 
particular libraries joined the project and key terms of the agreements with Google.  I follow up 
with a more detailed description of the University of Michigan’s sensemaking and decision-
making process, drawing on public documents as well as in-depth interviews with key decision-
makers.  
Press releases by no means communicate the full and complete picture of institutional 
sensemaking but they can serve as important artefacts of the sensemaking process.  One of the 
reasons for this is that public statements (such as press releases) illustrate the high degree, 
binding strength of the decision as institutions make their choice to participate in the MDP highly 
visible and irrevocable.  Furthermore, as Weick and others have noted, the strength of the 
behavioural commitment tends to correlate to the relative intensity of the proffered justification 
for the action.386  We can mine press releases for evidence of some early justifications for joining 
the Project and use them as a touchstone for understanding how the Project was conceived of at 
the outset and how it evolved and transformed over time, leading to the emergence of 
organizational forms and knowledge infrastructures like HathiTrust.   
                                                 
386 Weick (1995:11-12). 
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The most commonly asserted justifications for participating in the mass digitization 
project tend to focus on the preservation of print materials, promoting the internal educational 
and research mission of the institution and, particularly in the case of libraries outside of the 
United States, communicating cultural heritage.  Improving access is another oft-touted benefit 
although its value as a meaningful category is somewhat dispersed.  “Access” is a term that 
seems to represent a number of distinct concerns around dissemination, delivery, discoverability, 
social justice, and administrative efficiency.  Interestingly, despite Google paying for the 
tremendous costs associated with digitizing the content and in some cases making improvements 
to the quality of scans that were then shared with its partners through batch updates,  few 
institutions cited financial concerns or pragmatism (economic and technological) as a 
justification.  One institution, the University of Michigan, cited the transformative potential of 
the project — this will be discussed in a subsequent section.  Perhaps most surprisingly, another 
institution cited as its sole justification the commemoration of its “150th anniversary.”   
These glimpses into the initial sensemaking around the Library Project, particularly with 
respect to the ways in which the justifications clustered around a relatively small number of 
themes, may be indicative of the social context in which libraries’ decision-making occurred and 
the co-construction of meaning around the Project.  Shared norms and expectations around 
preservation, access, educational/research mission, and (for non-U.S. libraries in particular) 
communicating cultural heritage influenced the rationalizations developed for entering the 
partnership and provided a process of legitimation. 
In addition to providing a legitimizing mechanism, justifications offered in press releases 
may also have a predictive influence on how the Project ultimately developed.  As the world’s 
first mass digitization project, there was no obvious roadmap dictating the features that would 
emerge.  But adopting the “library” moniker and offering a series of justifications closely tied to 
traditional library practices, norms, and values imbued the decision with what Weick calls 
tenacity.  Tenacious justifications tend to prefigure subsequent perception and action, which 
means they often become self-confirming, verging on self-fulfilling prophecies. 387   The 
clustering of justifications provides some social cover against potential risk and provides clues 
and context for potential commonalities that could accommodate and support collective action. 
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Another aspect of the early sensemaking around the Library Project which does not find 
an obvious analog in Weick’s work deals with the concomitant legal implications of the choice.  
In addition to providing justification reflective and responsive to the library community, one can 
only assume that another purpose of the statements and press releases were to begin building 
legitimacy in the event of future litigation.  In the legal context, we call this “creating good 
facts,” building a narrative that can be referred back to as a method of producing selective 
attention and building resilience against criticism.  One way in which this was accomplished was 
by providing justifications that emphasized libraries’ special and cherished roles in society (i.e. 
foster education and research) and signal key library functions (i.e. preservation and access) can 
constrain sensemaking and foster confident action with respect to the Library Project.   
Viewed with a more critical eye, the specific language adopted also reflects some insights 
into particular institutions’ sensemaking about the potential legal risks and rationale for the 
endeavor.  Cornell University, for example, provided a justification that focused almost entirely 
on discoverability, thereby positioning itself favorably in relation to existing case law — in Kelly 
v. Arriba Soft Corp., the Ninth Circuit held copying for indexing purposes, to facilitate search, to 
be a fair use.  Furthermore the absence of reference to preservation in Cornell University’s public 
statements is also significant.  As previously mentioned, Cornell was a leader in establishing 
standards for digital preservation and held the view that Google’s scans were not of preservation 
quality.  Therefore unlike the majority of other Library Project partners, Cornell’s justification 
avoided all reference to preservation, signalling its position that a defence to copyright 
infringement on that basis was, in its view, unlikely to be successful. 
University of Michigan’s press release was the only one discovered that justified its 
participation, in part, on the “transformative” potential of mass digitization.  Certainly this word 
choice references the broad transformational potentials of digitizing an entire library.  It also 
provides an artful reference to copyright law’s fair use doctrine which often turns on whether a 
given use transforms the original.  But we need not rely solely upon the University of Michigan’s 
press release for understandings of its sensemaking and decision-making process because the 
UM-Google Cooperative Agreement is one of the few that has become publically available.  The 
remainder of this chapter focuses on the University of Michigan’s sensemaking and decision-
making around the Library Project, drawing upon data generated from in-depth interviews with 
key participants and also discusses the UM-Google contract and its relationship to sensemaking.  
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While large-scale digitization projects had been undertaken long before Google came 
onto the scene, earlier efforts paled in comparison to the sheer scale, speed, and magnitude of the 
Google Library Project.  It was an effort full of potential and rife with uncertainty.  These are 
difficult circumstances in which to make decisions and engage in contract negotiations, 
particularly when considering the typically conservative nature of most academic institutions 
butting up against the typically innovative and risk-taking nature of Google.  It is somewhat 
remarkable that agreements between Google and university librarians, chief information officers, 
legal counsel, provosts, presidents, and regents were reached at all. 
The potential copyright risks could have only exacerbated an already rife decision-
making process.  As previously discussed, copyright law gives authors a number of exclusive 
rights over their works including, for example, the right to make copies, to publicly distribute the 
work, and so forth.388  The Act also contains various limitations of those rights including, for 
example, an exception for fair use, for a number of library and archive-oriented uses, and so 
forth.389  Authors’ exclusive rights and the limits on those rights reflect copyright’s means-end 
formula; they reflect the bargain between the public’s interest and the interest of rightsholders 
and they operate in tension with each other.   
While the balance between rightsholders’ interest and the public’s interest may seem 
straightforward, in practice it can be surprisingly unclear and messy.  One scholar referred to the 
Copyright Act as a “swollen, barnacle-encrusted collection of incomprehensible prose.”390  As a 
practical matter, it is often difficult to know what is legally permissible and what is not.  The 
extent to which a university might successfully invoke fair use for digitizing its entire corpus was 
uncertain at best, not least because the specific uses the University of Michigan might end up 
making with respect to the copies (and which would ultimately be evaluated in a fair use 
determination) emerged over time rather than being decided upon from the get-go.   
Notwithstanding the tremendous uncertainty, one section of the Act that is relatively 
clear, however, is section five, which lays out the remedies for copyright infringement.  Here we 
learn that remedies for infringement include, amongst other things, injunction, impounding and 
destruction of infringing copies, and damages of up to $150,000 per instance of infringement.  As 
of 2012-2013, the University of Michigan Library contained approximately 8 million volumes.  
                                                 
388 17 U.S. C. §106. 
389 Limits on the exclusive rights are contained in 17 U.S.C. §§107-122. 
390 Litman, J. (2010). Real copyright reform. Iowa Law Review, 96(1), 09-018. 
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Even if we assume a large portion of those volumes are in the public domain, UM’s liability 
could still hypothetically reach the trillions of dollars range.  Although, as a public state 
institution, the University may be insulated from liability for monetary damages under the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity, injunction, impounding and destruction of infringing copies 
would remain available. 
So how does a typically risk-averse institution like the University of Michigan decide to 
engage in an activity that is not only guaranteed to raise the ire of some rightsholders but also 
potentially (if the sovereign immunity and fair use arguments fail) expose the institution to 
damages for copyright liability and/or the embarrassment of an injunction that prevents the 
University from keeping (and using) the scans?  In interviewing several of the key decision-
makers about the sensemaking and decision-making process, a number of primary issues and 
concerns surfaced which demonstrated that pragmatic, reputational, and ideological factors 
played a role, in addition to copyright-related factors.  
 Large-scale digitization efforts had been contemplated and attempted before, with 
varying levels of success.  More often than not, digitizers were waging a constant battle against 
financial pressures and the creep of technological obsolescence.  By offering to cover virtually 
all of the costs, complete the project on an extremely fast timeline, and perhaps provide technical 
reassurances against obsolescence through batch updates, Google erased many of the concerns 
that had plagued earlier large-scale digitization efforts. 
Several of my participants described the decision-making process as essentially a 
pragmatic cost-benefit analysis.  The potential costs if the University of Michigan was sued and 
lost were less than the potential benefits if they did not get sued, or if they got sued and won, 
and the decision-makers were confident that the facts and the law would be on their side.   
    But it wasn’t a sure thing.  Lots of people recognized its potential but nobody really knew 
how the Google Library Project was going to turn out.  As one participant said,  
“People thought, ‘Hey, this is going to be good.  It’s going to be world-changing.  
We’re not exactly sure how it’s going to do it and what the exact benefits are, be 
we know somehow it’s going to be good.”   
 
Another participant said:  
“We didn’t have everything all figured out from the get-go.  We knew that this 
was a great opportunity and we wanted to seize it but we weren’t exactly sure 
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what we were going to end up doing with the scans.  I had great hopes for where 
this could go.”   
 
There were dreams and visions at this early stage, but the benefits were still uncertain and 
perhaps inchoate.  This uncertainty undercuts the potential for conducting a true cost-benefit 
analysis: “it should always be remembered that intangible benefits are weak bases for rational 
judgments” because it is difficult to know what value to assign them.391   True cost-benefit 
analyses have a tremendous difficulty accounting for uncertain and intangible benefits, 
particularly those that concern public goods like those contemplated by the mass digitization 
project.  Thus, the initial justifications around the decision to partner with Google and digitize 
the entire library were based on the conviction that mass digitization is a better way, because it 
offers tremendous potential benefits to society, although that conviction may have been largely 
aspirational rather than factual.   
Technological and moral ideology also played roles in the decision to partner with 
Google.  A common theme that frequently resurfaced during my interviews was that digitization 
was viewed as an inevitability.  Participants in my study talked about mass digitization not as a 
goal but as a given.   The move towards a digital environment is going to happen, it is the future, 
and it is not up for debate.  One of my participants said for libraries, “it’s like digitization is 
written into our organizational DNA.  It is what we have to do.”  Another participant reflected:  
“I can’t recall anybody in the discussion saying ‘Oh, we don’t have to do it this 
way.  This digital thing is overblown.  We’re not going to have to confront these 
issues.’  It’s like everybody knew they had to confront the issues and they did.  
They had to and they did.”       
 
 This sort of technological determinism has faced criticism in the literature.  Kling, for 
example, cautions against being too easily seduced by the pro-technology viewpoint which can 
often conflate technological progress with social progress.  Particularly when a technological 
advance ignores key aspects of the social environment in which it operates, technological 
advance can have a deleterious impact on society.   
 One participant responded to Kling’s brand of skepticism the following way: 
“What I took away from Kling was, saying ‘It’s a better way’ is a pretty good 
argument.  If you can really claim it’s a better way and people believe it’s a better 
                                                 
391 King, J. L., & Schrems, E. L. (1978). Cost-benefit analysis in information systems development and operation. 
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR), 10(1), 19-34. 
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way, that’s most of the battle.  And I think, without gilding the lily here, digital 
access to most stuff is a better way.” 
 
Certainly some authors, authors associations, and publishers were claiming otherwise, 
that digital access could potentially harm some aspects or segments of the social world of 
creative and intellectual expression.  By in large, the people who played a central role in U of 
M’s decision to partner with Google did not find those arguments compelling. “The fact that the 
Google Library Project causes some people to grow concerned about their livelihood is 
ultimately a moral argument, not an economic one.”  Fears that mass digitization may undermine 
existing business models is not a sufficient reason to abstain from doing it, particularly when the 
facts do not support a finding of market harm to rightsholders.   
As one participant noted, “there was this strong belief in the inherent rightness of the 
position of making stuff accessible to people, of making the benefits of those things accessible to 
society.”  We don’t generally permit people to hold back the progress of society simply because 
they feel entitled to, grown accustomed to, or become dependent on continued enjoyment of the 
benefits that accrued to them under the old regime: 
“God dammit, I want there to be a mechanism where almost everybody in the 
world has access to almost everything that has ever been published in electronic 
form at zero marginal cost, perhaps with some subscription fee, but a fairly small 
one.  That is what I think the world ought to look like.  For academic work, I 
think that marginal cost and the subscription fee should probably both be zero.  
The Google project showed me a feasible path to get there, not a complete path, 
but the starting point: ‘Okay, let's digitize a whole bunch of stuff so that all that 
prevents it from being available in the way I'd like it to be available is law and 
custom.’  I also hoped that, in time, the existence of this corpus of work would 
cause various actors in the world want to figure out a way to use it and to use it 
well and that sort of pressure, especially from the youth, would eventually lead to 
arrangements and outcomes that would make the work readable as well as 
searchable.  I was optimistic that if we, as a society, have valuable assets, then we, 
as a society, will figure out how to use them.  That was the utopian goal.” 
 
This utopian vision of what might be possible was a key factor in the sensemaking 
around the Library Project.  These visionaries understood, however, that “it was going to take a 
long time before we figure out how to get there,” particularly with respect to the legal and 
promotional arrangements that such a vision would require. 
When Larry Page approached Bill Gosling, the University Librarian for the University of 
Michigan, with an offer to create a digital back-up copy of its entire library collection, and cover 
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virtually all of the costs, to some it seemed like an opportunity Michigan couldn’t pass up.  It 
also fed into Michigan’s sense of ego and exceptionalism. 
When Google, one of the world’s most dynamic and innovative companies, came forward 
it offered a way to bolster the University’s sense of exceptionalism and reputation, and its unique 
role in the State’s economic future.    There was strong institutional support from the key players 
in the essential University sectors including the Library, Information Technology, Office of 
General Counsel, the Provost’s Office, as well as from the President and the Regents.  One of 
those players summarized the sense as follows: “There was a very strong feeling of Michigan 
exceptionalism on the part of key players that this is the kind of thing that Michigan does and we 
should do it.”  Beyond being a good thing for the institution, there was a sense that Google was a 
rising tide that could potentially raise all of the state’s ships. 
While pragmatic, ideological, and reputational concerns played a role in Michigan’s 
decision to partner with Google, the decision did require some careful deliberation, particularly 
with respect to the copyright issues.  As one participant noted: 
“There was a fair amount of turmoil and contention about copyright issues.  One 
the one hand, these were not risk-taking people who wanted to be sued by 
everybody on earth, but they weren’t particularly afraid of being sued because 
they thought that this was a better way.”   
 
Based on my interviews, key figures in the Office of the General Counsel developed a 
legal rationale to support and define U of M’s participation in the Google Library Project that the 
key decision-makers found convincing.  The rationale was based on the concept of the “dark 
archive” which is a term of art borrowed from archival science that describes a collection which 
is held in private, without any opportunities for access.  As described by one of my participants, 
in the context of the mass digitization project, the dark archive doctrine provided that “the right 
of first use extends to our making a digital copy of everything we own.” 
The dark archive rationale is not a copyright doctrine, although there are traces of it in 
§117.  That section applied only to computer software and entitles the purchaser of software to 
make a backup copy which they do not use, i.e. it remains “dark,” unless and until the original 
copy is damaged, destroyed, corrupted, etc.  Obviously the library’s print collection is not 
computer software so it appears this rationale is some murky blend of traditional archival 
practice and various other unidentified mitigating factors (such as fair use and sovereign 
immunity).   Although I was not granted interviews with members of U of M’s Office of General 
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Counsel, based on my interviews with other central figures, the overall experience of those 
involved suggests that the dark archive rationale was not really interrogated and the decision to 
join with Google was fairly simple, straightforward, and not overly deliberated upon.  
Another central figure in Michigan’s partnership with Google described the deliberations 
around the copyright implications as follows: 
“On one level the copyright issues are crucial. On another level, we didn't pay 
much attention to them because we decided very early on that, given what we 
were going to do, we were not at significant risk for a finding of infringement or 
damages from infringement.  I think we have the right to scan in-copyright works 
and use them for research purposes, for preservation purposes, for all students 
with disabilities to read them. We've already been doing that. We believed we 
could make a good faith case based on fair use and library privileges in the Act to 
defend the uses that we were making.  I'm sure we did the legal analysis, but I 
don't remember doing it.” 
 
The point about being able to make a “good faith case based on fair use” is significant 
because, as mention in Chapter II, libraries may be shielded from monetary damages where their 
activity, later determined to be infringing, was undertaken with a good faith belief that it 
constituted a fair use.  This raises some interesting questions around the standard of care and, in 
particular, whether the good faith belief must be both subjective and reasonable.  
As another participant recalled: 
“One of the things that I think was really laudable was the bravery of Michigan’s 
President (Mary Sue Coleman).  I don’t know whether she herself really thought it 
through but she was basically unafraid.  The digitization project resonated with 
her.  It was a risk she was willing to take.  She said, ‘We’re going to go ahead and 
do this.  We’re going to partner with Google.  We’re going to scan all these books.  
We’re going to create this thing.’ If you were trying to identify a signature of her 
presidency, I think this is it.” 
 
Another participant reasoned: 
“I argued in favor of partnering with Google because it was a move that would 
force theories. Either people would be silent about it and they would be okay with 
it or it would force a fair use case that would be on favorable terms for us, 
assuming we did it right.  And some of this is retrospective, and there is probably 
a warm glow of looking back knowing how things played out, but at the time I 
really do remember being very concerned that we either use fair use or we lose it.  
We were looking at the question prospectively rather than just reactively.  And our 
motives were impeccable. There was no profit incentive.  This was about both 
preservation and creating a corpus. And pragmatically, it was a trajectory that the 
University was on at our own pace, but even though at the time we were pursuing 
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one of the most aggressive digitization efforts in academia, at the pace we were 
going, we would have gotten where Google is now in about 100 years.  So it was 
seen it as a way of accelerating what we were already doing. 
 
Short of licensing something, there is no way to guarantee you won’t become a 
test case for fair use. The only way that you can determine that your use was, in 
fact, definitively a fair use, is to have a judge tell you that.  Part of the challenge 
around copyright cases is, for the most part, publishers pick cases that they think 
they will win, and then use those decisions to narrow the scope of fair use.  And 
the Google Library Project felt to me, at least intuitively, like, ‘Man, if we're 
going to have a discussion about fair use, this is the project to have a discussion of 
fair use around.’” 
 
It is likely that the prospect of protection under sovereign immunity provision played 
some role in Michigan’s decision-making process although the participants in my study indicated 
it did not weigh heavily on the ultimate decision:   
“We wanted to have the fight on the terms of the fight, not because we have 
sovereign immunity and can’t be held liable for infringement.  It really served as a 
safety valve in the event that everything went down in flames at least they 
couldn’t get damages.”   
 
As incredible as it might sound, given the worst-case scenarios offered by the Copyright 
Act, the decision to make a back-up copy of the entire Library was one instance, consistent with 
a long trail of precedents and likely antecedents, of Michigan’s “selfless audacity.”392  
As described by one of lead architects of U of M’s decision to join the Google Library 
Project, the thinking at the time was that: 
                                                 
392 This phrase was borrowed from the following piece publishing in the Chronicle of Higher Education concerning 
Michigan’s decision to merge its press with its library, but it could just as easily describe a number of other similarly 
situated endeavors:   
“The University of Michigan’s bold decision two years ago to merge its press with its library, and 
to publish all future books online, free of charge, offers tremendous hope and a way out of our 
predicament.  What is so inspiring about Michigan’s experiment is its selfless audacity, its resolve 
to produce good, free books without waiting for other institutions to reciprocate.  A pragmatic, 
calculated business plan might have looked something like a Start treaty:  We, Michigan, will 
undertake years of negotiations with presses and libraries at other institutions, cautiously acting in 
concert, committing ourselves and a circumscribed group of signatories to verifiable targets for 
sharing our publications without charge, while striking protocols to ensure that what we give away 
is commensurate with what we receive from others. 
Instead, Michigan acted unilaterally, with no assurances of reciprocity, in a fit of altruism.” 
Geffert, B. (2011). Libraries, publishers and a plea for a shotgun wedding. The Chronicle of Higher Education, 20.  
See also, Fister, B. (2001). “Selfless Audacity” Means Creating a Sustainable Not-a-Business Model | Peer to Peer 
Review,  March 24, 2011, available at 
http://lj.libraryjournal.com/2011/03/opinion/peer-to-peer-review/selfless-audacity-means-creating-a-sustainable-not-
a-business-model-peer-to-peer-review/#_  
 149 
“This is probably the showdown that we’ve all known had to happen.  And if we 
lose, it’s not over.  And if we win, it probably is over.  And I didn’t ever hear it 
said, but I think there were quite a few people who thought that ‘this is the last 
chance for people who are really opposed to us digitizing the stuff at all to 
prohibit us from doing that.”       
 
The legal risks were real, and potentially serious, but so were the pragmatic, ideological, 
and reputational considerations.  The conviction that digitization was both a better way and an 
inevitability provided support to the committed action and, combined with the tremendous 
inchoate potential of a digital copy of the library, formed the basis of justifications subsequently 
offered to explain and legitimize the decision.   
The University’s sensemaking around the decision to join the Google Library Project 
signals a number of potentially important observations.  First, social relationships formed a 
foundation of the behavioral commitment to partner with Google.  This was true between U of M 
and Google; Larry Page, a co-founder of Google, was also an alum of U of M.  More 
importantly, it was true within U of M; a small but tightly knit cluster of key players within U of 
M who shared the culture of Michigan exceptionalism controlled the salience of the mass 
digitization problem (ultimately a copyright problem) and facilitated with confidence selecting 
the tradeoff of vigorous action over careful deliberation.  As Weick notes, a choice amongst 
alternatives will ultimately come down to the control of salience, deciding whether deliberation 
or action is more important.  As was the case with the Google Library Project, this decision is 
often irreversible:  “If you choose in favor of accurate sensing, you reduce your capability to take 
strong action.”  Moreover, looking before one leaps may result in not seeing anything, and 
therefore may result in inaction.  If one just jumps in, on the other hand, action is guaranteed to 
generate outcomes that ultimately provide the raw material for seeing something. 393   All 
solutions, however, do not require massive action and so, again, it is a question of salience.  If a 
problem is construed such that only a relatively small corrective action is required, then detail 
and accuracy are crucial.”394   If a problem is construed on a grand scale, as many social 
movement-oriented problems are, then an action-oriented approach is better suited.  Based on my 
interviews with participants involved in Michigan’s decision to join the Google Library Project, 
                                                 
393 Weick (1995:53). 
394 Weick (1995: 50). 
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it was readily apparent that the problem(s) mass digitization was going to solve were construed 
on a grand scale: digitization is a better way, it is the future, it is inevitable.   
At the same time, however, with respect to copyright law there was no bridge between 
“here” and “there.”  There was no obviously legitimate path for digitizing the entire print 
collection.  The mismatch between the legitimate goals of digitization and the lack of available 
legitimate means for accomplishing the goal produced a structural strain that pushed firms and 
institutions like Google and UM toward innovative deviance.  The possibilities of the MDP 
highlighted a mismatch between the goal of copyright and the articulated available means 
designed to achieve that goal. 
Innovative deviance offers a new analytic framework for understanding how and why the 
University of Michigan and other institutions engaged in mass digitization of in-copyright works.  
Michigan engaged in behavior that, in the view of many if not most, promoted the goal of 
copyright law — the cultural and intellectual enrichment of society — but, with respect to 
copyright law as it existed at the time, it used unorthodox, potentially illegitimate, potentially 
infringing means to do so.  Under this framework, UM’s decision behavior was not the result of 
opportunistic or irrational decision making or technological determinism, but rather was a natural 
consequence of the imbalance in copyright’s means-end formulation brought about by significant 
changes in information technology.  Technological change strains the structural foundations of 
copyright law.  It creates an imbalance between the law’s means and end and raises serious 
doubts about the existing law’s continuing functionality, credibility, and relevance.  Breaking the 
law becomes easier, perhaps unavoidable, and more easily justified.   
This view is consistent with the interpretation of key participants in UM’s decision-
making process: 
“One of the ways in which the law gets changed is that it gets broken.  And I 
would argue that the law’s already broken, and what mechanisms of breaking the 
law do is reveal how the law can’t be sustained under the new reality.”    
 
Borrowing from the social disorganization theorists, in the grand scheme of things, 
breaking the law or poking at the wounds of a dying regime is a form of normative competition.  
Reorganizing around new norms that accord with a new technological reality is essential to 
processes of sociotechnical transformation.  Sometimes the existing laws and other institutional 
forms are resilient enough to be able to stretch and adapt to the contours of emerging 
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technologies and behaviors.  In those cases innovative deviance can become a process or 
mechanism by which the law and institutions learn to change.  This theme will reappear in 
subsequent chapters as the story of HathiTrust’s emergence and evolution continues. 
POST-DECISION CONSIDERATIONS 
Once the decision was made to join the project, a second set of concerns surfaced around 
how the partnership and Project would be defined.  The UM-Google Cooperative Agreement is 
one of the handful of publicly available Library Project contracts.  It is significant not only for 
what it reveals about the University of Michigan’s sensemaking about the Project, but also for its 
role in subsequent library contracts and the eventual emergence of HathiTrust.  This section 
begins with some general observations about the relationship between contract negotiation and 
sensemaking before highlighting the basic copyright issues and a few of the key terms of UM’s 
contract.  The contract provides important clues about how some of the uncertainties of the 
Project were managed, cordoned off and, in some cases, preserved.   
Formal contracts like the UM-Google agreement operate in tension with the sensemaking 
process.  In particular, they impose a certain degree of rationalizing and attempt a certain degree 
of prescience that may not realistically reflect the way most sensemaking occurs.  Contracts are 
designed to reduce uncertainty, to design around all imagined pitfalls, to force the parties to slow 
down and deliberate about their actions and decisions.  Contracts are made in anticipation of 
action, to constrain the possibility space of future activity, to protect against harm.  They are a 
mechanism for prospectively opening and closing spaces of engagement and activity.  In contrast, 
sensemaking is fundamentally retrospective.  Contracts also serve important social roles by 
channeling behavior and providing evidence of terms of the agreement as ways of signaling to 
those outside the contract that a meaningful agreement exists.  Contracts are, by their very 
design, distinct from the dynamic, revisionary, retrospective process of sensemaking they co-
exist with.  This section will first discuss a few of the key features of the UM-Google agreement 
and then draw upon interview-generated data to flesh out the sensemaking picture.  
A close read of the UM-Google agreement reveals that it contains several significant 
terms. First, we learn that UM was the first institution (and remains one of the few) that 
permitted Google to scan its entire collection — public domain and in-copyright materials.    
Second, we learn that UM retained ownership of its digital copies whereas many other library 
partners refused ownership (presumably to reduce exposure to copyright liability or simplify 
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technical infrastructure issues).  Perhaps most significantly, however, is provision §4.4.2 which 
reads in pertinent part: 
4.4.2 Use of U of M Digital Copy in Cooperative Web Services.  U of M shall 
have to right to use the U of M Digital Copy, in whole or in part at U of M’s sole 
discretion, as part of services offered in cooperation with partner research libraries 
such as the institutions in the Digital Library Federation.        
 
Thus, this provision permitted UM to share its digital copies with other institutions and 
use them in the provision of cooperative web-based services.  The importance of this provision is 
perhaps best described by the librarian who crafted it: 
“I wanted to make sure we had a provision that we could use to take what we 
believed to be the only comprehensive library digitization effort, the Michigan 
one, and leverage it for collective action around print management, management 
of the collective collection.  §4.4.2 gave Michigan the right to use its copies as 
part of services offered in cooperation with partner research libraries.  Michigan 
was the only institution that negotiated this clause and this is the clause that made 
HathiTrust possible.” 
 
Absent §4.4.2, it was doubtful that research libraries would have been legally permitted 
to share or collaborate around the digital corpus.  We would have ended up with Google’s range 
of services and up to forty siloed back-up copies (one for each participating library).  While such 
digital siloes are not without value, it is the capacity of the libraries to cooperate and collaborate 
around this material, and build something by, of, and for the academic research world that was so 
potentially transformational.  Without §4.4.2, there would have been no HathiTrust, no collective 
action around the collective collection. 
After the UM-Google agreement was disclosed, and other institutions recognized §4.4.2, 
interviewees noted that Google shifted its approach by preemptively including §4.4.2-like 
privileges in all subsequent agreements.  Similarly, based on interview data, pre-existing 
agreements were amended to also include the clause although there remain some questions about 
the legal effect of those revisions: 
“Many of the libraries’ amended agreements with Google were dependent on the 
Google Books Settlement going through.  When the court rejected the Google 
Books settlement, the libraries’ amended agreements with Google were also 
rejected.” 
 
This would suggest that the terms of the original library-Google agreements would still 
control, however, as a practical matter, Google has discretion to enforce the terms of those 
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agreements and has shown no indication that they intend to restrict library collaboration.  In 
other words, it appears that Google is allowing §4.4.2 to stand, effectively permitting libraries to 
engage in cooperative activities. 
It can be tempting, in retrospect, to normalize the evolution of new sociotechnical forms.  
In hindsight, the Library Project, its agreements with various institutions including the University 
of Michigan, and the subsequent emergence of HathiTrust can seem like a logical, linear follow-
on to previous large-scale digitization efforts.  This research reveals how tenuous, conflicted, and 
emergent these developments were.  With respect to §4.4.2 in particular, this research suggests 
that its inclusion in the UM agreement was largely value-driven rather than goal-driven.  
Participants at UM appreciated the potential power of the resources generated by the MDP — a 
digital back-up copy of its entire library — but its potential beyond serving as a back-up was 
largely inchoate and aspirational.  Participants were not exactly sure what they would or could do 
with the content, but they knew they wanted to be able to decide collectively.  §4.4.2 was a 
policy safeguard for the value of collectivism and for the MDP’s inchoate potential. 
Due in part to its questionable, uncertain, and/or murky purpose, negotiations around the 
inclusion of §4.4.2 were somewhat contentious.  Some representatives from Google, particularly 
those who were invested in the technical design elements of the MDP, viewed the policy as a 
potential weak link in its still-emerging business plan.  UM’s lead architect of the provision 
described the negotiations in the following way: 
“I got very close to the person responsible for the digitization effort at Google and 
I can recall a number of conversations with them where they would essentially 
say:  ‘What the fuck did we do?  I think we just gave away our business here!’  
And I would say: ‘No, no, you did not at all.  Google will find ways to capitalize 
on this that will not be undermined by another copy being out there.’ And then 
they would say: ‘But what is this ‘Digital Library Federation?!’ And I would say: 
‘No, no, it’s just ‘like’ the Digital Library Federation.  Don’t get distracted by 
that.’  The fact that we were also dealing with Larry Page and with the General 
Counsel – they had a bigger picture view and were not troubled at all by this the 
way that some product managers were.”     
 
Google was contributing significant resources to the MDP; they needed the libraries to 
provide access to the print materials but they wanted to avoid inadvertently creating a competitor 
in the provision of web-based services around the digital corpus.   
Although representatives of Google declined to be interviewed for this study, citing on-
going litigation around the MDP, one can speculate as to the reasons the company’s co-founder 
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and general counsel were not overly concerned.  Interviewees were quick to point out the ways 
in which the libraries and Google perform distinct functions, with different goals, and approach 
digitized material differently.  Libraries regarded the digitized corpus, in some ways, as an 
extension of their print collections.  While it presented new opportunities for search and 
discovery, remote access, and service opportunities for blind and disabled users, these new 
possibilities arose very much within the library environment.  There was a strong centripetal 
force pulling the library scans back to the core missions of preservation, access, records 
management and ensuring high-quality metadata. 
Google, on the other hand, had its own set of priorities that were likely different than 
those of the library.  Even Google’s Book Search, arguably the nearest cousin of the library 
community, offered different functionality and used quality measures calibrated for purpose 
distinct from those of libraries: 
“If you searched for something, Proust’s “Remembrance of Things Past,” in 
Google Books the three volumes were not together.  And journals were scattered 
and not understood in a coherent way.  In contrast, libraries would provide a serial 
record or a multi-volume unit title of a record which said “here are all the parts 
and here’s how they relate to each other and the print holdings.”  If you had a 
thousand-volume journal that went back to the seventeenth century, the library 
would show you number one, two, three, rather than “your hit occurred in these 
25 places in some uncoordinated way.”      
 
Discoverability and record management were just a few of the ways in which Google and 
libraries differed.  Overall, there was a compelling sense that research libraries and Google 
operated in distinct, non-competing spheres. Libraries care a tremendous deal about metadata, 
record management, and core library missions around preservation and access as evidenced by 
the library-partner press release data. Google cares a tremendous amount about improving and 
expanding its computational power and reach via enhanced search algorithms and the 
development and provision of innovative new services like Google translate. The MDP was a 
means for each to achieve their particular ends.  §4.4.2 made sense in the context of libraries 
traditional functions and did not seem to pose a serious threat to Google’s interests or market 
dominance. 
Hindsight bias can pose a significant obstacle to accurate tracing of the creation and 
subsequent impacts of a policy such as §4.4.2.  There is a strong tendency for people to 
understand the Library Project and HathiTrust as it currently exists and retrospectively make 
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sense of its emergence and evolution as a rational, planned, fairly linear, perhaps even 
unavoidable progression from point A to point B.  In reality, however, that could not be further 
from the truth.   
When the UM-Google Agreement was entered into, and section §4.4.2 was drafted, UM 
was operating on the belief that the digitized corpus would be a dark archive – a digital back-up 
copy of the library with little to no provision for access. 
“The legal rationale supporting our decision to digitize our entire collection – in-
copyright works as well as public domain – was based on the dark archive 
principle.  We believed we were permitted to make a back-up copy of everything 
we own for ourselves.  Whether we do anything with it or let other people see it is 
where we believed the copyright questions would come in.”     
 
It may, in retrospect, seem implausible or unbelievable that a sophisticated and savvy 
institution like the University of Michigan engaged in the mass digitization of its library to create 
a dark archive, but it was an understandable position to take given the state of copyright law as it 
was understood to exist at the time.  
This is not to suggest, however, that there was no inkling that the digitized corpus might 
someday, somehow, under a modified set of legal and organizational facts, become something 
more than a dark archive.  There was certainly a utopian vision of creating a universal digital 
library underlying §4.4.2, but it was deeply buried and very much inchoate when the agreement 
was made.  No one, not even the architect of the provision, knew the extent of its significance 
and meaning in advance.  §4.4.2 was, at that point, a matter of embedded generativity, 
safeguarding the possibility of future transformation within the academic research library world 
by preserving open spaces for collaboration and new, innovative, and unanticipated uses of what 
was assuredly an unparalleled digital resource.   
Having lived through some of the earlier large-scale digitization efforts (and failures), the 
architect of §4.4.2 recognized that primary obstacles to the success of large-scale digitization 
projects were not technological or resource-based, but were rather social and/or institutional: 
“We needed to find a way to use the MDP to leverage collective action around the collective 
collection.”  Although it was not deterministic, the inclusion of this clause in the UM-Google 
Cooperative Agreement reflects important values and opportunities for generativity embedded 
the contract itself.   
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While §4.4.2 opened space for new, often unanticipated, forms of innovation and 
generativity, it is important to note that the clause also foreclosed some opportunities.  The 
Internet Archive, for example, has been largely excluded from participation in HathiTrust 
because of §4.4.2 and other aspects of the UM-Google Agreement.  As described by one of the 
lead architects of the Agreement:   
“The University of Michigan’s agreement with Google allows us to share the 
scans with other library consortia and indeed part of the reason that the HathiTrust 
exists is to meet that requirement.  It is a library consortium.  The Internet Archive 
is not part of a library consortium.” 
Relatedly, the Agreement has fairly rigid restrictions about sharing and collaboration even 
with respect to the public domain materials: 
“Under the Agreement we would not have been permitted to open the public 
domain for mass use. We agreed with Google that we would take measures to 
prevent potential competitive usage of the scans – we argued that there wasn’t 
actually that much economic value in the public domain scans – but nevertheless, 
we agreed that we would take measures to basically throttle mass downloading of 
the collection.   
 
Giving the Internet Archive permission to mass download all of the public domain 
materials to host on its site would not have been consistent with our agreement 
with Google.  My personal view is that Google is being wrongheaded and they 
should have opened up the public domain but we have to wait for all these damn 
lawsuits to resolve before we can start being rational with them again.” 
 
Recognizing that sensemaking involves post hoc justification and reorganizing and 
reconstructing interpretations of events to resolve multiple, often conflicting interpretations of a 
decision’s meaning(s), there may be more to the Internet Archive’s exclusion than what appears 
on the surface.   
Conclusion 
Large-scale digitization efforts had been undertaken prior to the Google Library Project, 
but those efforts were relatively underfunded, ad hoc, and prone to obsolescence.  They also 
paled in magnitude and scale in comparison to the Google Library Project, an important project 
in the prehistory of HathiTrust.  A complete understanding of the Project is complicated by the 
persistent haze of uncertainty and confidentiality that surrounds the MDP.  The overarching lack 
of information about the project, combined with its sheer magnitude and obvious copyright 
implications, led many stakeholders and commentators to voice concerns about the Project.  
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These concerns include: copyright concerns of rightsholders; concerns of legal scholars around 
the potential harm to the rule of law and/or risks of overzealous forays into fair use; concerns of 
librarians around disintermediation, reputational issues, and the perceived “closed” nature of the 
Project (both with respect to the general lack of transparency around the details of the project and 
in terms of digitized content).    
Uncertainty and concern around the Project also produced a spectrum of responses from 
parallel or competing digitization efforts.  The efforts of the Open Content Alliance, consisting of 
the Internet Archive, University of Toronto, University of California, amongst others, with 
funding support from a number of technology firms and foundations, were offered as a 
counterpoint to the Library Project.  The Open Content Alliance example demonstrated how 
some of the perceived problems of the MDP were resolved, e.g. through an unwavering 
commitment to open access principles, but nevertheless many of the challenges plaguing earlier 
large-scale digitization efforts persisted, e.g. the projects were largely ad hoc, with limited 
funding, and lacking binding organizational infrastructure.   
Notwithstanding the haze of uncertainty around the Library Project, this chapter 
described how public documents such as press releases and contracts, to the extent they are 
available, provide important clues about the sensemaking and decision-making processes of 
Library Project partners.  For example, the press releases themselves are important and powerful 
artifacts of the binding commitment of institutional partners and lend legitimacy and tenacity to 
the project as institutional justifications cluster around shared library norms and practices such as 
preservation, support of academic/research mission, and improving access.  The press releases 
also provide important clues about how institutions perceive the copyright implications of their 
participation — reference to preservation, educational use, and even transformation demonstrate 
a sensitivity to copyright and produce a selective attention that guards against possible future 
criticisms by controlling salience around the purpose of the Project.  
The University of Michigan’s sensemaking and decision-making around the Project was 
explored in detail, drawing upon public documents, in-depth interviews with study participants, 
and the UM-Google Cooperative Agreement.  In concert, these sources of data suggest that 
pragmatic, reputational, ideological, and copyright concerns factored into the decision to partner 
with Google in digitizing its entire print library.  In other words, the decision was the product of 
broad socio-structural pressures and individual social relationships amongst key decision-makers 
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at Michigan and Google.  The scale, speed, and financial backing of Google, paired with UM’s 
willingness to undertake a comprehensive retrospective conversion effort (including public 
domain and in-copyright works) and develop the organizational infrastructure to withstand the 
copyright risks and support collective action around the resulting resource, pushed the MDP past 
the obstacles that had hampered many previous large-scale digitization efforts. Digitizing 
everything as fast as possible and securing the possibility of cooperative work around the corpus 
was an imperfect strategy in some respects, but it was able to successfully fend off the creep of 
siloed obsolescence and that had threatened, endangered, and extinguished many previous 
digitization attempts.  
Relatedly, we saw the importance of social relationships as providing a strong basis for 
engaging in vigorous, risky, action without becoming encumbered by a lengthy deliberative 
process likely to tap the institutional energy needed to implement and justify the project.  These 
relationships controlled salience around the issue of mass digitization and supported 
justifications that focused on the broad social goals of the project (digitization was a better way 
to promote the progress of society) as well as digitization’s inevitability.  The simultaneously 
goal-focused but means-eschewing nature of the project, combined with its perceived 
inevitability, aligns with sociological theories about the relationship between technological 
change, structural strain, and deviance.  The University of Michigan’s digitization of its entire 
library collection, including the in-copyright works, was an example of innovative deviance, the 
creative use of potentially infringing or illegitimate means to accomplish the overarching goals 
of copyright law and academia.  When existing laws collide with emerging technologies and 
social practices, innovative deviance can provide a mechanism by which law and institutions 
learn to change. 
In addition, it highlights the importance and potential of policy, as exemplified by the 
UM-Google contract.  In particular, §4.4.2 had a tremendous impact on library mass digitization 
and the subsequent emergence and evolution of HathiTrust not because it was determinative but 
because it embedded a source of value-driven generativity into the system.  §4.4.2 did not cause, 
create, or produce the HathiTrust we know and understand today.  Rather, it embedded within the 
MDP a source of generativity capable of opening (and closing) spaces of social practice and 
technical design in new, innovative, often unanticipated, and potential transformative ways.  
Thus, this research suggests that an increased focus on policy can help bridge “the gap between 
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what we need to do socially and what we can do technically” that has been a primary concern 
and challenge for many researchers studying the intersections of law, technological change, and 
emerging social practice.   
Policies like §4.4.2 can also stabilize and coalesce future sensemaking and decision-
making around emergent sociotechnical forms. The UM-Google agreement provided important 
clues and signals about individual and organizational sensemaking and decision-making around 
the MDP.  Policy provides a window into what the parties believed was important, what concerns 
(or lack of concerns) they might have had, and what sorts of justifications might underlie those 
beliefs and decisions.  In addition, when the UM-Google agreement became public, its power 
became demonstrable; the policy altered the ways in which other institutions negotiated, enacted, 
and engaged in digitization.  The irreversible and visible commitment between UM and Google 
channeled future sensemaking and decision-making around the MDP, tightening these processes 
and making them more predictable, orderly, organized, and self-reaffirming.  The policy became 
more than a simple artifact of a binding commitment between UM and Google.  It became a 
reserve for leveraging and generating collective action.     
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Chapter VI: Genesis of HathiTrust 
Continuing the story that started with the beginning of Google Library Project in the last 
chapter, this chapter describes and explains how and why HathiTrust emerged from the 
University of Michigan’s participation in that Project.  This chapter discusses how HathiTrust 
developed initially as a solution to an instrumental technical problem.  It then discusses 
sensemaking and decision-making around the establishment of a shared digital repository and the 
eventual launch of HathiTrust in 2008. 
Solving an Instrumental Problem 
Once the decision was made to join the Google Library Project, scanning of the 
University of Michigan’s library got underway.  Google set up a pilot facility to begin the 
scanning process in a building on campus.  Once the project got going, they leased an industrial 
facility on the outskirts of Ann Arbor where the bulk of the scanning took place.  The location, 
the process, the technologies used; virtually all aspects of the scanning project were confidential, 
even to key administrators at UM.   
Google’s trucks would pick up the books from the library, shelf-by-shelf, stack-by-stack, and 
transport them to the scanning center.  When new books arrived at the center, they went through 
a triage process whereby books whose physical condition might make them unsuitable for 
scanning were rejected.  The rest of the books would proceed through the scanning process in 
assembly line fashion.  Once scanning was complete, the rejected and scanned books would be 
reunited on the book cart, in their original order, and returned to the library with alacrity and 
determined efficiency.   
Given the scale of the project and the sophistication of Google, the technical origins of 
the project were shockingly of the “garage-inventor” variety.  According to one of my 
participants:  “The particular scanning gadget was invented by Larry Page personally, at his 
mother’s kitchen table.”  In addition, Google invented special library book carts that could  
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function easily among library stacks and corridors as well as out of the building and into 
the back of the particular kind of truck Google operated: 
“Google actually did something you never would have believed anybody could 
do. They really reinvented the library carts.  The library carts that we had all been 
using for thousands of years were not optimal for this process and so they 
invented a new size and shape of library cart and stamped out hundreds of them, 
maybe thousands, and they fit just so in a particular kind of truck and were 
integrated into this process.” 
   
While technical aspects of Google’s ingenuity were noteworthy to observers at the 
University of Michigan, it was the human-engineering throughput that they found particularly 
impressive: 
“There were more than dozens, probably not as many as hundreds, of work 
stations. What did a work station look like? It looked like a place where you set a 
book and photograph it, scan it. And we know (not from what I saw, good 
heavens!) but from the fact that you saw so many thumbs and fingers on scans, 
that human beings turned the pages. And the thing was very well organized in the 
sort of operations engineering sense. Things stayed in order so it was easy to get 
them back into the carts and then back to the libraries they came from and put 
back on the shelves.  It minimizes costs. And they were processing thousands of 
books each day. 
 
From the very beginning, my reaction to Google has been that these people are 
completely unafraid of, and believe in exploiting at every margin, scale and that’s 
exactly what this place (the scanning center) told you.  It was big, lots of people 
doing lots of things, absolutely everybody knowing what they were up to, and 
really impressive throughput.  If librarians had organized a mass digitization 
facility, it would have been only a third as fast.”  
 
At the height of Michigan’s digitization, Google was scanning approximately 30,000 
volumes each week, with an average turnaround time for any given work of about one week.  To 
put this in context, a participant from Cornell University, another early leader in large-scale 
digitization efforts, remarked that when Cornell joined the Google Books Project several years 
later, Google was able to scan in two weeks the equivalent of what Cornell had scanned in the 
previous decade.  The scale and speed of this project was unlike anything that had ever been 
done before. 
The Library Project very quickly became an embarrassment of riches for the University 
of Michigan.  More than that, however, concerns were mounting at Michigan about how to 
protect the valuable resources flooding in.  U of M was getting the back-up copy of the library it 
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had asked for but it was not prepared to deal with the instrumental problems this back-up raised.  
Michigan urgently needed a place to put the scans and it lacked the technical infrastructure to 
securely store them. 
Relatively quickly, Michigan developed an initial infrastructure for storing the digital 
scans.  As one participant described it, the infrastructure developed as a “forcing function of the 
thing itself.”  The first instance of the digital back-up copy of the library was created fairly 
quickly, supported by funds provided by the Provost’s Office.   But according to participant 
interviews, everyone knew that, to do it responsibly, there had to be a second instance located 
offsite “so that problems that hit you aren’t likely to hit them.”  The University of Michigan was 
desperate to create a second instance, somewhere else.     
John Wilkin, at this time an Associate University Librarian at Michigan and a lead 
architect of U of M’s digitization efforts, suggested that U of M create a second instance and 
simply give it away to another institution that would take it.  Under his leadership and expertise, 
Michigan had already created the infrastructure to support the initial back-up copy.  Now he 
proposed adding more storage offsite and letting other institutions in to use it.  This position 
found support within the key decision-making hierarchy at Michigan.  As another participant 
reflected: 
“What John Wilkin argued for was, I think, exactly right.  If every institution tries 
to do their own version, it won’t be done well.  But if we have a single 
infrastructure, we can do it at a high quality and we can afford to bring in other 
people.  Michigan is already supporting this thing quite well; we just need another 
instance somewhere else.”   
 
The problem with creating the second instance was neither technical nor social; it was 
financial. Michigan did not have the funds to cover the full expense of creating another back-up.  
It needed to find additional financial support and so began to think through a model in which 
different institutions build on, and contribute funds and content to, Michigan’s system as a shared 
digital repository.  The way to attract partners, in the view of participants at Michigan, was to 
build a quality infrastructure that was cheaper to co-maintain than build from scratch.   
As one of the lead architects described: 
“The infrastructure had to be done right.  It had to be done in a way that people 
looked at it and said to themselves, ‘This is something we can’t not do, but we 
can’t afford to do it on our own, and we don’t need to do it on our own.  We can 
partner with these guys and it will get taken care of.” 
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The evolution of conceptualizing the products of the Library Project from a second 
digital back-up copy, held as a dark archive, to a shared trusted digital repository was therefore 
not predetermined or predestined.  Rather, the concept of and need for a shared digital repository 
emerged as a response to a series of instrumental problems set in motion by the mass digitization 
of Michigan’s print collection.      
Sensemaking and Decision-Making around the Shared Digital 
Repository 
Michigan turned to its partners, the Committee on Institutional Cooperation (“CIC”), to 
ask for support in creating the shared digital repository.  The CIC was viewed as a source of 
social capital which Michigan could draw upon to accomplish its task.  As one of Michigan’s 
decision-makers described:  “We’re good at sharing with each other.  We like building things 
together.  We recognize the advantages of economies of scale.”   
By this time, other institutions had joined the Google Library Project and were facing 
similar dilemmas with respect to secure storage of the scans.  For example, the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison, a member of the CIC, joined the Google Library Project in October, 2006.  
Meanwhile, the CIC Librarians and Chief Information Officers had also been talking to Google 
about joining the project as a consortium but, according to study participants, there was a 
tremendous degree of nervousness amongst CIC institutions about the copyright implications of 
digitization.  In particular, the CIC was struggling with questions regarding ownership and 
possession of digital copies of in-copyright works.395  
While the CIC seemed primed to move on creating a shared digital repository in theory, it 
was not a priority in the same way it was for Michigan.  As one study participant described it: 
“There was no notion in the CIC that the digital corpus would really become a huge collection, at 
least anytime soon, and so there was no forcing function for most of the CIC about this.”  As a 
result:  
“Discussions about the creation of a CIC shared digital repository were vague, 
and they were moving quite slowly.  What would the shared digital repository be?  
Would it be a CIC project?  Would it be a project of some university?  Were there 
                                                 
395 Ultimately, the CIC did join the Google Library Project in June, 2007 and, under the terms of its agreement, 
Google held copies of the CIC digital scans in escrow.  
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other universities involved?  Would it be a project of a consortium of universities?  
How are we going to determine the governance, write the bylaws, and so forth?   
 
While conversations amongst the CIC regarding the shared digital repository were 
moving along very slowly, tens of thousands of scans continued to pour into Michigan’s coffers 
each week.  A serious disequilibrium resulted between Michigan and the other CIC institutions.  
For Michigan, the need to create a solution to its back-up problem was urgent and coupled with a 
desire to do it collectively at scale.  In comparison, the other CIC institutions simply did not 
share Michigan’s sense of urgency and thus the conversations about creating a shared digital 
repository were moving very slowly.  
Reflecting or perhaps compounding tensions between Michigan and the CIC, several 
participants observed a clash of cultures between technologists and librarians during discussions 
about a potential shared digital repository.  From the librarians’ perspective, the hesitant slow-
moving decision-making process reflected a culture of collectivism that was integral to the 
identity of libraries and which libraries had thrived upon for centuries.  It also reflected a sense 
of respect and gravity for the serious role libraries play in society.  For example, part of the 
reason libraries enjoy certain privileges under copyright law is because they can be trusted to 
perform their important function in a responsible, lawful manner.  
In contrast, from the perspective of the technologists, the CIC librarians’ deliberations 
about the creation of a shared digital repository were “pecking this thing to death.”  Another 
participant referred to the discussions as a “Zeno’s paradox situation.”  Zeno was a Greek 
philosopher from the fourth century B.C. famous for the reduction ad absurdium method of 
reasoning whereby a hypothesis may be disproven or contradicted by carrying the reasoning to 
its increasingly absurd ends.  In the context of the shared digital repository, this particular 
participant was suggesting that the CIC librarians’ task of creating the shared digital repository 
was being broken down into an infinite number of smaller tasks, making completion of the 
ultimate task impossible:   
“We were 99% of the way there but the rest of the way was very clearly going to 
be something that we weren’t going to be able to accomplish because everybody 
was splitting that last 1%.  We had library directors saying, ‘Yeah, it seems kind 
of pricey, maybe we shouldn’t have two copies of this.  The redundancy thing 
gains us something but we can save money if we don’t do that.’  But we at 
Michigan had already committed to that path!  It was very clear to us that we 
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needed to have two copies and a back-up to make it viable.  And this was 
supposed to be the meeting where we made the final commitment!” 
 
Michigan needed the repository to move forward but it didn’t have the money to do it on 
its own.  The CIC was caught up on the last remaining details (the 1%).  It became clear to many 
participants that the negotiations were stuck.   
The failure to reach consensus could be understood as a difference of opinion regarding 
salience of the mass digitization project and a future shared digital repository.  Differences in 
sensemaking, particularly with respect to how the CIC and Michigan framed the central problem 
was in turn, reflected in different (ultimately incongruous) approaches to decision-making.  The 
CIC favored a more deliberative, detail-oriented approach because it construed the essential 
problem and challenge on a smaller, fine-grained, scale.  The CIC viewed the decision making 
problem as one of uncertainty and thus sought increased quantities of information to provide the 
source of a solution.  It was essentially looking before it leapt.  The CIC therefore was reasonable 
to prioritize accuracy and careful planning over quick action.     
Michigan construed the salient features of the problem differently. It faced an immediate, 
significant challenge that had, in its view, a fairly straightforward and simple solution.  The 
challenge holding up the creation of the shared digital repository was not uncertainty, but rather 
confusion and thus Michigan focused its efforts on reigning in the multiplicity of meanings to 
reduce the criticality.  It was essentially encouraging the CIC to jump out into the unknown 
because, after all, it is difficult to predict how things will turn out ahead of time and at least this 
way outcomes will be generated that provide the raw material for future action.  Given 
Michigan’s perspective, it was reasonable for it to favor a vigorous action-oriented approach to 
decision-making.   
At the end of a long day of CIC discussions and debates about the shared digital 
repository — the meeting where the CIC was supposed to finalize its behavioral commitment to 
act but was instead trapped in a Zeno’s paradox — a decision had not been reached.  For 
Michigan, inaction was not a viable outcome.  If the shared digital repository was not going to 
move forward as a CIC initiative, Michigan had to look elsewhere for its solution.  A key figure 
at Michigan described his position the following way: 
“I was something of a bull in a china shop.  I hadn’t been a University Librarian 
for very long.  I didn’t know the secret handshakes.  I was a former Provost.  I 
think I was a suspicious character in the CIC and I think that actually served the 
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whole project well.  I tried to be friendly, and we did give a lot, but I was 
unwilling to be hamstrung by the norm of unanimity that meant so much to my 
CIC colleagues.” 
 
Less than twenty-four hours later, Michigan had its deal.  The shared digital repository 
would be created without the CIC.  After the anti-climactic conclusion of the CIC meeting, 
Michigan called upon an old friend, Indiana University, for help.  In a matter of hours and a 
couple of brief phone calls between librarians and CIOs at the two institutions, an agreement was 
reached that they, Michigan and Indiana, would move forward with the shared digital repository 
on their own.   
Indiana’s CIO described the decision-making process as follows: 
“I got a call from the CIO of Michigan saying, ‘Our Librarian is going to call you 
because the CIC librarians are really struggling to figure this out.’  Then 
Michigan’s Librarian calls while I’m changing planes in Chicago.  He knew that I 
didn’t have a lot of time and he said:  
 
‘The shared digital repository governance is fucked.  This is not 
going to happen.  I can find about $600,000 per year at Michigan.  
Can Indiana find about $300,000 per year?  We’ll tell the CIC that 
we’re going to sort this thing out — we’ll be the operators of the 
shared digital repository and the CIC can be its first client.  And 
down the line, we’ll get this moved to something else, but this is 
the only way to get it done.’ 
 
And I said, ‘Well, I’m very intrigued.  Just let me consult my Librarian.  By the 
next morning my Librarian had gotten the $300,000 per year and I had squared 
things away with general counsel.  By noon the next day, I called Michigan back 
and said ‘Indiana is in.  We will sign on for the $300,000 for several years to get 
this thing launched.’ 
 
I told my guys in research technologies, ‘Go do whatever Michigan wants.  If they 
say: ‘We’re using this.  We’re going to use that architecture.  We’re going to buy 
from whatever vendor,’ and if you think it will work and it’s reasonably sensible, 
just do it.  And they stood up and literally turned that thing on in 30 or 60 days. 
 
And I have to credit the strength of Indiana University’s IT organization because 
that was a bit of a countercultural moment in higher education.  In higher 
education, even in administrative and staff positions, everybody gets a vote and 
everybody gets a say and you have to reach agreement on things.” 
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The two institutions had what was described by many involved as a “charmed 
relationship.”  There was a tremendous amount of personal capital and trustful capital built up 
between Michigan and Indiana on many different institutional layers:   
“The charmed relationship isn’t structural but personal.  We have a lot of personal 
connections of people who have confidence in each other and in creating good 
outcomes together.  We could jump out into the unknown, without everything 
figured out in advance, and trust that we would both make smart decisions and 
solve the obvious emergent problems together.” 
 
In interviewing the key figures at both institutions about the relationship, a number of 
explanations were offered in an attempt to demystify the nature of the bond.  For example, 
participants cited a shared organizational temperament as one basis for the closeness between 
Michigan and Indiana: “Both institutions have people in key leadership positions who were more 
interested in making things happen.  Not just studying it, but making it happen.”  Relatedly, 
participants cited close personal and professional bonds between key administrators at both 
universities.  The Chief Information Officers,396 the University Librarians, the Provosts, General 
Counsels, Presidents, were all committed to shared values and these commitments served as 
powerful links between figures at each institution.  One participant explained, “We are kindred 
spirits and we complement each other.”  Another participant said, we share the sense that “great 
public research universities have to act now or risk becoming less relevant.  That is what drives 
us.”  Michigan and Indiana also share a history of successful collaborations and projects.  
Sakai, 397  a learning management system that has been adopted by over 350 colleges and 
universities around the world, and the more recent Unizin Consortium398, working to create a 
digital learning landscape built around cloud-based infrastructure based on open technology 
standards, are but two examples.   
The tremendous social and organizational capital shared by Michigan and Indiana 
supported vigorous decision-making and a willingness to jump out into the unknown.  One of the 
participants said: 
“Institutions feel like they have to be able to answer every possible foreseeable 
question before they take the first leap.  And so that reservoir of personal capital 
really helps a lot.  It’s remarkable that from a phone call at about 3:30pm in 
                                                 
396 The University of Michigan did not have a CIO but an Associate Provost for Academic Information and 
Instructional Technology Affairs and, later, Vice Provost for Academic Information. 
397 Sakai Project, https://sakaiproject.org/  
398 Unizin, http://unizin.org/  
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O’Hare airport to noon the next day, Indiana University would dig up and make 
an exceptional $300,000 per year commitment and take on the ire of some of our 
colleagues by stepping out and saying: ‘We will be the operator of the shared 
digital repository.’” 
 
When Michigan and Indiana returned to the CIC meetings the following day, and 
informed its members of their plan to create the shared digital repository, shockwaves rippled 
throughout the room.  One participant described the announcement, saying: 
“Oh my God, one day, the CIC is going to do this and the next day, it’s just 
Michigan and Indiana.  You can imagine, I mean, whoa, that was like, ‘Hey, what 
happened here?!’  It was a bomb.”   
 
For those in attendance at the meeting when the announcement was made, the episode 
was shocking.  Stories of that meeting still persist today.  Many people were very unhappy about 
it at the time and some of those feelings linger on:   
“Librarians have a very collectivist culture and for someone to break out and do 
something this way was not only debatable as a strategy, it violated cultural norms 
of how librarians tend to do things and it violated the governance structure of the 
CIC.” 
 
The person who actually made the announcement recalled it this way: 
“We said, ‘Indiana and Michigan are going to cover the entire costs between the 
two institutions and if the CIC institutions want to come in now, they can be 
secondary partners and will pay for part but will not have a seat at the table in the 
same way.’  And it was a catastrophic falling out.  One of the library directors 
turned his back on the table.  Literally turned his back to me, and lots of people 
were very unhappy about it.” 
            
Sensemaking around the decision to push ahead with the shared digital repository offers a 
useful perspective into that decision and provides a conceptual link to the innovative deviance 
framework.   Michigan engaged in act of innovative deviance by breaking from the shared norms 
and practices of the library community and the CIC governing structure to strike out on its own, 
with the help of Indiana.  The impetus of this act was a perceived mismatch between the shared 
goals of the library community — establishing a shared digital repository — and the means of 
accomplishing that goal — the CIC’s highly detail-oriented deliberative process that privileged 
egalitarian consensus-building over rigorous action.  By breaking ranks with the CIC and 
forming a bi-lateral partnership with Indiana University mid-negotiation, Michigan used 
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illegitimate means to achieve an accepted legitimate goal, ensuring that the digital repository 
which it so desperately wanted was built. 
A short time later, the key participants from Michigan and Indiana met in Indianapolis to 
discuss strategies for moving ahead with the shared digital repository.  Over the course of a day, 
the group chose a name for the repository, identified a strategy for getting buy-in from additional 
institutional partners, sketched out basic details for what the repository should look like and how 
it should operate and agreed on which aspects of the project could be shelved until some future 
date. 
Creation and Launch of HathiTrust 
Rudyard Kipling’s short story, “Toomai of the Elephants,” begins with the following 
short poem: 
I will remember what I was, I am sick of rope and chain– 
I will remember my old strength and all my forest affairs. 
I will not sell my back to man for a bundle of sugar-cane: 
I will go out to my own kind, and the wood-folk in their lairs. 
I will go out until the day, until the morning break– 
Out to the wind’s untainted kiss, the water’s clean caress; 
I will forget my ankle-ring and snap my picket stake. 
I will revisit my lost loves, and playmates masterless! 399 
It was Kipling’s story that inspired the name “HathiTrust.”  During the Indianapolis 
meeting just described, Michigan’s Librarian had Kipling’s story floating around in his head and, 
when it came time to select a name, he suggested it as a source.  Initially, he thought they should 
name it “Toomai,” but that is the name of the human elephant-handler in the story and what he 
was drawn to, as the poem suggests, was the elephant or, more precisely, the idea of the elephant.  
He explained his sensemaking as follows: 
“I somehow liked the idea of the library and libraries as being an elephant.  
Elephants never forget.  Elephants are big and strong.  Elephants carry heavy 
burdens.  And it’s inspired by Kipling, so it’s a semi-classical reference, shows 
that we’re sort of literate.”   
 
                                                 
399 Kipling, R., & Howe, I. (1982). The Portable Kipling: Penguin Books. 
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While it did not surface in his description, the elephant in Kipling’s story also represents 
liberation, breaking free from constraints and returning to one’s true nature.  One can speculate 
as to how the decision to digitize the entire library may have also seemed like a step toward 
liberating the ideas, knowledge, and learning contained in the pages of its books in line with the 
utopian vision of making all of the world’s books accessible online to everyone. 
While the elephant in Kipling’s story was a source of inspiration, “elephant” was not 
perceived as a compelling name for a shared digital repository.  The Hindi word for “elephant,” 
which is “hathi,” seemed like a much more appealing alternative.  
As Michigan’s Librarian explained his idea behind adopting the “hathi” moniker, 
Indiana’s CIO was online conducting a domain name search.  After discovering that the “hathi” 
domain was already taken, they brainstormed for a few minutes, tacking on other words, until 
they found one that both made sense and was available as a domain name.  Everyone agreed that 
“HathiTrust” was an improvement on the original concept: “We have all these works that are in 
trust for the future, guarded by, carried by, in my imagination, this wise, infinitely long-lived 
elephant.”  The shared digital repository now had a name: HathiTrust.           
At this point, the thing that would soon be formally introduced to the world as HathiTrust 
functioned as a technical solution to Michigan’s instrumental problem: it was a safe, secure place 
to store digital scans.  Some of the more challenging aspects of its development still lay ahead.  
Namely, how Michigan and Indiana might navigate the organizational and institutional fallout 
stemming from their innovative deviance and begin building consensus and partnership around 
HathiTrust.   
As one of the lead architects described, once the technical problem was solved: 
“My first reaction was ‘What will all of the people who were involved with this 
do?  Well, they’ll hate us.  They’ll hate Michigan.  Anybody we try to bring in 
will hate us because we’re so hegemonic.  So I wasn’t worried about the technical 
side.  Michigan and Indiana had that covered.  I was worried about the 
organizational side.”       
 
With respect to the CIC institutions, once the initial shock of Michigan and Indiana’s 
announcement wore off, and discussions within the CIC resumed, the CIC did agree to come in 
as a partner. But attitudes toward Michigan and Indiana remained mixed for some time.  Some 
CIC members recalled thinking: “there’s Michigan again, taking the lead on things and not 
waiting for everybody else.  Why can’t those people in Ann Arbor be more collaborative?”  
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Participants from Michigan and Indiana noted that the resentment they felt from certain quarters 
of the CIC for going forward with the digital repository without asking, in their words, ‘Mother, 
may I?”   
One of the ways that Michigan and Indiana sought to diffuse some of the backlash was to 
make it very clear that “HathiTrust would always view the CIC as a founding member.”  Even 
though the CIC initially came on board as a secondary partner, the first client of Michigan and 
Indiana’s repository, the founders noted:  
“We ultimately gave them a seat on the board and on the executive committee, 
and that turned into two seats in time.  So I think they’ve gotten everything they 
would have gotten, but it was the thing that caused them to move forward.”   
 
There was initially no forcing function for the CIC with respect to creating the shared 
digital repository.  Michigan and Indiana’s innovative deviance ultimately became that forcing 
function.  The act of circumventing or abandoning CIC norms and governance and proceed 
independently toward the goal of creating the digital repository was the bomb that caused them 
to move forward.    
Another thread of Michigan’s early organizational strategy around HathiTrust was to 
bring in additional institutional partners outside the CIC.  The University of California, in 
particular, was pursued quite vigorously.  Michigan’s interest in the UC system was motivated by 
reputational and geographical concerns.  It was also tied to personal relationships and 
investments of social capital that had been underway for years prior.      
Conversations between individuals at the University of Michigan and the University of 
California had been ongoing with respect to using the Google scans as a lever for collective 
action around print management of the “collective collection.”  Those discussions had even 
gotten as far as an ultimately unsuccessful grant proposal to the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, 
co-authored by a Michigan librarian and a key administrator at the California Digital Library 
entitled: “Mass Digitization of Research Library Holdings and the Public Good.” 400  In the 
memory of one of those participants, discussions between Michigan and California stalled after 
the proposal got a “serious rebuff” from Mellon, a disappointment compounded by the tragic 
demise of a key UC administrator and subsequent “collapse in the University of California 
administration.”  The upheaval at the UC led to organizational restructuring which pulled the 
                                                 
400 On file with author. 
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CDL administrator who had co-authored the grant proposal into UCOP (UC’s Office of the 
President).  Needless to say, the collaboration was sidetracked.   
When Michigan and Indiana were contemplating HathiTrust, a newfound attention was 
paid to the UC.  Key participants hoped the prior collaborations retained sufficient warmth to 
spark a reconnection.  Sensemaking around a possible UC partnership was described by one of 
the key figures at Michigan as follows: 
“We need to bring in the University of California because the CIC produces about 
10% of the PhDs, and the University of California produces another 10% of the 
PhDs.  If we got 20% of PhD construction it will be very hard for the others not to 
join.  Once the two sort of biggest institutionalized players are in, we’ll get there.”   
 
When the Michigan librarian responsible for those early discussions with the CDL 
reached out to them anew about the possibility of joining the nascent HathiTrust, he discovered 
that, not only had his former collaborator moved on, the CDL had a completely new roster of 
personnel.  All of the social ties Michigan hoped to capitalize upon had unraveled.  Moreover, 
there had been apparently zero communication (or zero organizational memory) within the CDL 
regarding the mass digitization grant proposal: 
“The former head of the CDL hadn’t shared our conversations with anybody else 
at CDL so when I came back a couple of years later and started trying to move 
things forward with CDL, I shared with them what we had written and they were 
all stunned that the conversations had gone so far and they didn’t know.” 
 
Gaining the University of California’s commitment was a formidable challenge beyond 
the broken social ties.  As previously described, the University of California and the California 
Digital Library had been leaders in early digitization efforts.  They had been an active participant 
in the Open Content Alliance.  They had partnered with Microsoft, Yahoo!, the Sloan 
Foundation, and the Internet Archive prior to partnering with Google on the Library Project.  
Sure, Michigan was an innovator and leader in digitization, but the UC viewed itself in some 
ways as in a tier to itself.  A participant at the CDL reflected that the CDL saw itself as “the 
intersection of the Venn diagram of digitization:”  
“We had a great sense of the big picture of what people were working on, how far 
they were, what kind of challenges they had, how they’re thinking about access 
and preservation in particular.  We really were in the center of the communication 
and social side of digitization efforts.”  
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The University of California’s self-appraisal and objective positioning within the social 
ecology of digitization had a number of implications, positive and negative, with respect to 
Michigan’s desire to bring them on as partners of HathiTrust.  On the positive side, CDL had 
experienced frustration over the lack of organizational infrastructure on some of its prior 
collaborations, perhaps most notably with the Open Content Alliance.  HathiTrust seemed to 
offer a solution to this problem.  In addition, while some of its previous partnerships (with 
Google and the Internet Archive) provided a platform or locale for access and preservation, 
participants at CDL noted:  
“Neither situation really served the needs of research libraries.  We were 
accomplishing digitization but we were not accomplishing the infrastructural 
aspects the libraries needed.”   
 
Relatedly, there was also a sense that private companies could not be trusted or relied 
upon to manage the data in a way that was consistent with library values or practices: 
“The academy traditionally tries to solve problems like each one of us are an 
island.  But the digital goes to scale, it favors scale.  Either we figure out how to 
create scale ourselves in ways that we can steer in our interest, and take some 
advantage of the economics of it, or others will create scale and they will manage 
it in ways that are not in our interest.” 
 
Weighing against a possible partnership in HathiTrust, the University of California 
intended to host its own content and was working on creating a technical infrastructure to 
support its institutional goals.  The group working on developing a CDL-based preservation 
scheme for dealing with the Google scans was not impressed by Michigan’s project which they 
initially viewed as a regional, CIC project. 
Furthermore, the UC system is large and, by many accounts, highly bureaucratic.  
Consensus is often difficult to come by.  Eventually, the CDL did approach the University of 
California’s governing board and advocated that the University of California join HathiTrust but 
the board was not immediately convinced.  They asked the CDL to write an internal memo 
explaining why the University of California should join.  Meanwhile, the Michigan librarian who 
had been spearheading the partnership wrote a formal letter entreating the University of 
California to join HathiTrust which he delivered to his old collaborator (now at the UCOP).  The 
University of California still did not act.   
In the view of some people at Michigan, the situation was getting dire: 
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“It was easy to get the CDL people to join because this was right up their 
bailiwick.  But it was clear to me from the start that this wasn’t going to go 
anywhere unless we got Berkeley and UCLA on board.  They are by far the 
biggest pieces of the UC system in terms of campuses, and they have stopped 
things repeatedly in the past.  If Berkeley and UCLA gang up they are essentially 
invincible.  So, we didn’t necessarily need them to say, ‘We’re in.  We love it.’  
But we at least had to get them to say, ‘We won’t fight it.’  That took about a 
year.”   
   
The University of California did, eventually, decide to partner in the shared digital 
repository that would eventually launch as HathiTrust.  Its sensemaking around the decision was 
essentially two-fold.  The first reason was financial.  Like Michigan, and the growing list of 
Google Library partners, the University of California faced the technical problem of creating the 
infrastructural support for its back-up copy.  While the UC had the technical ability to meet this 
challenge, money to fund the project was another question.  Thus, according to my interviews, 
the primary reason the UC decided to join HathiTrust was economic.   
The second reason for joining revolved around issues of salience and control.  Although 
the UC sat on Michigan’s offer for some time, word eventually began to trickle through that 
Michigan, Indiana, and the CIC were about to announce the launch of HathiTrust.  If the 
University of California wanted to join as a founding member, have a seat on the board and 
executive committee, and take an active role in shaping the path of HathiTrust, they needed to 
make a decision.  As it had done with the CIC’s deliberation process, Michigan forced the 
University of California’s hand by saying:  ‘We are moving forward with or without you.  If you 
join us now, we’ll give you a seat at the table, but if you wait, you won’t get that level of status 
within the organization.’  The strategy was a gamble that paid off.  It prompted a binding 
behavioral commitment on the part of the UC and enabled Michigan to, once again, push the 
repository forward despite a stagnating decision-making process.     
But this was, ultimately, a short-term strategy for generating acquiescence to build critical 
mass around HathiTrust’s creation.  For HathiTrust to have lasting success, its founders 
recognized that Michigan could not operate the repository as a dictatorship.  Michigan needed to 
play the long game and that meant putting in place measures that would ensure that control of 
HathiTrust would be given over to the collective.  As one of my participants very eloquently 
described: 
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“The library community is very catty.  Because they’ve been deprived of power 
for so long they engage in horizontal violence at the local level.  So, the number 
one complaint would be that Michigan is doing this thing that really benefits us so 
that they can control us.  This was going to be a huge issue.  And so we had to 
give HathiTrust over to the members of the community, so that they could settle 
upon what HathiTrust might become.  We couldn’t say ‘This is the direction it’s 
going to go’ because, even if we were right, it would be prima facie evidence that 
we were drunk with power, and mad, and taking them where they didn’t want to 
go.  This is all part of that old aphorism: ‘Those who lead the revolution shouldn’t 
be the ones who build the subsequent state.’  And I think that was right in this 
case.  We had a vision, which was that we really needed to back-up our digital 
scans, but the rest had to be settled by the library community.”   
 
When the press release went out on October 13, 2008, announcing the official launch of 
HathiTrust, it was introduced as a shared digital repository jointly founded by the 12-university 
consortium known as the CIC and the 11 libraries of the University of California system.  There 
was no specific mention of Michigan or Indiana (other than as CIC members).  Much to the 
frustration of Michigan’s public relations department, which wanted HathiTrust to bear Michigan 
branding, Michigan’s fingerprints were already receding from the HathiTrust creation story.   
Receding into the emerging HathiTrust collective was a crucial foundation for 
HathiTrust’s future success. A librarian at Michigan who joined the organization just after 
HathiTrust’s initial launch reflected:   
“When you’re at Michigan, you see what’s going on here.  It wasn’t until I was at 
a CIC meeting and saw people with HathiTrust stickers on their computers and 
heard them referring to HathiTrust as ‘We’ rather than as ‘Michigan’ that I 
realized there was already this broad sense of collective action being expressed 
around HathiTrust.  It was really an amazing thing to see.”  
 
While a sense of collective ownership and control over HathiTrust began to emerge from 
the outset of its launch, the next chapter describes how the transition to collective governance 
followed a more measured and deliberative process.  HathiTrust’s lead architects continued to 
play an important role in its early development as the organization continued to grow and 
transform from a Michigan initiative to a semi-autonomous collective organization.   
Conclusion 
The period between the UM’s decision to join the Google Library Project in late 2004 
and the official launch of HathiTrust in 2008 reveals several key insights into the processes of 
sociotechnical transformation.  For example, tracing the evolution of the mass digitization 
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project from something initially conceived of as a dark archive to a collective shared digital 
repository demonstrates that change and transformation emerges through complex, dynamic, 
non-linear, often unanticipated actions and interactions amongst technology, social practice, and 
law.   
The overwhelming influx of scans, upwards of 30,000 volumes per week, vastly outpaced 
all earlier large-scale digitization efforts.  The scale and speed of the project revealed a failure to 
fully prepare for and anticipate the need for a secure, multi-located technical infrastructure for 
storing the digitized content.  The infrastructure which would eventually form the technical basis 
of HathiTrust emerged as a technical solution to an instrumental problem.  But the technical and 
financial issues facing Michigan were quickly overshadowed by the organizational challenges it 
faced.  
This chapter demonstrates how the innovative deviance framework can provide 
meaningful clues into the organizational aspects of HathiTrust’s emergence.    While Michigan 
and the CIC shared a common goal of creating a collective digital repository, a disequilibrium 
arose with respect to the means of accomplishing the goal.  Michigan favored a rigorous action-
oriented decision-making approach whereas the CIC’s approach was deliberative, focused on 
fine-grained details, guided by principles of egalitarianism that had been core values of the 
library community for centuries.  When Michigan decided to circumvent or abandon the CIC’s 
governance and create a shared digital repository with Indiana University, it was engaging in 
innovative deviance — making creative use of illegitimate means to achieve a desired legitimate 
end.  That innovative deviance, in turn, became the forcing function for the rest of the CIC to get 
on board with the shared digital repository.  It was, as one of my participants articulately 
described, the bomb that got things moving forward. 
While the disequilibrium and organizational strain prompted Michigan’s innovative 
deviance, the willingness of Indiana University to partner with Michigan in this risky behaviour 
reflects the importance of sensemaking and close personal bonds and affinity.  In particular, this 
research showed that shared values reflected a confluence of salience around the core issues.  In 
addition, strong and trustful personal capital provided the foundation necessary to engage in 
potential risky behavior guaranteed to raise the ire of colleagues at other institutions.  Relatedly, 
and perhaps most importantly, this work demonstrates the fundamental importance of similarity 
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in decision-making approaches.  Both Michigan and Indiana favored vigorous goal-oriented 
action over a process-based look before you leap strategy.  
Social relationships and differences in decision-making approaches also played key roles 
in terms of Michigan’s negotiations with the University of California.  Despite having worked 
closely on digitization issues in the past, a change in personnel dissipated much of the social 
capital and common that had been established in years prior.  In addition, differences in 
institutional self-perception about what its proper role should be in the transformative process 
influenced the negotiations.  Despite coming to the Google project years after Michigan, the 
University of California situated itself at the intersection of the Venn diagram of all the various 
digitization efforts and projects.  Its expertise and leadership made it reluctant to sign on to 
something it perceived to be a “Michigan” or “CIC” project.  For the shared digital repository to 
be “the digital repository,” Michigan believed it needed the UC system.  Michigan courted the 
UC for a year, trying to convince it to join, before ultimately gambling with an ultimatum: join 
us now as a full partner with the power to shape the initial evolution of the repository, or take a 
chance on forging your own path.  The gamble paid off and the University of California agreed 
to join Michigan, Indiana, and the other CIC institutions. 
The final key takeaway from this chapter deals with the organizational fall-out of 
innovative deviance.  As participants noted, once critical mass was established to ensure that 
HathiTrust could have a successful launch, the main issue became how Michigan could 
ameliorate some of the relational damage caused by its “bomb” and ultimatum.  Its strategy, 
which proved to be incredibly effective, was to erase its organizational fingerprints from 
HathiTrust.  Thus, when HathiTrust was launched it was introduced as a joint initiative of the 
University of California and the CIC.  Moreover, by its launch, its origination as a technical 
solution to an instrumental problem had been subsumed in a broader values-oriented goal deeply 
tied to core library functions of the providing access to and preservation of knowledge.  The 
press release for HathiTrust’s launch may even provide some of the tenacious justifications 
necessary for coordinated sensemaking around what HathiTrust could or should become.  It 
described HathiTrust as a collective organization that coordinates preservation and use of 
digitized content for collective action within the library community on long-standing issues, a 
retrospective justification that, as the following chapter describes, quickly morphed into a self-
fulfilling prophecy.
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Chapter VII: Reification of HathiTrust 
“Real isn’t how you are made.  It’s a thing that happens to you. … It doesn’t 
happen all at once.  You become.  It takes a long time.” 
-Margery Williams Bianco,  
The Velveteen Rabbit.401 
 
This previous chapters describe and explain how HathiTrust came to be.  This chapter 
describes and discusses an important phase in HathiTrust becoming the HathiTrust we know 
today.  This is the part of the story where HathiTrust is reified, where it becomes real, where it 
creates a new reality.  The process of reification is essentially a social process and therefore this 
chapter will focus on the social aspects of HathiTrust’s development and evolution.402  
The term reification has a number of other connotations beyond the “social process of 
becoming real.”  Particularly in Marxist and postmodern philosophy, reification is criticized for 
its tendency to oversimplify and collapse an object into a single phenomenon or form that can 
then be studied, controlled, etc., instead of acknowledging that the meaning of an object emerges 
from an unbounded, continuously evolving set of mutually-constitutive processes, experiences, 
and participations.   
My approach to this phase of HathiTrust’s development borrows both Weick’s sense of 
reification — the social process of becoming real — and the more critically-oriented 
interpretation of reification just described.  The process of HathiTrust becoming the thing we 
know it to be today did grow out of a collective sensemaking process and this chapter describes 
and explains key facets of that process.  But in also revealing the dark history of HathiTrust’s 
emergence and evolution, and the murky, still unresolved and contested intersections, this work 
also pushes back against a static, monolithic understanding of what HathiTrust is.   
Picking up where the story left off in the last chapter, the first section of this chapter 
describes HathiTrust’s early sensemaking and decision-making in forming its governance 
                                                 
401 Bianco (1926). 
402 Weick (1995: 23). 
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structure and describes the evolution of its path, purpose, and organizational trajectory.  The 
second section shifts into a description of how HathiTrust grew and transformed in scope and 
functionality from a shared digital repository to a more complex, multi-faceted service 
organization.  This chapter concludes with a discussion of a milestone event in the evolution of 
HathiTrust, its Constitutional Convention, an event which formally marked HathiTrust’s 
transition into a (semi-)autonomous collective organization.  
HathiTrust’s Early Governance 
At its inception, the governance structure of HathiTrust consisted of an Executive 
Director — an Associate University Librarian at Michigan who had served a vital role in 
Michigan’s digitization efforts and was a lead architect of HathiTrust — and a small executive 
committee comprised of the University Librarians and Chief Information Officers at the 
University of Michigan and Indiana University.  When HathiTrust was officially launched, 
representatives from the CIC and the University of California also joined the Executive 
Committee.   
While few things were certain in terms of the broader social implications of mass 
digitization and the creation of HathiTrust, the Executive Committee had three clear priorities 
from the outset.  First, it wanted to grow the membership of HathiTrust:   
“We recognized upfront, even though it was something new to all of us, that it had 
such potential and was going to get huge.  It was clear, almost from the beginning, 
as everyone started wanting to sign on.  We decided, let the membership grow.” 
 
Much as Michigan knew additional partners would be needed for the shared digital 
repository to be a success, the Executive Committee knew its membership would need to grow 
for HathiTrust to reach its full potential (whatever that may turn out to be).  
Second, the Committee agreed that legal ownership of HathiTrust would remain with the 
University of Michigan.  In other words, while HathiTrust was launched jointly by the CIC and 
the University of California, it originated as a project of the University of Michigan and thus its 
status, as a legal entity, remained with Michigan.  The possibility was there that, at some point, 
Michigan might transfer legal ownership to some other institution or otherwise undertake action 
to make HathiTrust a fully sovereign entity.  But there was never much interest or organizational 
momentum in pursuing that end: 
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“HathiTrust was initially structured this way as a matter of convenience but, over 
time, there was never a real push to transition legal ownership of it to some other 
entity.  There was a sense that Michigan was better at handling risk, or that it is 
better for the other member institutions if Michigan (rather than they) bore the 
risks.” 
 
While participants noted that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was not discussed when 
the mass digitization project was first undertaken, it was discussed by the Executive Committee 
as an additional justification for Michigan retaining legal ownership of HathiTrust.  Recall that, 
as a state institution sovereign immunity was perceived as limiting Michigan’s potential liability 
for monetary damages from copyright infringement.  Private institutions, on the other hand, fall 
outside the protections of sovereign immunity and thus, as several participants speculated, 
Michigan’s ownership “gives the members of HathiTrust some comfort.”     
In accordance with its legal status, Michigan’s Office of the General Counsel entered into 
bilateral agreements with each of HathiTrust’s member institutions.  These agreements set forth 
the essential terms of what activities and uses would be permissible with regard to the HathiTrust 
collection.  The vision of HathiTrust evolved rather quickly.  At the outset: 
“HathiTrust was envisioned in the beginning as a storage locker on the outskirts 
of town for digital scans.  Michigan would own the storage locker, and there 
would be some basic rules, but what you do in your storage locker is your 
business.” 
 
This was not, however, the model that was ultimately adopted.  The membership’s 
autonomy with respect to what could be done with HathiTrust’s collection was limited by what 
Michigan allowed, and what Michigan allowed was primarily a function of its contractual 
obligations under the UM-Google Cooperative Agreement and risk assessments made by 
Michigan’s Office of General Counsel.  Ultimately, as one of the founders of HathiTrust 
reflected, “Michigan’s permissions were pretty limited.”  Michigan put a ceiling on what uses 
were possible and individual member institutions could adopt their own policies within that 
space in accordance with their own objectives and levels of risk tolerance.  
The third thing the Executive Committee agreed upon at the outset what that control over 
HathiTrust should not remain in the hands of its progenitors, now embodied in the Executive 
Committee, but should instead be passed on to the collective membership.  It was understood 
that HathiTrust should be “a broad collective thing, not “us” telling “you” what to do.”  One of 
the participants in my study explained:  
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“We knew we had to find a way to shift the control of this organization from the 
CIC and UC because the academic library community will hate us in the same 
way they would have hated Michigan and Indiana.”   
 
With respect to Michigan’s role, the move to create an innovative initiative and then 
essentially give it over to a broader collective was part of its institutional identity:   
“Michigan is powerful in its way, but the way we exert our power is less overt 
than other institutions.  Our bias is, we’ll get this ball rolling but we’re not going 
to stick around to control things.”   
 
One of the challenges that was not discussed by participants but which may be obvious in 
hindsight is that there is an inherent tension between the Executive Committee’s second and third 
goals.  Michigan simultaneously retaining legal ownership of HathiTrust and giving control of 
the organization over to the collective may be a source of friction where the risk tolerance of 
Michigan is incompatible with the organizational goals of HathiTrust.  At the time these goals 
were agreed upon however, in fall, 2008, none of the participants viewed this as a challenge, in 
part, because Michigan was still very much an innovative deviant with a relatively high and 
institutionally homogenous risk tolerance. 
Setting aside that tension for the time being, the transition of control from the Executive 
Committee to the broader HathiTrust membership raised a number of pragmatic challenges.  In 
fact, HathiTrust’s inaugural Executive Director reflected that “the biggest change in HathiTrust 
has been its move to a more formally defined shared governance.”  Two concerns, in particular, 
seemed to dominate the Committee’s sensemaking around this issue. 
First, the Executive Committee was concerned that giving control of HathiTrust over to 
the collective too quickly might prematurely stunt, and possible extinguish, the energy and 
momentum necessary to establish HathiTrust as a viable, resilient entity.  On an instrumental 
level, the Committee knew it would take time to get HathiTrust off the ground and therefore it 
wanted to reserve control for a period of time.  One of the Committee members explained it this 
way: 
“We will get there, but it can’t happen overnight because we are doing stuff and 
we need to keep doing stuff.  It wasn’t blackmail or holding anything hostage.  It 
was the plan.  We don’t have good models for this kind of thing and we needed 
time to figure stuff out. We need time to make sure this thing is solid and reliable, 
that the right technology is there, and the right people are working on it between 
Michigan and Indiana.”     
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The Executive Committee foresaw a series of tasks ahead that would need to be 
accomplished in order to get HathiTrust up and running.  It needed to figure out how the 
infrastructure would work.  It needed to have a model for attracting and supporting (technically, 
organizationally, and financially) its growing membership.  It needed to determine what kinds of 
services it might offer, and so forth.   
Fresh off the previous decision-making standstills that had bogged down negotiations 
around the creation of the shared digital repository and HathiTrust, there was a compelling sense 
that a smaller, less formal, and looser governing structure like the Executive Committee could 
more easily maneuver the multitude of decisions on the horizon.  One of the participants 
described it as follows: 
“It was good that we didn’t really have to have a real formal organization at the 
beginning.  The Executive Director put the issues on the table, provided guidance 
in dealing with them, and ultimately did most of the work.  The Executive 
Committee was nimble.  We almost always agreed on everything and we did a lot 
very quickly.  We didn’t try to dot all of the “i”s and cross all of the “t”s the very 
first day.  If we had, we would have been distracted because, as we discovered, 
doing that requires a tremendous amount of work.” 
 
Delaying transition to a formal collective governance structure was therefore seen as 
preserving or buffering a much-needed incubation period during which time HathiTrust could 
develop, innovate, and collaborate on the products and services it might offer, and build and test 
a robust supportive infrastructure.   
In addition to concerns around stymieing HathiTrust’s growth and potential, a second 
justification emerged for the small Executive Committee retaining initial control.  Specifically, 
some members of the Committee expressed concern that, if HathiTrust were turned over too 
quickly to the collective, it might make it vulnerable to usurpation by other institutions.  The fear 
was that other powerful institutions might seize the opportunity to assume a dominant role in 
HathiTrust’s emerging governance and undermine the potential for a truly collective, democratic 
governance model.  As one of my participants explained:  
“The question became one of control.  Who is going to get to call the shots?  And 
we knew right from the start that certain institutions, Harvard comes to mind, are 
going to want to control this from the get-go: ‘Either we control it or we don’t 
play.’  That’s an extreme version of Harvard’s position, but that was sort of their 
position.  My guess is that if HathiTrust had been started at Harvard, there would 
not have been discussions about how that institution needed to get out of the way 
for HathiTrust to be successful.  It would have been a Harvard thing from the get-
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go:  ‘We’re Harvard.  Don’t you want to join?’  They wouldn’t try to stop 
HathiTrust but they might withhold membership as their most extreme action.  
But we knew we would get enough people to sign on that it would be a going 
concern and eventually everybody would kind of go along.”  
 
Delaying the transition to collective governance was justified as a way of enabling the 
Executive Committee to safeguard future collectivism against institutions who may seek early 
membership as a way of vesting a controlling interest in the organization. 
Therefore, in order to grow, cultivate, and protect the membership, and have time to “get 
the ball rolling” on the multitude of decisions ranging from the day-to-day operations to defining 
its broader goals, a target date was set, at which time the Executive Committee was pass control 
of HathiTrust over to the collective.  Michigan and Indiana had committed funds to support 
HathiTrust for a period of three years, and thus three years from the date of its official launch, 
HathiTrust’s members would convene for a meeting — a Constitutional Convention — whereby 
the membership would take control of HathiTrust: 
“It was a very loose structure at first, but the idea was always there that, in three 
years, we will have a Constitutional Convention, a date certain by which we 
would come out with a map to a real governance structure, with a governing 
board, bylaws, all of those good things.  This new governing structure for 
HathiTrust would be implemented and the existing controlling structure would 
step back, back away, and say:  ‘You guys take it.’  The Convention would gather 
all of the participants, the supporters, the members of HathiTrust.  By then we will 
have a better idea of cost, what the issues are, and have a better ability to look at 
the kinds of projects that might form around this kind of a collection.” 
 
The Constitutional Convention was therefore envisioned as an organizational rite of 
passage marking HathiTrust’s transition into a full-fledged collective.  Between this initial 
sensemaking and decision-making by the Executive Committee and the Constitutional 
Convention three years later, HathiTrust went through a tremendous period of growth and 
transition which will now be described.   
Emerging Features 
In retrospect, providing access to the HathiTrust collection may seem self-evident, but as 
earlier sections of this thesis explains, the digital corpus largely comprised of the Google Library 
Project scans was initially conceived of as a preservation repository or a dark archive.  Because 
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there was no purported intention to make the scans accessible, the initial design of the 
infrastructure that became HathiTrust was not oriented around facilitating access. 
However, once the instrumental challenge of securely storing the digital scans was 
solved, the attention of HathiTrust’s progenitors quickly turned to questions of access.  As one 
participant described:  
“In the early days, we were really thinking about preservation.  That’s what got 
this going.  Over time, it began to occur to us, the excess power this resource had, 
and we began to build in access as well.”   
 
Beyond preservation, the key uses that emerged from this perceived “excess power” were 
access for non-consumptive research such as full-text search and copyright rights determination, 
improved access for print-disabled patrons, and the beginnings of enhanced access to so-called 
orphan works.  Before describing sensemaking around those emerging uses, this section will 
address some broader issues, challenges, and tensions raised around preservation and access. 
RELATIONSHIP AND TENSION BETWEEN PRESERVATION AND ACCESS 
In the library and archive community, preservation and access are often difficult to parse.  
Practitioners view them as mutually constitutive.  Access is not particularly meaningful if you 
cannot rely on an item being preserved and organized in a way that makes it discoverable and 
useable.  In addition, as one of my participants who is a lead archivist explained:  
“Preservation without access isn't preservation. The idea that somehow you can 
have material locked away and maintained in a pristine form with no access just 
isn't very practical in terms of preservation needs for no other reason than 
repositories aren't gonna wanna spend a lot of money preserving stuff that no one 
can take a look at.” 
 
While, as a matter of librarian and archival practice, preservation and access may be 
functionally entangled, in terms of copyright law, they receive different treatment.  As Chapter II 
described, libraries and archives enjoy specific exemptions around making copies for 
preservation purposes that are explicitly distinct from specific exemptions around making copies 
for lending and patron use.  Once a library makes a lawful copy for preservation purposes, it is 
not obvious what, if any, conditions might trigger lawful access to the copy, which is to suggest 
that while preservation and access may be deeply entangled with respect to social practice, they 
are held separate with respect to copyright law.    
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Nevertheless, once the institutions had safely stored the scans in the shared digital 
repository, new uses and justifications for accessing the scans quickly emerged.  The lead 
architect of a competing digitization effort speculated that the transition from a preservation 
justification to preservation-plus-access justification may have been more deliberate than 
emergent: 
“I'm not saying that HathiTrust’s progenitors are being disingenuous, but if the 
talk focuses on preservation it skirts all sorts of issues that are thorny. You can 
kind of prime a “motherhood and apple pie” perception about what you’re doing 
and you don't have to deal with the other issues. If you're really about 
preservation, then the preservationist wants a physical object — these books that 
were coming out of these libraries were safe and many of them were held in off-
site repositories. So the physical materials were quite safe.” 
 
Reading between the lines a bit, the participant here is problematizing preservation as a 
valid justification for engaging in the digitization of materials for two reasons.  The first reason is 
that the source material, the books, were already well-preserved.  They were not damaged, 
deteriorating, lost or stolen, stored in a format that had become obsolete as §108(c) requires.403  
In addition, many preservationists believed that the Google scans were nowhere close to 
preservation quality.  One of the participants in the study whose institution was an early leader in 
digitization and joined the Google Library Project in 2007 said: 
“We never viewed them as being preservation scans. Michigan always used a 
preservation argument but we never did.  I still don't think the quality of the 
Google scans would meet anyone's standards for preservation access. Certainly 
not the standards we cite.” 
 
Interviews with participants at Michigan suggest that preservation was a key concern not 
necessarily for the specific reasons articulated in the Copyright Act but for a more general reason 
that libraries’ print collections were all dying a slow death from “acid overdose.”  Interestingly, 
digital preservation, rather than preservation of the print collection was also offered as a 
justification:  
“You can’t put all of this money into scanning this stuff and then not store it in a 
way that you don’t lose it.  That’s insane!  So that had to be fixed.”   
 
Preservation as a justification for undertaking the original digitization and preservation as 
a justification for creating the shared digital repository and, later, HathiTrust were being 
                                                 
403 Some of the books were in various states of slow deterioration, “dying from acid” as one librarian put it. 
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conflated.  The conflation might reflect disingenuous motives, as the earlier participant 
suggested.  But it may also reflect the emerging reality that, as a shared digital repository, 
HathiTrust was merging digital content of varying provenance — much of it was scans of public 
domain material generated from their own institutional digitization efforts and/or collaborations 
with the Internet Archive — and merging institutional justifications — many HathiTrust 
members cited digital preservation as a key motivation in joining HathiTrust.    
While speculation as to the sincerity of motivations is a potential concern, an arguably 
more troubling implication is that the Copyright Act’s distinctions between preservation and 
access in §108 are wildly mismatched to the experiences and practices of actual librarians and 
archivists.  Digital technologies make the distinctions between preservation and access even less 
meaningful for libraries and archives, particularly when we consider that access comes in many 
guises which serve distinct purposes.  For example, a human accessing the digitized work to read 
or download it is arguably quite different than uses such as a machine accessing the digitized 
work to index and mine its contents or translate it into a format which a blind or print-disabled 
patron can access.   
These distinctions became triggers for subsequent decision-making by the Executive 
Committee around questions of access.  It didn’t take long before new questions emerged about 
what uses might be legally possible, and socially viable, with respect to the digitized corpus.  
The HathiTrust Executive Committee honed in on the possible ways they facilitate access to 
public domain content and shine a light on the dark archive.  The additional uses that emerged 
with respect to the copyrighted works during this period were non-consumptive uses such as full-
text search and access for copyright determination, and the provision of copies for print-disabled 
patrons.  The University of Michigan began a project that would have provided enhanced access 
to so-called “orphan works” but that project was suspended before any works were actually 
released.   
ACCESS TO PUBLIC DOMAIN CONTENT 
One of the first key milestones in the evolution of HathiTrust was the creation of its 
graphical user interface.  The technical ability to view content gave rise to the (perhaps obvious) 
follow-up question:  “Which content will we provide access to and what kind of access will we 
provide?”   
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The decision to provide access to the digitized public domain materials was 
uncontroversial within the Executive Committee.  Neither the Copyright Act nor the contract 
with Google seemed to forbid HathiTrust from making those materials publicly available on 
HathiTrust.org.  Providing the technical and organizational infrastructure to link preservation and 
access was fairly simple and its implementation was relatively straight-forward.  As a result 
HathiTrust members are able to link to, read, and download the full text of public domain works.  
In addition, members of the general public can read the full text of public domain works and 
have limited download ability (works may be downloaded a few pages at a time).      
Restrictions on the public’s access to digitized public domain content stems from the 
agreements Library Project partners entered into with Google.  These restrictions have and have 
garnered criticism.  Brewster Kahle, the founder of the Internet Archive, has been a particularly 
vocal detractor.  Chief among his complaints are the download restrictions placed on the public 
domain materials which makes it very difficult (perhaps impossible) for non-HathiTrust 
members to conduct non-consumptive research on the corpus:   
“I don’t think organizations and libraries like HathiTrust got the timing right. 
We've got an Internet and the computer technology that allows research to be 
done in a very different way now.  Let's let it happen. In fact, let's not just let it 
happen, let's make it happen.”  
 
In addition, Kahle argues that the public domain works are secured in ways that make 
their content less discoverable by non-Google search engines: “Global search engines are unable 
to crawl and index them in new and different ways and therefore they can’t be referenced and 
pointed to in that style.”  At the very least, says Kahle, the public domain should be opened up 
for machines to read: “Most of the things reading these works are machines, not people.  They’re 
machines!”   
Kahle has communicated his concerns directly to representatives of Google HathiTrust, 
recounting:  
“I have literally, in public, gotten on my knees and begged, hands clasped in front 
of me, in front of Michigan’s Librarian and the head of the Google Library 
Project, and begged them to open the public domain.  Literally.   
 
They said ‘No.’” 
 
When I interviewed Michigan’s Librarian and asked about this interaction, he 
acknowledged Kahle’s account but explained that the restrictions in Google’s contract limit 
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Michigan’s ability to share the scans, even the scans of public domain works.  The contract 
restricts sharing to library consortia and makes it subject to the effective implementation of 
download restrictions.  The Internet Archive does not satisfy either of these requirements.  The 
Librarian concluded by saying: 
“My personal view — and I have no trouble saying this; I've said it in enough 
places so if I haven't been quoted it's because nobody's listening — is that 
Google's view of this was wrongheaded.  They should have just opened up the 
public domain works.  That's still my view.”  
 
Other parties to the contract negotiations with Google reflected that both the agreement 
itself and the subsequent emergence and evolution of HathiTrust were imperfect.  The realities of 
the situation reflect compromise and satisficing but it was a vast improvement over what had 
come before: 
“Is this going to be the best version of this thing that could possibly be? Probably 
not. Is it going to happen now rather than in the distant future? Yeah. Yeah, it can 
if we work on it. So, that's really how it happened.” 
 
Despite its somewhat controversial handling of the public domain, the emerging version 
of HathiTrust — a trusted digital repository with access provisions for public domain works — 
had tremendous appeal to the academic research library community.  Several of the participants 
in this study indicated that if HathiTrust had stopped there, and not moved forward with 
additional forms of access and service, it would have been a tremendous success.  Indeed, 
numerous institutions were prompted to join HathiTrust on this basis alone. 
In December 2010, HathiTrust gained its first member outside of the initial membership 
of the CIC and the University of California.  According to participants at that institution: 
“We joined because we felt it was important, and the opportunity was there. 
HathiTrust was looking to expand membership at that point. We had been partners 
in different mass digitization projects at that point, with Google and Microsoft, 
and we were looking for a means of preserving those works and making the most 
value out of those.  By the time we joined, HathiTrust had moved beyond 
preservation. There really was something to look at and see and use. It wasn't 
simply a dark archive or anything of that nature.  
 
Where the emphasis was still towards preservation was in HathiTrust's design of 
the cost basis for joining. It was still based at that time on the amount of material 
an institution was depositing HathiTrust, so essentially the cost of the storage. At 
that point, what you pay for affects the way you see something as well. So it was 
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still seen at that point within the library community as a preservation repository. 
But it was starting to change. 
 
We did not digitize any of our in-copyright materials, so even if HathiTrust were 
to be sued for copyright infringement, it would not have had a direct negative 
effect directly on us. Of course it could affect us in other ways in terms of 
reputation of the university — how we are seen by our faculty and others — but 
that wasn’t a serious concern to us.” 
 
As additional members joined HathiTrust, they echoed the sentiment that digital 
preservation and access to the public domain were primary drivers: 
“Membership in HathiTrust was appealing because it enhanced our digital 
preservation strategy.  We had a local copy, an Internet Archive copy, and now the 
HathiTrust copy as well.  The Internet Archive offered to transfer its holdings to 
the HathiTrust but not every partner offers to do that.  Membership also provided 
holdings expansion because anyone can have access to the public domain 
materials and anyone can search across the copyrighted materials.  Hathi also 
makes it possible to put a link to the full-text in our catalog and therefore provides 
a very enriching tool, in addition to the three-part preservation strategy.”  
 
Another early HathiTrust member recalled: 
“We joined HathiTrust because we wanted a third, safe place to store our digital 
copies, in addition to the Internet Archive and Google.  All of our scans were in 
the public domain and so HathiTrust gave us easier access to them.  Prior to that 
the only way we could get to them was to link through Google books and while I 
don't think that Google's the Devil, they are a business and make business choices.  
We wanted to make sure that our records were safe and that if we were linking to 
a resource that the resource would be around.” 
 
From the perspective of prospective members, a primary source of HathiTrust’s value 
stemmed from its ability to offer digital preservation and access services related to public domain 
content.  In addition, this quote suggests that its identity as an organization of, by, and for the 
academic research community was also an important factor.   
Relatedly, many members noted the considerable goodwill and enthusiasm for 
HathiTrust’s mission: “To contribute to the common good by collecting, organizing, preserving, 
communicating, and sharing the record of human knowledge.”404  HathiTrust was becoming 
more than a preservation-focused repository to something with a broader vision and purpose, 
                                                 
404 HathiTrust (2011). “HathiTrust Constitutional Convention Meeting Notes,” p. 9, available at 
http://www.hathitrust.org/constitutional_convention2011 
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more closely resembling a digital library.  HathiTrust was becoming a brand.  As one of my 
participants described:    
“It didn’t take long after HathiTrust was born for people to realize that this way 
was much better than continuing down the road of the shared digital repository.  
HathiTrust proved itself hardly before the ink was dry.  We had other libraries 
clamoring to join in.  As new partners came in, it became “the thing.”  What we 
all wanted all along was for HathiTrust to be the digital library for academic 
libraries going into the future and with this many partners joining, we got that 
solidarity and that brand.”   
 
The reconfigurations of HathiTrust were tied into pre-existing social relationships and 
institutional frameworks within the library community.  HathiTrust was developing and evolving 
organically, according to the desires, needs, objectives, and concerns of its stakeholders.  The 
development of HathiTrust and the growth of its constituency were self-affirming and 
reinforcing.  Although formal control resided in the Executive Committee, these aspects of 
development and evolution were already pointing toward its reification as a collective.  As Weick 
and others have described, the development and reification of an organization is embedded in 
social relationships and processes.  In retrospect, the social aspects of organizational 
development can become less visible as they become more fully integrated into our seeing and 
understanding of the organization.  As the social aspects and relationships “tighten” through 
shared sensemaking and collective action, decisions become more predictable, orderly, 
organized, and self-reaffirming.  This process of reification is ultimate a social one that lends 
both form and substance to a developing organization.  In understanding how and why 
HathiTrust developed and evolved during this early period, we should therefore look to social 
factors for guidance.  
HathiTrust’s emergence and evolution shaped and was shaped by the social environment 
in which it operated:  
“Academic librarians know what they know, which is traditional academic 
librarianship. Some of them may be very enlightened and forward looking about 
this, but realistically what they're in the business of doing is academic libraries the 
way they've been done. There was a very strong centripetal force pulling things 
back toward the center.  Even if you got people who were entrepreneurially 
minded, and early adopters, and risk takers and so forth, they were still from the 
library community. So, most of the people who governed the details of how 
HathiTrust developed were mindful of library issues.  They were thinking in terms 
of what academic libraries do, what academic libraries are for.  There were also, 
of course, reinforcing influences from the provosts, the faculty, and the other 
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academic community members who themselves were stakeholders in university 
libraries which were then stakeholders in HathiTrust. So, in terms of what 
HathiTrust would become, it’s just a matter of who's doing it and what their 
values are, what their consciousness is, and what they care about.  The library 
community was very clearly going to be running this, and it did.  I think it's a 
good thing, but it was also an unavoidable thing. 
 
That said, however, the social environment in which HathiTrust operated was not 
homogenous.  Major research libraries such as the University of Toronto and digital library 
alternatives such as the Internet Archive disputed HathiTrust’s emerging characterization as a 
“good thing.”  The perspectives of these participants offer a contrasting view of HathiTrust’s role 
and impact on this broader transforming ecology:  
“The question was:  What were the libraries going to do?  When they went 
completely secret, that was kind of an indication that something strange was 
going on. What we ended up with was HathiTrust which is kind of like a JSTOR: 
it had funding from the Mellon foundation, and JSTOR is financially very 
successful, and it helped lead to the death of Aaron Swartz.  
 
The idea of making a subscription service for libraries is not a very “Google” 
thing to think of.  It is a very “major research library” thing to do.  It comes in the 
tradition of OCLC or JSTOR or RSTOR.  And if you take the big libraries that 
Google was dealing with, it’s not an unnatural outcome. And if you take the 
libraries that didn't go along with Google: Library of Congress, University of 
Toronto, Boston Public Library, they have leadership that are wary of that style 
that is becoming very common in higher education libraries. Higher education 
libraries built Elsevier.  As much as the libraries complain about Elsevier, it only 
exists because those major research libraries funded Elsevier at a phenomenal 
level.  
 
So, where did that come from? The University of Michigan, the University of 
California, and the others didn't have to go and make a centralized system.  It's 
just the kind of thing that those libraries do and I don't think it serves the public.” 
 
Arguably, some of the ways that HathiTrust serves the public was in pushing the 
boundaries of fair use with respect to digital content.  During this formative period in 
HathiTrust’s early history, it undertook several important initiatives, some of which formed the 
basis of the copyright infringement lawsuit discussed in the next chapter.  The following sections 
briefly discuss some of the sensemaking around those initiatives.  
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ACCESS FOR NON-CONSUMPTIVE USES 
In the period between HathiTrust’s launch and the Constitutional Convention, the 
organization (and its members via the organization) undertook several initiatives related to non-
consumptive research.  Three that will be briefly mentioned are the Copyright Review 
Management System (CRMS) project spearheaded by the University of Michigan under a grant 
by the Institute of Museum and Library Services (IMLS), full-text search which was a Hathi-
wide service, and the HathiTrust Research Center which was launched in the spring of 2011 as a 
collaboration of the University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana and Indiana University.  
The CRMS project was undertaken to fill in the massive gaps in copyright determinacy 
resulting from the ad hoc registration and arcane reporting practices of the Copyright Office.  As 
described by the primary investigator on the grant: 
“Through this project we can identify the author death date, and if something is 
old enough, we say that it can be opened, but even if it's not we know when to set 
a trigger for us to be open in the future. We emphasize finding, seeking the public 
domain, but were really emphasizing the idea of copyright determinacy. More 
information is helpful. When we identify a work as being in the public domain, 
that conclusory information is provided to HathiTrust to determine whether 
something will be opened.”  
 
The CRMS project is thus an example of non-consumptive research because the primary 
interest in a work is not the information contained in it, but rather the information about it.  
Furthermore, the copyright review process is one that would be virtually impossible as an 
administrative manner without access to the digital scans: 
“A few other institutions have tried small-scale copyright rights determination 
pilot projects without HathiTrust, pulling the books by hand, and it's basically 
impossible to do that work, even on a small scale. You need some kind of 
interface and access to the digital scans to be able to do this work.” 
 
As described by another librarian involved in the project: 
 
“It would not be possible to do the work, copyright rights determination work, as 
an administrative matter unless we have the reviewers having collective access to 
the scans that are in the HathiTrust. The fact that there is this collection, this 
cross-institutional collection that, with appropriate security procedures, we can 
make reviews efficiently because of the scans rather than pulling individual 
books. It allows for a high level of efficiency and it also allows us to have 
documentation of each of the reviews, and we know that remote reviewers, 
because of the double-blind process, to different people at different places will 
randomly review the same assigned work, we couldn't do it unless there was 
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something like HathiTrust, some mechanism for sharing the scans in the same 
system. We couldn't have that level of administrative possibility and consistency. 
The HathiTrust framework and collection allows for us to do more work because, 
if we didn't have that tool, we would be doing this by hand, or frankly not at all 
because it's not feasible.” 
 
The CRMS project was initiated by Michigan in 2007, prior to HathiTrust’s official 
launch.  As it proceeded, the project continued to be a Michigan initiative but it arguably 
benefitted the other HathiTrust members and the general public as works that were determined to 
have entered the public domain and/or information enabling a trigger date for future transition to 
the public domain were set.  This project also set an important progressive precedent for 
subsequent projects.  As the operations manager of HathiTrust noted:   
“Getting the Copyright Review Management System operational was a big deal 
because when that went into production the scans became something besides just 
a big block of dark stuff that we can't do anything with. There is really something 
there. It's malleable. You can flip the switch from closed to open and I think that is 
a huge part of what we're doing — to enable the greatest access to these materials, 
and different kinds of access.” 
 
The CRMS project was simultaneously serving an important social function, but 
investigating facts about protected works to build the fount of public knowledge and, in some 
cases, access.  But it also highlighted the striking insufficiencies in the way that the Copyright 
Office managed and communicated basic information about protected works.  In a shocking 
number of instances, works remained underutilized simply because basic information about 
author death dates and location of first publication was both crucial (in terms of copyright 
determinacy) and incredibly difficult to acquire.  Therefore, while performing a significant 
substantive function, the CRMS project also highlighted just how big the problem is.   
To manage the scope of the problem, participants intended to create a review process that 
was distributed amongst various partner institutions.  One of the mechanisms they were working 
on to facilitate a distributed CRMS was “toolkit:”  
One of the things that we’re trying to do is create a toolkit that other partner 
institutions can use to do their own rights determinations.  So we're creating and 
vetting the methodology that other institutions can adopt to help share the work 
that way.  Earlier in this project I thought that we could develop these toolkits and 
make it completely distributed and everybody could do their piece but I think to 
do this responsibly you actually need to have a committed investment somewhere; 
there needs to be a committed home. 
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At least for now, that home is the University of Michigan. 
Another challenge for the project has been its incomplete or underutilized record-keeping 
and communication practices.  As it currently stands, all records and documentation from the 
project are held solely by the University of Michigan.  An unintended consequence is that it 
makes tracing the impact of the project very difficult because there is no visible marker on works 
in HathiTrust that shows that the work has gone through the rights review process.  As the 
principal investigator describes: 
“We don't actually know who is using these works, how many people are using 
them, or how they're getting used.  When people use works that were opened by 
virtue of the copyright rights determination process, they're not aware of that 
because there's not a mark on the record that says it was reviewed. I'd really like 
to have records that indicate that something was reviewed even if it's closed so 
that people are aware and they don't ask us again, but also so that there's 
recognition in the value of the review being done.” 
 
It is far more difficult to demonstrate and communicate the value of the CRMS project to 
those not involved when there are not these digital breadcrumbs or traces that can be followed.  
Works that have gone through the rights determination process are not marked as such. 
Another early form of non-consumptive use was full-text.  The digitized content was 
OCRed and indexed which made the full-text of the entire corpus searchable.  As described by 
HathiTrust’s day-to-day manager, establishing full-text search was a huge milestone because it 
distinguished HathiTrust from most other library catalogs whose search returns basic 
bibliographic information about a work:  
“It becomes the sort of living breathing thing where you can search for the name 
of your grandfather or grandmother and get results and find out information about 
them.”  
 
In terms of sensemaking about adding full-text search functionality, one of the 
participants in that decision described the situation as follows: 
“We created a shared repository that was partitioned into fire-walled chunks that 
each institution could, under the “dark archive” doctrine, dump their stuff into.  
And then there was a second layer of discussion which had to do with fair use and 
the sentiment was that stuff about the stuff is fair use. So the number of instances 
of the word 'dog' across the HathiTrust corpus could not be copyrighted. It could 
be copyrighted if somebody wrote something about it, but the copyright holders 
on the documents couldn't say ‘You can't look at my instance of dog and count it.’  
Of course you can take that to a fuzzy point but that was part of the process of 
changing in the law and social understanding and so forth.  It was pretty clear that 
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text analysis was going to be possible against this corpus and the limits of this 
were not clear, but most of the low-hanging fruit and immediate stuff was clear 
enough that people who knew about this weren't worried about it.” 
 
Again, the sensemaking reflected in this justification references expectations around 
copyright but does not necessarily reflect a strict doctrinal understanding of the law.  Copyright 
infringement does not require that the infringing use result in a protectable work, e.g. that the 
number of instances of the word ‘dog’ be copyrighted.  Rather, copyright is a strict liability tort 
and fair use functions to make otherwise infringing uses non-infringing.  The adjudication of 
full-text search is addressed in more detail in Chapter VIII of this thesis.   
The last example of non-consumptive use I will mention here stems from the launch of 
the HathiTrust Research Center (HTRC) in April, 2011.  A service jointly offered by the 
University of Illinois and Indiana University, the HTRC aims to support computational non-
consumptive research across the corpus for educational purposes.  
“HathiTrust assembled a working group to develop a call for proposals for the 
research center, a request for proposals, and Indiana and Illinois submitted a 
proposal for that; faculty of those institutions submitted the proposal. They 
wanted to establish this research center so that is what they've done. It still got 
quite a ways to go, but the way it works is that faculty request data sets and so 
forth from HathiTrust. We distribute data sets, the research center has all the 
materials at least those right now that are in the public domain, and they offer 
access to it in an enclosed environment.” 
 
In terms of the evolution of HathiTrust, it was important to the Executive Committee to 
take advantage of the affordances of HathiTrust’s status as an academic organization and “push 
into a new service model around what had started out as a preservation model.”  The contract 
with Google was somewhat constraining in terms of supporting computational research, but so 
long as HTRC could institute mechanisms to vet projects for their academic research potential, 
the contract would not be prohibitive.   
“The establishment of the HathiTrust Research Center was an incredibly 
important milestone because it showed that not only do we offer the basic level of 
access to what we have, but we enable new kinds of research.  In thinking about 
the future of HathiTrust, it means a lot to know that were in that space, were in 
that direction of cutting edge research, and enabling new uses. If we were just a 
static collection, we gathered the stuff and you could click through it, it would be 
fantastic, but it makes it a whole different level to have that research center, that 
research component. 
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But, the research center is still trying to figure out its role.  Some research has 
been done, but I don't think that it has exploded to the point that you might 
anticipate in the future.” 
 
One of the participants in this study described an incredibly frustrating and disappointing 
experience of a faculty member who was attempting to do basic metadata text mining of the 
corpus.  Ultimately, employees at Indiana University stepped in to provide helpful assistance but 
the participant was left with the following impression: 
My theory is that HathiTrust has a great brand with worldwide recognition and 
cachet, but underneath it's not a highly sophisticated technology infrastructure. It's 
trying to evolve into something else and it's not there.” 
ACCESS FOR PRINT-DISABLED PATRONS 
The University of Michigan was an early leader in digitizing works for purposes of 
making them available to print-disabled patrons.  It had been engaging in this activity prior to the 
Google Library Project.  Participants reflected that accessibility was a long-standing important 
issue for the library and was a driving force behind digitization efforts. 
When HathiTrust was launched, Michigan imported its policies on accessibility to 
HathiTrust which, in turn, became the instrument for “serving the works up to other institutions” 
for use in the provision of services for print-disabled patrons.  As one participant from Michigan 
noted, “HathiTrust is where we store our stuff, so that's where we get it from to provide this 
service, but Michigan is doing it.  HathiTrust was sort of incidental to Michigan.”  
In terms of the broader academic research library community, access for print-disabled 
patrons was not a priority: 
 “It wasn't an issue that was being discussed within the community as a whole, at 
conferences and other things like that. It wasn’t a driving force for digitization.  It 
was very much a follow-on to digitization rather than a driving force.  It was one 
of the purposes we came to figure out after the fact. Now that we've got all the 
scans, what are the other uses we can make of them?  Access for the print-
disabled emerged as a good option after the fact.” 
 
Member institutions are able to opt in to the service and a number of institutions have 
taken advantage of the service.  Overall, response to the program has been nearly uniformly 
positive.  One participant commended “Michigan's really wonderful work for increasing the 
access for individuals with reading disabilities.”  Another remarked that one program was, in his 
view, one of the most revolutionary aspects of HathiTrust: 
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“What I think was really revolutionary is access for the print disabled.  Doing 
something like this hadn't occurred to me until HathiTrust implemented it. But, 
boy, what a game changer that is!  Rather than having to get a book, and take it to 
a special office on campus, and have them put it on Kurt's file machine, and have 
it show up a week or two weeks later … to suddenly to be able to have access to 
11 million volumes within a day or two, and not being restricted in what you're 
reading, that is a real groundbreaker.” 
 
The program for print-disabled patrons has had a positive impact on accessibility issues 
more broadly.  In recent years, for example, the Internet Archive has been actively digitizing 
current books and making them available to the blind and dyslexic.  Kahle notes:  
“We’re taking books that were published in the twentieth century and lending 
them and there hasn't really been a problem with that because we’re nonprofit, 
and libraries are nonprofit, and these books are all by and large not very easy to 
obtain.” 
 
ACCESS TO ORPHAN WORKS 
The third category of access which HathiTrust pursued during this time dealt with so-
called orphan works — works that are in-copyright but the rightsholder(s) are unidentifiable, 
indeterminate, or uncontactable.  Again, using HathiTrust as an instrument for cross-institutional 
collaboration, Michigan and a number of HathiTrust members partnered on the Orphan Works 
Project which launched in April, 2011. 
This was another initiative that was largely advanced by Michigan and there was some 
speculation that the timing of the Orphan Works Project may have been expedited in light of the 
Constitutional Convention scheduled for later that fall, 2011.  One participant recalls the 
Executive Committee and Michigan’s General Counsel’s Office deciding: 
"Yeah, this is one of the things HathiTrust is going to do. Let's go ahead and get 
this in place because once the new control structure is in place they might be too 
conservative to do this. And we think this is something they need to do."  
 
Given the fact that Michigan attracted a few other partners on the Project, it may not have 
seemed as contentious as the just-quoted participant feared.  In fact, one of Michigan’s early 
partners reflected almost nonchalantly on the decision to tackle orphan works: 
“When the Orphan Works Project came along, we said, ‘Yeah. That sounds pretty 
neat. Let's try doing that as an experiment.’ And that's why we joined on with that.  
There were four or five schools that said that they would participate in the Orphan 
Works Project.” 
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As a consequence of the lawsuit discussed in the next chapter, the Project was suspended 
before digital access was actually granted to any of the purported orphan works.  It was therefore 
significant as a possible trigger for the lawsuit.  In addition, the Orphan Works Project was 
significant in terms of how it foregrounds tensions between copyright law and social practice and 
problematizes sensemaking around initiatives that push the boundaries of access with respect to 
in-copyright works. 
By all accounts the Orphan Works Project emerged from the digitization project rather 
than being a driving force in digitization.  As one of the lead architects of the Project describes:    
“When we started thinking about what fair uses we might make of the scans, 
orphan works stand out as a putatively significant body of materials. For me there 
was a sense of the need to push the question. There is a large body materials in 
copyright but a significant percentage of it has no associated rightsholder.  As a 
consequence we end up squandering a significant resource with copyright 
protection.” 
 
There was very little data or first-hand experience on how significant the body of orphans 
might be.  So, a number of pilot orphan works investigations were undertaken.  For example, one 
participant recalled an investigation involving a book published by the University of Michigan 
Press in 1960 called The Age of Attila: Fifth-Century Byzantium and the Barbarians:405 (Figure 
16) 
 
 
                                                 
405 http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/000538413  
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Figure 16.  Cover of “The Age of Attila,” C.D. Gordon, 
 
“There was a book, I think it was called The Age of Attila. It has some relevance 
today for classical studies but it was never a big earner and will never become a 
big earner. And so we said we want to put it back in print. We have a scholar who 
wants to make some editorial changes, and the contract gives you some 
percentage of the royalties, which we would honor. We put the 1956 book online 
with a Creative Commons license and the rightsholder said ‘yes’ without any 
hesitation. I think we all believe that most scholars are interested in their 
scholarship being shared rather than profiting significantly.” 
 
In terms of copyright policy, the Orphan Works Project seemed to make a lot of sense.  
Presumably if rightsholders really cared about their exclusive rights they would not make 
themselves so difficult to discover, seek permission from, or pay royalties to.  In the above 
example, the rightsholder ended up being fairly easy to track down, in part because copyright in 
the work had been renewed and thus the provenance was easier to trace.  In many instances, 
however, rightsholders are far more difficult to discover.  Unfortunately, the Copyright Act is 
indifferent to the difficulty or ease with which a rightsholder might be identifiable or locatable.  
The onus is entirely on the user; rightsholders are free to be as visible or invisible, attentive or 
inattentive, as they wish.    
One of the participants in the Orphan Works Project provided the following telling 
anecdote about the on-the-ground realities of identifying rightsholders: 
“One of my last experiences before the Orphan Works Project was canceled was 
at the print house where we were going to republish a work whose copyright had 
been renewed.  And I will say that the press had a very cavalier attitude about this. 
No contact had been had with the rightsholder for decades and therefore we didn't 
need to worry about the terms of the contract. And I insisted that we pull out all 
the stops to try to find the author's heirs. We went through obituary statements in 
local newspapers and found that the person had moved around Canada and 
ultimately that his heirs were predominantly in Western Canada.  Some church 
announcement or something like that led to finding the son who told us that the 
wife was still alive and we put it all together. It took easily in excess of 100 work 
hours, over three months, to locate the rightsholder but we did, and the heirs were 
pleased to see the work be made available openly online. It was hard and yet 
ultimately possible to locate the rightsholders.” 
 
This anecdote suggests that if enough resources are thrown at the question, the 
rightsholder will ultimately be discoverable. “It may be a very hard problem, but it's ultimately a 
doable problem.”  
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As a practical matter, it is not feasible for libraries to spend hundreds of hours tracking 
down absentee rightsholders in a single work that probably has a very limited potential audience.  
Therefore, participants in the Orphan Works Project turned their attention toward developing 
reasonable mechanisms and processes for vetting potential orphans and defining standards of due 
diligence with respect to the search process.  As it turned out, this was not an easy task.  A 
participant involved in managing the day-to-day operations of the project described its basic 
inner-workings and speculates as to its unfortunate downfall: 
“The Orphan Works Project design was reasonable.  We planned to undertake a 
search with due diligence and once we made a determination we would publicize 
the hell out of that determination and give rightsholders an opportunity to come 
forward. I think the design was right, but it is very hard to find true orphans and 
we made a lot of mistakes. I'm not sure what the cause of the mistakes was. I 
think our answer was to spend more time on the determinations and I'm not sure 
that more time is necessarily the right answer.  
 
If we had not made so many glaring mistakes in the beginning — mistakes 
resulting from carelessness on the part of those conducting and reporting the 
search — it might've been a good experiment to test the publicity piece of things. 
If we had been able to secure cooperation from publishers and authors, the same 
thing I think would be true.” 
 
 On paper, the process was reasonable.  A diligent search would be undertaken; if no 
rightsholder could be identified, the library would publish the work on a title of potential orphan 
works and provide a window of time (perhaps a couple months) for a rightsholder to come 
forward; if a rightsholder came forward, the work would no longer be considered an orphan; if 
no rightsholder came forward, an electronic copy of the work would be made accessible to an 
authorized UM user.  The number of print copies in the collection would determine the number 
of simultaneous users of the electronic copy so that if the library held two print copies of a work, 
two authorized UM users could access the electronic copy at any given time.  According to the 
lead project manager, the failure of the Project was that, in its initial stages, several works were 
included on the orphan works list which were obviously not orphan works.  Even though those 
works were quickly removed from the list (demonstrating that the notice and takedown process 
was indeed effective), these initial “careless” mistakes cast doubt over the entire Project and 
raised the ire over some publishers and authors’ advocacy groups. 
 Other participants in the project took expressed a somewhat more dismal perspective on 
the orphan works challenge:   
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“For me, part of the challenge with orphan works is I don't think that there's a way 
to define due diligence. I like to think that we would know it when we see it, but 
it's always possible to second-guess somebody.  I don’t think that we can ever 
come to a common understanding of what due diligence is, in a measurable way 
that would be satisfactory to everybody.  I think the Orphan Works Project failed 
because we never grew comfortable with our process. It never engendered the 
kind of confidence that we felt we needed to have a go forward. It wasn't because 
of the lawsuit, it was because we had a loss of confidence in the process. I'm not 
sure what a reasonable level of risk would be.”    
 
Others argued that the focus on orphans was entirely wrong because, as the earlier-
described anecdotal experiences demonstrate, in reality, that while there may be a lot of absentee 
rightsholders, there are few-to-zero true orphans.  One participant suggested that the focus 
should have been on rights determinacy rather than orphans: 
“Ultimately, I think that the issue is not about orphans, it's about documentation. I 
spent a lot of time trying to convince the legal advisory group and then HathiTrust 
leadership that we needed to build the Book Rights Registry, taking the 
information that we had gathered in the copyright determination process as the 
starting place and then, for the works that we had determined to be in-copyright, 
work to bear down and those and get to the point where we could say ‘this is the 
rightsholder and it is a publisher and it has been identified’ or ‘she is an author 
and she has been identified’ and ‘this is the contact information for the 
rightsholder’ or ‘no one has been able to determine whether this person or their 
heirs exist.’  In other words, to document those things and to search for that 
information. And I think at the end of that process you end up with orphans but 
you don't start out trying to find orphans.  
 
This is the conclusion that I came to after going through the orphan works project 
and I think that this is still very important and worthy work that we ought to 
undertake.  I still believe and advocate for the HathiTrust Book Rights Registry, 
that we should try to document rightsholders.  It's not about finding the public 
domain, it's about fleshing out the picture of copyright. It's not about finding 
orphan works, it's about finding rightsholders and sometimes not finding 
rightsholders and sharing that information with others. That's the goal. And by 
doing that, we have a much better picture of what the publishing and copyright 
terrain is. Popular representations about works created between 1923 and 1963 is 
that only 15% of that is still in copyright. Over the course of the CRMS project 
65% of the materials were found to be in the public domain and something like 
30% or 40% were found certainly to be in copyright. And those facts I think ought 
to shape the conversation. But you can still find stuff on the web that says that, 
people who make money have a business around that kind of thing.  The 
conversation about orphan works, out-of-print works, and the public domain 
could be a more productive conversation if we have those facts.” 
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In essence, the Book Rights Registry proposed by this participant is an attempt to 
retrospectively fill in the gaps that are left by the United States decision to forgo formalities 
requirements. What the whole orphan works discussion and Book Rights Registry project would 
do is provide documentation were documentation doesn't exist.  As one of the participants said: 
“I think the formalities could and should provide that kind of documentation.”  However, given 
that the United States is obligated under a multi-national agreement called the Berne Convention 
to abandon formalities requirements, it is doubtful that reforms to the Act will include 
formalities. 
Another participant suggested that the focus should not have been on so-called orphan 
works, but on out-of-print works.   
“I think that is the fundamental issue is that I'd rather not have this be about 
orphans.  I'd rather have it be about the original framers’ understanding of 
copyright.  If there is no market harm because the works are out-of-print then how 
does keeping a body of materials locked away advance what is phrased as the 
science and the useful arts?  We should focus our attention instead on developing 
a way to be smart about determining what is in-print and on the market.  And if 
some publisher says: ‘I don't like that, I'm going to put this 1973 work back into 
print, or make available for sale’ there should be mechanisms that recognize that 
and turn off access. I think that would shift the focus to whether these books are 
meaningfully on the market, but I'd rather have that problem the current one. 
 
I feel like I found a pessimistic space about this but I'm not at all 
pessimistic. I think that the mistake that we made is to make it about orphans. And 
I think that the right conversation is about facts, is about determining facts, and 
about reasonable uses of the material and if we knew that there were 3 million 
books that were in copyright, and we knew that 95% of them were not on the 
market, that you could have a very good conversation about that regardless of 
whether their orphans or not.” 
  
Ultimately, the Orphan Works Project never got off the ground because when the 
copyright infringement lawsuit was filed in the fall of 2011, Michigan made the decision to 
indefinitely suspend the Project.  Even now that the lawsuit against HathiTrust has been 
resolved, there is little hope that the Project will be resumed.  For many in the library 
community, the brief experiment that was the Orphan Works Project was perhaps HathiTrust’s 
greatest tragedy to date:  “I think that the Orphan Works Project was great. But I think it was 
rushed and I think that it set everybody back. And I'm in this for the long haul. It's a war not a 
battle.”  As the next chapter explains, even though HathiTrust successfully defended its lawsuit, 
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because the court dismissed the claims based on the Orphan Works Project and thus the Project 
was never adjudicated, we might never know how the orphan works story might have gone 
differently. 
Constitutional Convention 
The Constitutional Convention was one of the major milestones in HathiTrust’s 
evolution.  It marked the transition of control from the initial progenitors of HathiTrust to the 
broader collective membership.  HathiTrust had been chartered by the founding partners for an 
initial five-year term: 2008 – 2012.  As previously mentioned, the Constitutional Convention had 
been planned from the outset of HathiTrust as an event to take place in the third year.  It was 
intended that members would come together to conduct a formal review of governance and 
sustainability.  In the words of one of HathiTrust’s lead architects:  
“We knew that HathiTrust would grow and that in a few years we would need to 
reevaluate everything — see how everything was going and see what other 
structures were needed for governing it and guiding its development into the 
future.” 
 
The Constitutional Convention was the turning point where HathiTrust went from a very 
small, relatively homogenous organization in terms of its membership, to a much broader 
membership in terms of both numbers of members and the range of institutions involved. 
Institutions who joined HathiTrust by October 31, 2010, were permitted to participate in the 
Constitutional Convention.  The result of this timeline was that HathiTrust experienced a 
tremendous upsurge in membership leading up to the fall of 2010 as institutions sought to secure 
their place as participants in the Convention: 
The manager of HathiTrust’s day-to-day operations commented:  
“The convention was a very big thing for us. There are a lot of institutions that 
joined in order to be part of the convention. They realize that in order to have a 
voice in this huge initiative that was going on, they needed to be a member, and 
they wanted to be at the table. So we went from 23 partners to 52 partners at the 
constitutional convention. It was a critical mass of institutional partners that were 
interested in making a long-term commitment to this effort.”  
 
The meeting took place the following year in Washington, D.C., October 8-9, 2011.  The 
meeting notes of the Convention, as well as the data generated from in-depth interviews with 
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participants, offer a richly detailed account of the process and outcomes during this pivotal 
period in HathiTrust’s transition.  
The overall tenor of the meeting, if one can be distilled, was that the membership 
communicated a tremendous amount of reverence and gratitude for HathiTrust founders and took 
on the mantle of directing its future course with enthusiasm and lively optimism.  For example, 
comments from participants included the following:   
“When we had the constitutional convention, it was not a rebellion of the 
membership, it was praise for the original group and acknowledgment that we 
needed to find a way to go forward.  And elections took place the next year.”  
 
And: 
 
“It was just alive. It was really exciting. I'm sure some people didn't like it, but I 
thought, but how often do you get a chance to just kind of feel like you are at the 
beginning of something?” 
 
And: 
 
“What was exciting about the constitutional convention is that it was so 
democratic. We started talking about projects that were important — digitizing 
government documents and those kinds of things and coalitions were being 
formed around to support it. It reminded me of the presidential conventions on 
television in the 1950s when I was a child. They weren’t all orchestrated.  You 
didn't know who the winner was at the beginning of the convention.  And so you 
had people running around, prophesizing here, pulling these people together — 
we are really interested in government docs, if you vote for this will vote for that.  
It was very lively and a lot of good ideas came out of it.  And we did come away 
with agreements as to what the governance structure would be, how much time 
before we would form the board, and that sort of thing. And John Wilkin, the 
Executive Director, he really was the mainstay. When you've got one person who 
lives, eats, and breathes it, which he did, and had just a core of wonderful people 
around him. We could all sit back and say, ‘Oh, thank you for doing that!’  I think 
the fact that we were able to see that transition in leadership happen speaks very 
well of the strength of the HathiTrust.”  
 
And: 
 
“The people who came up with HathiTrust and were involved in its founding 
deserve tremendous credit. They were the ones who took what might have been 
just another Google project and turned it into something that has a different focus 
and a different vision.” 
 
And: 
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“The Constitutional Convention was an excellent success. There were ballots, and 
motions from the floor, and people rose to object. There were 150 people in the 
room and that was really when HathiTrust moved into collectivist ownership.” 
 
And: 
“This is also where the vision changed of HathiTrust as a place to put your 
content and preserve it, as a place that serves research and scholarship in other 
ways as well, a shift from a preservation agency to a content repository. And then 
into other things as well.” 
 
The “other things” alluded to in that last quotation were, in large measure, represented in 
the ballot proposals submitted by and for HathiTrust’s membership.  The Convention consisted 
of a series of sessions attended by delegates from each partner institution and consortium. The 
sessions were designed to consider the ballot proposals submitted by partner institutions, 
allowing for amendments to proposals, and culminating in a final vote by partners.    
In terms of how votes were allocated, each partnering institution was allocated a certain 
number of votes that it could cast for the proposals based on a formulation that considered the 
member’s financial contribution and contribution of digital content.  HathiTrust published a 
paper and an accompanying table outlining the vote weighing process.406  In anticipation of the 
Constitutional Convention, the HathiTrust Executive Committee requested the University of 
Michigan to conduct research into effective multiparty weighting models, paying special 
attention to factors including the level of investment in the enterprise, such as duration of 
participation, role in establishing HathiTrust, the number of volumes contributed, and financial 
contributions. As a result of this research and subsequent Executive Committee discussions, a 
voting model emerged that based on financial contributions (excluding resources-in-kind) and 
volumes in the repository.407  The allocations have been normalized to represent a percentage of 
100 total votes, and have been rounded to the nearest whole number. Allocations that came to 
less than 1% of the total were rounded up to ensure that the smaller contributors have a single 
vote. 
Partners were permitted to submit proposals on any topics, in any areas, prior to the 
convention. As a result, the following seven ballot proposals were considered, amended, and 
                                                 
406 HathiTrust.org. 
407 Institutions’ voting allocation is based on the sum of the square roots of the institutions monetary contributions 
and deposited volumes. 
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voted on at the convention.  Five proposals were passed, one was rejected, and one was referred 
to the HathiTrust Board of Governors: 
1. HathiTrust Distributed Print Monographs Archive Proposal 
a. Proposes establishment of a distributed print archive of monographic holdings 
corresponding to volumes represented within HathiTrust that is collectively 
supported by the HathiTrust membership. 
b. Submittor(s): HathiTrust Executive Committee, California Digital Library, 
University of California – Los Angeles, University of Michigan, Northwestern 
University, University of Illinois – Urbana-Champaign, New York Public Library, 
Columbia University. 
c. Vote:  PASSED 
d. “Libraries are running out of space in a lot of places so it would be very nice to 
say, ‘Okay, I don’t need to have this material from 1920-1940, people aren’t using 
it, I think I’m going to store that and I will count on the HathiTrust digital copy 
rather than the print copy.’”   
2. Approval process for development initiatives by HathiTrust partner organizations 
a. A proposal for HathiTrust to formalize a transparent process for inviting, 
evaluating, ranking, and launching development initiatives from HathiTrust 
partner institutions. 
b. Submittor(s):  Cornell University, Columbia University. 
c. Vote:  PASSED 
d. “I just asked whether HathiTrust is in the business of archiving and curating data. 
He said, ‘No. I wish they were and they should get into this, but this is not 
something that most of the members want to do.’ I was like, ‘Okay, if they don't 
wanna do it, they don't wanna do it.’ I'm no longer making policy.” 
3. Governance 
a. A proposal to establish an effective governance structure. 
b. Submittor(s): CIC University Librarians. 
c. Vote: PASSED 
d. “At the Convention, one of the proposals was about establishing a new governing 
structure for HathiTrust that would be inclusive and representative of the larger 
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membership that had formed. And that governing structure — it's been a couple of 
years in the forming and solidifying and everything — but that has been a huge 
thing. To be able to say that, with this large constituency, we have a governing 
structure that allows institutions to participate and have a say, that's been a really 
key moment for us going forward.” 
4. Expanded coverage and enhanced access to U.S. government documents 
a. U.S. federal documents represent a significant resource for research and 
education.  The CIC’s initiative to digitize a comprehensive corpus of print 
documents is making significant headway, but an expanded effort is proposed.  
Further, problems with cataloging records and basic metadata do not provide 
sufficiently robust discovery to these complex resources. 
b. Submittor(s): CIC University Librarians. 
c. Vote: PASSSED 
d. “One plan is to create a complete digital copy of the federal legacy government 
documents with complete location information to facilitate getting a printed copy. 
One of the reasons we proposed this was Google took a very, very conservative 
view of rights around government publications. We thought we, as an academic 
group, would be fully within our rights to make those available. And we were 
willing to take that chance.” 
5. Mission and goals 
a. A proposal to broaden the stated mission of HathiTrust 
b. Submittor(s): CIC member universities as represented by their University 
Librarians. 
c. Vote:  Referred to Board of Governors  
d. “I remember at the Constitutional Convention, I raised my hand and said ‘I’m 
kind of puzzled. Is HathiTrust a preservation tool or an access tool?’ And now it’s 
clear: access — legal access with full respect of legal rights — is a main part of 
the mission.” 
6. HathiTrust implementation review committee 
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a. A proposal to create a HathiTrust committee to review the implications and 
applicability of services, policies, and procedures developed by its members 
before they are adopted by HathiTrust as a community service. 
b. Submittor(s): Cornell University, Columbia University, University of California. 
c. Vote:  NOT PASSED 
7. HathiTrust fee-for-service content deposit 
a. A proposal for HathiTrust to have a fee-for-service model to allow contribution of 
content from non-partner entities. 
b. Submittor(s):  University of Michigan 
c. Vote:  PASSED   
Through the Constitutional Convention, HathiTrust’s progenitors gave the organization 
over to its collective membership.  One of the ballot proposals in particular — proposal one 
which deals with the creation of a distributed print monographs digital archive — represented an 
important culmination and sort of implicit send-off from HathiTrust’s lead architect to the 
collective.    
“We have a shared responsibility for the print record and we don't have a very 
strong sense of how our collections align with each other and how that print 
record is represented in, say, the ARL's, the big research libraries. If we do this 
inductively, we start with a major body of material like the Michigan collection or 
what HathiTrust became, you can turn to the overlap analysis and see how our 
collections are embodied in it, or not embodied in it, and both of those things are 
helpful in addressing the shared responsibility. So right now were at a median rate 
of overlap of somewhere around 55%. That is to say any ARL library can find 
55% of its collection online in HathiTrust. From there we can begin to look at our 
print storage responsibilities in a way that is about the whole of our action, about 
our action spread across institutions. There is a shared print storage facility called 
ReCAP, the Princeton Columbia New York Public Library storage facility in New 
Jersey, and it was a very high-quality storage facility under one leadership, with 
three disparate, uncoordinated, storage strategies. What each institution put in was 
addressing the needs of each institution. And so maybe the same volume for each 
of the three institutions was put in. Once we started having conversations about 
HathiTrust with those institutions, and they committed to coming in, they changed 
it, and started thinking about their collection as a whole. Driving down costs by 
having one copy, or two copies, or whatever they thought was the most sensible 
thing, rather than having the uncoordinated strategy. They started moving in a 
coordinated direction. We know that this is a possibility for all of our institutions. 
We do it now with West for journals. The CIC Shared Repository is another 
example. We now think much more collectively about our collections. And the 
ballot initiative at the Constitutional Convention around shared prints monographs 
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is going forward with the same assumption, that we can coordinate our activities 
more effectively, save money, and do a better job of preserving the print record.” 
 
In interviewing HathiTrust’s lead architect — the person responsible for inserting §4.4.2 
into the UM-Google, for spearheading the innovative deviance that got the CIC and UC to back 
the shared digital repository, the person who served as HathiTrust’s Executive Director during its 
first several years — it became clear that the digital corpus was, in his mind, primarily useful as 
a way to leverage collective action around the collective collection.  Passage of the distributed 
print management system proposal was the clearest reflection of his own vision of success.  
Of course, collective action was reflected also in Constitutional Convention more 
generally.  HathiTrust’s partners were able to identify what the main priorities of the organization 
would be moving forward, and make important decisions about its vision, trajectory, and 
governance.  But, as one of the participant said, “We knew we wouldn't get it all done right away 
because we needed to get the governing structure together.”  One of the key pieces of governing 
structure that emerged was the Program Steering Committee which empowered a small subset of 
representatives to move forward with some of the initiatives that were voted upon: “We needed a 
group to apportion this work and so forth, and now that there’s a working group things have 
moved along really quickly.” 
Conclusion 
In addition to being a major milestone in the evolution of HathiTrust, the Constitutional 
Convention also proved to be a deeply empowering and positive experience for HathiTrust’s 
members and reflected a process of reification whereby HathiTrust continued to become real. 
Tying this back to the sensemaking literature, the evolution of HathiTrust from its launch 
to its transition to a collective organization reflects patterns that are common to organizational 
sensemaking and reification.  As Weick argues, one of the ways sensemaking (an essentially 
social process) becomes visible is through the justifications offered for behavioral commitments.  
These justifications often “reify social structure” by linking micro-behavioral commitments to 
macro social consequences.  In other words, while people commit to and coordinate instrumental 
acts before they worry about shared goals, shared goals emerge as people search for reasons that 
justify the earlier behavioral commitments.  This occurs through a process of shared committed 
interpretations.  Applied to HathiTrust, we can see how HathiTrust went from being a technical 
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solution to an instrumental problem to being a complex values-oriented and goal-oriented 
collectivist organization through emerging, continuously refined, shared interpretations about 
what HathiTrust “means.”    
Reifications that justify social commitment tend to set up expectations that operate like 
self-fulfilling prophecies and efforts to validate the social justifications tend to spread them to 
other actors.  When this occurs, the social relational aspects of sensemaking, through the process 
of reification, can generate collectivity.  “That action initially explained by reification soon 
generates the reality that replaces the reification with substance.”408  Reification of a collectivity 
can become a mechanism for justifying commitment, essentially flipping the earlier sensemaking 
process on its head.  “Having become bound to interdependent action, a person might invoke 
macro sources of micro-constraints as in, for example, ‘that’s the way we do things in this 
culture.’”409   We see signs of this in the reflections of HathiTrust’s members as they take 
collective ownership of the organization through the Constitutional Convention. 
The Constitutional Convention was a milestone and a new starting point in HathiTrust’s 
continuing evolution.  Its function as a rite of passage echoes Weick’s observations that 
“reification is an initial move in an extended chain of validating actions, many of which lend 
substance to what originally was a mere presumption of social structure.”410  Presumptions taken 
seriously often become self-validating.411  The Convention marked one more big step in the 
academic research library community taking ownership of HathiTrust as the thing that they made 
for themselves.  
The meeting was really a rite of passage that formally transitioned power from 
HathiTrust’s progenitors and founders to its broader, increasingly numerous and diverse, 
membership.  The Convention sparked specific initiatives and solidified shared expectations and 
visions for what HathiTrust might become and strengthened its social and organizational 
infrastructure.  One participant summarized the overall sentiment generated by the Convention 
quite nicely when she said: 
                                                 
408 Weick (1995:23). 
409 Weick (1995:19). 
410 Weick, K. E. (1993). Sensemaking in organizations: Small structures with large consequences. Social psychology 
in organizations: Advances in theory and research, 10-37, p. 25. 
411 Weick, K. E., Gilfillan, D. P., & Keith, T. A. (1973). The effect of composer credibility on orchestra performance. 
Sociometry, 435-462. 
 
 211 
“I'm sure some people thought the Constitutional Convention was imperfect. It's 
kind of messy trying to be a democracy. There is a tremendous amount of 
balancing you have to do between what people want to do, what make sense 
technologically, what make sense in terms of resources, and so forth.  But within 
the library community, I mean, boy, I think it makes people smile. I think it makes 
us feel very proud that we did something like this, and it came from the library 
community, and it's a pretty big deal.”  
 
Although the Convention marked HathiTrust’s transition into a collectivist organization, 
its legal status as a property and service of the University of Michigan persisted.  At this point, 
this institutional arrangement was not contentious or problematic.  If anything, it was the 
opposite.  As one of the HathiTrust’s members noted: 
 “One of the advantages of having Michigan is that their legal counsel was on 
board with us and their President was on board with us.  Copyright was always in 
the discussions, and Michigan stepped up there and took a really brave stance on 
fair use.” 
 
One of the reasons that HathiTrust’s members felt comfortable proposing innovative, 
potentially risky, initiatives, is that they felt secure under Michigan’s protective wing.  As future 
sections demonstrate, tensions soon began to surface between Michigan’s legal control and 
HathiTrust’s emerging semi-autonomous collective form. 
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Chapter VIII: Adjudication of HathiTrust 
In September, 2011, one month before the Constitutional Convention took place, twenty 
authors and authors’ associations (“Authors Guild”) sued HathiTrust, Cornell University, and the 
presidents of the Universities of Michigan, California, Wisconsin, and Indiana University 
(“HathiTrust”) for copyright infringement, asserting that the systematic digitization of 
copyrighted materials without authorization violates authors’ exclusive rights under §106 of the 
Copyright Act.  In its response, HathiTrust conceded that the Authors Guild had established a 
prima facie case of infringement with respect to certain works but defended its activities on the 
basis of fair use.   
Before describing and analyzing the case — including the District Court and Circuit 
Court decisions — I will briefly return to some of the legal doctrines discussed in Chapter II.  In 
particular, I will highlight potentially significant changes that occurred between late 2004 (when 
Michigan joined the Google Library Project and the wheels were set into motion that eventually 
led to the emergence of HathiTrust) and late 2011, when the copyright infringement lawsuit was 
filed.  In particular, I will focus on the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, and fair use jurisprudence.  This is primarily an effort to fill the gap where the 
discussion in Chapter II’s doctrinal analysis of mass digitization left off.  This chapter then 
delves into the sensemaking of HathiTrust and its partner institutions in response to the lawsuit 
before briefing the judicial opinions.  This chapter concludes by returning to the innovative 
deviance framework applied throughout this work and suggests how this analytic approach can 
help us describe and explain judicial sensemaking in Authors Guild v. HathiTrust. 
Pertinent Evolutions in the Law, 2004-2011 
This section provides a brief update to the legal doctrines discussed in Chapter II of this 
thesis.  In particular, this section focuses on potentially relevant evolutions in the application of 
sovereign immunity principles and discusses fair use and transformative use case law.  This 
provides an updated context for discussions of sensemaking that follow.
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In 2004, the doctrine of state sovereign immunity as applied to the intellectual property 
infringement seemed strongly to favor public universities.  Under the existing jurisprudence such 
as Florida Prepaid, the University of Michigan (and its subsidiary, HathiTrust) and many 
HathiTrust member organizations seemed insulated from liability for monetary damages 
stemming from tortious acts, such as copyright infringement.  That said, a 2006 U.S. Supreme 
Court ruling potentially re-opens some central issues debated in the Florida Prepaid case and, 
for that reason, is now briefly discussed. 
In 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Central Virginia Community College v. Katz 
that Congress’s powers under the Bankruptcy Clause of Article I could be used to abrogate state 
sovereign immunity in bankruptcy suits. 412   This is the first, and so far only, decision 
acknowledging Congress’s power under Article I to authorize citizens to sue states.  Writing for 
the majority, Justice Stevens explained that this result was not inconsistent with the precedent 
because the Bankruptcy Clause was not at issue and not fully debated in Seminole, City of 
Boerne, Alden, or Florida Prepaid.413  In addition, Justice Stevens cited the legislative history of 
the Bankruptcy Clause, emphasizing the reasons why it was written into the Constitution.  In 
particular, he stressed a justification based upon the overriding goal of ensuring “uniform laws 
upon the subject of bankruptcies.”414  In addition, he notes that the legislation passed in the wake 
of the Bankruptcy Clause’s ratification demonstrates “that it was intended not just as a grant of 
legislative authority to Congress, but also to authorize limited subordination of state sovereign 
immunity in the bankruptcy arena.”415 
While Central Virginia is not directly applicable to the copyright context, it may suggest 
that Congress’s perceived authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity under Article I is still 
evolving.  In particular, the legislative impetus for the drafting the Bankruptcy Clause neatly 
aligns with the impetus for drafting the Patent and Copyright Clause — ensuring uniformity and 
certainty with respect to federal intellectual property law.  In addition, when the Act was 
amended in 1976, federal copyright law also became fully comprehensive, as well as uniform; 
the Act articulates in §301 that federal law and courts have exclusive jurisdiction over copyright 
claims and state copyright and copyright-like privileges are preempted.  While Central Virginia 
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does not overrule the earlier rulings related to sovereign immunity in the copyright context, this 
decision reminds legal doctrine that what appears fairly well-settled and static may in fact be 
undergoing a process of evolution and transformation.   
Another, perhaps unanticipated, consequence of state sovereign immunity jurisprudence 
is that further complicates rulemaking concerning fair use and the library and archives 
exemptions.  For example, in 2008, a section 108 Study Group convened to report and advise the 
Copyright Office on rulemaking to update the section in light of evolution technologies and 
library and archive practices.  That committee reported:  
“The study group believes that it would've been able to reach greater consensus 
on certain proposed changes to section 108 if not for the issue of sovereign 
immunity. Many of the largest U.S. libraries are state operated, and rightsholders 
are concerned that they will not be able to obtain effective redress should such 
libraries exceed the bounds of section 108 and fair use.”416 
 
In other words, the specter of sovereign immunity compels some rightsholders to seek 
even tougher restrictions and enhanced enforcement mechanisms (through the use of technical 
protection measures, for example) to make up for their perceived (or assumed) inability to 
adequately redress their interests through the courts.  This may lead some rightsholders toward 
extra-legal mechanisms, such as technical protection measures (“TPM”), as a way to adequately 
protect and enforce their copyrights.    
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, codified in §§1201-1205 of the Act, expressly 
prohibits the circumvention of technological measures that effectively control access to protected 
works.  These provisions signal a stark departure from the existing copyright law — which had 
always been oriented around making, modifying, and publicly communicating copies — to now 
also including accessing copies even when those copies are for personal use and have been 
lawfully obtained through purchase or other means.  Because the mass digitization project which 
is the primary focus here involved the digital conversion of print materials — which have not 
historically employed TPM — the DMCA may be of limited immediate relevance.  However, its 
provisions may present a serious problem in the future, particularly as libraries and archives 
collections are increasingly comprised of born digital materials.   
                                                 
416 Section 108 Study Group Report (2008). 
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The Act permits libraries to circumvent TPMs if the purpose is to access and review the 
protected work in good faith for purposes of determining whether or not to purchase it.  As one 
commentator notes:  
“The exemption is narrowly and meticulously constructed, and a library is subject 
to serious legal penalties if it utilizes the exemption but is later determined to have 
misapplied the law.  One has to seriously question whether the benefits of 
attempting to use this exemption will outweigh the accompanying risks of 
possible liability.”417 
 
Ultimately, this issue may become moot as digital content acquired by libraries and 
archives is increasingly subject to negotiated licensing agreements with publishers.  The terms of 
those agreements are generally understood to control the conditions of access and use.  As we 
saw in Chapter II, the terms of licensing contracts govern library and archives privileges under 
§108.  While there are growing concerns amongst the library and archives community that 
license terms may erode core library practices under §108, the rule has not been reformed.  An 
even greater uncertainty exists with respect to the extent to which contract terms might limit or 
preempt fair use or other exceptions under the Act with respect to digital content.  This continues 
to be an active area of discourse and debate. 
In terms of fair use and transformative use jurisprudence, there are a number of key post-
2004 decisions that may bear on Authors Guild v. HathiTrust.  As Chapter II described, fair use is 
a four-factor balancing test requiring courts to analyze a secondary (allegedly infringing) use in 
relation to the original work.  Since the Supreme Court’s ruling in Campbell v. Acuff Rose, 
transformative use (which is tied to the first fair use factor) is generally deemed as the most 
important determinant.  While a use need not be transformative in order to qualify as a fair use, a 
finding that a use is transformative tends to have a dispositive influence with respect to the 
remaining fair use factors, as will be demonstrated in the following discussion.  
In 2006, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling 
Kindersley, Ltd. that shrunken reproductions of the Grateful Dead’s concert posters and tickets 
chronologically placed along a timeline for inclusion in a biographical history about the musical 
group was a transformative use.418  In particular, the Court noted that the purpose and character 
of the secondary use — enhancing the biographical information contained in the book with a 
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reduced size of image displayed along with informational commentary — is transformative with 
respect to the original’s primarily expressive nature.419   
Cases in other circuits have also held that wholesale copying of protected works may be 
transformative where the use and purpose of the copies was clearly distinguishable from those of 
the original.  For example, in AV ex rel. Vanderhye, v. iParadigms, the Fourth Circuit held that 
the copying and archiving of students papers for use in conjunction with anti-plagiarism software 
was transformative because the purpose and character of the secondary use was to identify and 
discourage plagiarism as whereas the originals were primarily expressive in nature. 420   In 
addition, in Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, the Ninth Circuit held that wholesale copying of Internet 
images for use in the provision of web-based search services was transformative because the 
purpose and character of the secondary use was to point or direct a user to a source of 
information whereas the purpose of the originals were primarily expressive.421  Furthermore, 
notwithstanding the test for transformative use articulated in Campbell, the Ninth Circuit held 
that a secondary work need not add anything “new” in order to be transformative.   The Court in 
Perfect 10 held that “even making an exact copy of a work may be transformative so long as the 
copy serves a different function than the original.”422  
In a footnote accompanying Perfect 10, the Court distinguishes the facts from earlier 
cases saying in Texaco a corporation made photocopies of copyrighted articles for use by its 
researchers. The court concluded that the majority of the copies served "the same basic purpose 
that one would normally seek to obtain the original — to have it available on his shelf for ready 
reference."423 Likewise, the Court distinguished the ruling in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, 
Inc, where that court had found that conversion of CDs into computer files for use by users over 
the Internet was not transformative because the use to which the copies were put was not 
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different than the use for the originals.424  In other words, the Ninth Court holds the position that 
wholesale copying for iterative, socially productive, non-expressive purposes may be 
transformative.  
As mentioned earlier, a finding that a use is transformative tends to have a dispositive 
effect on the other three fair use factors.  For example, the Second Circuit noted that “the second 
factor may be of limited usefulness where the creative work of art is being used for a 
transformative purpose.”425  Furthermore, if the transformative purpose of the secondary use 
requires that the entire original work be copied, as was the case with the intermediary copying 
involved in AV ex rel, Perfect 10, and UMG Recordings, then copying a work in its entirely may 
still be deemed a fair use.  Finally, with respect to the fourth fair use factor — impact on the 
market for or value of the original — under Texaco, courts are instructed to only consider 
“traditional, reasonable or likely to be developed markets” 426  which, by definition, exclude 
“transformative markets.”427  Thus, a determination that a secondary use is transformative, while 
not determinative, in practice seems to carry a disproportionate weight in comparison to the 
remaining fair use factors. 
As the above jurisprudential refresher indicates, a number of key decisions involving fair 
use and transformative use took place in the period between 2004, when the University of 
Michigan digitized its entire library through the Google Library Project, and the filing of the 
Authors Guild v. HathiTrust lawsuit.  Before discussing the courts’ sensemaking and decision-
making in that case, I will first discuss HathiTrust’s and its members’ sensemaking and response 
to the lawsuit. 
Sensemaking around the lawsuit 
As an initial matter, the sensemaking HathiTrust’s members around the lawsuit is, in 
some ways, contextually bound to the so-called companion lawsuit of Authors Guild v. Google, 
which was filed much earlier (in 2005) and is still active today, over a decade later.  In that case, 
the Authors Guild and publishers sued Google for copyright infringement based on its mass 
digitization of works in connection with the Google Library Project.  Google defended on the 
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basis of fair use but that case was not adjudicated on its merits; instead the case largely stalled 
out over protracted negotiations around a hotly debated settlement agreement between Google 
and the plaintiffs.  In the spring of 2011, several months before the case was filed against 
HathiTrust, the district court finally rejected the settlement agreement (which by this time had 
been amended) and the case was effectively sent back to the drawing board. 
Given its incredibly protracted (and expensive!) litigation with Google, the Authors 
Guilds’ lawsuit against HathiTrust came as a surprise to many observers.  This was especially 
true given that the two cases had very similar facts (both revolving around the same mass 
digitization project) but with one very potentially important difference: HathiTrust was not a 
private, commercial firm like Google but rather a partnership of academic libraries oriented 
around strong educational and research missions.  These characteristics of HathiTrust made it, 
arguably, a far more sympathetic defendant in a case that would ultimately turn on fair use.   
Indeed, for the key administrators at the University of Michigan were surprised when the 
Authors Guild filed suit:  
“We did not expect to get sued for copyright infringement of this kind. I thought 
that we might get sued by certain individual rightsholders hoping to make a low 
probability/high stakes run at particular usage that might be infringing, and would 
carry statutory damages which, of course, they probably wouldn't under the 11th 
amendment.  But I thought we might get individual suits from authors and 
authors’ families who were unhappy about particular uses. I did not expect a mass 
class action suit of this kind and indeed, after the Google suit was filed, we 
weren’t defendants at all for years. They sued us many years later.  
 
I didn't expect the suit because I didn't think we were very suitable. I still don't.  
We weren't suitable because we weren't doing anything that looks like 
infringement. We were copying, that's for sure, and we were keeping copies that 
Google gave to us, but our usage didn’t look to us, in practice, like their usage.” 
 
Other participants viewed the lawsuit as authors and publishers grasping at straws, trying 
to preserve their preexisting business models despite the changing sociotechnical environment.  
This perspective was communicated in various ways.  Those with a technical bent made 
comments like: “People on the outside are still threatened by the future and what technology 
means, and they don't get the open is the future.”  While those who had already had long careers 
in academic librarianship characterized the motivations of the plaintiffs slightly differently, said 
things like:   
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“It's very disappointing how the authors have responded to this. It reminds me a 
lot of publishers, years ago, when we think about interlibrary loan of journal 
articles and how restrictive everyone was trying to be especially as journals went 
digital. If you would make these things affordable, we would give up our 
interlibrary loan operations and just buy all the stuff from you. If it were five 
dollars for an article, we would have professors that would buy the articles. But 
it's really hard to get people to think of what their business model might be in a 
new environment. And so the first reaction is just to close ranks and make it as 
limited as possible.  These are groups that are just really worried that something 
that they could make money on will be given away for free.”  
 
What quotes like these suggest is that there was a sense that the lawsuit was motivated by 
a fear, shared by authors and publishers, that HathiTrust and the Google Library Project 
represented not just a loss of control over protected works, but a lost opportunity for further 
exploiting the works, never mind the fact that, as the history of large-scale digitization makes 
clear, it was a functional impossibility that authors and publishers would ever be able to carry out 
a mass digitization project or the creation of an organization like HathiTrust.   
Another reason why the lawsuit came as a surprise to those at Michigan was that 
Michigan and HathiTrust were fairly open and transparent with the Authors Guild, the 
Association of American Publishers (“AAP”), and the U.S. Copyright Office about HathiTrust, 
its efforts, and initiatives.  Things had even gotten as far as a scheduled meeting at Michigan 
amongst the some of the interested parties:   
“We had an initial meeting in September or early October to discuss and talk 
about what we were doing with the AAP and the Authors Guild. The AAP came 
and the Authors Guild didn't, because they sued us a week or two before the 
meeting was supposed to take place. And that was just to have a conversation.”  
 
A plausible theory advanced by a number of the participants in this study links the 
primary motivation for the Authors Guild’s lawsuit against HathiTrust with the emergence of the 
Orphan Works Project.  One of the participants said: “I've often wondered if our announcement 
that we were going to participate in the Orphan Works Project was the reason why Cornell was 
one of the defendants in the HathiTrust suit.”  In particular, there was a sense that early missteps 
in, and misconceptions about, the Orphan Works Project may have prompted the litigation.  One 
of HathiTrust’s members reflected: 
“I've always believed that it was the Orphan Works Project that prompted the 
lawsuit against the HathiTrust in the first place — the anger about how poorly it 
had been implemented by Michigan.  And then it was almost like, ‘As long as 
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we’re suing over it, we might as well sue about the general scanning as well, too.  
We’ll open a second front in the war against Google."  What didn’t make any 
sense to me was why they would run the risk that a court would find that, when 
libraries are doing it or are involved, it's a fair use, and so that might impact upon 
the Google decision.  It just seemed like a really stupid move for them to make.  
But I think it's because they were just so incredibly angered by the poor 
implementation of the Orphan Works Program.  Until we can get into the Authors 
Guilds’ archives and look at the internal memos and discussions and find out what 
it was thinking, I guess we'll never know.” 
 
Another participant who was more directly involved in the Orphan Works Project 
cited acknowledged that the initial vetting process which led to some non-orphan works 
slipping onto the list may have played a role in the Authors Guild’s decision to file suit: 
“We published the potential orphan works list.  We saw that some works had 
mistakenly gotten through.  We pulled them down.  We went back and reviewed 
the process.  We refined the process. There was a lot of attention given to process.  
Documentation on process developed and we shared that with the Authors Guild 
in those early days after the initial suit was filed trying to stimulate the dialogue 
there. I think that everybody felt that a good dialogue about these things is 
important.  But we didn't succeed in doing that; there has not been a good 
dialogue.  We sat down with Maria Pallante428 and Alan Adler429 to talk about a 
way that we could collectively — the Copyright Office, the AAP, the libraries — 
could undertake an Orphan Works Project.” 
 
Discussions on how various stakeholders might undertake or design a collaborative 
Orphan Works Project did not get very far, in part, because of the lawsuit and widespread 
misconceptions about the nature and operation of the Project at Michigan.  HathiTrust’s 
Executive Director at the time recalled: 
“The popular misconceptions about what we were doing made their ways pretty 
heartily into Congress and the Copyright Office.  They believe that the entire 
corpus of materials, all of it including in-copyright works, was being made 
available on campuses at partner institutions.  They also thought that when we 
made those orphan determinations, and posted the list of possible orphan 
candidates, we also opened those works to the world. And as you know, no 
orphans were made available to anybody.” 
 
Maria Pallante invited us to come talk to her in Washington DC in early 
December, 2011, right in the middle of the lawsuit. And when I described to her 
what we were actually doing, her reaction was: ‘Why are we having this 
conversation?’ Her visual reaction seemed not troubled.” 
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In other words, much of the impetus for the lawsuit may have been based on 
misconceptions about a Project that had not even reached the implementation stage.  
Even within the Project, there were misconceptions, or at least ambiguities, about its 
scope: 
“The Orphan Works Project didn't go anywhere.  We hadn't even worked out the 
details.  But I think our thinking was that if the work went through the Orphan 
Works process and was identified as being an orphan work, we would then make 
that text available to a user of the Cornell system in electronic form. But because 
this process never really developed, none of those details were worked out.”  
 
The Orphan Works Project had only begun a few months earlier and was still very 
much an experiment — an experiment that, so far, did not involve opening up access to 
any in-copyright works whether they were suspected to be orphans or not.   
Pallante’s purported lack of concern once the accurate details of the Project had 
been communicated also seems perfectly reasonable given the fact that libraries and 
archives had long-standing traditions of digitizing their special collections which were 
often comprised of presumptive orphans. 
A librarian involved in the Orphan Works Project at Michigan reflected on her 
previous experiences working at the Library of Congress:   
“Special collections materials, much of which is treated as orphan works, has 
been digitized and made available for the last 20 years. That's been an 
uncontroversial practice that's existed since I was at the Library of Congress in the 
‘90s. But trying to actually address it head-on, maybe that was too rigid.” 
 
Obviously Michigan’s Orphan Works Project would have involved materials outside of 
special collections, but this observation suggests that practices within libraries and archives co-
evolve and build upon each other.  As another participant noted, Pallante’s response aligns with 
the general sense that “practice in new areas should inform the legislation rather than the other 
way around.”  Although legislators had explored reforms to address the orphan works problem, 
there was a strong sentiment that a “wait and see” approach is preferable to a proactive approach, 
at least where Congress and the Copyright Office is concerned. 
In the case of the Orphan Works Project, the lawsuit stifled any real opportunity to see 
what the results of the experiment might be.  When the lawsuit was filed, the Project was 
immediately suspended by Michigan’s Office of the General Counsel.  We never got a chance to 
 222 
see how the Project might grow and evolve, and solve or fail to solve the challenges of orphan 
works.  The Project had the potential to remove some of the dead weight generated by absentee 
copyright rightsholders.   
In a particularly tragic twist of fate, as the next section describes, the Authors Guild’s 
claims based on the Orphan Works Project were dismissed as unripe, meaning that this issue 
remains wholly unresolved and the challenges of absentee rightsholders persist.   
Authors Guild v. HathiTrust 
The basis of the Authors Guild’s lawsuit against HathiTrust has surfaced in a number of 
other sections of this work.  Nevertheless, this section will begin with a brief description of the 
case before discussing the resulting judicial decisions at both the district and circuit court levels. 
BACKGROUND 
According to the district court opinion, the Authors Guild sued HathiTrust and several of 
its members for copyright infringement stemming from the mass digitization efforts of the 
Google Library Project.  At the time the opinion was written, in October, 2012 (approximately 
one year after it was filed), HathiTrust contained over 10 million volumes, 73% of which are 
believed to be in-copyright.  Between the initial digitization and the final deposit in HathiTrust, 
the Authors Guild contends that twelve unauthorized digital copies of each work have been 
made.430 
The court effectively splits HathiTrust’s digital corpus into two categories.  The first 
category includes works with known authors.  With respect to these works, HathiTrust and its 
members use them in the following three ways:  (1) for full-text searches; (2) for preservation; 
(3) in the provision of access for people with certified print disabilities.   
As the court describes, the full-text search capability enables users to search for a 
particular term across the entire corpus.  For works that are not in the public domain or for which 
the copyright holder has not authorized use, the search results only return information on the 
number of instances, and the page numbers, on which the term appears.  For works in the public 
domain or for which the copyright holder has given permission, the search term is displayed 
within a snippet of additional surrounding text and a link to the full page is provided. (Figure 17)   
                                                 
430 Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 448. 
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Figure 17.  HathiTrust full-text search results for the query “dogs” in “Great Expectations,” Charles Dickens. 
 
With respect to access for certified print-disabled persons, the court notes that, as a 
general matter, digitization has had a tremendous effect on the blinds’ ability to access print 
materials.  Prior to digitization, “the blind could access print materials only if the materials were 
converted to braille or if they were read by a human reader, either live or recorded.”431  Through 
Michigan’s (and by extension, HathiTrust’s) service: 
“Print-disabled individuals read digital books independently through screen 
access software that allows text to be conveyed audibly or tactilely to print-
disabled readers, which permits them to access text more quickly, reread passages, 
annotate, and navigate, just as a sighted reader does with text.” 
Through the university’s secure system, certified print-disabled individuals have full 
access to materials and, as a result, academic participation by this community has been 
“revolutionized” by HathiTrust.432 
                                                 
431 Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 448. 
432 Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 449. 
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The second category of works at issue in the case are those with unknown authors, i.e. 
orphan works.  The court outlines the Orphan Works Project review work-flow process as 
follows: 
1. Is the commercially available for sale?  If yes — STOP — if no, continue; 
2. Is the copyright holder contactable?  If yes — STOP — if no, continue; 
3. HathiTrust lists the bibliographical information for the work on the HathiTrust 
Orphan Candidates webpage for ninety days.  Does a rightsholder come forward?  If 
yes — STOP — if no, continue; 
4. The full text of the work becomes viewable on HathiTrust to UM students, professors, 
and other authenticated users and visitors to libraries at UM's campuses.  The number 
of users permitted to view a given work limited at any one time is limited to the 
number of copies held by the UM library. 
The court notes that the Orphan Works Project had been suspended indefinitely after a 
number of works made their way onto the Candidates list in error.433  All of the named Plaintiffs 
in the case, except Indiana University, had agreed to participate in the Orphan Works Project, a 
fact that lends some credence into the just-discussed speculations of some of the Project’s 
participants.  (Perhaps Indiana was included because it played such a pivotal role in making the 
shared digital repository and HathiTrust possible.) 
The court rejected the Authors Guild’s claims based on the Orphan Works Project 
because the cause of action was not ripe.  The Project had been suspended without indication of 
renewal.  No access to the so-called orphans had ever been granted.  Thus, the court determined 
that there was no actual case or controversy because the “mere possibility” the one of the 
Plaintiffs’ works might be included on a future Candidates list, or made available, is not enough.  
Therefore, the court granted summary judgment in favor of HathiTrust with respect to orphan 
works, leaving the three other uses — full-text search, preservation, and access for the print-
disabled — intact. 
In terms of the procedure of the case, both parties moved for summary judgment.  For a 
court to resolve a fair use determination at the summary judgment stage it must determine that no 
genuine issues of material fact exist that could lead a reasonable jury to side with the non-
                                                 
433 Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 449. 
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moving party.434   Because fair use is a mixed question of law and fact, granting summary 
judgment in favor of HathiTrust necessarily requires that a high burden of proof and persuasion 
has been met.  Essentially, to side with HathiTrust, the court would have to conclude that, even if 
everything the Authors Guild asserts is true, no jury could reasonably conclude that HathiTrust’s 
activity constituted copyright infringement and therefore the Defendant is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law.435 
With the facts and procedural background of the case laid out, attention now turns to the 
sensemaking and decision-making of first the district court then, because Authors Guild 
appealed, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.  A brief section of critical reflection, 
interpretation, and discussion follows each of the courts’ decision, followed by a final 
conclusion. 
DISTRICT COURT DECISION 
The district court ruled in HathiTrust’s favor, finding that the three uses HathiTrust 
permitted were transformative uses.  This section walks, factor by factor, through the court’s fair 
use analysis.  The first factor considered by the court is the “purpose and character of the use, 
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes.”436  The court then describes how the mass digitization project was undertaken with 
several goals in mind including preservation, search and discovery, and enhanced access for 
print-disabled patrons, and that all of these uses serve an educational or research purpose which 
tilts the first factor in HathiTrust’s favor.  In addition, the court notes that with respect to in-
copyright works, access to the actual text of those works is strictly limited to persons with 
certified print disabilities and for purposes of full-text search.   
Importantly, the court concludes that each of the three uses at issue in the case are 
transformative.  The key inquiry in transformative use determinations is: 
“Whether the new work merely supersede[s] the objects of the original creation ... 
or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, 
altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.”437 
 
                                                 
434 Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 137 (2nd Cir. 1998). 
435 Citibank, N.A. v. Morgan Stanley & Co. Int'l, PLC, 724 F.Supp.2d 407, 414 (S.D.N.Y.2010). 
436 17 U.S.C. §107(1). 
437 Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 459-460 citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575, 114 S.Ct. 1164. 
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Drawing upon the Graham, Perfect 10, and AV ex rel trio of cases, the court determines 
that, even though the protected works had been copied in their entirety, full-text search, 
preservation, and access for print-disabled patrons are uses that are functionally unrelated to the 
expressive intent of the originals.   
As previously described, a determination that a use is transformative strongly influences 
the court’s reasoning with respect to the remaining three fair use factors.  The court essentially 
brushed over the second and third factors — nature of the copyrighted work and amount of the 
work copied — before also concluding that Authors Guild has not suffered any cognizable harm 
to its traditional market because HathiTrust’s uses fall within a “transformative market” that is 
necessarily outside the purview of the Authors Guild.  Thus, the district court concluded that all 
four fair use factors tilted in favor of HathiTrust and therefore no genuine issues of material fact 
existed that could prevent a reasonable jury from ruling in HathiTrust’s favor. 
Given the fairly straightforward application of fair use and transformative use doctrine, it 
is somewhat surprising how the decision takes a markedly different turn toward its end.  It 
seems, in some ways, to backtrack or perhaps buttress the seemingly clear cut doctrinal support 
just outlined.  It does so first by stressing that its rationale in the case was primarily motivated by 
“the goal of copyright itself, whether ‘promoting the Progress of Science and useful Arts would 
be better served by allowing the use than by preventing it’”438 rather than doctrine.  Even more 
striking, however, is the unusual transition in tone at the end of the opinion where it shifts from 
the dispassionate and impartial rhetoric characteristic of most court opinions to Judge Baer’s 
personal, almost confessional, reflections on the case: 
“Although I recognize that the facts here may on some levels be without 
precedent, I am convinced that they fall safely within the protection of fair use 
such that there is no genuine issue of material fact.  I cannot imagine a definition 
of fair use that would not encompass the transformative uses made by Defendants’ 
MDP and would require that I terminate this invaluable contribution to the 
progress of science and cultivation of the arts that at the same time effectuates the 
ideals espoused by the ADA.”439 (Emphasis added). 
 
In other words, he seems to acknowledge that existing doctrine may not stretch so easily 
and completely to suit the emerging contours of the mass digitization project but, nevertheless, it 
                                                 
438 Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F.Supp.2d 445, 458 (Dist. Court, S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
439 Authors Guild Inc. v. HathiTrust, 2012, p. at 464. 
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so clearly promotes the overriding goals of the copyright law that we simply cannot let the law’s 
means defeat its purpose.  
The innovative deviance framework developed in this thesis can help us understand and 
explain Judge Baer’s sensemaking in this case.  He seems to acknowledge that, when copyright 
doctrine and precedent do not adequately carve out safe paths for particular copyright-related 
behaviors, i.e. prior to this decision legitimate non-infringing means did not exist for copying 
millions of in-copyright books, the system will find ways to support and protect those behaviors 
because they accomplish the overriding goals of copyright law.  Judge Baer’s rationale 
demonstrates how innovative deviance plays a crucial role in teaching copyright law how to 
change, fostering not just transformative use in the copyright sense, but transformation more 
broadly construed.  
The district court opinion raises a number of other interesting questions and tensions that 
are relevant to large-scale collaborative knowledge infrastructure development involving 
potentially infringing behavior.  In particular, the decision raises questions around timing and the 
extent to which the subjective intent of those doing the digitizing matters in fair use 
determinations.  As earlier chapters of this work demonstrate, the University of Michigan’s 
decision to partner with Google in the digitization of its library was complex and motivated by a 
series of pragmatic, ideological, and reputational concerns.  We know that Michigan desperately 
wanted to make a back-up copy of the entire library and believed it was justified in doing so 
under the so-called “dark archive” which tends to support the preservation purpose cited by the 
court.  But as we also learned, many of the reasons it had for undertaking the mass digitization 
project were far more inchoate and uncertain than the court seems to acknowledges.  Instead of 
being predetermined and deliberate, the uses of the digitized corpus emerged over time through 
complex co-evolving technical, legal, and organizational interactions.  The court’s reasoning here 
suggests that the purpose and character of the use at the time the alleged infringement took place 
is irrelevant.  Rather, we look at the purpose and character of the uses at the time the lawsuit was 
filed.   
In the context of large-scale collaborative projects and knowledge infrastructure 
development, this creates somewhat of a conundrum.  As we saw, HathiTrust emerged several 
years after the mass digitization project was underway.  Moreover, the uses adjudicated by the 
court emerged over time (although it appears that Michigan had been provided the services prior 
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to the creation of HathiTrust and its partners).  However, the cause of action arose when the 
digitization occurred, in 2004, before time passed allowing the subsequent (defensible) uses to 
emerge.  Are we to understand that HathiTrust was simply “lucky” that the Authors Guild waited 
so long to sue — or at least long enough that HathiTrust had time to develop the technical and 
organizational infrastructure to implement the uses at issue in this case?  If Michigan had been 
sued for copyright infringement after the mass digitization project started, but while the scans 
were still in a dark archive, how differently things might have turned out!  What cautionary 
lesson might future innovators and investors, and rightsholders, take from this?    
CIRCUIT COURT DECISION 
The Authors Guild appealed and the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s holding 
with respect to full-text search and enhanced access for print-disabled individuals — they were 
fair uses.  The Appeals Court, however, vacated the lower court’s holding with respect to 
preservation because it found that the Authors Guild lacked standing to bring the claim.440  
Despite reaching the same ultimate result with regard to the full-text search, the court 
disagreed with the lower court’s transformation analyses.  In particular, the Court of Appeals 
took issue with Judge Baer’s goal-motivated decision-making just discussed: 
“Contrary to what the district court implied, a use does not become transformative 
by making an ‘invaluable contribution to the progress of science and cultivation 
of the arts.’  Added value or utility is not the test: a transformative work is one 
that serves a new and different function from the original work and is not a 
substitute for it.”441  
 
In other words, innovative deviance cannot be “rescued” by how well it accomplishes the 
goals and purposes of copyright law.  The court then concluded that the creation of a full-text 
searchable database is a “quintessentially transformative use” because the results of the search 
are “different in purpose, character, expression, meaning, and message” from the original work 
from which it is drawn.442   
Likewise, the court took issue with the lower court’s transformation analysis with respect 
to HathiTrust’s improved access for print-disabled patrons, writing: “providing expanded access 
                                                 
440 Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 755 F. 3d 87 (2nd Cir.  Court of Appeals 2014) at 104. 
441 Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 755 F. 3d at 96 quoting Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 902 F.Supp.2d at 464. 
442 Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 755 F. 3d at 97. 
 229 
… is not ‘transformative’” because it does not “add something new to the copyrighted work”443 
and HathiTrust’s purpose in improving access was no different from the purpose of the original 
works — both are primarily expressive.  Transformation, the Court tells us, requires more than 
simply enabling a new audience to read a book.   
While the court declined to find HathiTrust’s improved access from print-disabled 
patrons transformative, it nevertheless found it to be a non-infringing fair use because HathiTrust 
took no more than was necessary to effectuate its valid purpose.  In addition, the Court 
determined that HathiTrust did not harm the potential market for the original because (sadly) the 
fact that a market for handicap-accessible books is virtually non-existent necessarily forecloses 
the possibility of harm. 
Both Courts reached essentially the same holding — HathiTrust’s uses were found non-
infringing, signifying that mass digitization for full-text search and the provision of access to 
print-disabled persons is non-infringing — but I do not think this means that libraries and others 
seeking a broad interpretation of fair use should grow complacent.  The difference in rationales 
between the District and Circuit Courts in Authors Guild v. HathiTrust signals a growing tension 
between creative or expressive works, which traditionally form the core of copyright, and an 
emerging subset of iterative, non-expressive, fundamentally technical and non-expressive class 
of works.  Fair use and transformative use jurisprudence arose out of the traditional, expressive, 
core of copyright, and its application to those sorts of work makes sense.  If we listen to 2Live 
Crew’s song, “Pretty Woman,” we can hear how it is a transformation of Roy Orbison’s original, 
“Oh, Pretty Woman.”444  Likewise, we can see how Annie Leibovitz’s portrait of Demi Moore 
was transformed by Paramount in its poster for the film “Naked Gun 33 1/3: The Final Insult”445 
and how Richard Prince’s work transformed Patrick Cariou’s photograph.446 (Figures 18 and 19)  
                                                 
443 Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 755 F. 3d at 101. 
444 These work formed the basis of the copyright infringement claims in Campbell v. Acuff Rose, US, 1995. 
445 Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F. 3d 109 (2nd Circuit Court of Appeals, 1998. 
446 Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337 - Dist. Court, SD New York 2011. 
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Figure 18.  Annie Leibovitz’s photograph on the left, Paramount’s movie poster on the right. 
 
 
Figure 19.  Patrick Cariou photograph on left, Richard Prince work on the right. 
 
 
Fair use and transformative use doctrine begins to lose cogency as we move away from 
the traditional core of copyright.  When we begin to consider uses like full-text search, for 
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example, it does not make as much sense to compare the secondary work — the search results 
showing the instance of the word “dogs” in Charles Dickens’ “Great Expectations” — with 
Dickens’ original.447 (See Figure 17)  The doctrine and precedent does not map particularly well 
to emerging, iterative, non-expressive, technology-oriented uses because the transformation we 
are interested in promoting is not captured by the secondary work.  The transformation we are 
seeking to promote through things like HathiTrust’s full-text search, and Google’s thumbnail 
image search, and iParadigm’s anti-plagiarism software is the broader sense of sociotechnical 
transformation.  Full-text search is transformative because it fundamentally and beneficially 
changes scholarly communication practices.  It makes new meanings, messages, and 
understandings possible by giving students, faculty, and others new tools for processing 
information, and in so doing promotes the overriding goals of copyright law.  But the search 
results in and of themselves do not accomplish this.   
We might speculate that this sort of understanding may have partially motivated Judge 
Baer’s conclusions in the district court opinion.  He seemed to recognize that the legal rules, 
tests, doctrines, precedents, and algorithms fall short in the case of innovative information 
technologies’ iterative, non-expressive use of protected works.  Arguably what HathiTrust, 
Google, Amazon, iParadigms and other are doing is more akin to “contributory transformative 
use” — providing tools and technologies so that others may make transformative secondary 
works — but, as of yet, no such legal doctrine exists.  If Baer’s decision had remained intact, it 
might have created space for judges to make determinations based upon the degree to which a 
use promotes the overriding goals of copyright.  Instead, the Circuit Court tells us that the proxy 
— the transformative use test — is more important, in some ways missing the forest for the trees.    
Conclusion 
In this chapter we explored sensemaking around the Authors Guild v. HathiTrust lawsuit.  
In particular, we learned how participants interpreted the lawsuit as a consequence of the Orphan 
Works Project, citing its early missteps and growing misconceptions in the broader community 
as key factors.  Not only was the Project, its process, and its purpose misunderstood, but the 
entire framing of the underlying issue as an “orphan works problem” may have been in error.  
                                                 
447 This comparison is only meant as an example.  Dickens’ work is in the public domain and thus it is perfectly legal 
to conduct a full-text search or otherwise modify the original. 
 232 
Participants suggested that the focus should have been on rights determinacy and discovering 
facts about the collective collection, particularly with regard to out-of-print works, instead of 
focusing on expanding the public domain.      
We also saw how the lawsuit forced the still-nascent Orphan Works Project into a 
suspended state.  In terms of legal strategy, this helped ensure that the court would agree that the 
Authors Guild’s claims with respect to the Project were not ripe for adjudication.  It also carried 
the unfortunate consequence of suspending momentum on solving the challenges of absentee 
rightsholders.   
This chapter also explored judicial sensemaking through the two Authors Guild v. 
HathiTrust decisions.  In particular, a comparison of the rationales developed by the courts 
highlighted the tensions between the goal of copyright and the legitimate means available for 
accomplishing its goals.  The district court’s opinion provided a broader support and protection 
for activities that promote the overriding purposes of copyright but yet do not fit neatly within 
existing doctrine and precedent.  Judge Baer’s rationale demonstrates how innovative deviance 
plays a crucial role in teaching copyright law how to change, fostering not just transformative 
use in the copyright sense, but transformation more broadly construed. The Circuit Court rejected 
that approach, however, emphasizing instead the need to adhere to formal rules and procedures 
instead of broad policy-oriented appeals.     
While the outcome resulted in a victory for HathiTrust, I suggested that those seeking a 
broad interpretation of fair use would be wise to avoid complacency for several reasons.  First, 
while the case against HathiTrust is over, the Authors Guild has filed for certiorari in their case 
against Google.  If the Supreme Court hears the case, there is the potential that an adverse ruling 
would negatively impact HathiTrust and its partners.  Second, the Circuit Court’s rejection of 
Judge Baer’s reasoning undermines copyright law’s adaptability to technological and social 
change, and its ability to promote transformation more broadly construed.  It suggests that the 
means are more important than the end.  Strong protections for iterative, non-expressive forms of 
use are necessary to ensure that copyright law remains relevant, functional, and credible as 
technologies change and new forms of social practice around protected works continue to 
emerge.  I suggested that a contributory transformation use doctrine might be small, but 
potentially meaningful, step in the right direction.  I would also argue that a test which gives 
judges broad discretion to weigh the potential harm of a use against its potential social benefit, as 
 233 
Judge Baer seemed to attempt, might also be a worthwhile reform.  Even that, however, might 
not support so-called “consumptive uses” of the digitized content, e.g. reading the books.  One 
might draw an inference that the next fair use battle might involve using the digital copies for 
reading purposes, within secure networked environments, perhaps limited to the number of print 
copies an institution holds in an off-site storage facility. 
The outcome of the case also raises some potentially troubling consequences for 
innovative deviance in general.  For example, one might wonder whether the Authors Guild, 
Perfect 10, iParadigms, and (so far) Google quartet of cases represent a custom-fit solution only 
available to very large and/or powerful companies or organizations.  It is difficult to imagine how 
an individual, small-scale, more modest, and/or more distributed exercise of innovative deviance 
would fare under this precedent.  But if we agree that deviance is a natural and unavoidable 
consequence of a disequilibrium between societies’ goals and the institutionalized means to 
accomplish those goals, then we should seek broader protections and support for those forms of 
deviance that promote the goals of society through the creative use of illegitimate means.  By 
limiting the protections of fair use to massive scale projects like those of HathiTrust and Google, 
we risk losing out on the societal benefits resulting from less heroic, less visible, but still 
significant, endeavors. 
The Authors Guild v. HathiTrust lawsuit suggests that while fair use and transformative 
use are incredibly important, powerful, and flexible doctrines, they might not take copyright law 
far enough in protecting innovative deviance and supporting sociotechnical transformation on a 
broader scale.  In addition, as the next chapter demonstrates, the lawsuit also impacted the 
organizational character of Michigan and HathiTrust, and their relationship to each other, and 
dampened the willingness to take chances and engage in innovative deviance.      
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Chapter IX: The Long Now of HathiTrust     
“My dream is that when Star Trek becomes real in the twenty-fourth century, and 
Mr. Data is looking back into some historical archive and reading something on 
his screen, that may have come from the HathiTrust.”                                 
 
 - CIO, a HathiTrust founding institution 
 
The last two chapters each covered a major milestone in HathiTrust’s evolution.  This 
chapter traces the implications and aftermaths of the Constitutional Convention and the Authors 
Guild’s suit against HathiTrust.  In combination, these events signal a shift from HathiTrust’s 
pre-and-early history — highly dynamic, reactive, action-oriented, and immediate — toward an 
organization searching for what we might call its “long now.”448   This chapter traces key aspects 
of that readjustment, as HathiTrust responds to the lawsuit, begins to implement the initiatives 
approved at the Constitutional Convention, and casts its gaze toward the future.   
Organizational Readjustment 
Notwithstanding the victory, the lawsuit had tremendous impact on the evolution of 
HathiTrust and its relationship to the University of Michigan.  Recall that the lawsuit was filed 
just before the Constitutional Convention took place.   The result was a sort of conceptual 
disjointing of HathiTrust.  On the one hand, HathiTrust’s members were seizing the opportunity 
to take control of the organization — making decisions about what projects it would undertake, 
how its governance would work, what its goals and mission ought to be.  On the other hand, the 
lawsuit foregrounded HathiTrust’s status as a service and property of the University of Michigan.  
Together, the events signaled a period of significant transition for HathiTrust.    
A number of key personnel changes shaped and were shaped by the organizational 
reconfigurations happening.  The University Librarian at Michigan resigned from his post, 
                                                 
448 The Long Now was a term coined by Brian Eno who, together with Stewart Brand and others, have created a 
foundation that seeks to encourage long-term thinking, serving as a counterpoint to todays “accelerating culture.” 
http://longnow.org/about/  
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returning to a position he half-jokingly calls “just a humble school teacher.”  The Executive 
Director of HathiTrust — who had been its lead architect at the start and continued to live, eat, 
and breathe HathiTrust through the Convention — resigned from his post as HathiTrust 
Executive Director and AUL at UM to take a position at another University.    HathiTrust was, 
for a period of time, in somewhat of a holding state as its governance structure emerged and as 
leadership at UM changed.  As one participant recalled, “after the Constitutional Convention, a 
lot fell dormant.”  It took time to elect an Executive Director, put together an advisory board and 
form committees, draft bylaws and so forth. 
During this period tensions arose, likely exacerbated by the pending copyright lawsuit, 
between the University of Michigan’s General Counsel’s Office and the interim director over 
implementing some of the initiatives approved by HathiTrust’s membership.  For example, the 
government documents project had been approved by HathiTrust’s membership but had, for 
years, been a source of conflict between HathiTrust’s leadership and UM’s general counsel’s 
office.  In fact, disagreements about how to approach the digitization of government documents 
arose as early as 2006, two years prior to HathiTrust’s official launch.  One of the lead librarians 
who spearheaded Michigan’s digitization efforts recalled: 
“When I was the co-interim Director of the University of Michigan Library, an 
attorney who worked in the General Counsel’s Office wrote me a scolding letter 
saying: ‘You must not provide access to federal government documents because 
of the copyright risks.’ As Director, you have the right to say this is what I'm 
going to do. And I wrote a response and was able to cite for him decisions from 
legal authorities and the government code of federal regulations on the inherent 
copyright status of things that were included in the public record.”   
 
When HathiTrust’s membership ultimately approved the government documents initiative 
at the Constitutional Convention in 2011, these tensions, or seeming cross-purposes, between 
HathiTrust and the opinions and advice of the University of Michigan’s legal counsel became 
more pronounced.  The tensions may have played a role in hiring decisions with respect to both 
HathiTrust’s new Executive Director and the new University Librarian at Michigan.  It should be 
noted that repeated requests for interviews with both the key attorney at the General Counsel’s 
office and the new Executive Director of HathiTrust were denied, and therefore the description 
and explanation of sensemaking is necessarily limited.   Nevertheless, it appears that there was a 
compelling desire shared by key figures at Michigan to reduce conflict and reestablish a unity of 
vision and purpose around a new, perhaps more conservative, institutional character: 
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After moving to a new position at the helm of a different library, the former Executive 
Director of HathiTrust recalled a conversation he had with the University of Michigan’s new 
Librarian regarding a body of older materials in HathiTrust that had been opened under GATT 
restoration: 
“I told him, ‘This is wrong. These are older materials and you've got the 
protections in the law.  In responding to things (i.e. take down requests), you can 
say, ‘We're sorry.’ And turn off access.  You can make restorations.  But right now 
for the vast majority of these things, there is no identifiable rightsholder.  No one's 
been in touch. We're not getting claims.  And he said that he disagreed.  That it 
was about trust and authority and they needed to back off. And I think those kinds 
of decisions now are the decisions of the day.” 
 
When I interviewed the new University Librarian at Michigan, about HathiTrust’s general 
approach to risk and innovation, he remarked:  
“I don't think of myself as risk-averse, but on a scale of legal risk aversion, the 
founder and first Executive Director of HathiTrust is at a very different place from 
where I am.” 
 
During this period of transition, key administrators at the University of Michigan became 
relatively more risk-averse.  The institutional perspective shifted.  As one participant described it, 
Michigan was “interested in the war not the battle.  It means that when we make decisions, we 
have to consider the legal analysis of our practices.”  This was a marked departure from nearly a 
decade earlier when key decision-makers embarked upon the mass digitization project without 
much hand-wringing about the copyright issues.  “I'm sure we did the legal analysis, but I don't 
remember doing it” was the response of one of the key decision-makers.    
The world looked very different to Michigan’s revised leadership: 
“We (Michigan) go out of our way to make HathiTrust operate as though it were 
independent of the University, except in one important regard and that is legal 
decisions. The definitive legal answer must remain with the University of 
Michigan so long is HathiTrust is in fact an extension of the University of 
Michigan.  In the beginning HathiTrust was very idealistic, and Michigan was 
able to push it that way because it was a land-grant institution and couldn’t be 
sued like Harvard could. They were very bold and idealistic and I think what's 
happening now is it's becoming much more realistic. It's much more grounded in 
the law. The lawsuit helped. It gave us perspective. So HathiTrust can have all the 
democratic governance, but around legal issues Michigan calls the shots.” 
 
In terms of the governance that emerged after the Constitutional Convention, the 
HathiTrust Executive Committee continued to govern HathiTrust until the Board of Governors 
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was established in April, 2012.  The Board of Governors is composed of six members appointed 
by HathiTrust’s founding institutions, six elected from the membership-at-large, and the Chief 
Executive Officer (who is also the Executive Director).  Policy for HathiTrust is set by the Board 
but, as one participant notes, “many of the decisions do not need real Board action but happen 
through the Executive Director.”  With respect to HathiTrust’s current Executive Director, a 
participant commented: “The current executive director of HathiTrust has a very different 
temperament then the founding Executive Director. It's like a different person for a different 
moment.”  Bylaws were passed in 2013, and they stipulated that there should be an annual 
member meeting; the first annual meeting took place in October, 2014.449  
In addition to the Board and the Executive Director, a number of groups and committees 
have formed to research and report first to the Executive Director who then reports to the Board.  
For example, there have been groups working on the monographic print archive and government 
documents proposals and there is a working group for HathiTrust User Support.  A Rights and 
Access Committee was formed to think of ways to improve copyright determinacy in support of 
new lawful uses of the corpus but, as one of the committee members noted: “Basic copyright 
criteria policies and copyright determinations were set before the Constitutional Convention and 
have not been called into question within HathiTrust.” And a Program Steering Committee was 
formed to think about strategic directions for HathiTrust.  One of the members of that committee 
remarked: 
“The way that the Executive Director appears to want to use the Program Steering 
Committee is to make recommendations to him. Because these papers are pretty 
long and they’re written by people who are really, really into that stuff, so he’s 
looking for the Program Steering Committee to sort of parse it out and make 
recommendations that he can then bring to the Board or the larger general 
membership.” 
 
Many of the day-to-day operations of HathiTrust were largely managed by its Assistant 
Director and a very small administrative staff.  As the Assistant Director described it: 
“I work for the University of Michigan, I'm under that administrative structure, 
but my salary is 100% paid for out of the HathiTrust budget.  I work 100% on 
HathiTrust. Of course many of the things that are in HathiTrust benefit the 
University of Michigan and other institutions. So, formally I work for the 
University of Michigan but I definitely see myself as working for HathiTrust 
because everything that I do is for HathiTrust.” 
                                                 
449 https://www.hathitrust.org/member_meeting_2014  
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This suggests that, while HathiTrust’s organizational governance structure is forming, 
functionally HathiTrust seems to operate in a somewhat murky (or illusory) zone of 
organizational semi-autonomy.  While participants noted that there has been “zero conflict” 
between HathiTrust and UM, I got the impression that there was a fair amount of hesitancy and 
uncertainty shrouding sensemaking and decision-making in this area.  As a librarian at Michigan 
said: 
“There is a balance and we need to tread carefully. A lot of the legal decisions are 
ultimately Michigan's responsibility because of how HathiTrust is structured right 
now. There is not shared liability per se, but there is shared action. Where the 
decision-making ultimately happens … I don't know to what extent Michigan and 
our General Counsel's Office make final decisions.  These are things that 
HathiTrust’s Executive Director is trying to work through.  The key attorney from 
the General Counsel’s Office spoke at the fall meeting of HathiTrust, and I find it 
really amazing that that's the first time he's been invited to meet with HathiTrust. 
The Executive Director and the Executive Committee of HathiTrust are very 
thoughtful people and they’re working through a lot of these things about shared 
decision-making, shared responsibility, how we transition this from a new thing to 
something that's going to be sustainable.”     
 
Over the course of an interview with the University Librarian at Michigan, the locus of 
decision-making authority and the relationships of power among Michigan and HathiTrust’s 
Executive Director became somewhat more transparent:  
“So HathiTrust has its own board and they make all kinds of decisions.  But the 
Executive Director of HathiTrust is a University of Michigan employee and 
reports to me. And he and I and the Board of HathiTrust have a very clear 
understanding that in terms of deciding what HathiTrust's priorities are, and all 
those other things, they're fine. But when it comes to legal advice and decisions, 
while we are happy to have the Board engage in opinion-ing … (trails off) 
 
There are only two things that I'm aware of that the HathiTrust Executive Director 
could do that would cause the University of Michigan to remove them.  There’s 
offenses that will always get you fired — fiscal impropriety, something like that.  
But decision-wise, strategy-wise, if our attorney provided advice for HathiTrust 
— and General Counsel here is very good about saying: ‘We provide advice, the 
decision authority rests with the administration, not with general counsel’ — so, if 
General Counsel provides advice, and I concurred with that, and HathiTrust’s 
Executive Director went rogue … that would be a problem.  Right?  But that's not 
gonna happen.  From the very beginning in the hiring, we had this clear 
understanding.  
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And it is my belief that over time, when the dust from the lawsuits settle, the 
world will be better and HathiTrust will become truly independent of the 
university.  But it ain't time yet.” 
 
There were a number of factors interacting during this period that contributed to a shift in 
institutional character, reconfigurations of power, and affected the evolution of HathiTrust.  Chief 
among these factors were the lawsuit, the emergence and establishment of HathiTrust’s 
governance, and key personnel changes.     
The result so far has been that HathiTrust’s perspective stretched.  It is no longer focused 
on the battle, but the war.  One of the words that kept surfacing during my interviews with 
HathiTrust members during this period was “sustainability.”  Participants seemed primarily 
interested in the long now of HathiTrust.  One of the ways sustainability was discussed was in 
relation to tensions between legal decision-making authority — which pretty clearly rests with 
the University of Michigan — and fiscal decision-making authority — which rests with 
HathiTrust’s Board of Governors. 
The University Librarian at Michigan reflected on this issue, saying: 
 
When the new Executive Director joined, immediately there were some decisions 
that were made that were in part influenced by our legal analysis.  We made some 
changes and it caused the Board to suddenly react and say, ‘Wait a minute, what 
do you mean Michigan says “no”?!’  This is a very useful thing. We've had 
conversations.  I've met with the Board.  We've talked about everything.   
 
But this creates an interesting tension because the Board of HathiTrust has 
complete fiscal authority, and even though Michigan holds the money, HathiTrust 
decides how to spend it.  I would say that most of the people in the library 
community see HathiTrust’s budget as an extension of their own budget.  They 
focus on the fact that HathiTrust has a big reserve, thinking ‘Why are my dues 
structured the way that they are?  Shouldn't we cut the membership dues to make 
it easier on librarians and help their budgets?’  This potentially sets up a dynamic 
where HathiTrust will be fiscally very conservative, but legally not conservative 
because they bear none of the risk.  My fear that they're going to become fiscally 
conservative and legally risk tolerant.  That would be a mismatch.  I talked about 
that with the board and I think were on a good place about it. 
 
If HathiTrust wants to see more access, more things opened up, the best thing 
HathiTrust can do is not try to get us to change some of our decisions, but to put 
serious funding behind the copyright review process; to create more access in a 
way that we can go defend in court and help the war.” 
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As described in previous chapters, the University of Michigan has done groundbreaking 
work in the area of copyright rights determination — a potentially useful, and also incredibly 
expensive and time-consuming form of non-consumptive research that, in view of its principal 
investigators, would be functionally impossible without access to a resource like HathiTrust.  
That said, rights determination was not one of the proposals submitted and voted on by 
HathiTrust’s members and so it appears unlikely, for the time being, that funds will be dedicated 
to that endeavor as the University Librarian at Michigan recommends.   
Implementation of Initiatives 
As tensions between legal and fiscal authority, between sustainability and growth, 
between ideologies, approaches, leadership, and governance continue to prompt readjustments 
and reconfigurations for HathiTrust and Michigan, implementation on a number of initiatives 
passed at the Constitutional Convention has begun to move forward.  In addition to a proposal 
for the establishment of a governance structure (the implementation of which has already been 
discussed), recall that the initiatives passed include: (1) revising the HathiTrust’s fee model; (2) 
creating a distributed print monographs archive; (3) creating a government documents archive; 
(4) creating a transparent process for inviting, evaluating, ranking, and launching new initiatives; 
and (5) broadening HathiTrust’s mission and goals.  This section traces the implementation of 
each initiative in turn. 
FEE MODEL 
Currently, membership in HathiTrust is limited to academic and research institutions.  
When an institution reaches out to HathiTrust about becoming a member, HathiTrust asks for a 
list of their OCLC numbers pulled from their institutional records which is then compared 
against HathiTrust’s holding.  As one of my participants acknowledged:  
“There are millions of small calculations that go into determining how many 
partners hold a given volume, in order to determine what the final cost to an 
institution will be.  The more partners join, the lower the costs are for everyone.”   
 
The current fee model, passed in 2013, uses information about the overlap to apportion 
costs as follows.  One portion of the costs is based on the number of public domain or open 
access materials and the number of HathiTrust partners.  All HathiTrust partners share the cost of 
those materials equally.  HathiTrust has come up with a number that essentially bundles up all of 
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its organizational operations and overhead costs for staffing, storage, web server infrastructure, 
etc., into a per volume cost.  At last check, this cost amounted to approximately $0.15 per 
volume per year.  HathiTrust currently has just over 100 partners, which means that any given 
partner would pay about $0.15 divided by 100 per public domain or open access volume per 
year.  That's one portion of the costs.  
The other portion of the costs is based on the overlap between an institution’s in-
copyright holdings and HathiTrust’s holdings.  As previously described, in-copyright works are 
not available to read or download in HathiTrust; nevertheless, the volumes add value for all 
members because they’re full-text searchable.  That said, the institutions that really gain value 
from the in-copyright volumes are institutions that hold those volumes in their print collections 
because HathiTrust is essentially providing a preservation backup of the volume.  In addition, 
these institutions are able, in some cases, to make lawful uses of the volumes and so, under the 
fee model, they are treated as deriving more full benefit than the general membership.  So for 
those volumes, HathiTrust divides the per volume cost among the institutions that hold a print 
copy.  Thus, if five institutions hold a print copy of a particular in-copyright work, each one 
would pay three cents per year for that volume (the standard $0.15 per volume cost divided by 
5).   
In terms of HathiTrust’s membership, the overwhelming majority are large, academic 
research institutions from the U.S.  Membership appears to be growing amongst smaller libraries, 
especially liberal arts colleges, which are drawn to HathiTrust primarily as a preservation 
strategy but also benefit from full-text search and enhanced access for print-disabled patrons.  In 
terms of copyright law and access restrictions, the path is somewhat simpler for U.S. institutions 
who do not have to contend with a separate, potentially conflicting, set of regulations from their 
home country.   
HathiTrust’s fee model has been a major stumbling block for at least one major ARL, the 
University of Toronto, whose OCLC records “need to be in better shape.”  As it currently stands, 
the University of Toronto is unable to provide HathiTrust with the full record list which, in turn, 
makes HathiTrust unable to compare holdings and develop a fee estimate.  As a result, University 
of Toronto is unable to join HathiTrust, although the Chief University Librarian has discussed the 
possibility of University of Toronto becoming a new HathiTrust node, perhaps called HathiTrust 
North.  
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With respect to the long now of HathiTrust, there is a strong sense among many 
participants that HathiTrust needs to consider new forms of membership and new types of 
members.  The Program Steering Committee has been charged with exploring new fee models 
that might attract international members:    
“Right now we have a single payment model, a single way to buy into the 
HathiTrust and then there you are.  I don't know exactly why more institutions 
outside of the United States haven’t joined but it may be because of our current 
value calculation.” 
 
Another possibility being contemplated is to permit members to join without contributing 
anything to the corpus:  
Another way of expanding the partnership model is through offering some kind of 
service model partnership, maybe not in preserving the content, but for receiving 
services.  The community will change over time and there may be different ways 
that institutions see value in HathiTrust in different services that we can provide.  
 
Relatedly, some participants discussed developing membership models that expand 
eligibility beyond academic and research institutions:  
“Perhaps an individual might one day be able to join HathiTrust.  There may be 
people who may just want to download content from us; they may want that 
ability.  They may want the ability to deposit content in HathiTrust without 
necessarily becoming partners.  They may have a different fee model that they're 
interested in.  I think there a lot of possibilities right now and it's a matter of just 
weighing, what's on our core mission?  Who is the community that we’re serving 
and how can we serve them most effectively?” 
 
These are all considerations for HathiTrust’s governance as it works toward sustainable 
evolution into the future. 
PRINT MANAGEMENT 
The distributed print monographs archive was proposed by HathiTrust’s Executive 
Committee and was, for HathiTrust’s lead architect, one of the primary motivations for creating 
HathiTrust.  HathiTrust represented, in many ways, his efforts to leverage the digital corpus 
generated primarily by the mass digitization project for “collective action around the collective 
collection.”  In particular, he believes that HathiTrust has the potential to revolutionize shared 
print management. 
It turns out that a very small percentage, about 3%, of an academic research library’s 
print holdings are actually used.  The other 97% is essentially stored in the libraries stacks or in 
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off-site storage facilities.  This reflects a costly, inefficient and, in the view of HathiTrust’s 
progenitor, unnecessary reality.  While he agrees that “libraries do need to store this material, we 
don’t need to have twenty or thirty copies stored in big refrigerators all over the country.”    
In his view, the HathiTrust’s print management project is fundamentally about: 
“libraries gaining efficiencies in storage and preservation of services while 
offering better access to those materials and allowing them to do even better 
things in the new digital world.  HathiTrust really grows out of the recognition of 
the great power of digital access to materials over great distances and the 
recognition of digital formats as a valid preservation strategy.  HathiTrust has the 
potential to revolutionize shared print management.  We don't have a firm grasp 
on what the print record is but if we use HathiTrust right, if we get this print book 
storage effort moving forward, we will begin to understand our print collections 
in a much more coordinated way and manage it more effectively.  We can have 
fewer copies, have the right number of copies, not hundreds of copies of 
commonly unused works.”  
 
One library director opined that print books were going to become “the albatross around 
the necks of libraries — all cost, no value.”   
After planning and reporting phases reached completion, the program shifted into its 
implementation phase in 2015.450 
The distributed print monographs archive also has potential implications for the long now 
of HathiTrust.  Although the risk tolerance is not there for Michigan, some members of the 
library community within and beyond HathiTrust have suggested that fair use might enable 
digital access to in-copyright works where the institution holds a print copy in storage.  
Particularly if the number of readers of the digital copy was limited to the number of print copies 
held in storage, some participants speculate that fair use might support this activity:  
“I'd like to think that format shifting was a fair use, and that you could take analog 
material and convert it into digital form and then do everything with the digital 
work that you could do with the analog work. But, I don't know if that's the case 
or not.  I haven’t run through the analysis.” 
  
Indeed the Internet Archive has already begun doing this with its Lending Library 
program.  Kahle has purchased (or received donations of) over 16,000 contemporary works, 
digitized them, stored them, and now lends them to the public through its website.451  Whether 
                                                 
450 https://www.hathitrust.org/print_monograph_archiving  
451 https://archive.org/details/lendinglibrary  
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the Lending Library will prompt a copyright infringement lawsuit giving rise to a fair use 
determination, we can only speculate as to the legality of such an arrangement.  
GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS 
The government documents proposal is well underway.  In particular, significant progress 
has been made on the creation of a metadata registry of U.S. Federal Government Documents 
“including documents produced at the government’s expense, in all formats, at the item level, 
from 1789 to the present.”  It may also include grant-funded or contract work, declassified 
materials, pieces of legislation, administrative publications, and/or data sets.452  As previously 
mentioned, disagreements arose over this project with respect to potential copyright implications.  
According to my participant, the University of Michigan’s General Counsel’s office advised 
against the project due to the potential copyright risks involved, but the participant decided to 
move forward with it after conducting a review of relevant legal rules and literature.  Under §105 
of the Copyright Act, works prepared by an officer or employee of the federal government within 
the scope of employment are not entitled to protection under U.S. law.  While this seems fairly 
straightforward, like many things in the copyright universe, boundary lines get blurry pretty fast. 
In terms of the long now of HathiTrust, some participants suggest that the government 
documents project might signal that HathiTrust’s future could become, in some ways, integrated 
with national infrastructure. 
INITIATIVES REVIEW PROCESS 
The purpose of this proposal was to initiative the development of a transparent process 
for inviting, ranking, evaluating, launching and assessing development initiatives from 
HathiTrust partner institutions.  Unlike some of the earlier proposals, this one did not result in a 
stand-alone project but was rather folded into aspects of governance (with the working groups 
and committees, for example).  As described earlier, the general sense of participants in the study 
was that the Constitutional Convention provided members with enough to do that there has not 
been an opportunity or need for the review of additional initiatives, yet. 
                                                 
452 https://www.hathitrust.org/usgovdocs_registry  
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MISSION AND GOALS 
The proposal regarding broadening HathiTrust’s mission and goals was referred to the 
Board of Governors.  HathiTrust’s mission is to contribute to the common good by collecting, 
organizing, preserving, communicating, and sharing the record of human knowledge.  Its website 
lists a number of specific goals including: 
 To build a reliable and increasingly comprehensive co-owned and co-managed digital 
archive of library materials converted from the print collections of the member 
institutions. 
 To dramatically improve access to these materials in ways that, first and foremost, meet 
the needs of the co-owning institutions, with a particular emphasis on ensuring access for 
individuals with print disabilities. 
 To develop cost-effective and robust infrastructure for digital content of value to scholars 
and researchers, including a variety of formats and born-digital materials. 
 To develop partnerships and services that ensure preservation of the materials in 
HathiTrust and the entire print and digital scholarly record. 
 To reduce long-term capital and operating costs of storage and care of print collections 
through redoubled efforts to coordinate shared storage strategies among libraries. 
 To build infrastructure that facilitates cost-effective and productive collaborations among 
partnering institutions to reduce the cost of securing campus intellectual assets. 
 To define and make available a set of services that supports research using the HathiTrust 
corpus. 
 To create a technical framework that allows for both central and distributed creation of 
tools and services. 
 To sustain the HathiTrust enterprise as a “public good” while at the same time defining a 
set of services that benefits member institutions. 
One of the standard questions I asked of all my participants dealt with whether the 
mission and goals of HathiTrust was well-understood.  I got a somewhat surprising range of 
responses.  There were participants who believe, in the academic library community, that “we all 
understand HathiTrust and stand behind it and are proud of it.”  Another said, “HathiTrust has 
achieved broad acceptance even though it’s expensive to join.”  One even went all the way back 
to HathiTrust’s progenitors saying: 
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“Michigan and Indiana IT are mighty.  It’s just fantastic to store things correctly 
for long-term digital preservation and create new applications and new kinds of 
search mechanisms.  People respect that and know that it’s done just about the 
best way it could possibly be done anywhere.” 
 
On the other hand, as you move beyond the academic research library community, 
HathiTrust’s resonance fades fairly quickly: 
“I don't think that the goals and nature of HathiTrust are probably well understood 
in the broader community. When I talk about the HathiTrust I look around the 
room to see how much it resonates with the group. I would say that it resonates 
much more than it used to but could somebody define it? Probably not. I think 
where we have a brand with people, it's very strong and I think that it is of values 
brand. Is it a brand that tells me what it is exactly? Probably not.”  
 
Another participant said: 
 
“Within the larger academic community the most prevalent view is to not have 
ever heard of it at all. It's a challenge that HathiTrust visions and objectives are 
not well understood by a broad community. I think what we need to do is mobilize 
the HathiTrust membership to create more awareness of HathiTrust in more 
positive ways.”  
 
Participants were mostly in agreement that, beyond the library community, HathiTrust 
does not have a particularly strong brand.  In terms of what to do about that, opinions varied.  
Some, like the participant above, thought that HathiTrust should do more education and 
outreach, communicating its mission, goals, and services to a broader constituency.  Others, like 
the participant below, worried that additional attention and interest in HathiTrust might 
overwhelm the fledgling organization (still buried under the weight of the Constitutional 
Convention initiatives): 
“Normal people don't really know what HathiTrust is. It's kind of opaque. I'd like 
to do a lot more PR and outreach but I don't think we have the resources to both 
be out there and respond to the kind of possibilities that I think would come from 
that.” 
 
One possible approach might be to do outreach that is oriented around that expansion of 
particular services.  For example, given the Court’s ruling on the issue of access for print-
disabled patrons, some HathiTrust members have expressed interest in working to expand that 
access beyond HathiTrust’s members: 
With respect to users who have print disabilities, we’re actively working to 
expand access outside of HathiTrust members for users with print disabilities. I 
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don't know what a service model might look like to sustain not work if one would 
even be needed, but that's something that's on the horizon.  
 
This is another example of the shift in perspective from the highly dynamic, reactive, 
action-oriented, and immediate early days of HathiTrust, to the more structured, deliberative, 
long now of HathiTrust.   
The Long Now of HathiTrust 
This section concludes this story of HathiTrust.  We began in the dark, somewhat hidden, 
catacombs of early large-scale digitization efforts.  We were catapulted into the digital future by 
the Google Library Project and the whirlwind of mass digitization’s great unknowns.  We 
navigated the terrain of inter-institutional team-building and decision-making which was marked 
by tremendous acts of courage, trust, and a few landmines.  We witnessed the tremendous growth 
of HathiTrust through its intensive incubation and development period.  We observed its rite of 
passage from a small, nimble, informal organization to a semi-autonomous, collectively 
governed organization with over 100 partners.  We watched with cautious optimism as it fought 
for fair use and returned home victorious.  We surveyed the aftermath, as it rejoices and recoils, 
shaping and becoming shaped by its broader sociotechnical environment.     
Now we turn our gaze toward the future.  Using data generated from my interviews, this 
section distills some of the key themes, concerns, hopes, fear, and dreams of participants as they 
speculate about the long now of HathiTrust. 
When asked to hypothesize and contemplate the future and HathiTrust’s role in it, many 
respondents returned to a focus on technology.  Technological change has always been a 
significant propellant of sociotechnical change.  “Technological change changes the context of 
decisions,” one of my participants said.  The future will depend, in large part, on how 
technologies continue to evolve.  Another participant reflected, “[t]he mass digitization project 
was the starting place to whatever the endgame was going to be.  We are still nowhere near the 
endgame.”    
It may be true that we are nowhere near the endgame, but one thing that the mass 
digitization project and subsequent emergence and evolution of HathiTrust demonstrated is the 
academic research communities’ ability to engage in effective collective action.  As one of my 
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participants remarked: “One of the breakthroughs of HathiTrust is that we've proven to ourselves 
that we can aggregate scale to mutual benefit and outcome in the digital era.” 
 In terms of how technologies might impact HathiTrust’s continued evolution, 
participants agree that a number of project developments might be in its near future.  One project 
focuses on continuing to push forward and innovate in the area of accessibility technologies.  As 
one participant stressed:  
“This is where the quality of the scan does impact access, because the adaptive 
technology may not permit the print disabled person from accessing the content if 
the quality of the scan is poor.”   
 
In addition, building better tools and systems for digitizing, preserving, and organizing 
non-text items is thought to part of our near future.  The HathiTrust Collections Committee has 
begun exploring the possibilities of pushing forward into image and audio file formats, but the 
ultimate role HathiTrust will play in that transition is still up for debate.  
More broadly speaking, participants talked about how technological change will continue 
to have important implications for emerging social practices implicating copyright law.  As one 
participant said,   
“I think that it will be decided by society that in order to maintain a balance of 
rights and access, some things are going to have to be changed and the thing that 
will drive that, somehow or another, is technology.” 
 
The intersections of copyright, technology, and social practice will continue co-evolve.  
Whether this process of mutual-readjustment will ultimately lead to greater access and openness 
or tighter restrictions was a question that weighed heavily on the minds of my participants.  One 
of the key decision-makers involved in the UM-Google project reflected: 
“My hope from the beginning was that, in time, the existence of this corpus of 
work would cause various actors in the world to want to figure out a way to use it 
and to use it well. And that sort of pressure, especially from the youth, would 
eventually lead to arrangements and outcomes that would make the work 
readable, as well as searchable and metadata rich, and that’s still my hope.” 
 
Another participant said: 
 
“I truly believe that open is the future. Do we get there in one fell swoop? No. But 
we're pushing the envelope as much as we can through things like HathiTrust and 
so I think that the naysayers are the ones that are trying to hold back the ocean.” 
 
Other participants were somewhat more cautious in their assessment of the future: 
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Is everything going to be locked up and corporatized?  Is it all going to be Apple 
iPhones all the way down with closed apps closed operating systems?  Or are we 
actually going to have a World Wide Web-style future?  I guess I'm a little bipolar 
on that.  Sometimes I think we’re going to win and sometimes I think we are 
going to lose.  Looking back, I think it's going to be the seeds of things to come.  
We’ll either be locked up in this sort of: ‘Open was a nice idea by a bunch of 
idealists but they don’t understand the rigor of what we’re talking about in MBA 
school.’  That's one version of the future.  Or there's the open competition and 
open system and method that allowed newcomers to come in and innovate.  That’s 
the winning system and we knew that all along. And I can't tell you which of 
those histories is going to be the one that's written.  I can tell you which one I'm 
throwing everything I’ve got into trying to make happen.” 
 
What does it mean to throw everything we’ve going into trying to make the “Open” 
version of the future the one that succeeds?  For many participants it means taking on more of an 
advocacy position and working collaboratively with other stakeholders and constituencies to 
advance the interest, values, and goals of HathiTrust.  Advocacy happens on multiple fronts.  
One front is social.  HathiTrust is collaborating with other digital libraries and preservation 
networks: 
“The landscape is evolving right now and we are beginning to form a community 
that is thinking about the different functions of the library and how to fulfill them 
and specializing within the community, recognizing that some people or 
institutions have certain aptitudes for doing certain things really well. For 
example, Europeana and the Digital Public Library of America are very much into 
aggregation and the Digital Preservation Network is an underlying preservation 
network.  Right now HathiTrust is in the middle of those.  We have a preservation 
mission and we also have a deeply ingrained access mission.  If we do well as a 
community, and we succeed, it will be because we’re performing these functions 
collaboratively.” 
 
There is a recognition that, for HathiTrust to succeed in its mission, collaboration and 
advocacy will need to expand beyond the library universe.  “As long as it's seen as a library 
thing, a library responsibility, it's not really going to get off the ground.”  Another participant 
said:   
“I just don't think it's realistic that HathiTrust can continue maintaining the status 
quo, doing exactly what it's doing now, and remain viable and valuable for users. 
If our users continue to just be the librarians, were okay. But I think we would 
want, in the future, for any citizen in the United States or abroad to be able to 
leverage this information. And right now the only audience is librarians talking to 
librarians.” 
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 Another participant said: 
 
“I hope that in the future more people other than librarians are going to care about 
this.  A part of me thinks that HathiTrust and libraries are not important enough to 
advance these problems.  I think that if Google or Amazon said, ‘You know what?  
Public domain books — that's where it's at!  We have to invest money in that.  
That's the thing!”  I mean, we wouldn't have HathiTrust if it weren't for Google so 
part of me is a little cynical about whether or not the research library community 
has enough moxie and power to really articulate these issues to the average 
citizen, or even the average faculty member, to make a difference and get people 
to agree that this is something worth investing money in, that people need to stop 
giving up their rights, that we need to make these things open.”   
 
There was a shared sense amongst participants that so long as issues around open access 
and open systems and fair use were treated as “library issues,” initiatives were going to be of 
limited success.  Figuring out ways to make these issues resonate with a wider audience is going 
to be a key part of advocacy moving forward. 
Another important, and somewhat more contentious, front for advocacy around these 
issues is on the law side.  Some participants recommend engaging with the Copyright Office and 
legislators in an effort to reform the Copyright Act:  
“Responsible government should revise the Copyright Act in the next 20 years 
because of the technological changes that are continuing to happen.  What reforms 
should there be?  Any reforms that make it perfectly possible for us to do exactly 
what we want without any extra money being paid!  Right now, based on the 
model of library practice that we've been pursuing for the last century, we have 
what we need.  But if changes can be made that maintain protections for the 
copyright holder — especially authors — and permit libraries to provide full, 
legitimate, lawful  access for educational purposes … that is my dream.”  
 
Others are not so convinced that the Copyright Act will be, or should be, revised. 
 
It is a worry that if they open up the Copyright Act in this day and age, the results 
will be more limiting.  Most copyright experts don't seem to have a lot of hope 
that the copyright regime is going to change for the better.  For the copyright 
regime to change, Congress has to make a change.  And none of them would say 
that that's going to happen in their lifetime.” 
 
As it arguably did in Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, additional acts of innovative deviance 
may be the best approach to teaching Copyright law to change along with the changing 
sociotechnical environment.  Programs such as providing digital access to out-of-print works that 
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are held in storage, in hard copy, at the institution may be a reasonable next step forward in the 
fight to advance fair use.   As one participant noted:  
“The problem is always, of course, with copyright and the real big change will 
come if and when we can actually read these books.  That's why I was so 
disappointed that the Google settlement eventually collapsed, because that was 
the only avenue that was gonna be able to allow us to read most of the books 
published in the twentieth century.” 
 
The Internet Archive’s Lending Library is already taking an aggressive approach to 
making contemporary works accessible by offering digital access to in-print works without tying 
digital access to physical access.  Kahle recalled a conversation he had with Michael Lesk: 
“Michael Lesk, who I think of as the father digital libraries, said I'm worried 
about the twentieth century — no problem with the twenty-first century it looks 
like we’re in good shape — but it looks like the twentieth century might be locked 
up.” 
 
The Lending Library takes a step toward unlocking the twentieth century.  However, few 
participants were convinced with Lesk’s assessment that the twenty-first is in good shape 
particularly because of trends of publishing moving increasingly toward a licensing regime. 
“Another legal regime, based on licensing or something else, is going to pop up 
dominate the landscape in terms of the way access to these materials is handled.  
We are just at the beginning of this era of license and that is going to continue to 
move forward.”  
 
“Initial first publications are increasingly being published in a digital format and 
we’re basically going along operating as if e-books have the permanence of a 
printed book on our shelves.  But there is a big difference.  If something bad 
happens to the computing infrastructure of our nation there would be a blank on 
our shelves of everything starting about 2007 moving forward.  Many of the 
typical academic library publications that we buy from vendors will not be there.” 
 
Another participant notes: 
“I think we’re under tremendous risk to not have long-term access to works that 
are being created now and in the future that are licensed rather than sold to 
libraries.  I think it's overly optimistic to view the twenty-first century as problem-
free.  Works that are currently being commercially exploited, and published in 
electronic form, they will be okay for so long as their commercially exploited, and 
then they're likely to turn into digital dust without anybody noticing.  So I think 
the twenty-first century is deeply fraught.” 
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So far, HathiTrust has not addressed the challenges inherent in the shift from a copyright 
to a licensing regime.  HathiTrust is a fundamentally about retrospective conversion and the 
challenges of continuing to bring in new materials, particular born digital or licensed materials, 
and grow the collection is not happening.  The challenges posed by the transition to licensing 
may prevent HathiTrust from continuing to meet the needs of the community.  As one participant 
said:   
“It's really the community that's driving things and our success right now 
completely depends on being aligned with the needs and goals of our members.  
To the extent that we were able to stay on target with that, stay in touch with our 
members and leverage the abilities of our members, we’ll do well.  If we don't do 
that, I think we’ll shrivel pretty quickly.  I think there is the ability for it to do 
even more.  I think as long as University of Michigan exists, HathiTrust will exist.  
Michigan will not let HathiTrust fail.” 
  
 We can notice an interesting tension hidden in the above quote.  On the one hand, the 
participant recognizes the continuing relationship between Michigan and HathiTrust as a source 
of strength and security.  On the other hand, they recognize that the community is driving things 
and it is HathiTrust’s ability to serve the goals of its members that will determine its success or 
failure.  Finding space to experiment, grow, and innovate in the current, relatively more 
conservative, sustainability-focused environment at Michigan will be one of HathiTrust’s main 
challenges moving forward.     
One of my participants made an interesting observation related to this point: 
“One of the revolutionary aspects of HathiTrust is that it models the future.  The 
revolution here is in the community coming together around a very important 
value and concept for libraries and then figuring out how we leverage this use it to 
the best and greatest extent for our user community for our scholars and really 
push the boundaries of fair use as much as we can and be willing to do that.  
Technology is going to force us to really think differently and the more we can do 
that as a community, the better.” 
 
There’s almost an inherent tradeoff between sustainability and generativity.  We can focus 
on finding ways to ensure that HathiTrust remains relevant, functional, credible, and sustainable 
in the future, treating the future as some relatively stable uncertainty.  Or we can focus on finding 
ways to create the future we want to inhabit; this approach necessarily involves more risks and 
more opportunities for failure and success.  There is not one correct approach, but it is very 
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difficult to attempt both approaches simultaneously.  One of my participants who runs the IT 
department at a major library had the following reflection:  
“Librarians come from a fairly long and well-established book culture, where 
there's all kinds of structure and format around how you encode your knowledge 
and how you describe your knowledge, and how you accredit your knowledge, 
and how you distribute your knowledge.  And now we’re in this environment that 
is fundamentally different in ways that we do not yet understand.  We're still 
figuring it out.  But we have this mindset that’s very, very deeply ingrained in 
academia and in libraries.  And so the place where I tend to fret a little bit in 
thinking about the future, is preserving enough ‘figuring it out space’ while we’re 
still in a place of very rapid transition.  I want us to resist the urge to encode too 
carefully what we’re doing and how we do it because we also need to keep 
figuring out what it is that we’re playing with.  And really, this is young.  It's 20 
years old right now.  25 years old maybe.  And I worry that you expect everything 
to walk like a duck and quack like a duck because ducks is what you deal with.  
But if an ostrich wanders onto the scene, you're going to make it look like a duck 
because you deal in ducks.  We need to retain enough space for the technology 
team to think creatively about what this means so that they don’t simply make us 
more ducks.” 
 
 Finding that balance between safety and innovation is going to a key challenge moving 
forward.  The participant just quoted is a technologist and brings that perspective to the issue, but 
as this work demonstrates, technology is one strand of a much larger, incredibly complicated, 
sociotechnical knot.  If HathiTrust’s past is any indication, it will be the organizational and 
institutional relationships that play the most central role in its continuing evolution. 
 Perhaps it makes sense to conclude this story of HathiTrust with an expression of its 
earliest progenitor’s hopes and fears about the long now of HathiTrust:  
“If HathiTrust succeeds, I think it will succeed because we recognize in it the 
potential to do the things libraries needs to do and that libraries will leverage the 
scale of HathiTrust to be better at stewarding the cultural record and devote more 
resources to engagement on their campuses. 
 
If HathiTrust fails, it will fail because our collectivity limited the opportunity for 
expansive interpretations, for brave actions, the kinds of things that happened 
with the Authors Guild lawsuit that got us to her we are now.  Now that there's 
this collectivity there is a danger that good and bold things will not be done 
because we would not be able to act with the same kind of courage as a collective 
and that would drive us to narrower and narrower positions.  And I don't think that 
shift in thinking is an inevitability.  These things are choices.  A successful 
enterprise is going to make brave decisions no matter how big it gets and how 
much shared governance you have.  You can make decisions to push the 
organization in that direction.  You can push them to timidity or you can push 
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them to bravery and I think that this is the big challenge that HathiTrust’s new 
Executive Director is going to have.  He’s got to encourage them to be brave.”  
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Chapter X: Conclusion    
This research traced the emergence and evolution of HathiTrust.  The story of HathiTrust 
provides a window through which we can describe and explain some of the complex, often 
murky, intersections among technological change, emerging social practices, and copyright law 
as part of a larger reflection of processes of sociotechnical transformation.    This research asked 
questions including: How and why does a relatively risk-averse academic institution decide to 
undertake an incredibly risky new initiative?  How and why does technological change influence 
decision-making around risks and opportunities?  How do decision-makers make sense of, 
explain, and justify those decisions, actions, and tradeoffs?  How do new technical, 
organizational, and legal forms emerge and evolve over time to support the social 
transformations?  How do emerging forms of practice and design reflect and respond to internal 
and external factors, tensions, relationships, and stakeholders?   
This research on HathiTrust attempts to provide answers to those questions and others by 
offering a richly detailed account of the entangled and mutually constitutive relationships among 
law, technology, and social practice.  The pre-history of HathiTrust, which explored large-scale 
digitization efforts up to and including the mass digitization project, offers clues about how 
changes in technology change the context of decisions.  Innovations in technology alter the 
possibility space of our activity as well as the ways in which we identify, evaluate, and make 
sense of opportunities and risks, and the ways in which other stakeholders in our environment 
interpret, react to, and in some cases adjudicate our choices.  Technology may emerge and evolve 
in a relatively more fast-paced and dynamic way, but it is neither determinative nor always the 
primary force or source of sociotechnical transformation.  New spaces for social practice and 
engagement are made possible through changes in technology and, through processes of 
invention, use, modification, and regulation we come to recognize technologies are also socially 
constructed.  Transformation in the context of this research is shown to be characteristically 
dynamic, non-linear, multi-directional, and guided by careful deliberation and planning as well 
as unanticipated, accidental, and/or sometimes controversial choices and actions.  
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Technological change is a useful jumping off point, but very quickly we begin to 
recognize the ways that technologies are only a small piece of a much larger and more 
complicated system that also includes, in this instance, legal institutions like copyright law, and 
academic institutions that have deeply encoded practices and shared traditions.  As technology, 
social practice, and law interact and constantly readjust to each over time new sociotechnical 
forms emerge, like HathiTrust, that provide signposts to broader still processes of sociotechnical 
transformation. 
In addition to providing a telling of HathiTrust’s origination and early evolution, this 
research makes a number of other contributions which will be briefly summarized in this final 
chapter.  Its first, and perhaps most potentially significant, contribution is the development of a 
new analytic framework for describing, explaining, and understanding processes of 
sociotechnical transformation based on the concept of innovative deviance. 
Innovative Deviance and Sociotechnical Transformation 
The innovative deviance framework provides important clues into some of the ways that 
social and legal structures may influence, prompt, and channel emerging behavior, particularly in 
environments destabilized by rapid change.  A mismatch between culturally accepted goals and 
the institutionalized means to accomplish the goals can generate a sense of disequilibrium or 
strain within a society or community that pushes people toward deviance.  Deviance can follow a 
number of different paths but one path in particular, innovative deviance, merits special attention.  
The reason that innovative deviance differs from the other paths of deviance is because it is the 
only one that promotes the accepted goal, although it rejects the institutionalized means to 
accomplish the goal and/or legitimate means are unavailable for accomplishing the goal.  
Innovative deviance is the creative use of illegitimate means to accomplish a desired legitimate 
end.  Innovative deviance therefore represents a tension between our desire to accomplish the 
goals to which we all aspire, and the sense that we should all play by the same rules, and that the 
rules are a fixed point.  Innovative deviance is a method by which institutions, social structures, 
law, and other slow-moving forms learn to change. 
This research expands upon the innovative deviance framework articulated by Robert 
Merton and others working in the structuralist vein in two ways.  The first is by applying it to a 
new context, namely copyright law and emerging research and scholarly communication 
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practices.  The innovative deviance framework helps us understand how and why 
transformations occur at a grand scale, influencing collaborative computing and knowledge 
sharing at the level of institutions and infrastructures.   
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, this research expands on the basic framework 
advanced by Merton and others by supplementing the structuralist/functionalist approach with a 
process-oriented approach informed most meaningfully by Weick and colleagues’ research on 
sensemaking.  Sensemaking and decision-making theories provide insights into how change and 
transformation is not simply a reaction to structured imbalances in society, but also coalesces and 
percolates up from individual and organizational relationships and interactions.  When we shift 
our perspective from the bird’s eye to the worm’s eye, we can see that the on-the-ground realities 
of personal relationships and small-group dynamics play a big part in how the structural tensions 
are channeled and interpreted.  Dispersed, emerging, mutually-constitutive sensemaking 
processes are also crucial; sensemaking shapes and is shaped by the entanglements of law, 
technology, and emerging social practice.   An understanding of sociotechnical transformation 
calls for a combined top-down and bottom-up analytic approach.   
There were three key instances in the story of HathiTrust where the innovative deviance 
framework provided a useful analytic lens.  The first instance was Michigan’s decision to join the 
Google Library Project.  As described, lots of institutions including Michigan had been actively 
pursuing digitization on a large scale.  There was a strong sense within academia, echoed in 
many other sectors as well, that “digital is the future.”  There was a drive to digitize but various 
technical, organizational, financial and (to a lesser extent) legal impediments hampered the 
implementation and follow-through on those early endeavors.  Google’s offer to digitize 
Michigan’s collection in a matter of years and cover virtually all of the associated costs seemed, 
to those at Michigan, like a way to overcome many of the obstacles that had stood in the way of 
earlier digitization efforts.  Unfortunately, copyright law, as it existed at the time, did not provide 
an obvious safe passage from the analog to the digital world.  There were no institutionalized 
means within copyright law for digitizing millions of in-copyright books.  Therefore, when 
Michigan decided to engage in the digitization and assume the copyright risks associated with 
this new behavior, it was essentially making creative use of illegitimate means to accomplish a 
desired legitimate end.  There was the sense that Michigan’s choice would force theories of fair 
use, theories that had not yet been borne out by practice or adjudicated by the courts.  The mass 
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digitization project was a way of recalibrating the balance in copyright between its overriding 
goals and the institutionalized means articulated in the Copyright Act; it was a way of teaching 
copyright law to change and adjust to changes in technology and social practices.  
The second key instance of innovative deviance discussed in this research was Michigan 
(and Indiana’s) decision to move outside the CIC governance structure and forge a bi-lateral 
agreement to form the digital repository.  All of the CIC institutions recognized the need for a 
shared digital repository, i.e. there was a shared goal, but the institutionalized means for 
accomplishing the goal were, in Michigan’s view, far inadequate and restrictive.  The governance 
structure and shared culture of many academic libraries favored slow-moving, fine grained, 
detail-oriented deliberation via egalitarian voting processes.  Michigan and Indiana attempted to 
“reason” with the group but ultimately rejected that decision-making process in favor of their 
own bi-lateral agreement.  Michigan and Indiana made creative use of illegitimate means to 
accomplish a desired legitimate end.  As with the decision around the mass digitization project, 
the decision to create the shared digital repository was a way of teaching the CIC to change.  The 
innovative deviance “bomb” was the thing that unstuck the shared digital repository and got the 
process moving forward again.  As one of my study participants reflected: “HathiTrust is not 
going to change libraries.  What it's going to do, it's going to allow libraries to change.  That's the 
big one.” 
The third key instance of innovative deviance was reflected in the district court’s 
sensemaking around the mass digitization project.  I suggested that while fair use and 
transformative use doctrine and precedent provide an incredible source of protection and 
flexibility for new and emerging forms of practice and engagement with protected works using 
digital technologies, the legal mechanisms and tests employed by courts may not go far enough 
to protect and support innovative deviance.  The district court judge seemed to recognize this 
when he concluded that the current uses of the digital corpus so clearly promote the overriding 
goals of copyright that we should not be particularly concerned about whether or not legal 
precedent exists to support a finding of fair use.  In other words, he seemed to accept innovative 
deviance — creative use of illegitimate means to accomplish a desired legitimate end — as a 
legally valid exercise of one’s rights under the Act.  The Circuit Court disagreed, however, 
explaining that the behaviors are not analyzed on the basis of how well they accomplish the goals 
of copyright, but rather on whether or not they satisfy the test for fair use, i.e. the 
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institutionalized means.  While the ultimate outcomes of the decisions were functionally the 
same — HathiTrust won — the difference in reasoning may have important, potentially negative, 
implications for future adjudications of innovative deviance.   
The innovative deviance framework may help us also make sense of HathiTrust’s 
continued evolution.  For example, where the story left off, there were growing tensions 
emerging from the power dynamics between HathiTrust’s membership and the University of 
Michigan.  In particular, there were concerns over future initiatives and directions from 
HathiTrust, particularly where they raise potential copyright implications.  The institutional 
character of Michigan has changed in significant ways in the last decade, becoming increasingly 
conservative and risk-averse as a consequence of the lawsuit and key changes in personnel and 
leadership.  As HathiTrust’s members are still working through the implementation of several of 
its first-round initiatives, these tensions have not come to a head.  One could imagine, at some 
future date, that the dynamic between HathiTrust and Michigan will be in need of recalibration 
either through some act(s) of innovative deviance and/or through severance, i.e. HathiTrust 
becomes an independent legal entity. 
In addition, the innovative deviance framework can help us make sense of other 
controversies emerging within and outside of the copyright world.  For example, it could provide 
some helpful insights into describing, explaining, and understanding Aaron Swartz’s copying of 
JSTOR’s archive and the ensuing reaction from the affected institutions, the government, and the 
public media around the events.  Similarly, the current controversies involving Sci-Hub, a 
website that hosts 40 million mostly unauthorized copies of copyrighted scientific works, might 
be partially explained through an application of the innovative deviance framework.  Beyond 
copyright, the framework may help us understand how structured inequalities produce socially 
beneficial transgressions.  We might look to controversies involving Edward Snowden and 
Wikileaks as possible departure points for future explorations.   
Transformation and Transformative Use 
In addition to contributing to understanding of the emergence and evolution of HathiTrust 
and processes of sociotechnical transformation through the innovative deviance framework, this 
research also contributes understandings of the relationship between transformation, broadly 
construed, and transformative use. Transformation in the copyright context is related to, but far 
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more restrictive than, the broader notions of sociotechnical transformation mentioned above.  In 
the context of research and scholarly communication, transformation provides a particularly 
interesting point of comparison between the overlap, and lack of overlap, in meanings and 
understandings.  
Transformation is critical to the scholarly endeavor.  Researchers, teachers, and students 
routinely read, use, adapt, reconfigure, modify, synthesize between and among various resources 
as part of the learning, teaching, and communicating process.  Copyright recognizes the 
importance of transformation in educational contexts, in large part through the fair use doctrine.  
In copyright law, transformation is made quantifiable through the application of elements, 
factors, comparisons, analogies, and tests.  The Authors Guild v. HathiTrust case revealed some 
interesting insights into judicial sensemaking about transformation.  But transformation in the 
scholarly communications context is far broader than its legal definitions.  It refers to how 
emerging technologies are fundamentally altering the ways that scholarship is created, 
disseminated, used, preserved, and controlled.  And transformation also refers to how social 
practices in the scholarly environment are changing at the institutional, organizational, 
disciplinary, and individual levels.  
To the extent that fair use and transformative use in the copyright law context are overly 
focused on tests and precedent (as is the custom in the practice of law) it can sometimes lose 
sight of the forest for the trees.  In other words, sensemaking around copyright law can lose 
sense of the broader purposes of fair use, transformative use, and the goals of copyright law more 
generally.  This can become problematic when the courts are asked to rule on innovative 
deviance which involves behaviors that, by their very definition, promote important social goals 
but do so via illegitimate, unorthodox, and/or infringing means.  If we are restricted to tests that 
privilege the test itself over the ultimate purpose of the determination, then we risk condemning 
emerging socially productive uses of protected works.   
As I described in Chapter VIII, iterative, non-consumptive, technology-enabled uses of 
protected works do not fit neatly within the core traditions of fair use and transformative use.  
With things like search and data mining, the transformation we’re seeking to protect through fair 
use isn’t captured by the secondary work — displays of the search results or the instances of the 
word “dogs” in a given work.  Rather, the transformation we are seeking to protect is this broader 
sense of transformation that I described earlier.  Full-text search is transformative because it 
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fundamentally and beneficially changes scholarly communication practices; it makes new 
meaning, message, and understanding possible and in so doing promotes the overriding goals of 
copyright law.  But it is not HathiTrust that is doing that work, it is the person using HathiTrust.  
To promote broad socially beneficial sociotechnical transformations, copyright law will need to 
offer robust protection for technology intermediaries and service providers.  I suggested that the 
development of a contributory transformative use doctrine might be called for.  In addition, a 
balancing test that provides judges with broad discretion to weigh the potential social benefits of 
a use (i.e. how well it promotes the overriding goals of copyright) against potential harms to 
copyright holders might also be a way of building greater flexibility into the copyright law 
system and ensuring more channels of support for innovative deviance.  Finding ways to bridge 
sensemaking around transformation in the context of copyright law will be an important locale 
for future research. 
Policy as Embedded Generativity 
This work also contributes to understandings of the role of policy in processes of 
sociotechnical transformation.  Section 4.4.2 of the UM-Google agreement teaches how, in 
addition to opening and closing spaces of technical design and social practice, policy can also 
function as a source of embedded generativity in sociotechnical systems, preserving open spaces 
in support of future transformations.  
The MDP was groundbreaking in terms of its scale, speed, and innovative deviance -- its 
willingness to creatively push against the boundaries of existing copyright laws to accomplish 
the overriding goal of copyright.  While large-scale library digitization efforts had been ongoing 
for at least a decade prior to the MDP, an endeavor like this had never before been undertaken; it 
was full of potential and rife with uncertainty.  This research showed how policy and 
policymaking played a central role in defining and navigating the emerging technical and social 
environments of mass digitization.  Perhaps by virtue of its scale, speed, and concomitant 
copyright risk, the mass digitization project generated an overarching web of policies around 
digitization that had been largely absent or uncoordinated in previous large-scale digitization 
efforts.  As earlier described, those precursors tended to be one-off, relatively short-lived, 
resource-restricted endeavors with limited organizational infrastructure and support.   
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Policy played a significant role in the story of HathiTrust for at least four reasons.  First, 
policy was functional. The agreements were designed and intended to mitigate uncertainty and 
provide a safety net against some of the potential risks (copyright and other) associated with 
digitization.  Second, policy was important in terms of internal and external sensemaking around 
the mass digitization project and the co-construction of meaning.  Third, policy, specifically 
clause §4.4.2 in the UM-Google agreement, can become a powerful value lever for 
sociotechnical transformation, empowering the University of Michigan to leverage the mass 
digitized corpus for collective action in the research library world around challenges and 
problems common to all of its members.  Finally, this research shows how policy can function as 
a source of embedded generativity, enabling new, innovative, often unanticipated, potentially 
transformative changes to occur at the intersections of social practice and technical design. 
Absent §4.4.2, it was doubtful that research libraries would have been legally permitted 
to share or collaborate around the digital corpus.  We would have ended up with Google’s range 
of services and up to forty siloed back-up copies (one for each participating library).  While such 
digital siloes are not without value, it is the capacity of the libraries to cooperate and collaborate 
around this material, and build something by, of, and for the academic research world that was so 
potentially transformational.  Without §4.4.2, there would have been no HathiTrust, and likely 
far fewer opportunities for collective action around the collective collection.   
It can be tempting, in retrospect, to normalize the evolution of new sociotechnical forms.  
Hindsight bias can pose a significant obstacle to accurately tracing the creation and subsequent 
impacts of a policy such as §4.4.2.  There is a strong tendency for people to understand 
HathiTrust as it currently exists and retrospectively make sense of its emergence and evolution as 
a rational, planned, fairly linear, perhaps even unavoidable progression from point A to point B.   
In reality, however, that could not be further from the truth.   
When the UM-Google Agreement was entered into, and section §4.4.2 was drafted, 
Michigan was operating on the belief that the digitized corpus would be a dark archive – a digital 
back-up copy of the library with little to no provision for access, an understandable position to 
take given the state of copyright law as it was understood to exist at the time.  This is not to 
suggest, however, that there was no inkling that the digitized corpus might someday, somehow, 
under a modified set of legal and organizational facts become something more than a dark 
archive.  There was certainly a utopian vision of creating a universal digital library underlying 
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§4.4.2, but it was deeply buried and very much inchoate when the agreement was made.  No one, 
not even the architect of the provision, knew the extent of its significance and meaning in 
advance.  It was, at that point, a matter of embedded generativity, safeguarding the possibility of 
future transformation within the academic research library world by preserving open spaces for 
collaboration and new, innovative, and unanticipated uses of what was assuredly an unparalleled 
digital resource.   
It took time for that generative potential to take shape and evolve.  Today, the values and 
generativity embedded in §4.4.2 are finding new outlets.  Projects like the HathiTrust Research 
Center are beginning to providing academic researchers with support and assistance in 
conducting non-consumptive computational research including data mining and other forms of 
digital humanities work.  Libraries are also using the corpus to engage in cooperative non-
consumptive research for their own ends.  For example, under the leadership of the University of 
Michigan Library and with funding support in the form of a National Leadership Grant from the 
Institute of Museum and Library Services, libraries have used the HathiTrust corpus to research 
key dates in the lifecycle of copyrighted works (publication date and location, author information 
and death dates if applicable, GATT restoration, and other complex considerations) to build 
evidence for opening works to the public domain or setting trigger dates for their future release.  
This copyright review management system would have been functionally impossible without the 
MDP and §4.4.2.  Additional nodes of expansion are being discussed to support new and 
innovative uses of the corpus.  Some HathiTrust members are actively seeking ways to expand 
beyond text-based services to include audiovisual nodes.  These are just a few of the changes 
currently being discussed and developed by HathiTrust’s membership and each of these new 
potentials reflects the values and generativity embedded in §4.4.2.   
While §4.4.2 opened space for new, often unanticipated, forms of innovation and 
generativity, it is important to note that the clause also foreclosed some opportunities.  The 
Internet Archive, for example, has been largely excluded from participation in HathiTrust 
because of §4.4.2 and other aspects of the UM-Google Agreement.  In addition, the Agreement 
has fairly rigid restrictions about sharing and collaboration even with respect to the public 
domain materials.  Recognition that policies like §4.4.2 can open and close spaces of social 
practice and technical design must also accept that even these barriers are permeable and, with 
sufficient technical skill and social support, may be prone to dissolution.  
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The story of HathiTrust thus provides a localized, granular example of how policy, 
design, and practice are entangled, dynamic, and mutually constitutive.  While policy, 
particularly §4.4.2, had a tremendous impact on library mass digitization and the subsequent 
emergence and evolution of HathiTrust, it was value-driven and generative rather than 
determinative.  §4.4.2 did not cause, create, or produce the HathiTrust we know and understand 
today.  Rather, it embedded within the Project a source of generativity capable of opening (and 
closing) spaces of social practice and technical design in new, innovative, often unanticipated, 
and potentially transformative ways. 
This research also suggests that an increased focus on policy can help bridge “the gap 
between what we need to do socially and what we can do technically” that has been a primary 
concern and challenge for researchers studying sociotechnical systems.453  Policy can provide a 
flexible-yet-binding link between relatively rigid technical forms and relatively fluid and 
unpredictable social practices.  Policy can simultaneously enable rigorous action by reducing 
uncertainty around risk and also imbue relationships with a degree of nuance and functional 
ambiguity that supports adaptability and change.  
In addition, this research demonstrates how policy can stabilize and coalesce future 
sensemaking and decision-making around emergent sociotechnical forms, ultimately tightening 
the design-practice-policy knot.454  The UM-Google Agreement provided important clues and 
signals about individual and organizational sensemaking and decision-making around the mass 
digitization project.  Policy provides a window into what the parties believed was important, 
what concerns (or lack of concerns) they might have had, and what sorts of justifications might 
underlie those beliefs and decisions.  In addition, when the UM-Google Agreement became 
public, its power became demonstrable; the policy altered the ways in which other institutions 
negotiated, enacted, and engaged in digitization.  The irreversible and visible commitment 
between UM and Google channeled future sensemaking and decision-making around the mass 
digitization project, tightening these processes and making them more predictable, orderly, 
organized, and self-reaffirming.  The policy became more than a simple artifact of a binding 
                                                 
453 Ackerman, M. S. (2000). The intellectual challenge of CSCW: the gap between social requirements and technical 
feasibility. Human-computer interaction, 15(2), 179-203. 
454 See e.g. Jackson, S. J., Gillespie, T., & Payette, S. (2014, February). The policy knot: Re-integrating policy, 
practice and design in Cscw studies of social computing. In Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer 
supported cooperative work & social computing (pp. 588-602). ACM. 
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commitment between UM and Google.  It became a reserve for leveraging and generating 
collective action.     
Thus, although policy is often conceptualized as a mechanism for channeling and/or 
regulating social practice and technological design choices, this research suggests that policy can 
also function as an important safeguard for the emergence of new, often anticipated innovations 
and transformations in technical and social spheres.  This is particularly important where large-
scale collaborations at the level of institutions and infrastructure are concerned.  It takes time to 
explore and co-construct meanings around a massive new digital resource like the digital corpus 
resulting from the mass digitization project.  This understanding contributes to future decision-
making in emerging sociotechnical environments. 
Conclusion 
This research into the emergence and evolution of HathiTrust facilitates deeper 
understanding of how institutions and organizations shape and are shaped by the interactions 
among copyright, technological change, and emerging social practices.  In addition, the analytic 
framework that expands and extends innovative deviance in combination with sensemaking 
approaches provides meaning and insights into the complex, often murky, processes of 
sociotechnical transformation.       
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